

V 1916  
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# The QUARTERLY REVIEW

#446-447  
Jan-Apr.  
(1916)

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Published Quarterly by the  
**LEONARD SCOTT PUBLICATION COMPANY**

(BARR FENNER, PROP.)

249 WEST THIRTEENTH STREET, NEW YORK.

Single Copies, \$1.25

Yearly Subscription, \$4.00

Entered at New York Post Office as Second Class Matter

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THE  
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

No. 446.—JANUARY, 1916.

Art. 1.—WHY CANADA IS AT WAR.

SOME articles by well-informed writers have appeared in various magazines during the past year on the part Canada is taking in the present war. The purpose of this paper is not to duplicate what has already been written, but rather to deal with a phase of the subject which has received little or no consideration, namely, Why does Canada participate in the war? What is the psychological cause of her sacrificing her money and her men so lavishly in a war which at first sight is only indirectly hers?

British citizens in all parts of the Empire need not be told that Canada took this step of her own free will, in conference with, but under no pressure from, the naval and military authorities in Great Britain. Canada is not part of an imperial military machine, such as we see exemplified in the German system, but a British colony taking her place in the Empire under the triple principle of 'self-government, self-development, and self-defence.' One of the rights of self-government bestowed upon the Canadian people by the Mother-Country is the control of its own military forces. While the command-in-chief is vested in the King, the Dominion Parliament at Ottawa holds the reins of control. If, then, Canadians help to keep the trenches in the battle-fields of Flanders, it is because the Dominion herself voluntarily sends her men thither. And—as the Canadian militia cannot be compelled to serve outside the Dominion—if Canada's sons are giving their lives for Belgium, France, and Britain, it is because they volunteered for that service. Because

we are not bound but free, because we are not blindly driven by the caprices of a military caste, but because as British citizens we enjoy 'British freedom,' which confers upon us the privilege of holding most of our destinies in our own hands—for these reasons, among others, we Canadians respond by saying that this is not only Britain's war but our own.

We cannot, in the second place, point to a bellicose spirit among the Canadian people which needed only an occasion to be kindled into flame. The Canadians have always been a peaceful people, assuming as their highest task the developing of their great natural resources, and setting up as their highest ideal the attainment of nationhood through a policy of peace with the Mother-Country, their neighbour to the south, and the whole world. Canada's part in the American Revolution, in the War of 1812-14, in the Rebellion of 1837-38, in the North-West Rebellions, and in the South African War, was in each instance only a ripple on the surface of her national life compared with what she is attempting in the present struggle; and in no case was it sufficient to put the military stamp on her people. When the war broke out in Aug. 1914, she had a navy of two small discarded British vessels to guard two oceans, and a land force of about 5000 regulars to guard a frontier of 3000 miles. Of compulsory military service for her citizens she knew nothing. Even her militia of some 40,000 men, trained for about a fortnight each summer, was, from a military point of view, a picnic affair, so that Lord Dundonald spoke the bitter truth when he said that Canada was in no position to defend herself even against a small invading force. With no war knocking at her gates for a hundred years, with a neighbour to the south who was also devoted to the arts of peace, with a growing bond of union among all the English-speaking peoples, and finally, with the feeling of security afforded by the protection of the army and navy of Great Britain, Canada developed her farms, mines, forests, and fisheries, with no dread of war and no desire for its glory. Her 'place in the sun' was to be achieved by peace alone.

Nor, in the third place, can we point to any race-hatred or commercial rivalry between Germany and Canada, as even a remote cause of Canada's part in the

war. She was too far removed from Europe to be affected by European suspicions, jealousies, and hatreds, or to be exposed to the periodic nightmares of threatened invasion. On the American continent, on the other hand, she feared no evil. She and her American cousin were living on cordial terms; and, although in the course of a century numerous petty grievances and irritations had arisen, diplomatic relations had never been at the breaking point, and time had wiped out old scores. There was no Alsace-Lorraine to engender a spirit of permanent hatred. In spite of the reciprocity campaign in 1911, there was never, perhaps, a more friendly feeling on both sides of the line than there has been in recent years.

If this is true of Canada and the United States, the two countries between which we should naturally look for jealous rivalry, we Canadians can assure the Germans, so far distant from our borders, that, before the war broke out, we had only good-will toward them. Till then we had nothing but admiration for them as a great people. We knew something about their military machine, but we believed it was for defence only. As to the warnings occasionally sounded in the English press and by English public men, to the effect that Germany nourished evil designs against Great Britain, and that a clash between the two empires was inevitable, we Canadians never really believed them. We regarded these occasional alarms as a delusion, by which we refused to be haunted. We were too busy laying broad foundations for the future development of our rapidly growing country, and too friendly with all the peoples of the world to think seriously of war. As we look back, seeing things in their true perspective, we realise that it was but the blissful repose of false security and blind optimism in which Canada slumbered while the Empire was approaching the greatest crisis of its history. Only the Government leaders, who had received confidential information from the Admiralty, believed in a German peril. The masses were indifferent.

There was no real cause for anything but a friendly spirit toward the German people. Generation after generation of Canadian children have been taught to regard Germany as England's friend. We have thrown our doors wide open to German citizens and extended to

them the same privileges that we gave to our brothers from the British Isles. They enjoyed liberties among us which would not have been granted to Britishers in the Fatherland. And when the breach finally came and we were placed at the parting of the ways, we felt deep reluctance that at this stage of the world's civilisation we should be obliged to draw the sword against an old-time friend. Without the heat of passion, we faced deliberately what we believed to be our duty, the duty of all who honour right above might. We do not hate the German people, but we loathe the faction in Germany that would rule the world with 'blood and iron,' and has persuaded the nation to believe what they say as to the origin of the war. Ever since Canada entered the war she has had a profound conviction that there can be no peace on earth until the militarism which is the tap-root of the present war is crushed.

The week preceding the declaration of war was one of subdued and tense emotion. It gave the Canadian people the necessary breathing-spell in which to take national stock and decide what course Canada would pursue should the worst come. Throughout those days of anxious waiting the country remained stoically calm, no jingoes clamouring for war, no public demonstrations such as preceded the outbreak of hostilities in Italy. The idol of the hour was Sir Edward Grey, who made such strenuous efforts to avert the calamity. And even after Germany had declared war against Russia and France, Canadians persisted in the hope that Great Britain might not be dragged into the struggle.

In the meantime, however, the Government took preparatory steps; and public opinion became united in support of Great Britain in anticipation of war. As Parliament was not in session at the time, the outlining of the Dominion's policy fell to the Premier and his Cabinet in consultation with the Governor-General. On Aug. 2, 1914, the following message was sent to Great Britain:

'If unhappily war should ensue, the Canadian people will be united in a common resolve to put forth every effort and to make every sacrifice necessary to ensure the integrity and maintain the honor of our Empire.'

Although this message was sent by the Premier and his Cabinet in consultation with the leader of the Opposition, without the sanction of Parliament, it voiced Canadian sentiment as truly as if it had been the outcome of a national election. A 'political truce' was declared, a truce which is still maintained. All party differences were forgotten. 'In Canada,' said Sir Wilfrid Laurier when the truce was declared, 'there is but one mind.' All the problems discussed at the conferences on imperial federation and in the debates on imperial defence were laid aside. No demand was made that Canada should be given 'representation,' a voice in declaring war and making peace, before she could participate. By mutual consent of all parties, Canadians felt the only honourable thing to do was to give their hearty support. Thousands of Canadians, however, who are making great sacrifices for this war, are not necessarily committing themselves to support every war in which the Empire may become involved. When the war is over, there will be imperial problems to settle which no Britisher is discussing to-day. When the crisis came Canada forgot that there were any problems. One thing was needful and that at once—men at the front. That was the one problem which the Canadian Government grappled at the time and which has received the undivided attention of Canadians ever since. In the face of an Empire-crisis such as exists to-day any other policy would be madness. When the Empire is in safety, there will be ample time to make the adjustments which may be found necessary. What they will be, Canadians are not now discussing; and whatever may be Canada's attitude toward Empire wars in the future, for the present at least the Canadian standpoint is that which the 'Toronto Globe,' on the day before war was declared, expressed in no uncertain terms: 'When Britain is at war, Canada is at war.'

Those who visited the country during the first twelve months of the war reported their surprise at the calmness of the people, the lack of military display and the absence of obvious military activity. Yet beneath the calm surface there has been since the outset a mighty current of deep patriotic devotion to the Empire, which inspires the people to make greater and still greater sacrifices. When the first army unit of 22,000 was called



for, 100,000 volunteered. From this number the First Contingent of 33,000 was picked. Forty-four days after the declaration of war, they had been recruited, trained, equipped, and were on their way across the Atlantic. A second contingent was prepared, and then a third. In December last, approximately 200,000 men were under arms, equipped and supported by the Canadian Government. At least half of these have been in the firing line, and the rest are on their way. Recruiting is still being vigorously pushed. The total number enlisted up to date and the Government's plans for the future are of course a secret; but, when figures are available, we believe that Canada will have contributed proportionately almost as well as the United Kingdom.

Financially, Canada has nothing to gain and everything to lose by her participation in the war. Had she refused to send a man, her commercial products would have been sought as readily by the Allies as they are to-day. In fact, Canadians feel some annoyance that large war-orders, which could be executed as well in Canada, are being placed in the United States. On the other hand, in addition to a large deficit in revenue, which she meets by a special war tax, the military burden voluntarily assumed by Canada will add to her national debt more than \$120,000,000 (24,000,000*l.*) a year as long as the war lasts (more than \$15 a head per annum). The probability is that it will reach \$150,000,000 a year or more. This may seem a small amount, but in a young country with a small population and the development of its railways, canals, harbours, industries, etc., just beginning, it is a serious matter. The capital required for the development of our Canadian West, for example, will not be forthcoming for years.

Canadians fully realise all this, but they are shouldering the burden without a complaint. They have been sobered by the horrors of the war and by the sacrifice of such large numbers of men. The Princess Patricia regiment was wiped out, its ranks filled and wiped out again. At Langemark, in April last, one-fifth of the First Contingent was lost in their first engagement. On May 15, the Western Ontario regiment went into action with 23 officers and 700 men. It returned with two officers and 250 men. Canada has already lost more

men than England lost in the Crimean War, and the end is not yet in sight. Yet after a year to think about the matter, with losses in money and men out of all proportion to what she had anticipated, there are no regrets that the step was taken. The 'London (Ont.) Advertiser,' in reply to some American papers which thought Canada ought to have remained neutral in order not to violate the Monroe Doctrine, said :

'We are under the impression that Canada's loyalty to the Empire was something so big, so obvious, that our taking part in this conflict would never be questioned. To a Canadian, to remain neutral during an Empire-crisis such as exists to-day would be a monstrous thing.'

Doubt as to the propriety of the step comes from without, not from within.

There is every indication that Canada is to-day in better fighting trim than a year ago, and that it has become a people's war. From one single issue of a recent (Aug.) St Thomas 'Times,' we gather a few straws which indicate the way the wind is blowing :

(1) 'The day has come for every man to ask himself if his business is here or in Flanders.'

(2) A message from 'Ralph Connor' (Rev. C. W. Gordon), a man known through his books in almost every home in Canada and the U.S. 'Men, and even more men! Not the men only who can be spared! Not the men without ties of love to hold their hearts! Not the men whose going is easy! No, no! But the men whose going will imperil business interests and will break hearts. These men, men of sacrifice, whose wives and mothers will wave them away with mist-dimmed eyes, but with hearts that will not refuse to make complete the sacrifice.'

(3) Brantford, Aug. 3.—'Every male member of St Luke's church, capable of bearing arms, is at the present time at the front or in one of the training camps on his way to the front.'

(4) Toronto, Aug. 2.—'Old St Paul's Hall was Sat. night the scene of an important gathering when Church and State jointly consecrated themselves to the life-and-death struggle against savagery. . . . The Archbishop made a patriotic address, urging a prompt response to the call of King and country, and was enthusiastically cheered when he said in conclusion: "I think when Canada will have had

300,000 men at the front, we will send word across the Atlantic—We are coming, still 300,000 more.”

(5) The latest movement is the raising of funds by popular contributions for the purpose of donating machine guns for the troops. One old man contributed the price of a gun, \$750. ‘I am too old to go, but they tell me that one machine gun is worth fifty men; so I went to the savings bank and drew out my savings to buy one.’ In Glencoe, Ont. (a village of 800 people) the citizens were raising the price of a gun. John Stevenson, a young man of twenty-seven, married, three children, could not contribute. He went to the recruiting station and enlisted and is now in training, hoping that he will be able to man the gun from his own home town.

These passages are culled from one issue of a paper in a small Canadian city and could be duplicated in almost every other paper in the Dominion. They indicate something of the spirit which prevails in Canada to-day, a spirit which is not, as outsiders may be tempted to think, an outgrowth of the present war, but a spirit which has been latent in Canada for years and required only the emergency to call it forth.

In order to understand the Canadian attitude of mind, which induces them to pour out their resources on foreign soil for the first time in their history, and to do it at a truly great sacrifice, we must know something about the transformation of Canadian national life in recent years. The past few decades had been the most prosperous in all Canadian history. At one stroke Canada gained faith in herself and became conscious of the marvellous possibilities of her future, when she would have become the granary of the Empire and taken her place beside the United States as one of the great nations of the world. She had passed from a local to an imperial consciousness; and, with her eyes on the future, she developed her natural resources, encouraged immigration, and promoted manufactures and trade. She built not navies, forts, and armies, but transcontinental railways, grain-elevators, factories, and working-men’s houses, with the conviction that in the greater Empire that is to be these would play a vital part. She talked of imperial federation, encouraged preferential tariffs within the Empire, rejected reciprocity with the United States,

rejected also temporarily the Borden Government's plans for active participation in imperial defence. Whatever we may think of the solution she gave to these various problems, we must recognise that Canada was for the first time grappling seriously with imperial and world-wide interests. We have in them an indication of a new mental attitude on the part of the Canadian people, whose interests, once limited to purely local affairs, were now extended to the wider concerns of the Empire as a whole and of their own place in the world's future. Only the Canadian-born, or those well acquainted with the new national spirit through years of residence in Canada, can really understand the enthusiasm of the Canadian people as they turned their backs on the days of their apprenticeship and faced a future so full of the promise of national greatness.

Canada had at length become conscious of herself. Her internal prosperity and expansion had given her faith in her destiny. Her part in imperial affairs had broadened her horizon and set before her the ideal of a place to be filled in the British Empire, in which also she had unbounded faith. The first opportunity given for the expression of her new life and interest was the South African War. In the following years the various imperial conferences bound all parts of the Empire more closely together. The reciprocity campaign in 1911 drew the cords which bind her to the Mother-Land still tighter. And, in spite of its defeat in 1913, the Navy Bill was the most significant step, from an imperial standpoint, which Canada had taken in her history. It is only fair to Canada to say that the defeat of the bill gave to the world a false impression of the true Canadian position. All parties, even the Liberals who opposed the bill, were unanimous in the conviction that Canada ought now, and to an increasing extent in the future, to bear her full share of the burden of imperial defence. The battle was fought over the means, not the end in view; and, before an agreement could be reached, the present war was upon us.

When it came, Canada had a wider vision, higher ideals, a more vital national life, and a closer contact with the rest of the Empire than ever before. She was now in a position to feel at home in a world-enterprise.

She could sympathise with Belgium, whose rights were so ruthlessly downtrodden, and feel no incongruity in sending her sons to die upholding them. Above all she was touched by the spectacle of Britain nobly struggling for peace, only at last to be dragged into a war that is not hers, with everything to lose and nothing to gain. Fifty or even twenty-five years ago Canada would have taken a passive interest and pursued her peaceful way. To-day she throws her soul into the conflict, because she is a different nation.

But we must go deeper than the new national, imperial, and world-consciousness to find what is after all the mainspring of Canada's action. Indignation at the bleeding of Belgium, an insistence that the treaties of nations shall be scrupulously regarded, sympathy with the British struggle for democracy, a determination that might must not rule, the romantic desire for participation in world-enterprises—while all of these are determining factors, none of these alone, nor even all of them combined, is sufficient to account for Canada's sacrifice. The United States on the whole feels these emotions just as keenly as Canada does, yet she remains neutral. There is a more fundamental cause which ought to be the most obvious, yet is the most apt to be overlooked, namely—a devotion to British interests which results from Canada's long unbroken connexion with the Mother-Country.

Canadians have felt for years that they depend for their national existence on Great Britain. For generations, whether right or wrong, there has been a widespread feeling in Canada that the various provinces would long ago have been absorbed as states in the American federation, were it not for their attachment to Great Britain. The feeling doubtless originated in the attack upon Canada during the American Revolution and in the attempted annexation in 1812-14, and has been fostered by the settlement of the various boundary disputes, in each of which Canada felt the United States took the lion's share. So late as 1903, intense resentment was felt throughout Canada on the occasion of the settlement of the Alaskan boundary dispute, the sting of which has, however, been largely forgotten in view of the long-standing friendship between the two peoples. This feeling of her own weakness, and the real or supposed



danger of being overshadowed and finally absorbed by her great neighbour, drove Canada all the more closely to Great Britain. S. E. Moffett concludes his book, 'The Americanization of Canada,' with the words: 'The English-speaking Canadians protest that they will never become Americans—they are already Americans without knowing it.' While this may be true of such external things as dress and customs in general, it must not be applied to Canadian patriotism. In national sentiment Canadians are British to the core, and view with alarm anything which seems to encroach upon the ties which bind them to Great Britain.

This became apparent on two important occasions. In the discussions about Confederation the proposed union of the provinces was presented as the only alternative to union with the States. The words of G. E. Cartier are typical: 'The matter resolves itself into this; either we must obtain British North American Confederation or be absorbed in an American Confederation.'\* The Canadian people chose the former. Fifty years later, they thought the same issue was presented again, only in a different garb—the reciprocity compact with the United States. Here again they showed a decided preference for Britain. The national election of 1911 was fought out on this one issue; and a more heated election perhaps never took place in Canada. There can be no doubt that what tipped the scale so decidedly against reciprocity was the fact that Canadian national pride was touched, and they feared a severance of their British relations. Among various utterances by the American press and American public men, the most fatal was that of Speaker Champ Clark:

'I am in favor of the reciprocity treaty because I hope to see the day when the American flag will float over every square foot of the British North American possessions clear to the North Pole.'

Canadians will readily grant that many worse things might befall them, but the fact remains that this is decidedly what they do not want. Their historical connexions, their sympathies, their ideals are British, not

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\* 'Parliamentary Debates on Confederation,' p. 55.

American. The result was that a storm was raised on the Canadian side of the border. Among several reasons against reciprocity issued by the Canadian National League\* is Article 8: 'Because the agreement, as proposed, would weaken the ties which bind Canada to the Empire. . . .' At a non-party mass-meeting held in Massey Hall, Toronto, March 9, 1911, presided over by Sir William Mortimer Clark, the chairman said: 'We are at the parting of the ways. We must either choose the way to Washington or the way to the great Empire beyond the sea.' The opinion of the majority of Canadians was briefly expressed in these sentences. In the election, life-long party affiliations were broken; and many men, setting their patriotism above their financial interests, cast their vote, as they believed, for the Empire. The net result was a political landslide in which the Liberal party, which advocated reciprocity, was defeated by an overwhelming majority. Thousands of Liberals helped to block 'the road to Washington.'

Let the people of Great Britain have no misgivings; our centre of gravity lies within the Empire. However strong the feeling of friendship with any other nation may become, that deeper *love* which grips the heart is reserved for only one—our Mother. For this, other nations must not blame us, for Great Britain has been immeasurably more to us than all others combined. On the other hand, the message of the reciprocity campaign is not that Canadians had any ill-will toward the United States. But it did show conclusively, that, if in time of peace the Canadian people could become so alarmed over a commercial treaty with a kindred people with whom they enjoyed an unbroken friendship of a hundred years, simply because in the dim future it might sever their British relations, then henceforth the imperial tie was so strong that any danger threatening the Empire would call the Dominion to the support of Britain. The reciprocity campaign of 1911 was a forerunner of Canada's action in 1914.

The direct result, therefore, of the close attachment to Great Britain, ever since the days of Wolfe's victory at Quebec, and of Canada's dependence on the

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\* Reciprocity Pamphlets, 1911.

Mother-Country for protection during the formative period of her national life, has been to produce in Canada a British loyalty which can scarcely be excelled in the United Kingdom itself. A recent statement by one not himself a Canadian is significant :

‘Every one who has known Canada must have been struck with the fact that Canadians are almost more British than the British themselves. The Canadian love for the British Empire has for years burned like a slow fire, making little heat and smoke to be sure, but only awaiting the draft of war to cause it to blaze into a fusing flame.’ \*

There are in Canada, of course, different groups with varying patriotic sentiments. There is a small Annexation group, whose voice is no longer heeded, and which is destined to an early death. Those who emphasise the weakness of the bond between Great Britain and Canada make capital out of the utterances of this group, which in reality does not express Canadian opinion at all. There is also a growing Nationalist group, especially strong among the French-Canadians. The watchword of this group is the development of Canada along Canadian lines. What needs emphasising in this connexion is that one may be a Nationalist and yet be intensely loyal to Great Britain and the Empire. There is, thirdly, a considerable body of new-comers not yet fully Canadianised ; but we have faith that they will make good loyal Canadian citizens, as millions of immigrants have been Americanised across the border. Finally, there is the main body of the population, which is British-Canadian through and through. Contrary to a wide-spread opinion that this group is composed almost exclusively of English-speaking Canadians, it is a fact that it contains a large number of French-Canadians. Too many writers forget that they too can appreciate and respond to the privileges granted them under British rule. The words of the Hon. Rodolphe Lemieux, himself a French-Canadian, ought to refute all insinuations that they are not loyal Britishers :

‘You ask me why I am a British subject and why I wish to remain one. I reply that I honor the flag that honors

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\* Julian Street in ‘Collier’s Magazine,’ Jan. 16, 1915.

its obligations; that I prize most those institutions that secure me most strongly in my rights and liberties; that I am proud to be a sharer in the great work of advancing peace and progress throughout the world, for which the British Empire stands. Gratitude for what has been done for them [i.e. for the French-Canadians] in the past, contentment in the liberties which they to-day enjoy, pride in the future greatness of England and her Dominions scattered throughout the whole of the globe—this, and much more, warms the hearts of French-Canadians to the Motherland and makes of them loyal subjects, second to none under the British crown.\*

On the whole, therefore, there is in Canada to-day, and has been for years, a filial love for the Mother-Country, an admiration of all things British, a glory in the Empire, and a devoted loyalty, all of which are being embodied in Canada's present contributions to the war. This devotion to the British cause may not always be apparent on the surface. Only those who know the inner Canadian spirit can truly appreciate it. To the German it is almost incomprehensible. The American, or the Englishman even, who merely tours Canada for a year, can have little conception of it. We Canadians are often misjudged by both Americans and Englishmen, for the simple reason that the visitor may see only externals and base his judgments upon them, while he fails to study the more essential thing—the spirit which lies more deeply hidden.† Canadians, however, are willing to be misunderstood occasionally, so long as they themselves are sure of their own inner spirit; and this spirit, which they will persistently maintain, in spite of statements to the contrary from the outside, is one of consecrated devotion to the British cause.

Great Britain has handed over to us full control of our own internal affairs, even the disposition of our military forces—a thing Germany certainly would not have done. She has allowed us to develop our own institutions according to our natural inclinations, without forcing upon us the English stamp. To the German

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\* 'Canadian Annual Review for 1912,' p. 44.

† A conspicuous example is J. F. Fraser, 'Canada as it is.' A more appropriate title would be, 'Canada as it is *not*.'

charges that Britain is avaricious and guided by sordid mercenary motives, all we Canadians can answer is that we know nothing about it. Our country has vast stores of great undeveloped natural resources awaiting captains of industry to turn them into money, yet our rich farms, mines, forests and fisheries have never been exploited by the English. Our preferential tariffs have been made by ourselves without English solicitation. During all these years, while we have gone our own way politically and commercially, the British navy protected our commerce to the ends of the earth, and for that protection we paid not one dollar.

After a century and a half of British rule, after our bitter experience with English avarice in trade and land-grabbing in general, we silently point to the Canadian graves in Flanders. Surely we are not hypnotised fools! No, but as an expression of our appreciation of the goodness of a Mother who has erred, if at all, on the side of leniency, and at the same time as a guarantee of the future continuance of the liberty and happiness which we have enjoyed under British democracy, greater we believe than we could have enjoyed as an independent nation or under another foreign power—for these reasons Canadians are going to the front and they will continue to go. They go not because Great Britain says they must, nor because they have any special hatred for the Germans, nor because the adventures of war have carried them off their feet. They go because it is the only honourable course to take in view of their present happy position in the Empire. But above all, they go because their filial love is so strong that they would regard it as a monstrous neglect of duty to stand aside and complacently look on while the Mother-Country fights for her life. They go for ideal and sentiment combined, both of which are grounded in their British loyalty. In the last analysis they go because Britain is at war, and because their interests are one with those of the Empire.

A CANADIAN.



## Art. 2.—OUR AGRICULTURAL RIVALS.

1. *Rural Denmark and its Lessons*. By Sir H. Rider Haggard. London : Longmans, 1913.
2. *Report of the British Consul in Copenhagen for 1912*.
3. *A Free Farmer in a Free State*. By 'Home Counties.' London : Heinemann, 1912.
4. *Agrarverfassung und Landwirtschaft in den Niederländen*. By Dr J. Frost. Berlin : Carey, 1906.
5. *Land and Labour : Lessons from Belgium*. By H. Seeböhm Rowntree. Macmillan, 1911.

THE writer who narrates the agricultural history of the last half-century will chronicle few things more remarkable than the descent which has been made on Denmark by seekers after rural truth. Singly or in deputations, students of farming and of rural civilisation from Great Britain and Ireland, from all parts of the Continent, from the Colonies, the United States, South Africa, and Japan, may be met with any summer, laboriously examining the institutions, and collecting the ideas of a little country half the size of Scotland. In almost every recent English book on rural life and industry one may turn to the index with the certainty of finding a reference to Denmark; while in speeches and newspaper articles, since the development of the land controversy, allusions to Denmark have been constant. It is the same, if in a minor degree, with Holland and Belgium, so far as students of agricultural therapeutics from the United Kingdom are concerned.

Unfortunately, although the investigations have been numerous, they have often been untrustworthy. Few of the visitors have allowed themselves enough time; not many have had the gift of gathering information in a foreign country. Certainly, there is hardly a publication about rural Denmark which is altogether free from slips; in many cases, indeed, it is charitable to call them slips. Some visitors to Denmark have not gone thither with an open mind; they have carried with them a political axe to grind. Another drawback from which investigations in Denmark and Holland have suffered is seldom considered. Danish and Dutch rural industry being concentrated on the export trade, those who direct

it need to be reasonably well acquainted with English. It is to the care of these leading men that the visitor generally finds himself committed. But, ready of speech though these courteous guides prove invariably to be, the extent to which they are accustomed to the simplicities of English visitors and to reeling off well-worn *clichés* for their benefit makes it possible for their guests to return home with generalisations more picturesque than accurate. It is the man or woman who has had little or no direct intercourse with foreigners who, often, by some chance phrase or experience, gives an enquirer the precious view into the real state of things—precious, that is, if the foreigner has insight, perspective, and knowledge enough to appraise it. The life and soul of another country, even of a country 'whose talk is of bullocks,' are not laid bare to a foreigner in a week or two of easy sight-seeing, in which he puts forth little or no intellectual exertion.

It need hardly be said that the more or less pressing proposals which have been made, in not a few instances, to apply Danish methods to English conditions have been by no means according to knowledge either of Danish or of English agricultural practice. Those who have lightly proposed the Danification or Hollandising of England have certainly omitted to tell us what form the development of our country at the hands of the Danish or Dutch agricultural invaders would be likely to take when they found themselves in the possession of coal and iron. Danish agriculture and Dutch agriculture are what they are largely because Denmark is wholly without minerals and Holland is practically so.

While we are a naturally rich, primarily manufacturing country, Denmark is a naturally poor, primarily agricultural country. While our agriculture is wholly devoted to providing food for the people and the cattle of Great Britain, and succeeds in providing only a proportion of the supplies needed, Denmark is farming not only to feed herself, but with a view to sending enough produce abroad to obtain from her foreign customers the wherewithal to buy all the necessities of modern life beyond bread, meat, milk, and cheese. The English, Scots, and Irish farmer's eyes are ordinarily on the corn and hay and straw merchants and the cattle dealers in

the next market town. The Danish farmer's eyes are on the needs of the British breakfast table.

There are, nevertheless, several reasons why it is profitable to enquire into the causes underlying the success of agriculture just across the North Sea. One of them is that British agriculture and Danish and Dutch agriculture are at least comparable in this that they are carried on by men of the same stock, living under the same conditions of administrative and political liberty, and with all the advantages or disadvantages—according to the reader's view—of Free Trade. The main agricultural products except cheese are admitted to Denmark duty free.\* In Holland a determined attempt to pass a Tariff Bill has lately been defeated; and since 1877 all the prime necessities of life, including grain and flour and most raw materials for agricultural and industrial purposes, have been admitted free.† Import duties in Belgium did not average more than  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on the value of the supplies brought from abroad.

But the chief reason why those who are attempting to promote rural progress in Great Britain may usefully look about them in Denmark and Holland particularly, and examine some ideas in the light of Danish and Dutch experience, is that the Danes and the Dutch, because of the lack of minerals in their countries, have been able to devote to the consideration of land problems an amount of attention, on the part of men of science, educationists, social reformers and business men, which in Great Britain must be shared with other questions. Possibly, when we realise what a magnificent dividend has been returned by the attention given by Denmark

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\* There is a duty on preserved meats and preserved foods, on fruit, hops and sugar.

† 'The Dutch are as near a "free breakfast table" as we are. The only things to eat or drink on which duty is payable are honey, confectionery, dried fruit, nuts and spices, meats, tea and intoxicants. Jam, marmalade, syrup, treacle, sugar, dried and preserved fruit, chutney and condensed milk, tea and intoxicants, are mulcted by our Customs. With regard to the Dutch duty on fresh, dried and salted meats, seeing that mutton and pork come in free and the whole Customs income from fresh, salted and dried kinds together is only 1600*l.*—the import is 384 tons against an export of 35,400 tons—it is no great matter. On the other hand, coffee and cocoa, on which we levy duty, are admitted free, and manufactured tobacco comes in at the nominal rate of 10*s.* per cwt. Our Customs receives 14,000,000*l.* a year from these articles.'—'A Free Farmer in a Free State' (p. 275).

and Holland to their agriculture, we may increasingly feel that in our own country, where agriculture not only employs a larger proportion of the population than any other pursuit but furnishes that reservoir of physical strength and vigour by which the physical, mental and moral stamina of the towns is so largely sustained, clear thinking about rural life and industry, and resolute and wise action in its interests, may be of immeasurable value to the nation.

There are now half-a-dozen Danish farmers working land in England. What is it that one learns from these men, from one's Danish friends, and from travelling about Denmark? Three lessons of the simplest possible kind, so simple that they can never be repeated too often. The first is the lesson of adaptability, of enterprise, of willingness to march with the times. The second is the lesson of education and character. The third is the lesson of mutual aid. These are lessons for every country, irrespective of economic and climatic conditions.

Because the creameries and wholesale cheese-making of the Danes and Dutch pay handsomely, it is not necessarily good business for our farmers to give up catering for the almost unlimited demand for household milk at a rising price. The fact that the prosperity which has come to the Danes has been aided by co-operative bacon factories, while the equally successful Dutch have left co-operative pig-killing alone, may not be a conclusive reason for pressing upon our farmers prospectuses for co-operative bacon production in every county town. That the Danes and the Dutch see their way to big crops of sugar beet is not of itself a reason for insisting on all our farmers at once giving large areas to that crop.\* Because a Danish or Dutch farmer is a member of half-a-dozen or a dozen co-operative societies, that is not to say that at this moment it is co-operation of which our three-hundred-acre farmers are most of all in need. Because a 'Christian Goat-Breeding Society' and a 'Catholic Egg-Collecting Society'

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\* This is not to say, however, that the case for sugar beet for certain agricultural areas in England is not made out. In the opinion of the present writer it is made out.

play parts of some economic and neighbourly importance in Brabant, there is no reason to believe that goats would fill the pockets of the plum-growers of Pershore, that egg-collecting would pay at Epping, or that we should organise our agricultural life on a denominational basis.

But can we ever hear enough about the fruits of adaptability, of enterprise and of willingness to march with the times, particularly when the lesson is the invigorating message of a small, hard-pressed nation to a big and more happily situated one? Upon the disasters of 1864\* there followed closely the agricultural depression of the seventies and eighties, caused by the arrival in Europe of cheap corn from overseas. But while the extraordinary sight was to be seen of one of the counties into which the greatest city in the world has sprawled becoming steadily 'derelict,' little Denmark was resolutely turning from corn-growing for sale to corn-growing for an increasing farm stock and to the production of fodder crops for that farm stock's further use. A rural gospel—from Scotland—of 'muck, muck, still more muck' was preached incessantly; cow-houses were added to cow-houses; and steadily growing piggeries, containing animals of English strain, did their share towards the better fertilising of the land. To-day there are twice as many cattle in Denmark as there were before 1864, and about five times as many pigs. The acreage under roots, not including potatoes, has increased a hundredfold. When butter was found to be in greater demand than beef, Denmark reduced the number of its bullocks and increased its dairy herds. The average annual harvest of corn and fodder, which was worth 16 millions for the five years 1875-9, reached close on 34 millions in 1903-12. Before 1864 the acreage devoted to grass and fallow was half of the cultivated area; it is now only a third. But the cultivated area itself has been largely increased. The extension of the cultivated area from six to eight million acres is largely due to the attack on the 3000 square miles of heath in Jutland. It is not surprising, then, to find that the rural population of Denmark is increasing; and that Danish farmers, besides supplying their home

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\* During the invasion of Denmark by Prussia and Austria.



market, send abroad, on the average, produce valued at more than 1*l*. per week per head.

The bringing of poor land under cultivation necessarily keeps down the crop averages of the country; but, in spite of this, the yield of wheat per acre, which in 1878-82 was 30 bushels, is now 42; barley, which stood at 28 bushels, is now 36½; oats, which amounted to 32 bushels, are now over 41. And the same with the live-stock. The annual yield of butter per cow, which was 80 lbs. in 1864, and 116 lbs. in 1887, was, in 1908, as high as 220 lbs. (The average annual milk yield per cow is now 5664 lbs.) The value of the bacon and pigs produced is four times the figure attained in 1881-5. Against the 1,500,000*l*. worth of butter made in 1881-5, there is to be set the 10,300,000*l*. worth produced in 1908-12. And only half a century ago a British Consul reported Danish butter to be 'execrably bad'! The Danes, wrote Mary Wollstonecraft a little earlier, 'seem averse to innovation.'

Further figures illustrating as remarkably as those cited the reality of Danish agricultural progress might easily be added. Reference has been made to the tremendous application of farmyard manure to the land of Denmark; it is significant that 20,000 farmers are reported to be in possession of covered dung sheds, while 90,000 have watertight liquid manure tanks. The import of nitrate, which was 5000 tons in 1890, was 360,000 tons in 1912. The import of potash rose from 10,000 tons to 260,000, and that of other fertilisers from 300,000 tons to 1,190,000. Then there is the indirect fertilising of the land by means of feeding stuffs. The value of the import was, in 1911, 3,700,000*l*.; grain is imported to the value of 4,300,000*l*.

How has all this advance been brought about? There is no doubt whatever. Denmark is what it is to-day simply because the rural population has been in a position to do its best. The rural advance which has taken place in England, Scotland and Ireland during the last few years is remarkable, more remarkable than is imagined by those who do not possess a wide experience of our rural districts or have not kept themselves informed as to the facts by means of such books as Mr Hall's 'Pilgrimage of British Farming.' That the advance has not been greater is due to the fact that our

rural population has not been in a position to do its best. Happily this is a matter as to which there is no longer any controversy. The truth is established by the statements of the informed writers and speakers of all parties, as is shown in ten recently published pages of extracts in parallel columns from Unionist, Liberal and Socialist authorities.\*

The devotion of our rural population to the land can be strengthened in three ways only. It can be strengthened, in the first place, by the rural population of every grade obtaining a greater hold on the land than it now feels that it possesses. It can be strengthened, in the second place, by an increasing realisation, brought about by the right kind of education, general and technical, of the abiding interest in, and the far-reaching possibilities of, agriculture and rural life. It can be strengthened, in the third place, by the development of a greater neighbourliness, leading to mutual aid, economically and socially.

In making progress in these three directions we are continually stimulated by the agricultural history of Denmark. 'A bold peasantry, its country's pride' has been amazingly preserved. 'Bold' indeed! Here is no bovine and forlorn peasantry. Nearly one half of the population of Denmark consists of peasants, but well-clothed peasants with money in the bank, and usually the possessors of a nice vehicle and the freehold of their holdings. Three quarters of the outstanding people in the kingdom are of peasant birth. Of the last Cabinet of nine members, four were peasants.

From the 14th century we have Danish legislation forbidding the sale of peasant land; from the 16th, laws enacting that land let to peasants must be leased for a lifetime, though the lessee may give notice to quit. Since the 17th century it has been provided that the land must be let not only for the lifetime of the peasant farmer but for that of his widow. In the same century it was enacted that peasant land should not be enclosed in estates. In the 18th it was made law that, though a man may own several peasant farms, they must each, even if adjoining one another, be farmed independently,

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\* 'In the Mouth of Three Witnesses.' 'Nineteenth Century,' April, 1914.

and have a farmer's household upon every one. A peasant farm cannot be done away with even if it is to be cut into allotments. Peasant land may be sold, but enough must be retained to support a farmer—that is, say, 30 acres. The Marquis of Lincolnshire was forestalled by a century and a half by a Danish King who gave the peasant occupiers of Crown land an opportunity of buying it. Many landowners followed the royal example. When Robert Burns, in straits for money, was thinking of emigrating, he might have obtained, had he been a Danish peasant, an irrevocable loan at 2 per cent. in order to buy his farm. About the time when Peter Plymley was prophesying that 'if French troops land in Ireland the whole population will rise against you to a man,' a quarter of the peasants of Denmark had bought their farms. To-day most of the peasants are freeholders. Seven-ninths of the land are covered by about 72,000 peasant farms, which average about 90 acres only, but are middle-sized for Denmark. One-ninth is occupied by allotments and by about 120,000 crofters with an average of 6 acres each. The remaining ninth is made up of large estates. Some 900 of these average about 1000 acres;\* for, though the large proportion of the middle-sized freehold peasant is the characteristic feature of Danish land tenure, the large landowner is not extinct. And here a tribute may be paid to the patriotic work which, from the middle of the last century, was done by the owners of estates and by large farmers as the leaders of agricultural progress. The example of the landowners in introducing dairy farming had a great deal to do with getting the peasants to believe in the potentialities of butter-making.

As the farmer has very much the same outlook and disposition all over the world, why was it that the Danish peasants proved so responsive to the preachers of progress? Undoubtedly, because their education was rather that of the Scots than that of their Southern and

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\* The state of things may be set out thus: freehold and hereditary holdings cover 87·5 per cent. of the whole agricultural area; holdings (*fæste*) under the system that the land is held for the life of the tenant (*fæste-bonde*) and of his widow after him, 2·7 per cent.; tenancy or lease, 7·3 per cent.; State or local officials, 2·5 per cent. In number of holdings there are freehold, 84·8 per cent.; *fæste*, 4·2; tenancy, 8·3; official, 2·7.

Mid-England fellows. Compulsory education was in force in Denmark before Waterloo; five years after Waterloo the Danish Royal Agricultural Society began to offer to peasants' sons, as it still does, three years' practical training on well-managed farms; a quarter of a century later the first of the farmers' rural high schools was opened. As to the development of agricultural teaching in colleges and schools, and in the fields and cow-houses of peasants, it is enough to say that every agricultural country has profited by the experience gained by the elaborate organisation set up in Denmark.

With regard to general education, much may be read in the recently published report of the Canadian Commission. The Danes, said Björnson, are 'the most enlightened peasantry in the world.' As a well-known educationist put it, 'You will perhaps nowhere find people in general better educated than in Denmark.' As in Holland, it has been realised that among an imperfectly educated people it is impossible to expect to find an avidity for agricultural education. The Dutch have a word *weetgierig* ('desirous of knowledge'), and the Danes have *weetgierigheid* ('desire of knowledge') pre-eminently. The Danish countryside reads and thinks. The visitor is not chilled and depressed, as on entering the home of many an English farmer in a fair way of business, by the sight of a library consisting of little more than an out-of-date 'Stephens,' a tattered volume of veterinary practice, some rubbishy dog-eared magazines, and a few school reward books. The number of papers taken in by the Danish agriculturist of all classes, and his pride in his bookshelf, are as marvellous as his passion for lectures. Of that characteristically Danish product, the rural high school, it is regrettable that so little should still be generally known in this country. These thirty-eight universities of popular culture—at many of which the possession of text-books by the students is discountenanced, lest they should try to cram their heads instead of devoting themselves to the widening of their minds, and at which, so far as the major part of the curriculum is concerned, little is taught that can be of direct financial advantage to the student—are places to which some of our rural reformers might well go to school. There is taught there the power of history,

poetry and science, and of a higher level of life and thought to glorify ordinary work-a-day existence. This and the power of hard physical exercise to develop a sane mind in a disciplined body are brought home to peasants' sons and daughters, in association on equal terms, at the most impressionable period of their lives.

But it is ill preaching the higher life to a man who may feel that he and his are less well nourished than they might be, whose home may be such as to minister to no sense of personal dignity, whose outlook may afford him small promise of that self-respect and measure of independence, when his physical powers shall fail him, which is the right of every hardworking life. There must be a material basis for rural enlightenment. The Danes are certainly in no doubt about that. In the first place they put the land in the hands of those who can and will do their duty by it. Then comes education. After that, mutual aid and all rural progress.

Let us turn back to the Danish peasant, a man in adequate control of his land and reasonably well educated. He had turned his attention to dairy-farming, following the example of the larger land-holders, and he often made very good butter. When at the International Dairy Show in London in 1879, a Danish estate gained the first prize for salt butter from all countries, it was a Danish peasant, as Mr Harald Faber, the admirable Danish Agricultural Commissioner in London, is fond of reminding us, who took second prize. But the peasant farm which had won the second prize for a product of practically equal value with that which had gained the first prize could not obtain the same price as the 'gentleman farm.' The reason was that the estate had 120 cows and the peasant farm had only half-a-dozen. The estate could therefore maintain not only an average quality but offer a considerable weight of butter. Before long the peasants of one Danish parish had decided to bring the milk of their 400 cows to one place and make their butter together, so placing their product on a level with estate butter. Within six years as many as 300 other co-operative dairies were built. Now there are nearly 1200, and the big estates are glad to join them. Butter-making, as the tall chimney shafts of the perfectly equipped, white-walled creameries which dot the Danish

landscape suggest, is now a highly developed industry. In a year co-operative creameries make about 2,500,000 tons of milk into about 94,000 tons of butter, worth 10,700,000*l*. The milk of 83 per cent. of the cows in the country is delivered to co-operative creameries. There are 1177 co-operative creameries to 328 joint stock ones. Danish butter is a standard product that may only be exported under a Government brand which guarantees that it is made from pasteurised cream, containing less than 16 per cent. of water and no preservative other than salt. It is not only the law but pride in a national product of great excellence which has made the fortune of Danish butter. 'It is not a gentlemanlike thing,' said a peasant to the present writer, 'to cheat over butter or to water-pump milk.' 'A Dane,' said another speaker, 'may possibly fail in morals over a horse deal, or he may even murder his mother-in-law, but he may not adulterate butter'!

The development in bacon-making is as noteworthy as the progress with butter. Down to 1887 the farmers sent their pigs to Germany or to private bacon factories in their own country. But swine-fever broke out, and Germany closed her frontiers. The private bacon factories in Denmark thought to profit by offering very low prices for the non-affected pigs. The farmers replied with a co-operative bacon factory, started five years after the first co-operative creamery. There are now double as many co-operative bacon factories as joint stock ones; and co-operators kill four times as many pigs as private traders, or about 40,000 weekly. Only bacon which bears the Government brand in red, signifying complete freedom from tuberculosis, may be exported. Some 90 per cent. of Danish butter, bacon and eggs comes to the United Kingdom. This is Mrs Bull's little bill for a recent year:

To Butter	.	.	.	.	.	.	£10,500,137
„ Bacon	.	.	.	.	.	.	6,690,957
„ Eggs	.	.	.	.	.	.	2,030,607
							<hr/>
							£19,230,701

The system on which the creameries and the factories and all sorts of other co-operative enterprises for providing seeds, artificials, implements, groceries and so on



are started is the same. A loan is obtained on the joint and several security of the shareholders; annual income provides working expenses and the repayment of the loan; the balance of profit is divided between the shareholders in proportion to the pigs, milk or eggs they have supplied or the goods they have bought; and the shareholders may not supply any other buyer than their society. They may be bound to their society for ten years, at the end of which time the liabilities are often practically paid off. So far as the adoption of the joint and several guarantee and the undertaking to send all the product to the co-operative society are concerned, some of our co-operative organisations in England—whence, by the way, the Danes originally had their co-operation—have still to rise to the Danish level. And the thoroughness of Danish co-operation is seen in the number of societies a Dane will join, for every branch of agricultural activity has its corresponding society.

An obvious result of membership of these societies is that it is unnecessary for the Danish farmer to spend time on 'going to market.' His buying and selling are done for him as a separate branch of rural industry, as separate as his butter and bacon manufacture. He is able to concentrate on the farmer's proper task, the cultivation of the land and the management of stock, work for which a good farmer may have much more aptitude than for 'dealing.' In the case of our own agriculture, it is a fault that the system of going to market once or twice a week tends to bring to the top in a district the clever dealer among the local farmers, rather than the ablest cultivator and cattle manager, or socially worthiest. No doubt home-staying farmers have ever homely wits; and, from this point of view, as Mr Edward Strutt once impressed on the writer, there is some justification in market-day. But the Danish farmer is more than compensated by the business training and the training in character he receives in the management of his many co-operative organisations. There is also the rich life of all the agencies for intellectual self-improvement which have their centre in his village halls and in the people's high schools, the teaching of which has been well summed up as: 'Honour physical labour; know your trade well and put your brains into it; never

neglect your intellectual development.' The device of the school for small holders is an owl sitting on a spade.

Attention is frequently directed to the indebtedness of the Danish farmer. Mention should certainly be made of the credit associations which are so largely financing him and to the extent to which he avails himself of their assistance. There are co-operative land credit associations granting loans on first mortgage, and the mortgage loan societies granting cheap loans on second mortgage. In 1913, the amount of loans granted on first mortgage was 95,000,000*l.*, or 12,500,000*l.* more than in 1910. The second mortgage associations' loans amounted to 1,100,000*l.* As many of the first mortgage organisations do not make a distinction in their reports between rural and urban loans, exact information does not seem to be available as to the amount of the rural land debt, but it is estimated at half. The second mortgage associations' loans are on rural properties only. In the case of the first-named associations the interest has been of late years rather above 4 per cent., while in the case of the second class of associations it has been from  $\frac{1}{2}$  to 1 per cent. higher. Loans are granted up to 60 per cent. of the value of the property. In the case of farms which were voluntarily sold between the years 1905-9, it was found that the loan averaged 50 per cent. On crofters' holdings it was about 34 per cent. The advances should rather be called loans than mortgages, for, so long as the interest is paid, they cannot be called in. Short or working loans to farmers are granted by about 170 short loan associations, which were started with a Government advance of 270,000*l.*, on which  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. interest is paid. The associations may not charge more than 5 per cent., nor may a loan exceed 166*l.* or be for longer than nine months.

As to the extent to which the man on the land may have burdened himself with loans, in order to meet expenditure not wholly or at any rate not directly reproductive, there are differences of opinion in Denmark among people who are entitled to speak with some authority. It is not, therefore, for foreigners to form conclusions too readily. That the standard of living on the farms has risen very much is patent to any one who has had the advantage of paying casual visits to the

hospitable homesteads which dot the Danish landscape. But those who are coming to believe that the farmer all the world over is in need of learning not only to save but to spend will hesitate to judge too summarily the healthy, well-lighted rooms of the new houses, with their shiny furniture, their musical instruments, pictures and assemblages of books and papers. They will realise that the stimulus derived from self-respecting surroundings is an asset of no small value for rural civilisation.

No doubt, even in a thrifty country there will always be the thriftless. Not everyone who is able to come by the possession of land is the best sort of farmer or small holder. It can never be difficult to point to cases in which farmers have been injudicious in their expenditure or in which small holders have forgotten that the margin of profit on small plots must needs be small. But in debates on the actual cost of butter, as on the real indebtedness of the men of the land, the foreigner must be exceedingly cautious. He needs to possess fuller information than he can well hope to acquire. And, after all, he is not directly concerned in the domestic rural politics of another country. It is the question of how rural Denmark stands in relation to the rest of the world that is of most importance to him. It is the broad lessons of the policy she has adopted towards country life and industry that are of the greatest value. Every country has to work out its rural salvation according to its own conditions; and it will be enough for neighbours if, after taking account of the general results, they are able to approach with fresh confidence and quickened faith the solution of their own problems.

It is unnecessary, however, to go so far from our own shores as Denmark in order to be stimulated in the work of rural amelioration. Within the distance covered by a twenty-shilling second-class return fare from the Thames, is another country, the agricultural population of which is increasing. Since the accession of Queen Victoria, Holland, by means of the pump and the spade, has redeemed from her sea-shore, her meres and the morasses of her high moor an amazingly large acreage of land. Although only a third of the Netherlands would be flooded if the sea and river dikes

broke, it costs a little country, less populous than London, a million and a half every year to save its vulnerable area from the water. But the agricultural tourists who, content with visiting Zeeland, South and North Holland and Friesland, grasp something of the primary land problem of the Dutch—how to save themselves from drowning—seldom hear of that other national question, the transformation of the high moor. There is no story more creditable to Holland than that of how the dank wilderness of her high moor has been made to give place to 'Fen Colonies' with a population of 125,000. These Home Colonists produce, from a soil composed of sand and peat litter—and artificials—enormous crops of potatoes for the co-operative potato flour factories, the furnaces of which are fed by the peats from the reclaimed high moor, piled in black stacks as high as churches.

When the price of corn fell—it is recorded in the English book on Holland at the head of this article—

'it was not only through corn-growing that Holland, like ourselves, was badly hit. The Danes were cutting into her butter trade, and her market gardening was feeling the strain of competition. Within the period, however, during which there has been free importation of agricultural products into the Netherlands, the area of land under cultivation has been increased by fifty thousand acres, and there have been brought on the farms a quarter of a million more cattle, half a million more pigs, and fifty thousand more horses. In fifteen years the bulb export has become thrice what it was. As for butter, within five years the output in a year increased by 7000 tons.'

Like Denmark and Great Britain, Holland has an excellent geographical situation. She has also the advantage of cheap water carriage—at what cost? And she has, in certain parts, excellent soil for crops and pasture. But it is a land which has been made. And the farmer has been at least partly remade.

'When one considers' (says Dr Frost), 'quite apart from their obstinacy and distaste for anything new which is characteristic of every farmer, more or less, that the general culture of the great mass of Dutch farmers is at rather a low standard, it is extraordinary with what intelligence and

what practical understanding they regard modern agricultural technique. Nearly every farmer one meets, be he in ever such a small way, can talk about phosphoric acid and nitrogen. He can tell you about the proportion of fat in the milk, and he sprays his potatoes.'

He has changed his crops and his methods. Within three years of the discovery that there was a market for a Dutch Cheshire, one province alone marketed 40,000% worth in a twelvemonth! The Dutch farmer has had the advantage of rising prices, no doubt; but he has had the wit to obtain the fullest possible benefit from the excellent returns. Instead of seeking the merchant, he brings him to co-operative auction marts. Electric auctions, at which a barge-load or trolley-load of produce is disposed of in a few moments, are to be found all over the country. In the electric auction mart, it may be explained, the buyers are provided with raised seats. Between the knees of each one is a button communicating electrically with a big dial opposite, and with the clerks. If the mart straddles a canal, there is the water between the merchants and the dial. A barge-load of produce is poled in, the lads belonging to the mart throw to the merchants specimen 'salads' (the quality of which is guaranteed by the farmer barge-owner's co-operative society), the fact that there are 2200 head of lettuce and 1000 cucumbers in the barge is called out, and the pointer on the dial is set going. When one of the merchants touches his button, the pointer having reached a figure on the dial at which he is prepared to buy, the pointer stops and the sale is made. If the seller is dissatisfied he touches a bell suspended near the barge and the goods are again offered. Under this system there can be no dispute as to what the price was or who bid, and time is enormously economised. There are some 80 co-operative auction marts in Holland.

As to co-operation in other directions, 680 out of the 958 creameries in the country belong to the farmers themselves, and 201 of the 291 cheese factories as well. In four years the nonco-operative creameries added 1000 tons to their annual production; the co-operative creameries added 5000 tons, and now make nearly thrice as much butter as the joint stock concerns. Of the

21 potato flour factories in Holland, 13 are co-operative. There are also half-a-dozen co-operative strawboard factories and two very large and highly successful beet-sugar factories. The co-operative organisation at Lonneker alone does nearly half the trade in artificial manures in Holland. In one year its consignments filled 12,000 railway wagons. It also sold 1800 wagons of feeding stuffs. Even seven years ago the value of the co-operative purchases of 74,000 Dutch co-operators was 1,500,000*l*. There are about 600 credit banks affiliated to three central institutions. The famous Government Boter Controle system of the Netherlands, the most ingenious and perfect in the world for defying the butter-faker, was originated by the co-operative societies. Although the State aids agriculture in all sorts of ways, its motto is 'a free farmer in a free State'—the phrase was first used by a Dutch Minister of Agriculture—and it is most careful not to impair the feeling of independence and right of initiative which were reflected in the decision of a certain organisation to refuse the subsidy which the Government had proffered. There is now an excellent cheese-control system; and, what with herd-book systems, as well thought out for coping with slimness as the Boter Controle itself, and all the milk controllers of the cow-testing societies cycling from cow-house to cowhouse all the year round, cattle-breeding and cow-keeping have been raised to a fine art.

In a country where land has been so dearly gained from the water, it is not surprising to find that the people who rent or own areas of 500 acres and more are only about two dozen in number, and that there are just 216 holdings over 250 acres. The number of holdings below  $2\frac{1}{2}$  acres is very large indeed, and so is the number from that area up to the English limits of a small holding, 50 acres. The number is 182,011; and there are only 27,311 more of other areas in the whole country. More than half the  $2\frac{1}{2}$  to 50 acres holdings and more than half of the whole land of the country are owned by the occupiers; but the question of ownership and tenancy in Holland, Denmark and Belgium need not be embarked upon after the discussions in the issues of this Review for April and October, 1913. As it would seem that the Dutch are now determined to proceed



with the drainage of a large part of the Zuider Zee, there is likely to be a very considerable addition to the cultivated land of the Netherlands. It is proposed to spend about 30,000,000*l.* in order to indike about 400,000 acres, and to have some of the land under crops within thirty years. The fact that the sea dike, carrying a railway and a road between North Holland and Friesland, will be twenty-two miles long, attests the magnitude of the enterprise.

Some of our farmers, when they are told about Holland, are too ready to imagine that their Dutch neighbours have an advantage in low-priced land and excessively low rates of wages. The author of 'A Free Farmer in a Free State' shows that in the Westland opposite Essex, rents, rates and wages mean to an agriculturist very much the same total expenditure as in the English county; and, whatever may be the case elsewhere in Holland, women are not employed on the land. In North Holland, we notice, purchase of grass land varies between 125*l.* and 250*l.* per hectare (2½ acres), and the rental value between 6*l.* 5*s.* and 12*l.* 10*s.* Plough land is from 83*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* to 208*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* per hectare to buy, and from 5*l.* to 10*l.* 8*s.* 4*d.* to rent. Labourers get from 37*l.* 10*s.* to 47*l.* 16*s.* 8*d.* a year. Special 'market garden' land may be worth anything from 250*l.* to 500*l.* an acre. On a 110-acre farm near the Hague the author found the farmer paying 10*l.* a year in taxes on a rental of from 4*l.* to 5*l.* per acre. Five labourers were getting 16*s.* 8*d.* a week all the year round, and a milkmaid 15*l.* to 20*l.* a year and board. Some three and a half tons of hay an acre were being raised from the land with cowhouse dung only. In the vicinity 2*l.* 10*s.* to 3*l.* 16*s.* was being paid per boat-full (four or five single horse-loads) of dung. It remains to be mentioned that fruit, vegetables, butter and cheese are increasingly sent to Germany instead of Great Britain, because, though they have to face heavy duties, better prices are got there. Nevertheless Holland and Denmark are still the two countries which send us most of the food supplies we receive from the Continent of Europe.

So far as we can judge, no writer who has been responsible for anything we have read about rural

Denmark in English has spent more than six weeks there, and some who have written most confidently have been content with a much shorter stay. It is to the credit of Dr Frost that he was two years in Holland; and the present writer may claim to have written after several years' acquaintance with Dutch rural life. Mr Rowntree's book about Belgium is the result of four years' work in a country rather less than twice as large as Yorkshire. The way in which its author applied himself to obtaining first-hand data is most praiseworthy. On one particular enquiry he had a hundred clerks at work and used up  $2\frac{1}{2}$  tons of record cards. Based on investigations conducted so conscientiously, Mr Rowntree's report on rural conditions in Belgium before the recent invasion inspires confidence.

In turning from Denmark and Holland to Belgium we leave wholly agricultural countries for one which, in spite of its small size, had some 116,000 miners and 35,000 quarrymen. In the half-century closing in 1896, the proportion of the agricultural population to the industrial fell from 25 to 19 per cent., and it has continued to fall. As is well known, the land of Belgium is much more cut up than that of any European country. Two-thirds of the holdings are under  $2\frac{1}{2}$  acres; 94 per cent. of them are of less than 25 acres. The average holding in Denmark is thrice as large as the average holding in Belgium. Belgian land is split up by the laws of succession, by the density of a population—denser than in France—demanding land, and by the profit which accrues to landlords from what the Dutch call *versnippering*. Whereas  $6\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. of the cultivated area of Great Britain is in areas of less than 20 acres, the percentage in Belgium is 40. Yet in the opinion of some good judges the cutting up is more alarming on paper than it is in practice.

As to ownership, nearly half the land is owned by holders with less than 100 acres; only 146 have more than 2500 acres. Three-quarters of the landowners of Belgium own less than 5 acres; 95 per cent. less than 25. There are also nearly 17,000 of the 'emphyteutic' leases of rural land, which run from 27 to 99 years. About two-thirds of the country is cultivated by tenants; about a third (35 per cent.) by owners. This proportion

of ownership to tenancy is smaller than in France (where it is nearly a half), or in Germany or Denmark (nearly nine-tenths). In Great Britain 12 per cent. of the agricultural land is cultivated by owners.\* Evidently there is in Belgium a slight rise in the proportion let to tenants. A desire for ownership is undoubtedly felt. It is due to sentiment, a desire for independence, and a belief in the social status of the landowner; but the price to which land has risen stands in the way of a more general realisation of that desire. Mr Rowntree is disposed to think that English leases are slightly more favourable to the tenant than Belgian. He is not convinced that owned land is on the whole better worked than rented land. It is worth noticing that there are 32,000 acres of cultivated land owned by the communes. After special investigations Mr Rowntree thinks that the average value of agricultural land in Belgium, taking pasture and arable together, is close on 60*l.* an acre, and the average rent 36*s.* 3*d.*, in both cases without buildings. Between 1880 and 1895 the value of arable fell 33 per cent. and that of pasture 23 per cent. By 1908 the average value of land had risen to within 8*l.* an acre of the 1880 price, and the average rent to within 4*d.* an acre. It would appear that the recovery has been brought about by more intensive cultivation and the adoption of new crops, by co-operation, by increased belief in artificials and in agricultural science, and by improved prices.

Why does land fetch so much more in Belgium than in England? It is not the greater fertility of Belgium, Mr Rowntree replies, because nine of the ten arrondissements where the agricultural values are highest consist of that sandy soil which Laveleye called 'the worst in Europe.' 'Though fertilised by ten centuries of laborious husbandry,' said that Belgian economist, 'the soil does not yield a crop without being manured once or twice—a fact unique in Europe.' Nor is it, in Mr Rowntree's opinion, the density of the population, though in Belgium there are 866 persons per square mile of cultivated area to 759 in England and Wales, and the number

\* Mr Rowntree, whose figures these are, explains that they are of the years specified: Belgium, 1895; Denmark, 1901; Germany, 1895; France, 1892; Great Britain, 1905.

of agriculturists is proportionately thrice as large as in Great Britain. The principal reason is the demand for land, due to Belgium being a country of small farms, while Great Britain is a country of comparatively large ones. Also the greater part of the work on the land of Belgium is done by the farmers themselves or their relatives, that is, by persons directly interested in the best possible working of it. Then, when a farm is cut up for sale, there are always eager buyers on the spot, which is not always the case with us. Mr Rowntree believes that the Belgian farmer was able to pay so much more for his land than the English farmer because of Government help, with light railways, for example—'the transport facilities are better than in any other country in the world'—because of his own excellent cultivation and 'extremely hard work,' because of agricultural education, because of a 'world's record' in the amount of artificials used per acre, because of co-operation, and because the low rate of industrial wages prevents town life from offering an attractive alternative to a life on the land. As to help from tariffs, all cereals (with the exception of oats, on which the duty is 1s. 2d. per cwt.) and potatoes and beet, were admitted to Belgium free. But there was a duty of 8s. per cwt. on butter; and, though horses and pigs—Belgium keeps 101 pigs per square mile against 90 in Denmark—came in free, there was an impost of 1s. 7d. on cattle and sheep, and of 6s. per cwt. on meat. These duties have, no doubt, added something to the farmers' profits. Although Belgium fed a smaller proportion of her population than formerly, the value per head of the food imported was only 1l. 18s. 2d. against 3l. 14s. 10d. for the United Kingdom. (In Denmark the excess of exports over imports per head may be set down as 3l. 13s. 10d.) The difference between Belgium and England, Mr Rowntree points out, is as striking in the case of eggs and vegetables, which were free from duty, as in the case of meat and dairy product, which were mulcted by the Customs. Belgium, after providing herself with vegetables and fruit, exported to the value of 710,000l. a year; the net annual import of the United Kingdom is valued at 2,638,000l.

Those who feel that attention cannot be too often directed to the necessity of increasing the production per

acre in Great Britain must continually point to the example of Belgium, which, with twice the proportional area devoted to wheat and oats that is given to these crops in England, showed a national yield per acre of 33·5 bushels of wheat and 54·5 bushels of oats against our 29·7 bushels of wheat and 41 bushels of oats.\* Mr Rowntree speaks of one commune which produced 57 bushels of wheat per acre, and of a second, the oat-yield of which was 111 bushels.† Apart from crops, it is to be remembered that Belgium had 156 cattle per square mile against 120 in Denmark and 97 in England.

The other side of the picture is, of course, that, with the value of land what it is, 'only very arduous toil enables the cultivator to make a living.' As to low agricultural wages, Mr Rowntree thinks that the average may be 1s. 7d. a day, with some perquisites. With regard to the financial indebtedness of the farmers, the author of 'Land and Labour' is of opinion that the facts contradict the assertion that the land of small proprietors is usually mortgaged to the hilt. The proportion of mortgage to the value of properties is 'comparatively small, less than one-sixth.'

It is sad to have to write in the past tense of so many matters in connexion with the agriculture of Belgium. We all cherish the hope that before very long the indomitable Belgians may once more be the masters of the destinies of their own country, the rural development of which has been for so many years an inspiration to every student of agricultural sociology.

J. W. ROBERTSON SCOTT.

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\* The recently issued (1903-12) average is 31·74 bushels of wheat and 41·84 of oats.

† The Drysdale Dalmeny figures are—wheat, 64 bushels; oats, 120 bushels.

### Art. 3.—RECENT POLITICAL EVOLUTION IN ARGENTINA.

DISCOVERED and first occupied by the Spaniards early in the 16th century, the colony of Argentina was in the 18th transformed into a vice-royalty. Its history is uneventful until the commencement of the 19th century. The events which at that epoch agitated Europe had their counterparts in America. In 1806 an English military expedition laid siege to Buenos Ayres and twice occupied the city; but the invaders were finally beaten by Liniers, a French officer in the service of Spain. The invasion of Spain by Napoleon, in 1808, was the signal of independence for the Spanish colonies. A 'Junta' or provisional Assembly proclaimed the independence of the Argentine Republic on May 25, 1810, a date which was afterwards chosen for the celebration of the annual national festival.

In 1814 Uruguay, Santa Fé, Cordoba and other provinces constituted themselves into independent republics under the direction of D'Artigas. It was a period of anarchy between federalists and unionists; the words 'liberty' and 'republic' remained for a long time a signal of discord, favoured by ambitious rivals. In 1825 war was carried on against Brazil. The Brazilians were beaten by General Alvear; and Uruguay seized the opportunity to declare her independence. The struggle between federalists and unionists continued even during the dictatorship of the sanguinary Rozas (1827—1852). He was succeeded by General Bartolome Mitre, and Mitre by Sarmiento. These two rulers did much for the material and intellectual development of Argentina; and progress continued under the presidency of Nicolas Avellaneda (1874—1880).

A popular rising drove President Celman from power in 1890; but since that year the Argentine Republic has been free from any revolutionary shock, the transmission of legislative and administrative power taking place in a normal and legal manner. The most remarkable name in the list of rulers is that of Dr Roque Saenz Pena, who took office in 1910. He was a man resolutely opposed to sterile political dissensions; and his integrity and honesty



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of purpose were admitted even by his opponents. During his presidency of less than four years, ending with his untimely death after a prolonged illness, on Aug. 9, 1914, he managed to establish the important political transformations which we shall outline further on.

Within a week after the demise of Saenz Pena the Argentinos also had to mourn the death of General Julio A. Roca, ex-President of the Republic. General Roca had been for many years a prominent figure in Argentine national life. Born in the year 1843, much of his early military life was spent in fighting the Indian tribes who then infested the western parts of the province of Buenos Ayres, now among its most prosperous districts. He was President of the Republic from 1880 to 1886, and again from 1898 to 1904. The rapid rise of Argentina from a comparatively unknown State to one of world-wide importance is due to a considerable extent to his activity and influence among his countrymen. He was an ardent patriot and a sincere friend of England.

The present Chief of the State is Dr Victorino de la Plaza, formerly Vice-President under Saenz Pena. He is a barrister of distinction, and collaborated in the making of the Argentine Civil Code. He was elected a deputy in 1875, and since then has acquired considerable political experience, having been Minister of Finance under President Avellaneda, and successively Minister 'par interim' of Justice, of Public Instruction, of War and the Navy. Under President Roca he was in charge of Foreign Affairs and of Finance. During the international political crisis of 1908 he again acted as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and rendered his country good service by his calm and far-sighted diplomacy. Having been elected Vice-President for six years, in 1910, at the same time as President Saenz Pena, his Presidency will expire on Oct. 12, 1916. He has lived for some years in England, and is a great admirer of English institutions.

In accordance with the constitution voted in 1853 at Santa Fé, and somewhat modified in 1861, the country is governed on the federal representative system. Under this form of government the provinces composing the federation enjoy a limited autonomy. They nominate

their own governors, legislators and functionaries, and have their own tribunals; but certain classes of cases are decided by the supreme Federal Court. Penal, civil, commercial and mining laws, called national laws, are voted by the National Congress and applied throughout the Republic. The Federal Government alone has the right of coinage, the right to conclude treaties, to declare war or peace, to fix the limits of provinces, and to undertake large public works of national importance. It has also the right of intervention if the public order is seriously threatened or disturbed, and can declare martial law in the disturbed district.

The Republic is divided into fourteen provinces, all of which bear the names of their capitals, excepting Entre Rios, of which the chief town is Parana. These provinces comprise departments, further divided into districts. There are, moreover, ten territories or 'national governments,' and a 'federal district'—Buenos Ayres.

The executive power is in the hands of a President and Vice-President, who are elected for six years and cannot be re-elected except after an interval of six years. A Congress, composed of a Chamber of Deputies of 120 members and a Senate of 30 members, forms the legislative body. Each province, together with the federal district, is represented by a certain number of deputies, at the rate of one for every 33,000 inhabitants or fractions of that total not less than 16,500. The city of Buenos Ayres alone provides twenty members. The duration of the parliamentary mandate is four years; and one-half of the members retires every two years. Every member receives a salary of 18,000 piastres per annum. The legislative assemblies of the provinces elect each two senators; and the same number is allotted to the federal capital. Eight Ministers or Secretaries of State divide with the President the duties of office. The stability of the Cabinet is generally safe during the six years' term of the President who has chosen its members.

Dr Roque Saenz Pena, the late President of the Argentine Republic, was born at Buenos Ayres in 1851. He was elected a deputy in 1876, and was President of the Chamber at the age of 26. He retired from that position in 1878, because his fellow-members opposed the application of rigorous rules to a member whom he wished to punish

for some breach of parliamentary etiquette. During the war between Chile and Peru, Saenz Pena joined the ranks of the Peruvian army and distinguished himself in various battles. As a Lieutenant-Colonel he fought together with Bolognesie and Moore during the heroic defence of Arica; his whole force was annihilated, and he himself, seriously wounded, was made prisoner by the Chileans, who kept him in captivity till the end of the war. Returning to Buenos Ayres at the end of the war, Saenz Pena was made Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Under Juarez Celman he was sent as Minister Plenipotentiary to Uruguay. He distinguished himself brilliantly at the South American Congress of Montevideo, and at the Pan-American Congress of Washington, where, in opposition to the famous Monroe doctrine 'America for the Americans'—meaning in reality 'America for the North Americans'—he proposed 'America for Humanity.' Later on we find him representing the Argentine Republic at the marriage of King Alphonso of Spain, then for some time at Rome, and at the second Peace Congress of the Hague, in company with Luis M. Drago and Carlos Rodriguez Larreta. Dr Saenz Pena had thus lived and studied much outside his own country before he was elected President of Argentina.

From 1810 to 1853, every attempt at political reform was successfully resisted, owing to the instincts inherent in the race. Even after the introduction of a more liberal system of government, the people were for a long time unable to make a proper use of the freedom they had acquired. Indeed the will to do so was apparently lacking; for a long time they submitted peaceably to the tyranny which was moulding them to its own ends. They no longer fought against the idea of constitutional government, but, though they had risen to the point of accepting it, they were yet incapable of respecting and appreciating this great principle. For almost fifty years they lived under the constitution, out of sympathy with it and in many cases ignorant of its very existence. It was enough for them if they were left free to work in peace and were protected from political strife and agitation, things detrimental to their commerce and destructive of their national credit in the great markets of Europe. Their commerce and their credit were essential

to their material welfare; for the rest they were completely indifferent to politics and to the rise or fall of any political party. They were, also, completely indifferent to the fact that the federal councils had been brought under the control of one central government. A powerful coalition of various interests had been formed, which, though not officially recognised, possessed tremendous weight in all the affairs of the nation. Consisting as it did of the leading banks, the principal commercial companies, and all the most important industries, it soon acquired great power.

In elections to Congress, voting was not compulsory; and the great majority of the people abstained from this civic duty. The official party was always victorious, and it was useless to vote against it. Thus a spirit of callous indifference and of scepticism came into being; the people were indignant at nothing, because surprised at nothing. And this spirit of indifference finally became almost traditional; the excuses given for it were, 'It has always been so,' 'You cannot alter the habits of the people,' 'You cannot change public opinion,' and 'You must let people practise their politics in their own way'; and even men of the strictest honour and integrity came to share in these ideas as soon as they began to take part in the struggle. The people ended by coming to the conclusion that politics represented nothing more than a highly specialised profession; that all its manœuvring amounted to no more than a prodigious burlesque, well rehearsed beforehand; and that it was better to laugh in one's sleeve at all the intricate wire-pulling, the serio-comic 'crises,' and the almost farcical methods of the whole ingenious hypocrisy, than to attempt protests which they knew would be utterly futile. They saw, without apprehension, the same persons always in office; for they recognised the fact that the destinies of the country were beyond mere politicians. Though they were quite aware that genuine statesmen, acting in conjunction with politicians, could do much good, they realised that the politicians alone were incapable of doing much harm.

Eventually, however, a strong reaction, due no doubt to their inner sense of justice and to feelings of injured pride, set in against this usurpation of power and this

arbitrary form of government. And this reaction originated in the people themselves, who began to suspect those men who were responsible for this state of affairs.

Dr Roque Saenz Pena, when he came into power in 1910, was convinced that the country was ready for reform. He thoroughly realised that it would be necessary, not merely to amend the existing laws or to make new ones, but to encourage and foster in every citizen an intelligent interest in all matters of national concern. In his presidential campaign, he promised to observe absolute impartiality in all political matters; and in order to carry out this promise, from his first day of office, he severed all ties with the party that had supported him in his candidature. But 'party' in the Argentine signifies men and not opinions, so that Saenz Pena did not in any way renounce his former views, though taking the greatest pains to show no special favour to those who had helped him to his position. For the sake of a forcible example, he permitted himself no outward display of gratitude or friendship. This step was specially significant in a country where, by tradition and a false conception of loyalty, the President had always felt it his duty to raise members of his party to the highest posts in the State. By a kind of tacit agreement his will was thus completely bound up with each individual will of his friends and colleagues. By accepting outside assistance he thereby pledged himself to repay it, and thus entangled himself in a multiplicity of obligations, which hampered his every action. The needs of the State were entirely neglected, the sole aim of his administration being to enrich himself and his followers by every means in his power. The State therefore remained at the mercy of the President and his satellites, who were mutually dependent on one another; while the Executive, the Congress and the Provincial Governors formed a happy combination, whose sole object appeared to be to set the constitution at naught and turn everything to personal advantage.

Saenz Pena was desirous of putting a speedy end to this condition of things, a condition that crippled the power of the Executive and upset the whole machinery of constitutional government. He fully realised that, in separating himself from his friends and thus depriving

himself of their support—which was relied on as a matter of course by all former Presidents—he was cutting himself completely adrift and was thus risking the failure of his policy. But his care was for the State and not for the security of his own office, and in acting thus he hoped to increase the prestige of the Executive and strengthen its hands for the future. In order to keep the Executive free from all corrupt influences, he chose his ministers for their integrity rather than for their political leanings. But he did not confine himself merely to showing his intention of governing without the help of any political group; he seized every opportunity of letting the Provincial Governors know that he could do without their costly friendship. But, though he could dispense with their protection, he still required their loyalty; and he therefore left to each of the federal states full responsibility for its actions and absolute autonomy. Thus Congress gradually became composed of conscientious members who eventually transformed the once submissive ally of the Executive into a powerful independent body.

This step of Saenz Pena, which is clearly the indication of a master mind, may be regarded as the fundamental characteristic of his government. The change brought a sense of relief to the people, which had long awaited in vain its introduction. It meant no mere correction of past faults; it was the foundation stone of political and administrative honesty. Its effect was to keep each branch of the government within the bounds assigned to it by the constitution, and to make the people their own rulers; it was in fact the establishment of 'government for the people by the people.'

Roque Saenz Pena did not mislead the people when he announced that he would make the constitution his guide. He made them realise that the moral reform thus started meant the advent of good government, and that as President, in giving them this proof of confidence and esteem, and offering himself as their governor, he was in fact setting them in the position that they ought to hold in any true democracy.

The hearty reception accorded to this great change, both by the people and by the Press, showed clearly the feeling of grateful appreciation it had aroused among



the whole nation. It was evident that the success of the legislation which was bound to follow was already assured. It was in fact but the first step towards the introduction of a bill for the reform of the whole electoral system, which was destined to effect a sweeping political change. It soon became manifest that Roque Saenz Pena was no dreamer, but that he fully intended to carry his schemes into effect. The obvious inference to be drawn from his conduct was that he felt, above all, anxious to prevent corruption in the elections, to guarantee the purity of the ballot and the free exercise of the vote, in order that the candidates elected should be the true representatives of the people.

In January 1912 he laid before Parliament his Electoral Reform Bill, which at once met with keen, though not unexpected opposition; many members, elected under the old *régime*, perceived the risk of losing their seats under the proposed new system. The moral value of the Bill, however, was recognised, and the majority of members, though not pinning much faith to its working in actual practice, gave it their support; it seemed, on the face of it at any rate, a step in the right direction. Saenz Pena, strange as it may seem, found public opinion inclined the same way, both before and after the passing of the Bill. Though favourably disposed towards it, people were somewhat sceptical. They believed that it would be inoperative owing to the attitude of the politicians of the old school, who would probably find some means of evading the new law; they were afraid that corruption would still triumph, that the masses would vote no more freely than before; and they looked upon the whole thing as an impracticable Utopia. After a brilliant defence by the Minister of the Interior, M. Indalecio Gomez, the measure, despite all opposition, passed through the Lower House to the Senate and shortly afterwards became law.

The new statute established compulsory voting and the secret ballot, and provided for representation of the minority. The elector now no longer holds a civil certificate, as formerly, but a military one, which contains his signature, his photograph and his finger-prints; and the register used in the elections is compiled by the officials of the War Office. This arrangement not only

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acts as a great check upon impersonation, but has the advantage also of doing away with the old method of the census; the register is now not only a list of all citizens, but a list also of all those citizens fit for military service. The register, after being drawn up by the War Office, is revised by the federal judges, to ensure its accuracy. Any person on the list, who refuses to vote, is liable to a penalty of ten piastres or two days' imprisonment, while public servants are prohibited from taking any active part in the elections and from becoming candidates, without having previously handed in their resignations.

In order to record his vote, the elector has to present himself at one of the polling booths of his parish and take his military certificate with him. The officer in charge, after identifying him, hands him a special envelope and allows him to pass into the voting-room, where he finds the voting papers of each candidate. There the voter exercises his choice and places the paper in the envelope, which he then seals and slips into the box as he goes out, in the presence of the presiding official. The counting takes place in public, and the validity of the voting papers is secured by a committee composed of the President of the Court of Appeal, the President of the Municipal Council, and one of the federal judges. As formerly, Congress is the supreme tribunal for all questions concerning the validity of elections.

On April 7, 1912, the election of sixty deputies—to take the place of the half about to resign—gave the people their first opportunity of testing the new law and verifying the promises of strict impartiality that had been so freely given. The result showed that the President had been right; it confirmed his faith in public opinion and confounded the adversaries of the new system. It was a complete success. Out of an electorate of 934,401 persons, 840,852 voted at the 4,650 polling booths, whereas formerly scarcely 25 per cent. recorded their votes. The Radical Party, which for the past twenty years had taken no active part in any of the elections; the Civic Union, which in the end came near following the example of the Radicals; the Socialist Party, which had struggled in vain for eight years; the National Union, which under various different names

had triumphed at many successive elections, and several other parties of minor importance,—all took part in the contest. Corruption was not entirely absent, but it frequently rebounded against those who resorted to it. The voter open to bribery accepted bribes, but, owing to the secrecy of the ballot, was able to cheat the giver and drop his voting paper into the box of the party of his choice. Detection was impossible. Unscrupulous persons were thus enabled to gratify at once their greed, their sense of humour, and their consciences, at any rate so far as their politics were concerned. It no longer amounted to a fraud on the public; it was a mere private imposture.

The elections, which all took place on the same day, passed off peaceably and without any exercise of official pressure. The suffrage had been made free; the President had kept his word. The results were all declared together, some few weeks later. They formed a complete vindication of the new system and indicated the real views of the people, while showing up in their true colours the fictitious triumphs of past elections. Thus in Buenos Ayres the Radicals, who had not been able to enter the Chamber for twenty years, gained eight seats in the Lower House and one in the Upper; the Socialists won two seats, and the Civic Union one; while the National Union, which had formerly swamped every other party, kept only one, and that solely on account of the personal qualifications of the candidate.

The result came as a surprise, and produced the greatest satisfaction; it was practically a deliverance, a complete and thorough cleansing of politics; it was as though some foul thing had been swept from their midst, and a new vista of light and purity opened up before the eager eyes of the people. It is difficult to express in mere words the feeling of absolute satisfaction, not unmixed with a certain sense of pride, which was aroused in all classes of the community by this sudden revival of their civil rights and liberties, so long delayed.

The compulsory vote has finally roused the people from the state of indifference into which they had drifted. It is no longer useless for them to record their votes, no longer excusable to hold themselves aloof from the affairs of the nation. Those who were formerly

completely estranged from politics, regarding it as a profession monopolised entirely by their unconquerable enemies, see it now suddenly freed, expanded, elevated and brought within reach of even the humblest members of the community. The new system, if it has not completely done away with corruption, has at any rate set a great check upon it. The compulsory vote has made the electors so numerous that it is impossible now for any candidate to purchase a majority; while no bribe, as the elections of April 7 clearly proved, affords sufficient guarantee for any party to try again an experiment at once so costly and so meagre in its results.

The natural opponents of this great social reform, that is to say the professional politicians, who are still both numerous and powerful in the provinces, put forward in defence of the old system, and by way of attack upon the new, an argument that is as childish as it is paradoxical. 'By our methods,' they say, 'we keep all power in the hands of a few tried and capable men, experienced in the management of affairs. That is surely better than the granting of universal suffrage to a nation still totally unfitted for democratic government. We are far better able to choose the governing body than are the masses; there is no telling what sort of men will get into Parliament if the people are allowed to vote as they will.'

Here we meet with the most deeply rooted vice of all political oligarchies; they believe themselves to be indispensable, they pretend that they alone have any right to power, and imagine that it is their duty, not only to restrain all freedom, but even to infringe the written law, to the end that they may preserve in its entirety a supremacy which they regard as essential to the safety and welfare of the nation. For twenty years the country was ruled by the same group of men, who eventually came to believe that, outside their own number, there was no one capable of taking even the smallest part in the government of the country. They pretended that they were the preservers of all the best traditions of the nation. When they felt themselves growing feeble, they extracted a philosophy therefrom, making of their very feebleness a political doctrine. If one examines closely this 'experience in public affairs,' of which they

boast so much, one soon realises that the term in fact signifies 'experience in political wire-pulling,' which is a very different matter. It is, besides, by no means true that the new law enables men of inferior abilities to rise to power. The candidates for election are decided upon by the leaders of each party at private meetings, and it is for those candidates that their partisans will vote; they affect to ignore all others. And it follows, as might be supposed, that each party selects those men who are best known, most capable, most influential, and at the same time best able to look after its own interests. The method of selection by 'caucus' is open to objection, but it is at least superior to selection by the government in power. In either case the choice of the electorate is limited; but, while the one method is legitimate and democratic, the other is arbitrary and unjust.

It is a splendid thing for the country that this spirit of justice and fair play has found its way into politics, for there was ample need of it. When Parliament, only half of which has, so far, been affected by the new conditions, is filled with members possessed of a due sense of political honesty, it will have at last secured its rightful supremacy; and, if at any later date a less scrupulous or less disinterested President should be elected, he will be unable to destroy the fabric so patiently woven together, without incurring the very gravest risk.

The reform, in spite of its youth, has already shown the most excellent results. While bringing politics, so to speak, to the very doors of the people and ensuring at any rate the elements of the true representation of the masses, it has at the same time had the effect of putting a complete check upon the activity of those professional politicians of the capital, who formerly lived solely by this manipulation of the votes at elections. The old system has been destroyed like an anthill struck by a shell. The problem now for the ants is how to reconstruct their house in the presence of a powerful enemy, ever present, ever on the alert. The motto of these professional politicians is that every man has a right to hold whatever position he can take; but the new order of things has degraded them to positions so insignificant that their maxim, so far as

they are concerned, no longer fits the case, though it was good enough in the days of their prosperity. Now, however, that popular and not official politics is the order of the day, they have had to renounce politics as a means of livelihood. Their instinct of self-preservation has made them realise the fact that, so soon as the body on which they have been feeding dies, the parasites must leave it for another home; and they have now turned their attentions to commerce, ranching or speculation. The reform has thus achieved one object of very great importance. It has reduced the professional political element and purified what is left; it has assured the return of those candidates who are most popular and most suitable; while finally it has awakened the interest of the working classes, whose labour forms one of the chief sources of the country's wealth. But this is not all. Much more has been effected than the mere interference with certain individuals or even groups. To-day, Congress is quite independent of the Executive, which cannot now ensure, irrespective of popular opinion, that majority which formerly supported it as a matter of course.

This great reform, however, could not be brought about without recourse to drastic measures, which were bound to react to some extent unfavourably upon the progress of national affairs. As mentioned above, Saenz Pena, in separating the Executive from the Legislature, proved himself a man of no small degree of courage; in thus nobly depriving himself of the support which had always been accorded to the Executive in the past, he was deliberately acting in the interests of the State and against those of his office as President. In abandoning this powerful assistance, he reckoned on being able to lean upon the better feeling and patriotism of Congress. Public opinion, however, had not yet grown quite accustomed to the new order of things; and the people had not entirely thrown off their hereditary apathy. President Pena did not receive the full measure of support he so justly deserved. As for Congress, as might have been foreseen, a certain amount of hostility has been shown by those members who have suffered personally, or feel likely to suffer, from this administrative cleansing. The President, far from wishing to



lessen his isolation, deemed it expedient rather to accentuate it, in order to bring the fact more clearly before the eyes of the people; he deliberately took this course in order to keep himself free from dangerous associations with any interested parties in the future.

In the Argentine, however, the President of the Republic is at the same time head both of the State and the Cabinet. He ought, therefore, to be in complete accord with the legislators who are called to lend him their aid in the control of the affairs of the nation. He can, in fact, only act through his ministers, in consequence of which Saenz Pena's power of action was crippled to a very considerable extent. The attitude which he thought fit to take up to ensure the success of his schemes injured him in many ways and caused great friction between Congress and Executive. The former is clearly hostile, though its opposition is not collective, open or decided; it shows itself rather in individual reprisals, accompanied by a great measure of petty shuffling and inconsistency. This discord is mainly due to circumstances and not to any disagreement on general principles; and in all probability it will not last long, as it is to the interest of both the Executive and the Legislature that they should be in accord with one another.

But it must not be forgotten that the Argentine is a Federal Republic, which means that, in order that this great reform shall become an effective reality throughout the country, it is necessary for each province to enforce it within its own boundaries. Now the provinces are by no means so advanced or civilised as the capital. They present, moreover, an obstacle that time alone can surmount; they are very sparsely populated, and the people are so scattered that compulsory voting is very difficult to enforce. It was the abstention from voting, caused by the corruption of the professional politicians and the despotism of those in power, that, as we have seen, resulted in all the evils of the former régime; and this tendency to abstention will be difficult to overcome in provincial elections. Public opinion, however, in many of the provinces is gradually becoming hostile to the political system of the past; the last national election, as well as those for the choosing of the provincial governors, plainly showed it. The old

system is tottering, and it will not be very long before it has completely crumbled away, but in the meantime things must not be hurried too much. Projects of reform are under discussion in several of the provinces; officialdom is every day growing more feeble; public opinion is gradually gaining strength; and public morality is receiving more and more attention. When, at length, the provincial districts have learnt how to elect their representatives in the provincial parliaments in absolute freedom, as the provinces were able to return their deputies to Congress at the election of April 7, 1912, then indeed will the reform have become a national reality.

The eminent French writer on Argentine affairs, M. R. Levillier, reminds us in one of his recent works concerning political changes in general, that the complete assimilation of new ideas is not, like mere adaptation, a phenomenon of the will, but a slow and unconscious transfusion and absorption of new elements, accompanied by an evolution of the innermost feelings. It is essentially a change of sentiment, which is dependent on the racial instincts; it is not easily altered or moulded; it is inborn and cannot be lightly discarded, however great the desire to do so. The adaptation of the people to the constitution, the combination of theory and practice, has taken more than sixty years to accomplish, and has not yet been thoroughly accomplished in Argentina. Complete assimilation will require a much longer time, though apparent assimilation will be noticed long before it in fact exists. President Roque Saenz Pena thoroughly realised this; and neither the new President nor the Argentine people are likely to be deceived by appearances.

F. L. DEFANCE.

## Art. 4.—A CHAPLET OF HEROES.

Ernest Psichari, Charles Péguy, Emile Nolly (Captain Détanger), Henri Alain-Fournier, André Lafon.

THE resident in a Catholic country envies sometimes the placid old women sitting in the twilight, telling their beads; their dim sight and thickened tympanums do not disturb this tranquil occupation; they seem secure against the demon of *Ennui*. Why should not we Anglicans institute, in the interests of the idle, the elderly, the meditative or the sentimental, an unconsecrated rosary of recollection, adapted to the events of our existence? As we fingered the chaplet—every bead of it representing a year of our past—when we came to the big bead we should linger and reflect, and try to draw a lesson from the evocation of that term of years. Or we might string a thread to commemorate the lovely places we have seen, recalling them on different days at different seasons, summoning thus from the dimmest haunts of our memories beauties too good to lose. Or we might count a chaplet of the Dead.

To-day I would tell my beads very briefly in memory of five French soldiers, men of letters by profession, who died for their country in the first months of the war. It was on them I chiefly counted to renew the spirit of literature in France. Yet (with the exception of Péguy, who was an eccentric genius) they were perhaps not more gifted than several others—than Paul Acker, for instance, or Léo Byram, among the hundred and fifty young writers who have fallen for France. They had not yet gathered in the finest fruit of their vintage, for (save Péguy, who was over forty) they were young. They belonged one and all—Péguy first and young Lafon last—to a generation in full reaction against the excessive intellectualism of their fathers and their elder brothers. Two of them were soldiers and explorers by profession, men who had seen life arduously enough, and death face to face, in African deserts and in colonial battles; these were Captain Détanger (Emile Nolly) and Lieutenant Ernest Psichari; Alain-Fournier stood on the threshold of politics as secretary to Claude Casimir-Périer (also fallen); Charles Péguy was a publisher, a printer, a

polemist, as well as a prose-writer and a poet; while André Lafon was a budding schoolmaster. Not one of them was an out-and-out man of letters of that thorough-going and professional sort whose horizon is bounded by the twy-peaked summit of Parnassus and the roofs of Grub Street. They were men of action, doers, not dreamers.

Of course, all of them had served their term of military service in the regiment, and had thus, beside their official calling, another—the career of arms. All felt, with a precision and an acuity that their forefathers could not guess, the importance of the regiment—of the army—and the corresponding humiliation of belonging to a country that has been vanquished in arms, but has not yet avenged and redeemed that disgrace. It is, in fact, the army of a nation which determines the language it shall speak, the laws it shall obey, the trade it shall make, and even the Church it shall worship in, since all these follow the conqueror. These young men considered themselves to belong to a generation—to a series of generations—sacrificed in 1870, deprived by that defeat of their place in History. The little things they did they could not love; the great things they fain would do they were not allowed to undertake; so that they felt like the sons of a bankrupt emperor, unable to forget their Empire or their bankruptcy. For compare the France of fifty years ago with the France of Caillaux! No amount of literary glory, or scientific invention, or artistic refinement, or material prosperity, could console this ardent generation. They murmured with their spokesman, Péguy :

*'Où sont nos mourants et nos morts? Nous n'avons même pas renversé un gouvernement! Nous mourons tous dans notre lit! Et je ne m'intéresse pas aux personnes qui mettent cinquante ans à mourir dans leur lit.'*

So deep in them did the taste for action and activity descend that Péguy declared in one of his most characteristic pages :

*'Ne peuvent pas mener une vie chrétienne, c'est-à-dire ne peuvent pas être chrétiens, ceux qui sont assurés du pain quotidien . . . Et ce sont les rentiers, les fonctionnaires, les moines. Peuvent seuls mener une vie chrétienne, c'est-à-dire*

peuvent seuls être chrétiens, ceux qui ne sont pas assurés du pain quotidien. Et ce sont les joueurs (petits et gros), les aventuriers; les pauvres et les misérables; les industriels, les commerçants (petits et gros); les hommes mariés, les pères de famille, ces grands aventuriers du monde moderne' ('Victor-Marie, Comte Hugo,' ch. 84).

Well, if thus they still felt in the spring of 1914, before that blazing summer should run out they were to have their fill of life and death! Three of them at least must have quaffed their heart's desire. I know little of the dreamy, delicate Lafon; his slight young soul seems to have slipped away out of all that clamour and clatter of battle like a frail white wisp of sky-ascending vapour, or the clear note of a clarion. But I know that the romantic Alain-Fournier was happy in his great adventure an hour or two before his mysterious end. As for Péguy, Psichari, and Nolly, their death was a dream come true—almost the answer to a prayer.

'Faites que je sois fort, et que je tue beaucoup d'ennemis. . . . Si vous le voulez, Seigneur Dieu, donnez-moi la grâce de mourir dans une grande victoire.'

Such is the soldier's petition in Psichari's 'Appel des Armes.' And their prayers are answered; they are dead in their promise, but at least they have lived! The longed-for hour arrived, and they left the daily round, the dull routine, and set forth to conquer a new world—to frame it nearer to the heart's desire! What a task was theirs—to save, defend, avenge! Around them mustered hundreds and thousands and millions of soldiers, one at heart with them, following the same flag, marching in step; the same mighty passion, like a rhythm, beating in all alike. See them, swinging forward, with that quick yet patient stride, mile after mile, league after league. Hear them, humming rather than singing, crooning rather than humming, no poem of their own (poets though they be) but the same wild song for all—La Marseillaise. Mark them, marching through the sunstroke and stifling dust of August 1914 to the scorched, cannon-blasted stubble-fields of the Marne; breasting the whistling winds of Lorraine; scaling the forest-hung precipices of the Vosges; sunk

knee-deep in the black mud of Flanders; slipping in the white treacherous slime of Champagne. All are equal, all are one—glorious incorporate atoms of the Eternal France, even as, in the communion of saints, living and dead are blent in the substance of God. No voice, no soul of their own, but henceforth an inseparable immortality, the army of 1914.

The first of them to fall was Ernest Psichari. I knew him root and branch—his grandparents before him, and his mother in her charming girlhood; and, when I think of Ernest, the first image to rise on my mind's eye is that of a dear boy of eleven years old whom I found one day half-stupefied with grief, passionately sobbing, beside an open wardrobe, in which he had discovered the dressing-gown worn by his grandmother the year before, when she had nursed him through some childish illness—and she had died in the spring. The child's heart, perceiving in one moment the irrevocable, and the impoverishment of life when some great tenderness goes out of it, nearly burst with the force of that enlarging pang. And then I see another Ernest, still younger, perhaps nine, unaware of my presence in his grandmother's drawing-room, as he talks to his little brother in the twilight: 'When I am grown up (says Ernest) I shall be a great man! Et j'aurai ma statue sur tous les marchés de France!' And the little one of seven ripples with laughter at Ernest's having so satisfactorily 'gone one better': 'Il y a du chemin à faire, mon frère! (says he). Il y a bien du chemin à faire!' Whereat I too laughed and broke the spell, the two little boys informing me that, while waiting for their violin-lesson, 'on s'amusait à raconter des blagues.'

Even in Ernest's fun there was a desire of greatness; that, and an intense sensibility, a rare faculty of moral imagination, were what I chiefly noticed in the child, of whom I saw less and less as his studies absorbed him more and more; youths between twelve and twenty have little time for their mother's friends. A quiet young man, with charming, living eyes, and in his whole aspect something ardent, firm and grave—that is all that Ernest Psichari was to me.

And then came a bolt from the blue. It was on the



morrow of the Dreyfus case, when France was divided into two camps, and each faction feverishly counted its men and the great families which centralised these men on either side. As Daniel Halévy wrote, in a passage already celebrated: 'Paris a ses familles comme Florence eut les siennes; et ses maisons, non couronnées de tours, n'en abritent pas moins des factions guerrières.' Ernest was born into one of these houses—one of the most important to the Liberals—for those grandparents of his (both dead before that shock of schism shook France to her foundations), those grandparents of whom I have written, were Ernest Renan and his wife. And his father was Jean Psichari, a philologist of most 'advanced' opinions. It came, therefore, almost as a defection, an apostasy, when the rumour spread in the ruffled circles of the Dreyfusards that Renan's grandson, at nineteen, had enlisted as a volunteer in the Colonial Artillery.

'Le fils a pris le parti de ses pères contre son père'—so Ernest himself defined the situation in his 'Appel des Armes.' Just as his Breton ancestors, curious of the vast world on the other side the seas, most incurious of worldly advancement, would sail the world over in the service of the State, before the mast, seamen content with the salt air and their duty, so this grandson of theirs spent five years with his cannon in the Congo, a non-commissioned officer. When at twenty-four years of age he returned to Paris, he could scarcely understand why his friends pressed him to enter a school for officers. 'One can serve the country as well in the ranks; one is perhaps more useful!' But he yielded to his mother—to her, indeed, he always yielded.

Péguy has left an eloquent description of his friend, telling how he lived like a king in the palace of the École Militaire, but a step from the dome of the Invalides, where in the summer mornings, in the freshness of the dawn, he used to escort his slender little three-inch cannon—'ses 75, ces petits jeunes gens de canons modernes, ces gringalets de canons modernes, au corps d'insecte, aux roues comme des pattes d'araignées'—filing them off under the shadow of the monstrous historic artillery of the great Pensioners' Hospital, the cannon of Fontenoy and Malplaquet, bronze mastodonts and

leviathans of an earlier age. Before I learned of his presence in my neighbourhood, he had left—he and his battery. He went away into the deserts of Mauretania, and there in the desolate tropical country that lies between the burning plains of Senegal and the sands of the Sahara, he spent three happy years. He sent home a little book—‘*Terres de soleil et de sommeil*’—which marked the awakening of his literary gift; but the real event of those three years, for Ernest, was his ardent conversion to the Catholic Church. Ernest was a mystic; the only life possible to his insatiable heart was the spiritual life; and in the Sacraments he sought that assurance of a world beyond our own, in constant communication with our own, which other minds may find by other means. He has left behind him a manuscript (which is to see the light this winter), a testimony of that inward flame of intense devotion, ‘*Le Voyage du Centurion*,’ a record of the Manna vouchsafed in the Desert.

It was, I think, in the end of 1912 that Ernest left that immense and mortal splendour of the Sahara and came back to France, bringing his sheaves with him, in the shape of a short military novel, ‘*L’Appel des Armes*,’ which (coming after Péguy’s elaborate pæan) received, on its publication in 1913, an honourable, a more than honourable welcome. Ernest Psichari’s fame must rest on this tiny volume, so full of inexperience, of an ardent evident *parti-pris*, but also of a sincerity, a living sensibility, a moral earnestness such that I would recommend it to the English reader (and I am sure there are many such) puzzled by the great spirit, the heroic steadfastness that the French have shown in this war, for which he finds little warrant in the ‘yellow-backs’ on his table. Among many others, this brief record of the mind and conscience of a young French officer is a *document à l’appui* of no mean value. It relates the story of a youth of twenty who turns from the Radical, humanitarian views of his father, the village schoolmaster, to find salvation (for it is, in his case, really a sort of religious conversion, a change of heart) as a soldier in Africa. And the reader will remark, here as also in the last novels of Emile Nolly, an almost mystical view of military matters recalling the recent German theories.

"Croyez bien," répondait Nangès, "que la force est toujours du côté du droit."

L'instituteur se récriait :

"Mais certainement," expliquait Timothée. "Qu'est-ce que la force? C'est l'intelligence, la ténacité, c'est la patience, c'est l'habileté, c'est le courage, c'est la volonté. Voilà, Vincent, les facteurs de la force. Voilà les fibres du tissu. Ne croyez-vous pas qu'avec toutes les vertus qui la composent, la force n'a pas de grandes chances d'avoir toujours le droit pour elle?"

'Naturellement, Vincent ne comprenait pas.'

Alas, how soon were events to show our young neophyte that intelligence, that tenacity—that patience, ingenuity, courage, force of will—that the most indisputable military qualities may be associated with inhuman, with indeed a devilish perversity! But Ernest did not live long enough to learn all the ripe iniquity of his enemy. He fell in the very beginning of the war, at Rossignol, on the frontiers of Luxembourg, midway between Virton and Montmédy—quite close to Sedan, in fact; and the Germans thought to make another great haul there. The fight at Rossignol was a sort of southern branch of that terrible battle of Charleroi which no living European can ever forget. The French commander, perceiving the ruse and danger of the enemy's plan, set on the low hill of Rossignol some twelve thousand men, with orders to hold the heights to the last man and shield the road beneath, where the French troops were passing in one constant stream; and the men who died there were not less heroic than those of Thermopylæ. Twelve thousand, they were; and I am told that scarce one of them lived to reach the French lines. They fought all day—thirteen hours—against a hundred thousand Germans, holding the passage (one cannot call it a pass, for the hills there are too low), and, towards evening, they saw on the horizon a moving grey mass, and thought for a moment that this meant reinforcements. Oh, despair! they were German reinforcements! I say, despair! for such a feeling indeed fills my breast in writing of this supreme deception; but the young officer who gave this account to Psichari's mother, affirms that even then (feeling how useful was the part they played) not despair but a noble exhilaration was the intimate feeling of those heroes on the hill. At last the

German army, creeping steadily nearer, and distant now by no more than thirty metres, prepared to take the last irreducible French batteries by assault. At this moment, Lieutenant X saw Ernest Psichari lead his Captain, grievously wounded, to the *poste de secours*, immediately returning to face the enemy. He came on with that quick half-racing, half-dancing step which the soldiers call the 'pas gymnastique,' on his face a bright excited smile, and ran with this springing gait to his battery, standing there a moment, still smiling, as he watched the oncoming mass. And then he fell right across his cannon—slipped heavily to the ground; a ball in the temple had shattered that young head, so full of dreams.

'Pourtant, dans sa grande peine, une consolation lui venait. Car il croyait que le sang des martyrs était utile. Sa conviction était que rien n'est perdu dans le monde, que tout se reporte et se retrouve au total; ainsi tous les actes sublimes des héros formaient pour lui une sorte de capital commun dont les intérêts se versaient obscurément sur des milliers d'âmes inconnues. Mais quand il pensait à ceux qui n'iaient cela dans sa patrie, alors il plissait les lèvres, il souriait, et quel mépris dans son sourire!' ('L'Appel des Armes,' p. 295.)

I think that Péguy never learned the death of his friend, for Charleroi, after all, was but a little while before the battle of the Marne, and news in those difficult days travelled so slowly. One of Péguy's last preoccupations was the hope of meeting Ernest on the road to battle; and in fact they must have been in Lorraine together, but no chance encounter by road or rail set the two friends face to face. They both set out in the same mood of heroic exaltation. 'Si je tombe (said Péguy) ne me pleurez pas; ce que je vais faire vaut trente ans de travail!' Thanks to the recital of one of his soldiers, Victor Boudon, we can witness the fall—or rather I would say the assumption—of the poet and brother of Joan of Arc. For he too fell in driving the invader out of France! There is an extraordinary breath of heroism in this page of an unknown private soldier relating the end of a great man. I cannot do better than translate it here, for the daily paper in which M. Barrès published it (though treasured by

many) is but a thing of the hour. I translate with some abridgements and suppressions :

'On the 5th September in the morning, the 55th division of the army of Paris was ranged on the left of the forces which had received the general order "Die where you stand, rather than retreat." In front of us, on the wooded hills that reach from Dammartin to Meaux, von Kluck and his Boches, who had followed us step by step from Roye during our terrible retreat, lay in wait for us, hidden in their trenches, like beasts of prey.

'The heat was tropical; the battalion halted a moment at the pretty village of Nantouillet. I see again, with the mind's eye, our dear Lieutenant Péguy, seated on a stone, white with dust (as indeed we all were), covered with sweat, his beard rough and shaggy, his eyes shining behind his pince-nez. Such he was, as we had seen him in Lorraine during the retreat, impervious to fatigue, brave under a storm of shells, going from one to another of his men with a cheering word for each throughout the whole length of our company (the 19th), sharing our rations (and we ate as a rule one day in three), never complaining despite his forty years, as young as the youngest, knowing just the right way to take the Parisians that we were, heartening the discouraged with a word, satirical enough sometimes, but more often a friendly quizzical quip, always brave, always an example; ah, yes! I see again our dear Lieutenant, bidding us fight in hope, raising our flagging spirits in an hour when many were near despairing, with the assurance of his own absolute confidence in our final victory.'

At last the sun began to slope towards evening; it was five o'clock. After four hours' incessant fire, the 75's had silenced the Prussian batteries on the ridge, and the infantry were ordered to attack their intrenchments. The black troops from Morocco, in what had seemed an invincible rush, had tried once, and failed. Now Péguy's company starts in skirmishing order; the German batteries are quiet, but when our men reach the ridge they are greeted by a storm of bullets. The ground is covered with tangled, down-trodden oats that catch the feet; and in front, just on a level with their heads, that burst of fire. Péguy's voice, ringing and glad, commands the assault: 'Feu! En avant!'

'Nous tirons comme des enragés, noirs de poudre, le fusil

nous brûlant les doigts. . . . Péguy est toujours debout, malgré nos cris de "Couchez-vous," glorieux fou dans sa bravoure. La plupart d'entre nous n'ont plus de sac, perdu lors de la retraite, et le sac, en ce moment, est un précieux abri. Et la voix du lieutenant crie toujours : "Tirez ! Tirez ! Nom de Dieu !" D'aucuns se plaignent : "Nous n'avons plus de sac, mon lieutenant, nous allons tous y passer !" "Ça ne fait rien ! (crie Péguy dans la tempête qui siffle). Moi non plus ! Je n'en ai pas, vous voyez. Tirez toujours !" Et il se dresse comme un défi à la mitraille, semblant appeler cette mort qu'il glorifiait dans ses vers. Au même instant, une balle meurtrière fracasse la tête de ce héros, brise ce front généreux et noble. Il est tombé, sans un cri, ayant eu l'ultime vision de la victoire proche ; et quand, cent mètres plus loin, bondissant comme un forcené, je jette derrière moi un rapide coup d'œil alarmé, j'aperçois là-bas, comme une tache noire au milieu de tant d'autres, le corps de ce brave, de notre cher lieutenant.'

It is strange how sorry I am that Péguy is gone, for, when he was alive, I think I did not much like Péguy. An odd little man with the look of a small farmer from the Loire—a farmer, a village schoolmaster, a country doctor, a curé even—there was something of all that in the refined and yet rather common little man with the bent shoulders, the charming hands, the square jowl, and the deep-set blue eyes whose glance was at once so keen and so gentle, often so quizzical, sometimes so mystically tender, and sometimes so irritable and angry.

'Un petit homme barbu (said Barrès) un paysan, sobre, poli, circonspect, défiant et doué du sens de l'amitié, bien campé sur la terre, et toujours prêt à partir en plein ciel. C'était un petit homme terne et lent, de qui se dégageait un merveilleux rayonnement.'

He seemed to me like some preaching friar of the Middle Ages, vowed to Dame Poverty ; and, for himself, content with a crust in his wallet—a wretched living picked up as he went along the roads—yet, where his Order was concerned, insatiable, a relentless beggar for the Love of God. Pitiless to any human hobby or pursuit of yours which did not square with that sublimer hobby and pursuit of his ; himself disinterested, and yet in his ardent piety as dauntless an intriguer as any



Jesuit of Eugène Sue's; cordial and frank by fits and starts, with that engaging air of rustic simplicity and popular plain-dealing, and, on the morrow, infinitely wily, full of craft, subtlety and innocent guile. I thought him, notwithstanding the mysterious, irradiating kindness which sometimes beamed from that wonderful glance of his, on the whole a crotchety creature, 'difficile à vivre,' with a temper full of sudden twists and turns and unsuspected asperities.

Admirable he was, nevertheless. Patient as a peasant and courageous as an apostle, wise and witty, bitter and gay, Péguy was full of sense and of charity—almost that rarest of geniuses, a saint—and failed there (remaining merely a poet and a hero) chiefly, perhaps, because of that insatiable vanity of his. He hungered and thirsted, not only after righteousness, but after praise. And I fear he never had his due share of it. There was something of Rousseau in the fiery little autodidact with his penetrating delicacy of sentiment, and that sore vanity of his, as touchy as a gouty foot which always fears the man across the way may stumble on it. When that aching place was hurt, the poet, so exquisite in his sense of friendship, so abundant in his recognition of any help received, would surprise those most who knew him best by certain restive little treacheries or morbid quarrels—the blemishes of a too sensitive temperament.

Despite this temperament, which was not great, there was something really great in Péguy. There was in him the most generous passion of rescue—the desire at all risks to rush in and save. The grandeur and misery of Man and his need of salvation was the great idea which dominated all his life. Péguy was a mystic. Time was nothing to him; and he was sincere in saying that an act of rescue such as that which cost him his life was worth a career of thirty years. Yes, Péguy was a mystic, and one of the real, the greater race, no romantic idealist, not at all vague or dreamy, but positive and practical and intensely alive to every detail, because every fact in nature (and indeed all the best things in industry and in art) appeared to him, in Meister Eckhart's phrase, 'the words of God,' and therefore infinitely precious and important. One day that his friend and mine, Daniel Halévy, that subtle and yet substantial critic, found him

reading Dante's 'Paradiso,' in view of a certain Mystery he meant to write—'Le Propre de l'Espérance' (and the part, the lot, of Hope is Paradise)—M. Halévy asked the audacious poet if those whirling worlds of Dante's and all those whorls of singing aureoled angels did not inspire him with at least a certain vertigo? 'Not at all (replied Péguy). My Paradise will be quite different.'

"Il y aura dans mon Paradis des choses réelles. . . . Toutes les cathédrales." . . . Et il faisait avec les deux mains le geste d'y poser quelque chose. "Je les y mettrai."

It was more or less Swedenborg's Paradise. In Péguy's eyes the soul vivified and transfigured and made alive all that it touched. Hence his utter incomprehension of all attempts to examine matter as such, his withering contempt for science and scientists, the scorn he would pour on those miserable insects, the 'puissants millepieds' of the University, in their laboratories and archives.

'Et ce ne sera pas ces distingués cloportes  
Qui viendront nous chercher dans notre enterrement. . . .  
Et ce ne sera pas par leur usage externe  
Que nous nous lèverons de notre pourriture;  
Mais la Foi qui nous sauve et seule nous discerne  
Saura nous retrouver dans la fange et l'ordure.'—('Eve.')

What discussions I have had with Daniel Halévy concerning the final value of this poem of 'Eve,' whose mighty jog-trot extends interminably over a length which exceeds the 'Odyssey' and the 'Iliad' together! My friend, to whose opinion I attach the greatest weight, insists on ranking Péguy with Victor Hugo for poetry and with Rabelais for prose!

Well, all that is vain; Péguy now will never fill his measure. His monument is a broken column, like those we see in cemeteries. In these brief passages of recollection, I may not even stay to point out the extraordinary design and intention of that column; nor to quote that prose, surely unlike any other prose, which creeps up, wave after wave, with infinite repetitions and overlappings, until, like the tide on the strand, it has submerged and sucked in all the subject it meant to cover. How, in two words, could I give an idea of that style? With its reiterated rhythms, its phrase answering phrase,

its fugue-like pursuit of an idea, it approaches the character of music. With its constant harking-back to one central thought, its evocations and resuscitation, it appears the unformulated tongue of meditation. Sometimes, to amuse myself, I have divided the genius of our contemporaries into those that are crystalline and those that are colloidal; and, of all, Péguy's is the most colloidal. But this, I fear, is no more clear than Péguy's prose itself.\*

For a threnody, let me merely quote those noble lines, now familiar to the soldiers of France, but which, until Péguy had fallen in battle, were lost in that vast storehouse of lumber and treasure, the poem of 'Eve':

'Heureux ceux qui sont morts dans une juste guerre! . . .  
Heureux ceux qui sont morts pour quatre coins de terre.

Que Dieu mette avec eux dans le juste plateau  
Ce qu'ils ont tant aimé: quelques grammes de terre;  
Un peu de cette vigne, un peu de ce coteau,  
Un peu de ce ravin sauvage et solitaire.

Mère, voici vos fils qui se sont tant battus.  
Qu'ils ne soient pas pesés comme Dieu pèse un ange:  
Que Dieu mette avec eux un peu de cette fange  
Qu'ils étaient en principe et sont redevenus. . . .

. . . Heureux ceux qui sont morts dans les grandes batailles  
Couchés dessus le sol à la face de Dieu. . . .'

The saints that Péguy sang were patriot saints—Geneviève, who saved Paris from the Huns; Jeanne, who delivered France from the invader. And his country was for him the outer robe of God.

About two years before the war, the French Academy (perhaps a little jealous of the popularity among the young of the two great unofficial Prizes, the 'Grand Prix Goncourt,' and the 'Prix Vie Heureuse,' each of which, every autumn, awards a sum of two hundred pounds to the best 'young' novel or poem of the year), the French Academy, I say, decided to offer an annual

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\* Any reader who wishes an introduction to the difficult genius of Péguy should read M. Daniel Halévy's essay on his friend in his volume 'Quelques Jeunes Maîtres': Rivière, 1914.

'Grand Prix de Littérature' of double that amount. And of course Péguy was a candidate for the prize—Péguy always out at elbows with his publishing and his philanthropy; Péguy with his genius, his courage, his independence, his activity—it seemed almost impossible not to award the prize to Péguy. Who was there to compete with him? Who else of his stature? No one, except perhaps Romain Rolland, six years older, far better known, and a recent Laureate of the 'Prix Vie Heureuse.' The new recompense seemed almost to have been invented for Péguy. And yet, on the other hand, how *could* the Academy crown Péguy? As well imagine Lord Tennyson wreathing with bays the forehead of Walt Whitman. The forty Immortals, however, solved the enigma; they gave the Great Prize of Literature, then for the first time bestowed, neither to Péguy, nor to any rival of Péguy's, but to a youth of two-and-twenty, quite unknown, an assistant master in a clerical school at Neuilly. His name was André Lafon.

He was the author of a pretty little novel, certainly extremely delicate and sensitive, which had fallen from the press almost unnoticed and which deserved a better fate, but not the Great Prize of Literature. It never struck me before that, in that struggle between David and Goliath, all the Giant's friends and backers must have thought the result horribly unjust to Goliath! A shepherd—that is how I see M. Lafon—a charming young shepherd strolling down Mount Olympus, to whom the Muse gave, half-smiling, a dew-bespangled branch of laurel; but, ere he could twist it into a crown, the wolf came ravening and made an end of him and it! It is not for his talent that I evoke the memory of André Lafon (though I have read and re-read 'L'Elève Gilles' with singular sympathy, and love the too-slender, charming little book), but few things seem to me more romantic than the destiny of this young man. In the spring of 1912 a solitary, a sensitive, young usher in a school—before the year was out, his name on every lip, his purse swollen with those blessed ten thousand francs, and his slim portfolio bursting with letters from publishers. He certainly was not a Byron (it generally is *not* the genius who 'wakes to find himself famous'); but that is always a romantic adventure, especially when two years later,

the young laureate fills a hero's grave. Had he a mother, still young, in some old house in the provinces, to glory in her son's miraculous achievement and to mourn the withering of her hopes? I often sit and think of the life and death of André Lafon, and so, to-night, although I knew him not, I tell a bead for him.

Another writer, the romance of whose career seemed no less in his gift than in his life, was Alain-Fournier. Henri Alain-Fournier leapt into being (from a literary point of view) in 1913 with a strange romantic little novel, 'Le Grand Meaulnes,' not of our time in the least, though without any affectation of archaism. It appears related far more nearly to George Sand's 'Petite Fadette,' or to Gérard de Nerval's 'Sylvie,' than to any Twentieth Century production; and I think the closest we can get to it in our own times would be one of the more poetical of Hardy's Wessex novels, before he fell into the tragic pessimism of 'Tess' or 'Jude.' The poetry, the fantasy, are all in the author's imagination; for what, I ask you, could be less romantic than the setting of his tale—a Training College for Primary Education (or rather a large village Board-School with a class reserved in this intention), even though it be situate in the very heart of Berry? And yet over every page of 'Le Grand Meaulnes' there slips and trembles the light that never was on sea or land. The heroes are two lads of fifteen and seventeen; and rarely has any author rendered more delicately the prestige of the big boy for the little boy, and the chivalrous half-mystic hero-worship in which he walks enveloped. More than once we think of Steerforth and of David Copperfield. In this novel (as in Thomas Hardy's) the mystery, the beauty, the wonderfulness of the every-day world transfigure the homely story, which is merely that of a schoolboy of seventeen who runs away from school, who misses his way and gets caught up in the whirl of a large country wedding at a quaint half-ruined manor-house whose name he does not know. Never again can he find that manor or that beautiful girl, who was the bridegroom's sister, with whom he has fallen in love. And at last his boy friend finds her for him; and the capricious, fascinating Meaulnes returns, marries his longed-for love, and deserts her on the

morrow, leaving her, for all companionship and consolation, the adoring devotion of his humble friend, who tells the story.

Something in the atmosphere of this book constantly recalls Madame Audoux's 'Marie-Claire.' Of course I know one swallow does not make a summer, but two are at least a presumption of mild weather (and indeed do not the Persians say: One rose is Spring?); so, putting one and one together, and comparing them with the country novels of Charles-Louis Philippe, I thought, when I read 'Le Grand Meaulnes,' that we were on the eve of a revival of the pastoral novel. There has always been a pastoral novel in France, because it is an agricultural country; when I came to live there eight-and-twenty years ago there was a pastoral novel of sorts, with Zola's 'La Terre' and Maupassant's Tales for its masterpieces, but how glum and coarse and ungracious! How unlike the French country as it appears to the dwellers therein! Any one could guess that Zola and Maupassant were men-of-letters in Paris. But with Alain-Fournier, and Marguerite Audoux, with Emile Guillaumin following rather lumpishly and prosaically in their wake (as Jasmin Delouche accompanied Seurel and le Grand Meaulnes), I foresaw a different revival, a novel of the pastoral centre of France, as poetical as René Bazin, but nearer to the humble facts of life, full of delicate loveliness, and yet quite free from conventions, disguising nothing.

And then the war broke out. Henri Alain-Fournier set out for Lorraine, a Lieutenant in the Reserve; on Aug. 22, 1914, he was reported missing. For many months, for nearly a year, the hope that dazzles so many tearful eyes—the hope that he was retained by the Germans a prisoner in the invaded provinces, from which no communication is allowed with France—sustained his family and friends and that portion of the public who, like myself, watched his career with sympathy. And then one day last summer I heard the sad story.

A young lieutenant, fresh from the Polytechnique, the son of one of my friends, fell in with Alain-Fournier during that month of victory and retreat on the frontier of Lorraine. The two young men, no less ardent in their intellectual energy than in their military theories,



recognised each other as kindred spirits; with a third (a young pastor, I think, or the son of a Protestant pastor) they used to meet o' nights, their day's work done, in a broken-down military motor-car, wrecked by the side of the road. I like to think of the three young officers, in those August nights—the immense French camp asleep all round them—as they sat till the dawn broke, like gipsies in their van, eagerly talking 'de omni re scibili.' In the daytime they generally saw little of each other; but, on Aug. 22, one of the two others, marching to the front, met Alain-Fournier and his men going in a contrary direction. 'Ordered to the rear! (he called out); no luck! Au revoir!'; and he passed on. It chanced that that day's engagement was a particularly murderous one, but the two friends when they met at night felt no anxiety about the third of their accustomed party, deeming him safe. And yet, when the dead were counted and buried, there was one figure, the head bashed in, whose limbs and hands had so great a resemblance with their friend that the young men felt a chill presentiment. They looked for the badge of identity; a wicked bayonet-thrust had purposely driven it into the breast. So haunting was their surmise that they cut it out; and the number on the battered, bloodstained plaque, which they could but uncertainly decipher, appeared to be the number of their friend. The rest is silence. Alain-Fournier has 'disappeared.'

The saddest fate of all, I think, was Emile Nolly's—to die so slowly and so painfully of his wounds, in hospital, while the fight in which he longed to join was raging, still undecided. No man had welcomed the war with greater enthusiasm than Captain Détanger. I was not in Paris on that August morning when he left for Lorraine, eager (he said) 'to water his horse in the Rhine.' But I had bidden him good speed a few years ago, when he set out for Morocco. Shall I ever forget the transfiguration of that moody, noble, saturnine face? or the gleam in the great light-grey eyes, so often sad, or even morose, and now lit with a wild joy? or the tall lithe figure striding feverishly up and down my little drawing-room while, in a torrent of eloquence,

the Captain tried to explain to my languid feminine imagination (which could only look on, and listen, and gasp in amazement) 'la joie du combat'! That campaign in Morocco brought him chiefly fatigue and disappointment, since he and his black troops had little fighting to do, and were chiefly employed in conveying from sandy desert to sandy desert the provisions and munitions needed on the front. It brought him also, however, the material for a fine book—a fine, bitter, disenchanted, weary yet energetic book, eminently characteristic of its writer—'Gens de Guerre au Maroc.'

One of his three fine books! It was not those, however, which brought him the celebrity, almost the fame, on which he was entering when he fell in battle. The ardent soul of Détanger had thrown his talent overboard, as a wandering apostle might fling from his wallet some useless bauble and go on unencumbered save by his staff and scrip. His last two books, the famous ones—'Le Chemin de la Victoire' and 'Le Conquérant'—have indeed little literary grace and no sort of style; they are like those varnished Images d'Epinal in cut-out coloured paper which bring to the humblest cottage a sort of symbol of the wars of Napoleon, of the glories of Turenne; or again, like the Stations of the Cross in some wayside church. They preach a truth so august, and in the author's eyes so necessary to salvation, that art is of little consequence, the one thing needful being to make the meaning plain. That meaning was the same in each: the saving grace of the Army, and the glorious fact that any young ne'er-do-well, any weak dilettante creature even, so he be brave and willing to consent to discipline, may find a personal salvation there, while building a bulwark of glory round his country.

I never really ventured to tell Emile Nolly what I thought of those books, so I said nothing about them—a language which he perfectly understood and accepted with that grim, not untender smile of his. No one better than he knew the charm of art and romance. And I imagine he felt a certain fierce pleasure in flinging all that to the winds, in order, as he thought, to be more useful, reach a wider public, and influence it with the directness of a popular sermon. What use, after all, was there in his two stories of Indo-China, or in 'Gens de

Guerre au Maroc'? They were inclined, if anything, to inspire a morbid pessimism. On the whole, it is the first of his novels which I shall most often re-read—'Hiên le Maboul,' a book so poignant, clear and mild in its sadness, that it haunts our imagination for years after the last page is closed. No one, perhaps, has so well expressed the peculiar beauty of Tonquin. When, after Egypt, Aden, Ceylon, the Frenchman reaches the Delta, his first instinctive expectation is of something stranger still; are we not here at the end of the world?

Ἐχθὸνός μεν ἐς τηλουρόν ἤκομεν πεδόν,  
Σκυθὴν ἐς οἶμον, ἄβατον εἰς ἐρημίαν.

But what is this grey land where the silvery winter sunshine floats veiled by an imperceptible haze? Is it Brittany? Or a misty March day in the *Landes*, when the sun shines? And see, that ruined tower set on the round breast of a hill, with the far-off scaurs and peaks in the background—is it Auvergne? Nor, in the character of the conquered people, does there appear at first the difference that separates the Frenchman from the solemn Arab or the barbarous Kanak; the Annamite, with his wide intelligence, his keen and quizzical wit, his love of hearth and home, his respect for tradition and his religious indifference, appears at once a man and a brother. A certain aloofness adds to his charm. Such was the new and yet half-familiar world with which Emile Nolly made us acquainted. 'Hiên le Maboul' is a yellow brother of Loti's 'Mon frère Yves.'

And yet, on reopening the charming book (so appealing in its tender hopelessness, its elegant sobriety), I find, even here, the Pragmatist apostle who wrote Nolly's later works! For what is the nexus of the novel? It is surely the despair of the young French Lieutenant when he finds himself impotent to save the native *tirailleur* who, in an hour of moral anguish, comes to ask his infallible superior 'les paroles qui guérissent.' Alas, with all his science, the 'Ancestor with the two stripes' does not know the words that save; his philosophy affords him nothing but idle formulas void of faith and healing. And thenceforth his whole system of civilisation seems to him wanting and inefficacious. For Hiên goes out in silence and hangs himself on a banyan-tree.

Since then Nolly had learned the words that save. He was, I think, no ardent Catholic, like Psichari or Péguy; but his faith in the destinies of human society, his conviction that the army of France is indeed a Salvation-army, not only for Frenchmen, but for his dear Senegalese, for black, red and yellow—every shade of skin or soul—gave him the persuasiveness of the men of Napoleon's army. And he went out into the highways and the byways and compelled them to come in.

And now these young men—so much younger than I who, in this dreary, holy season of All Souls, sit by my lonely fire and remember them—these young men with a future, as it seemed, are all dead for their country and for the faith that was in them. Their bodies lie in wayside tombs, or in the middle of the fields, with a rough cross over them and a name traced in ink that the autumn rains efface. And that name, which was beginning to shine in the literary record of their nation, that name which they looked to burnish in the course of the next thirty years, can now receive no further lustre. From the personal, individualist, point of view, their fame is sacrificed, even as their lives are sacrificed. They are mulcted in their works, as in their race, for, among them all, only Péguy, I think, was a father. And, so far as they knew, their immense suffering and sacrifice was in vain, since their country is not yet delivered and redeemed. They lie, perhaps, among those dreadful heaps which the shell at once agglomerates and scatters, and from which all individual difference is wiped out. So many of them! these five are but a sign and a sample! But we who remain and remember—may we persist, and endure; may we bring, and lay on their tombs the flags of that victory for which they paid the price the day they fell in battle.

MARY DUCLAUX.

# Art. 5.—AN ECONOMIC STOCKTAKING.

THE beginning of a New Year is an opportune time for taking stock of our financial and economic position. It is much too soon to put all the debit and credit items of the account against each other, nor can we think about striking a final balance; the most that can be usefully attempted is a collection of the materials which enable us to see where the nation stands after seventeen months of the costliest war ever known. In order to get a true perspective, it is necessary to marshal in due relation to each other facts and figures that are already more or less familiar. These are, however, of such great importance to every individual in the kingdom that a restatement of them for the purpose of estimating their combined effect on the national life may justify what might otherwise be considered needless repetition.

The most arresting—and in some respects the most disturbing—fact is, not the extent of the burdens that have to be borne, but the way in which the people are bearing them. We are committed to a gigantic and increasing expenditure. We have already virtually doubled our tax revenue. We have raised nearly a thousand millions by loans and are looking forward to further borrowing. We are importing munitions, food-stuffs and other produce from foreign countries at the rate of about a million sterling a day in excess of our exports. We are compelled to pay a higher price for nearly every item in the cost of living. We accept as inevitable the fact that the country will be called upon to make still heavier sacrifices, and that the iron grip of taxation will be more relentlessly tightened. Yet one looks in vain for signs of national distress. On nearly every hand there are indications that our burdens are being borne, not only without serious privation or suffering, but almost with an air of jaunty indifference. These conditions are, however, to some extent superficial, and are far from justifying an optimistic state of mind. The prosperity of which they seem to be evidence is, more or less, a fictitious prosperity.

Mainly as a result of the great flocking of artisans to the army, and of the extraordinary demand of munition factories for labour, there is very little unemployment;

skilled workmen as a body are earning more than they ever earned; and, although people with small fixed incomes and those dependent upon casual brain work are obliged to be thrifter, there are very few symptoms of economic pressure. Every one tells every one else that retrenchment has become imperative, but the serious rise in the cost of food has not, so far, greatly interfered with the people's power to purchase a good deal more than necessities. We are, indeed, confronted with the astonishing anomaly that, although economy is publicly urged on a scale which, a couple of years ago, would have been received with a cry of dismay—a scale involving for many of us a denial of agreeable and accustomed superfluities—and although the nation is supposed to be going through an austere discipline, yet there is less poverty than there was in peace time, and the cheerfulness and comfort of the people verge on the ostentatious. In many provincial districts, where Government work is plentiful and wages are high, there is a regular demand for the best qualities of food, irrespective of price; workmen are furnishing their homes anew, and the music-halls and moving-picture shows are crowded several times a week. That so many workpeople are, for the time being, living in a Canaan of abundance, is due to a considerable part of the money voted for the war being paid in wages within the country. The distribution of 1,200,000*l.* a week to the wives and dependants of soldiers and sailors, making many of them much better off than they ever were before, is another contributory to this high tide of pecuniary welfare. Whether such conditions of unusual industrial plenty are conducive to thrift, may be doubted. We have yet to ascertain the full effect of bringing the worker who earns over 50*s.* a week within the operation of the Income Tax. In view of the certainty of new War Loans and yet heavier taxation one would like to see more self-denial among those who, when the war is over, and perhaps before, may be faced with economic difficulties in an acute form.

Our national resources are great, but a strain at least equally great is being put upon them. People have become so habituated to reading about thousands of millions that the figures roll glibly off the tongue without any adequate idea of what they signify. Nor



is it easy to make our enormous expenditure intelligible except as it is brought home to the individual by the pressure of his personal share. It has been officially stated that the adjusted expenditure between April 1 and Nov. 6—about seven months of the current financial year—amounted to 743,100,000*l.*, which was thus apportioned:

	£
Army, Navy, and Munitions . . .	517,300,000
Repayments to Bank of England . .	104,000,000
Loans to Allies . . . . .	58,900,000)*
Loans to Dominions . . . . .	39,400,000
Food supplies . . . . .	23,500,000

On the basis of the proceeds of the new taxation and the estimated expenditure for the remaining five months, a deficit of 1,285,000,000*l.* is looked for on account of the current year. Although these calculations may have been upset by the inclusion of new areas of struggle, it is so far assumed that the deficits to be met by loans and taxation will by March 31, 1917, have reached a total of 3,056,000,000*l.*, thus made up:

	£
Realised deficit to May 31, 1915 . . . .	333,000,000
Estimated deficit for current financial year . .	1,285,000,000
Estimated deficit for 1916-17 . . . . .	1,438,000,000
	£3,056,000,000

Votes of credit amounting to 1,662,000,000*l.* have been passed by Parliament, of which 1,300,000,000*l.* is on account of the current financial year. The latest vote, one of 400,000,000*l.*, sanctioned in November, will carry the country up to the middle of February, provided that the expenditure does not exceed 5,000,000*l.* a day. It is evident that, since the combined deficits for last year and this amount to 1,618,000,000*l.*, of which only 950,000,000*l.* approximately has been raised by loan, another big loan, of not less than 500,000,000*l.*, will have to be issued at an early date. This accumulation of National Debt is a disagreeable necessity which cannot be avoided. There are limits to the capacity of the taxpayer; and, however right in theory it is to pay one's

\* For the whole of the current financial year the loans to foreign countries are estimated to reach the amount of 423,000,000*l.*

liabilities out of income, such heroic rectitude is impossible with an expenditure of nearly 2,000,000,000*l.* a year. The bulk of this must be met by loans; and loans involve interest and provision for repayment. Our existing War Loans, including our proportion of the Anglo-French External loan, are costing us nearly 43,000,000*l.* a year in interest alone, without counting the extra interest to be paid on converted stocks. When the war is over, we shall be lucky if this new burden and its consequent pressure of taxation do not become a serious handicap to the economic reconstruction that will require all our energies and resources.

In connexion with the question of expenditure, it is perhaps necessary to refer very briefly to the way in which it has been swollen by extravagant administration. This is admitted by leading members of the Government; and the only excuse put forward amounts to this—that in the rush and confusion of creating, training and equipping the new army, too much was left in the hands of military officers who lacked business experience, and that there was a complete absence of Treasury control. The loss to the nation can be faintly guessed at from the experience of one command alone, where (Mr H. W. Forster is the authority) reductions of rations after the public outcry resulted in the following savings in a single month: 800,000 lbs. of meat, one ton of mustard, one ton of pepper, 10 tons of salt, 10 tons of bread, and one ton of bacon, ‘and so forth.’ Nothing is to be gained now by harping upon these unfortunate mistakes. They have cost the country dear, but this may be said, that, if in the critical first months of the war things had had to stand still while an effective system of check and control was organised and put into working order, the chances are that we should never have got our army at all. The War Office is now relieved of much of the early pressure; it has had brought home to it the importance of thrift in administration; the Treasury is exercising a larger measure of control; and practical economies—though very late in the day—have been effected in several directions. This is a beginning, but only a beginning. There must be no repetition of wasted food scandals and spend-thrift contracts. Lord St Aldwyn, who has been a Chancellor of the Exchequer himself, says:

'Unless there are drastic economies in the Civil Service, and the expenditure of the Army is dealt with *in a way never yet attempted*, I do not think the issue of this war will be as successful as we all hope and intend it shall be.'

But no economies effected now can materially lessen the obligation of raising funds by loan. One consequence must be noticed, namely, that borrowing at increasing rates of interest will bring about a general lowering of investment values. Before the war, Colonial and British Government and municipal bonds, high-class debentures, and other so-called gilt-edged securities, bearing fixed rates of interest, were more or less valued in relation to the market price of Consols. The 'premier security,' as it was then, was the standard of valuation; and a simple rule-of-three sum, subject to modifications to meet exceptional circumstances, made calculation of the value almost automatic. The second War Loan, with its  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. interest, altered all this, and a 5 per cent. Loan will alter it still more. The higher the interest offered by Government on the security of the national credit, the lower must be the market value of securities formerly measured by Consols. This does not lessen their intrinsic investment worth, but it lowers their realisable value. Moreover, the shepherding of vast sums into a National Debt of unusual attractions will tend to higher rates of interest generally. A recent illustration of the new values is furnished in the South Australian Loan, which had to be offered at 99 with a 5 per cent. interest. But perhaps the most striking example is that of Consols, which, directly the minimum prohibition was removed, fell from 65 to  $57\frac{1}{2}$  and have only recovered a couple of points or so since.

There are still many securities protected by a minimum price; and not until this protection can be fully removed without risk to the interests of the banking world, and the conditions of dealing once more become normal, will it be possible to judge accurately of the permanent effects of the War Loans on all kinds of marketable property. For the present, it is certain that the expansive quality of the national wealth, measured by the return on capital, has undergone an important restriction, independently of that produced by the war itself.

This fall in values can hardly be a matter of indifference to the Treasury, since every estate will have to be valued for probate on the new basis, and the death-duties will be proportionately less.

Although it is proper to include these unfavourable points in an impartial review, it need not be inferred that the financial position is one to cause a feeling of despondency. It must not be forgotten that we have done two very big things: we have created an army on the Continental scale, and we have exercised to a huge extent our special function as the worlds' bankers. The figures quoted above show that a large part of our expenditure is accounted for by advances to our Allies. In strict book-keeping, these advances should be set on one side and treated as investments which, sooner or later, will come back to us in either meal or malt. Even without making this deduction the outlook is nothing like desperate; on the contrary, it compares favourably with that which troubled our forefathers at the time of the Napoleonic wars. It has been authoritatively stated that, on the basis of its income of 2,400,000,000*l.* in 1914, Great Britain could support a National Debt of 8,000,000,000*l.* with no greater burden on the people than was borne a hundred years ago. The estimated wealth of the British people in 1914 was 17,000,000,000*l.*,\* and the present debt of about 2,000,000,000*l.* represents less than 12 per cent. of that wealth; whereas in 1816 the National Debt amounted to 36 per cent. of the estimated wealth at that time. These comparisons show that we are yet a long way from rivalling our ancestors.

Taxation has not hitherto inflicted any intolerable hardship, although there are numerous instances of an inequitable incidence more than a little trying to the victims. It is estimated that the new tax revenue to be raised in the United Kingdom under the several War Budgets will amount, in a full year, to about 170,000,000*l.*, so that the whole revenue will be nearly double what it was in time of peace. Our Chancellors have hit out all round. No class has escaped. Direct and indirect taxation have been imposed with an equally unsparing hand.

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\* If the whole of the British Empire is considered, the capital wealth amounts roughly to 26,000,000,000*l.*, and its yearly income to 4,000,000,000*l.*

The income-tax payer whose income is earned has to pay 2s. 6d. in the pound instead of 9d. before the war; and he whose income is derived from investments, 3s. 6d. instead of 1s. 3d. The limit of exemption has been lowered in order to bring in everybody with an income of over 130l. a year. Large additions have been made to the super-tax; an extra halfpenny per half-pint has been put upon beer, and 3d. a gallon on motor-spirit; the tea-duty has been more than doubled; 50 per cent. has been added to the duty on tobacco, which now costs at least 1½d. an ounce more than it did; an addition has been made to the sugar duty, also to that on coffee, chicory and certain dried fruits.

The more fanatical Free Traders have been greatly perturbed by the imposition of an import duty on certain articles, more or less in the nature of luxuries—motor cars, cinema films, clocks and watches and musical instruments. It would be a good thing if this list were extended. The enormous preponderance of our imports over exports shows clearly that some drastic action is needed for restricting the purchase of foreign goods which are non-essentials. The most novel feature of the new taxation is that of 50 per cent. on excess profits. All businesses, public or private, except husbandry, whether engaged on war work or not, whose profits owing to improved trade or better prices have increased as compared with their pre-war average, are to hand over half of them to the State. This is a new and startling innovation; but, provided the machinery for preventing injustice acts smoothly, the principle of commandeering profits which are a result of war conditions is no more objectionable in principle than any other requisition made for the defence of the realm.

Looking at the scheme of taxation as a whole, the only real flaw in it is that the burden falls with unfair weight upon the middle-class man whose income is from 130l. to 300l. a year, that is, upon the man who is least able to bear it. He has to pay, directly and indirectly, more in proportion to his means than any other class of taxpayer. He is taxed in his income, his tea, his sugar, his tobacco, his beer, and in other things, just when the cost of living has gone up—when bread, meat, milk, cheese, butter, bacon and eggs have advanced by

as much as 30 per cent. or 40 per cent. It is the head of a family living on a meagre income from investment, the commercial clerk, the struggling professional man, and the small shopkeeper, who will be caught between the upper and nether millstones of direct and indirect taxation and will suffer most from enforced economies.

The inclusion in the income-tax levy of the working man earning 5*l.* or 6*l.* a week cannot be found fault with, whatever objections there may be to such a low limit as 50*s.* The country is 'bulging with wages' just now; and it is only fair that the well-paid artisan should contribute his direct share to the cost of the war. Reference has already been made to the favourable conditions of employment, which, at least while they last, guarantee a considerable addition to the revenue. These conditions, regarded only in a comparative sense, have never given less cause for anxiety. There is, in fact, no unemployment to speak of; and the amount paid weekly in wages is a proof of the well-being of the working-classes as a whole. According to the 'Labour Gazette,' 4,626,000 workpeople have during 1915 received an increase of wages at the rate of 786,800*l.* a week, or about 40,000,000*l.* a year; and this does not seem to include 30,000*l.* a week conceded as an additional war bonus to the railwaymen.

Nevertheless, one cannot regard this hectic flush of prosperity without a twinge of uneasiness. As already pointed out, the two causes that have produced it are the withdrawal from the ranks of industry of nearly two millions of able-bodied men to join the colours, and the demand for workers in connexion with the manufacture of munitions and other supplies for the Government. All this is unproductive labour; and, although it enables a vast number of people to earn good wages, and incidentally raises the price of labour all round, it adds nothing whatever to the nation's wealth and it has contributed very little to the War Loans. To the extent, indeed, that skilled labour is withdrawn from the production of exportable merchandise in order to be devoted to the paramount need of the moment, the country is so much the poorer. This is an unavoidable effect of war, and especially of such a war as this. It has been said over and over again, but repetition does not weaken the force of the dictum, that we are fighting for the liberties



of Europe and the cause of Civilisation, and that 'no price is too great to pay' for victory. And there is at least the qualification, amid all this appalling economic waste, that the industrial population is able to keep going, not only without symptoms of distress, but with evidences of material comfort, and, in some cases, of careless profusion.

So great has been the demand for labour that we have the novel experience of women being employed in work hitherto performed by men. In addition to about 150,000 engaged in war contracts, there are women ticket-collectors, booking-clerks, letter-carriers, lift-attendants, policemen, scavengers, grocer's assistants, tram and 'bus conductors, gardeners, chauffeurs, van-drivers and commissionaires; and, so far as one is able to judge, this feminine irruption is without detriment to private interests or the public service. One nevertheless shrinks from anticipating what will happen when the war is over and the men who were recruited for its duration are thrown back into the country to earn their living by industry. There is bound to be a great dislocation of labour in many quarters, if those who have fought and endured for us are not to be 'frozen out'—which in the past has been the too common reward of patriotism.

Meanwhile it is interesting to cast a backward glance and to realise how completely the anxieties with regard to labour that threatened at the beginning of the war have disappeared. It is worth while recalling the serious set-back that took place in August 1914. Taking, first, the trades that are associated with Trade Unions, the percentage of unemployment, which was 2·8 at the end of July, jumped to 7·1 at the end of the following month. It then dropped to 5·6 for September and to 4·4 for October. The highest of these figures had been frequently exceeded in periods of bad trade, and was much lower than that recorded during the national coal strike of 1912, when the percentage rose to 11·3. Another view is obtained from the figures which deal with unemployment in 'insured' trades. Here the percentage rose from 3·6 at the end of July 1914 to 6·2 at the end of August, but dropped to 5·4 at the end of September and to 4·2 at the end of October. The employers' returns, which it is also

necessary to include because they deal with the question of short time, record that the average number of days worked per week for August 1914 was 4.55 in coal-mining, 5.81 in iron-mining, and 5.82 in shale-mining. These rose respectively to 5.01, 5.82 and 5.89 for September; and for October the figures were 5.03, 5.69 and 5.88. After seeing how quickly industry recovered from the first blow of the war, it will be useful to compare the results of those eventful months of 1914 with the corresponding months of 1915:

	July.		August.		September.		October.	
	1914.	1915.	1914.	1915.	1914.	1915.	1914.	1915.
Trade Unionists unemployed . . .	2.8%	0.9%	7.1%	1.0%	5.9%	0.9%	4.4%	0.8%
Unemployed in 'Insured' trades . . .	3.6%	1.0%	6.2%	0.9%	5.4%	0.9%	4.2%	0.8%
<i>Employers' Returns.</i>								
Days per week in coal-mining . . .	5.01	4.98	4.55	5.61	5.01	5.64	5.03	5.65
Days per week in iron-mining . . .	5.58	5.62	5.81	5.76	5.82	5.90	5.69	5.88
Pig iron furnaces in blast . . .	255	264	255	267	259	268	270	266
Tin plate mills working	595	486	395	489	451	489	470	489

Further light is provided by the unemployment figures of the Board of Trade Labour Exchanges:

	In July.		In August.		In September.		In October.	
	1914.	1915.	1914.	1915.	1914.	1915.	1914.	1915.
No. of work-people on register at end of four weeks	112,622	99,773	194,580	97,790	207,429	93,080	157,248	105,083

The returns of casual pauperism are also instructive; for Oct. 29, 1914, they were 5770; for the corresponding date in 1915 they were only 3931, a decrease of over 34%. The official Labour figures, however, do not cover the whole field of unemployment and reduced income. There is a large class adversely affected by the war whose misfortunes are not tabulated or worked up into statistics,

and whose privations are not paraded to attract sympathy. In the musical and theatrical callings there has been a great deal of compulsory 'resting.' Literature, except that which deals with the war, and its handmaid journalism, have been severely hit. There has been an almost complete suspension of business on the Stock Exchange; and, although many members have joined the army, and others have voluntarily surrendered their membership for twelve months, those who are left scarcely earn enough in commissions to pay their office expenses. Jewellers, publishers, artists and picture-dealers, keepers of antique and bric-à-brac shops, fashionable milliners and modistes, and others concerned with the manufacture or sale of goods that can be dispensed with, find themselves in the unaccustomed circumstances of commercial stagnation, and driven to live upon their capital until things get better. More than three hundred industrial companies have either passed or reduced their dividends, thus diminishing the spending power of their shareholders. These instances of hardship are, however, exceptional. They do not invalidate the general conclusion as to the wage-earning opportunities and almost luxuriant industrial prosperity of the present time.

Statistics of unemployment are not the only test of the state of trade. The Board of Trade Returns of Exports and Imports are equally useful indicators. It is in some degree satisfactory to find that, in spite of the enormous volume of our imports as compared with exports, there is a fairly steady improvement in the latter. It is necessary to bear in mind the fact that trade had already shown a marked decline before the war. This was the natural and not unlooked-for reaction after two or three years of abnormal activity. The war, therefore, inflicted a blow upon an already weakened subject; and it is important to remember this, otherwise an exaggerated importance may be given to its earlier effects. Compared with the export figures for July 1913, those for July 1914 chronicled a slump in trade; and, in measuring the earlier months of the war period with the corresponding months of 1913, allowance must be made for the industrial slackness that had already set in. The position (in values) of our export trade can be shown best by means of a comparative table:

## EXPORTS, BRITISH.

	1913.	1914.	1915.
	£	£	£
January . . . . .	45,445,699	47,806,165	28,247,592
February . . . . .	40,172,743	41,261,797	26,176,937
March . . . . .	41,689,947	44,518,661	30,176,066
April . . . . .	43,052,589	39,946,822	32,169,733
May . . . . .	43,858,262	42,051,190	33,618,992
June . . . . .	42,836,568	39,872,976	33,233,568
July . . . . .	47,164,208	44,405,380	34,721,511
August . . . . .	44,110,729	24,211,271	32,438,855
September . . . . .	42,424,864	26,674,101	32,308,432
October . . . . .	46,622,699	28,601,815	31,968,965
November . . . . .	44,756,188	24,601,619	35,639,166
December . . . . .	49,326,920	26,278,928	—

Since the great drop of 20,000,000*l.* in August 1914, there has been a progressive recovery in the monthly returns. The total for the four months August to November 1915 shows an aggregate improvement of 28,266,612*l.* over the same four months of 1914. We are still a long way behind the normal, and must perforce remain so until labour can be liberated from war-work to take up once more, so far as the demand allows, the broken thread of productive industry.

No one can feel comfortable about the huge excess of our imports, more particularly as it has been estimated by Lord Devonport that the non-essential imports amount to from 50,000,000*l.* to 60,000,000*l.* a year. The following revised figures for May to October are those given by Mr Runciman in the House of Commons, and that for November 1915 is quoted from the last Board of Trade Return :

## EXCESS OF IMPORTS OVER EXPORTS.

	1914.	1915.
	£	£
May . . . . .	6,877,000	27,783,000
June . . . . .	9,655,000	33,534,000
July . . . . .	7,145,000	31,417,000
August . . . . .	13,712,000	29,734,000
September . . . . .	13,058,000	30,420,000
October . . . . .	15,598,000	28,661,000
November . . . . .	30,916,511	36,007,994

The declared imports and exports do not, however,

cover the whole ground. Undisclosed Government imports have to be taken into account; and these are estimated at about 10,000,000*l.* a month. On the basis of the eleven months' returns already known, there will be an adverse trade balance for the year of about 370,000,000*l.*; and if the Government imports are added, the total becomes 490,000,000*l.* for the current year. Against this must be put interest on foreign investments, profits on shipping and insurance, and credits for miscellaneous services, all of which may be classed as 'invisible exports.' Together, they are estimated to amount to 425,000,000*l.* Deducting this from the adverse trade balance, we reduce it to about 65,000,000*l.* net. This, however, takes no note of the Loans to Allies and Dominions, which certainly will not total less than 300,000,000*l.* for 1915, and, if brought into the calculation, will bring up the net adverse balance to nearly 400,000,000*l.*

One result of this excess of trade imports over exports has been to imperil seriously the gold reserve in the Bank of England. There is no need to repeat here the familiar story of Germany's gold accumulation in the Reichsbank, or to prolong the controversy as to its reality. Germany's overseas trade has been so effectively interfered with that she has not been called upon to experience the practical inconvenience of an adverse foreign balance. Hence her store of gold, whether it amounts to 122,000,000*l.* or not, has escaped a drain for foreign remittances like that which has weakened our own reserve and made necessary the exceptional and drastic remedy of a large external loan in co-operation with France. However helpful such treatment may promise to be in securing stability of exchange, it cannot be more than a temporary palliative. So long as the continuance of the war compels us to import for our own and our Allies' armies large quantities of commodities and munitions, we shall have this excess of imports over exports, which must be dealt with either by sending away gold, or by borrowing in the creditor countries, or by selling foreign securities; or, as is probable, by a combination of all three methods. The Government have, within the last month, prepared a plan for mobilising British-held American and Canadian securities, either by exchanging War Loan stock for

them, or by borrowing them at an improved rate of interest, and then utilising them in the United States or Canada as collateral security for further loans to meet exceptional demands.

There is also an internal aspect of this gold question. The obvious necessity of economising in our use of gold as currency led the Treasury a few months back to make a special appeal to the public to use paper money instead; and Mr McKenna subsequently emphasised this appeal by asking employers to pay wages in Treasury notes instead of in gold. When the currency notes were introduced, in the financial crisis of 1914, as an emergency measure—in order to avoid a suspension of the Bank Charter Act—it was foreseen by competent judges that this form of money had come to stay. Owing, however, to temporary laxity on the part of the banks, gold coins were served out freely; and the full utility of a small paper currency was impeded until the appeals just referred to reminded the banks of the effective assistance they were in a position to give. This temporary laxity was in marked contrast with the desperate methods adopted in Germany to gather all the Empire's gold into the Reichsbank; and it was equally in contrast with the patriotic action of the French people when invited to exchange their gold for paper and silver.

It is not easy to judge of the effect of the Treasury's appeal. In spite of a remarkable increase in the number of notes outstanding, the corresponding gold does not appear to have found its way into the Bank of England's reserve. There is, however, room for hope, if not for inference, that the scarcity of gold in circulation is due to an accumulation none the less effective because it is not in evidence. On June 30, 1915—the latest date for which official figures are given—the amount of gold coin (distinct from bullion) in the banks, including the Bank of England, was 110,200,000*l.*, and the estimated amount in the hands of the public was 75,000,000*l.* Since then there must have been considerable movements; and, if to the 185,200,000*l.* of coin are added the 28,500,000*l.* of gold ear-marked against the currency notes and the bar gold bought by the Bank that has not been coined, our total gold reserves cannot be far short of 230,000,000*l.*, notwithstanding that the proportion now in circulation



is certainly very much smaller than it was six months ago. It is interesting to note that for the two months of October and November last the net efflux of gold in coin and bullion, after crediting the gold purchases, amounted to very nearly 15,000,000*l*. This can only be regarded as a disappointing figure; and its unpleasantness is not lessened by an examination of the stocks of the national banks of the chief belligerents, and by comparing the position a month ago with what it was in July 1914 and at the end of November 1914. These comparisons, of course, are with the Bank of England's reserve alone, and do not allow for the other reserves in the country.

Bank of	July 1914.	Nov. 1914.	Nov. 1915.
	<i>£</i>	<i>£</i>	<i>£</i>
England . . . .	38,100,000	71,409,677*	51,238,669†
France . . . .	165,600,000	Not stated.	195,100,600
Russia (including reserve) abroad) . . . .	160,100,000	176,540,080	173,891,100
Germany . . . .	84,600,000	99,562,700	121,762,700

\* Not including the 14,500,000*l*. earmarked for currency notes.

† Not including the 28,500,000*l*. earmarked for currency notes.

This gold question is important, because the ratio of a country's gold reserve to its note circulation is one of the tests of its financial stability. According as this ratio is high or low, the country may be solvent or insolvent. The Bank of England's own note circulation (apart from the Treasury notes) automatically contracts or expands in a fixed proportion to the gold in its vaults. It rises or falls as the gold rises or falls; and inflation is impossible. Furthermore, the Bank of England's notes as well as the Treasury notes are convertible into gold on demand. Germany's gold reserve, though so much larger than our own, does not indicate anything like so strong a position. With an *inconvertible* note circulation of three times the amount of its gold, ultimate financial disaster cannot be avoided by anything short of a miracle.

No survey of our economic position would be complete without farther reference to the food question. The reader may be reminded that at the outset of the war there was a sudden jump in food prices as the result of

a housewives' panic. Stores and shops put up prices in the fear of a prospective scarcity; and at the same time thousands of householders in hysterical alarm gave orders for stores of provisions as if they were in immediate danger of a state of siege. There was also some apprehension founded on the nervousness of foreign shippers. The Government promptly came to the rescue with schemes for financial relief and the State insurance of hulls and cargoes. In addition, the Home Office took in hand the question of the food supplies. There were conferences with the representatives of the principal retailers; and measures were discussed for regulating prices. To meet the difficulties caused by the abnormal conditions, maximum retail cash prices were recommended; and the importation of sugar, one of the necessities of every household, was placed in the hands of a Royal Commission. Since then, however, the Government's vigilance appears to have relaxed until quite recently. There was no organised effort to deal with the transport difficulties which have been one of the factors in high prices. Congestion on the railways and at the docks, resulting from the requirements of the War Office and the Admiralty, has been the means of holding up ordinary goods traffic; and the scarcity of shipping tonnage and the resultant higher freights, together with a shortage of labour and extraordinary requisitions for the feeding of the Allied armies, have been other weighty influences in making food dearer.

In order to release ships for the importation of necessary foodstuffs, Orders in Council were issued in November giving effect to special steps for securing an adequate supply of shipping tonnage to be available in case of necessity. These orders prohibit British ships from carrying cargo from one foreign port to another foreign port unless licensed to do so, and give the Government power to requisition ships for the carriage of food supplies and other necessities. The need for some system of organisation grew out of the withdrawal of a vast volume of the world's shipping—not less than 7,000,000 or 8,000,000 tons—from the carrying trade. Whether the effect of the first of the two Orders in Council will be beneficial or injurious it is too soon to say. Some of the leading authorities on shipping are

inclined to think that their enforced withdrawal from that class of trade will only open the door to competitors, and that, once relinquished, it cannot be recovered. Considering that we possess nearly one half of the world's tonnage—more, indeed, than that if speed be taken into calculation—there does not seem to be much ground for apprehension, although the results of the new policy on the trade of rival countries will have to be carefully watched. The immediate purpose of relieving the shipping congestion will doubtless be achieved, and not a day too soon, when we hear of 6000 Welsh coal-miners being idle because coal exports are held up by lack of shipping. Another kind of congestion—that at the home ports—has seriously interfered with distribution; and a Committee was appointed to deal with it in November. A remedy for this particular difficulty was all the more urgent because it was an essential preliminary to any organisation of the mercantile shipping industry.

It is quite clear, though, that shortness of supplies has not been the only, or the main, cause of high prices. Here are the official figures of stocks of provisions at Liverpool on Aug. 1, 1915, and a year before:

	August 1914. Boxes.	August 1915. Boxes.
Bacon . . . .	11,743	35,298
Ham . . . . .	1,937	12,714
Shoulders . . .	509	6,547
Butter . . . .	1,831	1,939
Cheese . . . .	29,536	58,536

There was a corresponding increase in the stocks in the London docks. Take, for instance, cheese, which rose from 90,416 boxes in July 1914 to 185,878 boxes in last July. At the two principal ports, therefore, the stocks had more than doubled, yet the average price of cheese rose from 8*d.* to 1*s.* 2*d.* a lb., and the cheapest quality still shows an advance of about 25 per cent. Somebody must have been making a fine thing out of it.

After the first rapid rise of food prices in August 1914 there was a partial reaction, and by Sept. 12 they were approximately only 10 per cent. above the level of the previous July. Since then there has been another and

a general advance. The household food budget a couple of months ago was 26 per cent. more than it was at the corresponding date of 1914; that is to say, the cost of food had risen 43 per cent. since just before the war. The better qualities of meat, fish, eggs, butter, bacon and cheese are fetching prices that must be a severe tax to people of small incomes. Fish, in particular, is 100 per cent. dearer in the big towns, granulated sugar is 97 per cent. dearer, fresh eggs 77 per cent., chilled beef (flank) 70 per cent., frozen mutton (breast) 68 per cent., household flour 39 per cent., tea 50 per cent., bread 40 per cent., bacon 32 per cent., and fresh butter 31 per cent. Not only food, but coal, drugs, woollen goods, and rents in munition areas, have risen. It is fortunate that industrial activity enables so many of the working-classes to earn good wages with which they can pay the increased prices without too severe a strain. Mr McKenna, speaking in the House of Commons a little while ago, said: 'The fact is, the consuming power of the nation, notwithstanding the increased taxes, appears to be as great as ever.'

How long it may be possible to tell this flattering tale nobody knows. It may yet become necessary to put heavier taxes on tea and tobacco and to gather other household commodities into the fiscal net, with additional cost to the unhappy consumer. An extension of the war areas may make new and urgent demands upon our shipping, and neutralise, or at any rate lessen, the benefits contemplated by the new Orders in Council. We must not delude ourselves into the belief, or even encourage the hope, that the worst of our troubles are over, and that the rough places are suddenly going to be made smooth. There is no sign that the war is nearing its end, or that the pace of war expenditure will slacken. The dead weight of our debt must soon go very far beyond its present total of 2,000,000,000*l.*, and the annual interest far beyond 80,000,000*l.* There can be no pause in the energy or expenditure of the Allies until victory, decisive and complete, is achieved; and no shrinking from sacrifice must interfere with this sacred duty.

Britain's position as the world's monetary centre makes it inevitable that the greater part of the immediate financial burden should fall upon her shoulders. While

it is difficult to anticipate with any confidence what is going to happen in the next year or two, one thing is at least certain, namely, that we ought to be organising with a view to the development of our export trade directly the opening occurs. The almost daily reminders to 'concentrate on the war,' excellent though their object is, have the characteristic British fault of belittling, or pushing into the background, other important duties. We are late in nearly every enterprise we undertake, and more than once we have been too late. Putting every ounce of our strength and will into the war need not prevent a diligent study of the commercial map with the object of planning future action. Perhaps we ought to say 'present action,' for surely, if figures ever had any lesson to teach, this is the case with those of our foreign trade. It is a lesson of vital interest not only to the present generation, but to those who will come after. For on the growth of her industrial enterprise and manufacturing exports the future of Great Britain depends. Germany is wide enough awake, and is already preparing schemes for the recapture of her lost foreign trade. What are we doing? Mr Asquith has assured the House of Commons that 'a great deal of preliminary investigation is taking place,' and that he is fully alive to the urgency of exploring these problems by skilled experts in advance. This is, so far, encouraging, for if we sit down and fold our hands and wait till the war is over we may find that the golden opportunity has been lost. To win the war is not enough; we must be ready to 'take occasion by the hand' and win in the more prosaic fields of Peace and Commerce.

H. J. JENNINGS.

Art. 6.—SOUTH AFRICA AND HER GERMAN NEIGHBOUR.

1. *Correspondence on the subject of the proposed Naval and Military Expedition against German South-West Africa* (April 1915). [Cd. 7873.] Wyman.
2. *Report on the outbreak of the Rebellion and the policy of the Government with regard to its suppression* (April 1915). [Cd. 7874.] Wyman.
3. *Report on the outbreak of the Rebellion and the policy of the Government with regard to its suppression* [U. G. 10. 15]. Pretoria, 1915.
4. *The Germans and Africa. Their aims on the Dark Continent, and how they acquired their African colonies.* By Evans Lewin. Cassell, 1915.
5. *The Afrikaner Rebellion. South Africa to-day.* By J. K. O'Connor. Allen & Unwin, 1915.

THERE is one remarkable contrast between the attitude of Great Britain and that of South Africa before the outbreak of war in Europe. In England hardly any one expected war; in South Africa the Government appear to have been fully alive to the dangers. The Blue Book on the subject issued from Pretoria opens with the phrase, 'With many in this country (as elsewhere throughout the world) it had become an accepted belief that war between the two countries—England and Germany—was inevitable, and that at no distant date they would be engaged in a deadly struggle for supremacy.' Nor did South Africans fail to acquaint their friends in England with the grounds which led them to this conclusion, so that proposals were made during the sittings of the Imperial Conference of 1911 for co-operation between London and Pretoria should an emergency arise. General Smuts was appointed Minister of Defence, and carried through the Cape Town Parliament a carefully drafted Defence Bill, which has admirably served its purpose. The war, therefore, found South Africa ready, first of all, to release the British troops stationed at Cape Town, then to suppress a serious rebellion, and finally to beat a German army in South-West Africa.

The Protectorate known as German South-West



Africa was founded on certain treaties with the Bastaards, Hereros, and other natives, which were arranged by German missionaries, of whom the best known was a Pastor Büttner, who earned for himself the high-sounding title of 'Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the German Emperor.' Great Britain had recognised Germany's claims on the coast in 1884, and her protectorate over the hinterland in 1890; but the inexperienced German colonists and their rulers soon found difficulties in the management of the native tribes. In 1893 Hendrik Witboi broke out into rebellion; and in 1896 the Hotentots and Hereros rose in arms because the Germans refused to respect the natives' rights over land. Gradually, however, the blacks were dispossessed and driven back to less fertile districts, while anger and thirst for revenge filled their breasts. After the Boer war there arose still graver unrest among these natives. The Hereros' Chief had been persuaded to dispose of his tribal lands to some German speculators; and, although this transfer was contrary to native law and custom, the German authorities desired to enforce the bargain so as to have land for German immigrants. The Hereros presented a touching petition to the German Governor, begging that all their lands remaining to them should be set aside in reserves, as is done in parts of British South Africa. The Government accepted the proposal in theory but not in practice; and some very irregular methods were adopted for inducing the ousted native to become a manual labourer.

When, therefore, the great war broke out between the Germans and the Hereros, it was a cruel and bloody business. The natives began, as has always been their way in such cases, with an endeavour to exterminate the Germans by killing men, women and children; and reprisals of a gruesome character were thought necessary by the Germans. In spite of these reprisals, nothing would induce the Hereros to surrender. Proclamations of all sorts were issued; clemency and threats were tried; rewards were offered to other native tribes to capture the Herero Chief; the Herero women and children were driven away into British territory. At last the trouble and expense compelled the attention of the Reichstag. The Germans were then employing a well-equipped army

of 19,000 trained men with machine-guns and vast quantities of war stores. Debates took place at Berlin as to whether the expenditure was justified; and to all objections one reply was given which soothed all criticism, viz. that a possible war with England had also to be considered, so that military railways must be constructed and military stores piled up, to meet all emergencies.

It is difficult to say whether the Government were only excusing themselves for their failure to effect a reasonable settlement with the natives, or really had in mind even then a military expedition against Cape Colony. However that may be, the German Government was unable to conquer the Hereros. The native leaders would cross the borders into British territory, and from our side of the frontier they carried on a guerilla warfare which broke the spirit of the German soldiery. In 1907 the German Emperor found himself compelled to appeal to England for assistance against the natives; and the Colonial Office took the view that it was our duty to help the German Empire against the African native. They appealed to Cape Colony to send the Cape Police along the borderland; and in a short time the Herero leader, Marengo, was captured by Major Elliott, who was decorated by the Kaiser in honour of his exploit. This was surely evidence of our willingness to live at peace with Germany in South Africa. The Herero war caused unrest among our own natives, who were also disturbed by the Chinese miners, so that General Botha at the Imperial Conference (1907) proposed to our War Office a scheme whereby the British garrison should co-operate with civilians in case of trouble. Lord Methuen was then sent out to settle details; and this was the germ of the Union Defence Act (1912).

During the Boer war some of the Republicans had escaped across the frontier and urged Germany to come to the aid of their kinsmen. Had any one been able to form a coalition against this country, the request might have been granted; but attempts in this direction failed, and Germany had solid reasons for remaining neutral. The Boers were vexed that the Kaiser's telegram to President Kruger turned out to be a mere scrap of paper, but the local German colonists showed much kindness to the refugees; and there was plenty of work for them.

Among the Boers, however, there was never any widespread encouragement for the proposition of the Pan-Germans that they should effect a political entente with their Teutonic kinsmen in Germany. Religion was a far more powerful incentive to action among the Boers than race. The Huguenot element remained; and the Huguenots were never Germans. What the Boers understood was independence; and the old Batavian Government of Cape Colony had, therefore, quite as much difficulty in controlling them as the subsequent British Government. But the Afrikaner had no desire to substitute government from Holland, and still less from Berlin, for that of Great Britain. There was, moreover, far greater community of religious thought between the Boers and Scotland than between the Boers and Holland; and even to-day the young Afrikaner predikant is more disposed to take his theology from Presbyterian Scotland than from the modern Dutch School.

After the Treaty of Vereeniging in 1902 a further party of farmers, who had never taken the new oath of allegiance, trekked over the frontier to German ground. Germany recognised the advantage of increasing the population of the colony, so the movement was encouraged; and the result was the formation of a considerable Dutch colony within German territory. These new-comers kept up constant communication with their kinsmen in British territory, although hundreds of miles separated them from their old homes; and they continued to speak the Taal and to keep their old religion. At that time it was expected that the Anglo-Dutch feud, which was settled at Vereeniging, would blaze out again. All the clever German publicists foretold this and calculated on it. A reconciliation between the British and Dutch races was outside their purview; for history does not record that Germany has yet rallied to herself nationalities over whom she has established her sovereignty. They completely failed to observe that the vast majority of South Africans had made up their minds that the time had come to put an end to the grievous differences between two races which have so much in common. The forces which marched against the Germans in South-West Africa were about equally divided between English and Dutch, and there were no politics in camp. They

lost 250 men killed during the campaign, of whom half were of British and half of Dutch extraction.

Among the unreconciled Afrianders who found refuge in German South-West Africa was a friend of General De Wet, one Solomon G. Maritz, who had fought against us with some distinction in the North-Western Districts of Cape Colony during the Boer war. When the Hereros rose in rebellion against the hated rule of the Germans, Maritz took service under the Kaiser, organised the German transport, and secured the assistance of a number of competent Boers for this purpose. This brought him into close touch with the German Government and with other Boers who were settled in German territory. After the capture of Marengo, the Herero Chief, Maritz went back to the Orange Free State, which had by this time acquired its new constitution; and he now joined the Police Force. His aptitude earned him a commission on the staff of the Active Citizen Force, so that in 1912 he passed through the Military Training School at Bloemfontein, where he first began to prepare schemes for South African Independence.

Before this, however, he had been an extreme partisan of the Hertzog movement; and political influence gained for him in 1913 the command of his old district, in the north-western part of the Cape Province, where he had fought for the Boers and whence he could visit both his German and Free State friends. Maritz seems to have avoided taking any oath of allegiance; his view was that the Treaty of Vereeniging was not binding, because it was forced on the Boers against their will. He brooded on the 22,000 Boer women and children who died in the unfortunate Concentration Camps; and he maintained that the three million pounds voted to the Boers by the terms of the Peace Treaty had not been fairly administered by the Crown Colony Government, and that 'the Jingo section in England' were opposed to the national aspirations of the Afrianders.

At this time General Beyers, who was at the head of the Defence Force, made repeated and urgent recommendation that Maritz should receive the appointment of Lieut. Colonel in command of the Union Forces on the German frontier; and his wish prevailed. From

the very beginning of the war, Maritz seems to have been in correspondence with the Germans; and he subsequently admitted that for two years and a half he had been in communication with them. Like General Beyers, Maritz was tremendously impressed with the military arrangements of the Germans—their preparedness and their elaborate supply of arms and ammunition. He believed England no match for Germany; and, as he had fought against us and alongside the Germans, it must be admitted that he was not without experience. He seems to have been convinced that the Union Defence Force could not face the German regulars. His chief friend was one P. J. Joubert, who had fought by his side in the Boer war and who also owned a farm in German South-West Africa, whence he too visited the Free State. On the border Joubert was regarded as a German spy, yet Maritz appointed him Staff Captain.

At first all was quiet along the frontier, and Maritz seems to have recognised that everything depended on keeping up cordial relations between the Germans and Dutch—a game which the Germans play badly. So long as General Hertzog could preach peace and expound the sin of removing your neighbours' landmark, there was a large party, including some of the English, who acquiesced in the view that no great advantage would accrue by attacking the German Protectorate. But a tricky demon possessed the Germans. Prostrating themselves, as is their wont, before their national god *Ordnung*, they issued a regulation that all whites living in the south of their territory should pack up and move their cattle and belongings to the north. An Afriander family named Liebenberg did not comply with the order, but preferred to move over into British soil. The Germans insisted that they must stay in the Protectorate, and were stupid enough to send a police force to prevent their leaving. The Afrianders gave the patrol a warm reception; they fired and drove the police away and then safely crossed the frontier into Union territory. Maritz permitted the German police to follow them across, but to no purpose, for the Liebenbergs got clear away. This invasion of Union territory by German police in search of South African farmers really put the fat in the fire;

but for some time Maritz succeeded in concealing this invasion from the Cabinet.

Meanwhile events were happening on the Vaal as well as on the Orange river. There was living in the back-veldt a simple and illiterate farmer whose name was Nicolaas van Rensburg. He went by the name of 'Uncle Nicolaas'; and every one in the neighbourhood regarded him as possessed of the gift of second sight. He appears to have been wonderfully successful in foretelling certain important events which led up to the Peace of Vereeniging. His obvious sincerity and his persistent refusal to accept any benefit from his successful prophecies impressed not only the ordinary Boer, but even so influential a man as General De la Rey, concerning whom, for some years past, van Rensburg had announced a special vision. He saw a cloud with the number 15 on it. There was blood issuing from the cloud; and General De la Rey was seen returning home without a hat, followed by a carriage covered with flowers. Van Rensburg now prophesied a revolution, but he insisted that it would be complete and bloodless; not a shot would be fired. When he was pressed to explain the vision, he admitted that he did not fully understand it; and, when asked as to the exact time of the rebellion, he replied that it would be in God's time, a month sooner or later would make no difference. His friends, however, seemed determined to regard the 15th day of every month as of special importance; and on Saturday, Aug. 15, 1914, a meeting was called and General De la Rey was invited to explain to his friends the situation in Europe. He begged the people to remain cool and calm; and a resolution was carried unanimously expressing complete confidence in the Government. The effect of General De la Rey's speech was instantaneous. The burghers dispersed, and the movement seemed to be at an end. This obviously did not suit the men who were acting along with Maritz, and were making great play with van Rensburg's prophecy that there would be a bloodless revolution. By using this utterance, they persuaded a large number of burghers that there was nothing to fear from the Government, which would doubtless prefer to resign rather than fire on their own people. It was even suggested that the Ministers themselves might lead the revolution.



It was just at this time that the Imperial Government requested the Union Ministers to occupy German South-West Africa; and, when this became known, the Hertzogite party united on the cry of neutrality. They naturally made much capital out of the fact that the Germans had sheltered the Boers during the South African wars; and on Aug. 26 a Nationalist Congress was held at Pretoria to denounce the 'robbers' campaign.' General De la Rey was invited to address the Congress; and his appearance at a Nationalist meeting no doubt made a great impression, but his speech was strictly correct. He urged the supreme importance of South Africa showing a united front during the present time of crisis; and the Extremists were bitterly disappointed at his caution.

Matters were also moving rapidly in the Protectorate, where the Liebenberg business gave the Germans an inkling of the true sentiments of the Dutch; news was received of a German advance at Nakab, where they occupied a hill on Union territory so as to command a local waterhole. It afterwards became known that Maritz at this time paid a friendly visit to the Germans at their settlement called Warmbad; and, on his return to his post, he sent his friend Joubert off to Pretoria to see General Beyers, who had been charged by the Government to call out the Defence Force. The commandos were all assembled in camp, and arrangements were made for speeches to be delivered to the men on Sept. 15—van Rensburg's fateful fifteenth. Beyers set his heart on having De la Rey at this meeting, but the latter took no notice and even left for Cape Town, where Parliament was called for a special session. Beyers pleaded with De la Rey that he should come back to Pretoria, but the latter declined.

On Sept. 11 the South African Expeditionary Force sailed from Cape Town to attack the German Protectorate. It was the duty of the troops under Maritz's command to co-operate with General Lukin; and, as Maritz was under the command of General Beyers, the latter found himself compelled to choose between serving the King or resignation. On Sept. 14 he dictated his resignation as Commandant-General of the Defence Force; and there is evidence that even at this date he imagined his

movement would follow the Ulster precedent. He seems to have believed that everything depended on securing the support of General De la Rey, who, according to the favourable interpretation of van Rensburg's vision, was to play the principal part. De la Rey was now returning from Parliament, and on Sept. 15 had reached Johannesburg. Beyers, therefore, sent Joubert in his motor-car to Johannesburg to induce De la Rey to come on to Pretoria. His invitation was accepted, but there is no evidence that the General had at that time committed himself to the scheme proposed by Maritz. He arrived at Pretoria in the motor-car, and at seven o'clock the same evening the two Generals started on their way back to Johannesburg, which is over an hour's run.

The local police had had orders to capture three burglars known as the 'Foster gang,' who were trying to escape in a motor-car. Instructions had, therefore, been given to stop every motor-car containing three men. The car of General Beyers was challenged repeatedly, but he instructed his chauffeur to drive on without stopping. The chauffeur obeyed, the police fired, and General De la Rey was shot dead. When the news reached the Burghers, who had been told that General De la Rey would address them, it struck terror into their hearts—for van Rensburg's dream had received an interpretation which did not suit Maritz. Beyers had some difficulty in explaining his own views to the local commandos, but he lost no opportunity of stating his case for neutrality. Nothing was yet known by the Cabinet concerning Maritz's rebellion; and Beyers seemed to have decided to wait until Oct. 15 before taking any action. In the mean time every effort was being made by the Government to promote conferences and to give explanations to the men who were hesitating between loyalty to the Government and the influence of General Beyers in the Transvaal and General De Wet in the Free State; and the Government did not omit preparations for the situation which might arise if conciliation failed.

Maritz now began to remove the mask, and revealed to some of his closest friends that he had been in communication with the Governor of German South-West Africa with whom a definite plan of action had been

arranged. We are fortunately in possession of a copy of the agreement, though perhaps it was never formally executed. The copy is neither dated nor signed, but probably we may regard it as a draft agreed on between Maritz and the Governor, each of whom would no doubt trust to the honour of the other to see the clauses of this 'scrap of paper' duly executed if the desires of both parties were realised.

The preamble states that the agreement is made between the Imperial Governor, representing the German Emperor, and General Maritz, acting in the name of the officers and men who were prepared to declare the independence of South Africa. The terms were that Maritz was immediately to raise the standard of rebellion, whereupon Germany would recognise all Afriander forces fighting against England as belligerents and would support them in the struggle. The Governor undertook to use every means to secure the recognition by Germany of the independence of South Africa; and this would be included as part of the general conclusion of European peace. In consideration of the assistance which Germany would render to the newly formed State, Maritz agreed that Germany should take Walfisch Bay and the British Islands off the coast of German South-West Africa, and that the southern frontier of the German Colony should be moved to the centre of the Orange River instead of the North Bank. In return for this the German Empire undertook to permit the acquisition by independent South Africa of the Portuguese possession of Delagoa Bay. The last clause was that, if the insurrection proved a failure, the rebels proceeding to German territory should be regarded as German subjects.

It is therefore clear that all this time Maritz was putting forward any excuse to justify a rebellion which he had long been contemplating. There was first of all the plea that the European war had no concern with South Africa, which might well remain neutral. Maritz himself exploded this theory by permitting the Germans to cross the frontier in order to fetch back the recalcitrant Afrianders who were determined to leave German territory when war seemed possible. A second pretext was that the Government were going to commandeer

burghers for service in German South-West Africa, and that it would be illegal for the Government to utilise its powers under the Defence Act for an attack on a neighbouring territory. It was on these grounds that Maritz persuaded his own commando to follow him. There was, in reality, no truth in this statement, for from the outset the Government made it quite clear that they would only rely on volunteers for service in German South-West Africa.

It was also urged that Germany was bound to win in Europe, and therefore the Boers were safe in throwing off the British yoke. In order to substantiate this argument it seems that the wildest possible statements were put forward regarding the success of German arms in Europe. A certain Mr Oost, who was at one time Secretary to General De Wet, made a practice of visiting the camp-fires of the various commandos every night in order to give them the latest news from Europe. It is not known how Mr Oost received his information concerning the capture of Paris and London, but it is not improbable that the wireless station at Windhoek was the means of stimulating his fantastic imagination.

On Oct. 6 a man was arrested at Kroonstadt in the Free State for using seditious language. This was Mr J. J. Smit, another of the Boers who had taken refuge in German South-West Africa after the Vereeniging Peace; and he was working with Maritz and Joubert. His business seems to have been to fan the rebellion in the Free State; but he was a clumsy person who did his work badly, and garrulously blurted out to a Mr De Wet, who was a loyal South African, that Maritz had promised to join the Germans when the proper time came, and that he had arranged this with the Germans for the last three years. Smit had just arrived from German South-West Africa and had seen Maritz on his way, and was then sent by Maritz into the Free State. He also boasted with much detail that he had told General Botha a lot of lies in order to put him off the track; if, however, we may judge from the fact that Smit was arrested and Major Enslin had been despatched from Pretoria to the German frontier to act as Chief of Staff to Maritz, the lies seem to have had an exactly contrary effect from what was intended.

Major Enslin, who is an experienced soldier and served on General Botha's Staff during the Boer war, at once found himself in a position of great difficulty; and the British and Union Governments owe him a great debt for the masterly way in which he managed to save an extremely dangerous situation. He succeeded at last in communicating the exact relations between Maritz and the German Government to General Botha, who then recalled Maritz. Maritz refused to obey the order from Headquarters, and, standing on a box, he addressed his commando and told them boldly of the contract he had made with the Government of German South-West Africa. He then divested himself of his distinction marks as an English Lieut. Colonel, and said he would shed his blood for his country. His men at once rallied to his side and appointed him Commandant General for the Cape Province and head of the Government of the North-Western District. Those who refused to join were taken prisoners and sent over to the Germans.

Thus the die was cast; and it remained for Maritz now to insure a real rebellion. He at once made a public appeal for support to Generals Hertzog, Beyers, De Wet, Kemp and Muller. This appeal caused consternation in the minds of the men mentioned, who were none of them prepared for the move. The Government responded by proclaiming Martial Law; but Maritz had managed to communicate to his supporters in the Free State and in the Transvaal the fact that Germany was placing at his disposal money, ammunition and guns. General De Wet visited Mr Hertzog, and appears to have differed with him as to what action should be taken, for the soldier instinctively knew that the psychological moment had come for action, whereas Hertzog was clearly of opinion that the rebellion might fail. A meeting was accordingly called in the dining-room of a Dutch Reformed Minister, named Ferreira. There were present a number of Herzogite members of the Legislative Assembly, some Dutch Reformed Preachers, and a number of soldiers who had seen service in the Boer war. General De Wet took the chair and told the meeting that Maritz was already fighting and had plenty of money and arms. Some one asked, 'Where are Generals Beyers and Hertzog?' De Wet replied that he had seen Hertzog the day

before and that he thought it better not to come to that meeting. De Wet added a remark which indicated his frame of mind. He said, 'Hertzog is not a soldier—he is only a lawyer.' There was a difference of opinion at the meeting as to what should be done. Some were for following the example of Ulster and others for a deputation to the Government, while De Wet was for fighting at once. As a matter of fact each party took its own course, for the clergymen went on the deputation; and, when they had left the room, De Wet called the soldiers together to a war council and took no further notice of those who were for conciliatory methods.

There can be no doubt that Beyers and De Wet were largely influenced by a chivalrous feeling that they could not leave their young colleague Maritz in the lurch, so on Oct. 29 they issued a joint protest against the invasion of German South-West Africa and the proclamation of Martial Law. They also announced their belief that God's curse would fall on the country if the Government carried out its determination to conquer the German territory; and they called on all burghers to refuse to fight against the Germans. Great play was made all this time with the idea that the protest was based on the Ulster precedent. General Beyers insisted that this was an 'armed protest' against the entry of South Africa into the European war; but De Wet did not understand the distinction between open warfare and armed protest. He understood war, he advocated war, and he made war. He flouted even the suggestions of ex-President Steyn that there should be a conference, and without further delay proceeded to commandeer men and material, announcing his intention to join Maritz and then to capture Pretoria.

This put an end to further hair-splitting; General Beyers had to choose between De Wet and the Government. It was no doubt a tight corner, but he made up his mind that he must unite his forces with De Wet; so he brushed aside all further observance of the law and tried to push his way through the Government forces into the Free State. He was at once defeated by General Botha, losing half his men as prisoners at this first encounter. As he had been head of the Defence Force, many of these men probably thought they were obeying



Government orders in following his word of command, for his subordinates continued to use official forms for their work. Meanwhile the Government had secured a body of Rhodesian volunteers to protect Bloemfontein, where the rebellion might have assumed serious proportions. It is estimated that De Wet had succeeded in gathering round him a body of no less than 5000 men, and he openly twitted the Government with their ridiculous efforts to treat with rebels. But it was an empty boast. General Beyers met his end in the Vaal; and on Nov. 12 Botha attacked De Wet at Mushroom Valley and drove him in headlong flight from the field. De Wet at once changed his tune and now desired a conference, asking President Steyn to put forward the request. Meanwhile surrenders began to take place, 700 prisoners being taken on one occasion and 200 more on another; so that many of the leaders, who had been bamboozled by the chatter about Ulster decided to throw over their Commander-in-Chief. They first asked to be allowed to see him, and, when this was refused and they were told that only unconditional surrender was acceptable, they laid down their arms. Within a month after Mushroom Valley the remainder of the malcontents either surrendered or were captured. As for Maritz, the Government forces had marched too quickly for him, and he was speedily driven over the frontier. Here he proceeded to fall out with his German allies, ultimately taking refuge with the Portuguese.

Meanwhile matters were not in *Ordnung* in the Protectorate. There is no doubt that the drastic military system, which has met with such remarkable success in the Fatherland, failed to enlist the sympathies of the German population in the freer air of South Africa. The Dutch who had settled among them were the first to resent the order to fight against their own country, even if they imagined their own country to be in the wrong. Many of the natives in German territory also desired to take refuge on British soil. They were fiercely ordered to retire inland with their families, their stock and their property, for the Germans could not trust them out of their sight. They had good reason to fear that the natives would give the advancing British troops

information concerning the movements of their German conquerors, the situation of their strongholds, the position of water supplies and grazing lands. It was also the intention of the Germans to compel natives to exchange their cattle for German paper money, as provisions were cut off by the British Navy; but this became known to the natives and they refused compliance.

When our troops reached the frontier, two escaped Hottentots approached and offered themselves as prisoners. At first they were regarded with suspicion, as it was thought that they were acting in collusion with the Germans. However, the information they furnished was over and over again proved to be accurate. They correctly stated the position of the German army, the nature of their artillery and machine-guns, and their plans with regard to supplies of food; and when a large British force was stationed at Dassiefontein, two more Hottentots allowed themselves to be captured and supplied information concerning the position and artillery of the Germans south of Keetmanshoop. Once more the information proved correct, and they remained with the Union forces. When they were offered the position of guides to the British troops they readily accepted the offer, showing the utmost zeal in helping us against the German Government, which had treated them in so scandalous a fashion. They were able to speak a few words of Dutch, which was sufficient for practical purposes; and it is not without interest that, as they marched alongside of our troops through the German territory, they were able to point out numbers of graves of German soldiers who had fallen during the great Hottentot rebellion against the German Government. Their one fear was lest we should allow them to fall once more into the hands of the Germans. For this reason they always refused to scout; and one of them admitted that the Germans had placed a price upon his head. Three of his tribe were actually caught by the Germans and hanged on a tree, which was photographed with the bodies suspended therefrom; and the photograph was circulated as a warning to other Hottentots.

The military campaign, which ended so gloriously for the South African arms, will not be understood unless at the same time we regard it as the climax of the failure of

German Crown Colony government. The population of the German Protectorate was divided into three sections. There was first of all the military element; secondly, the German settlers, tradesmen and farmers; and thirdly the natives. From the outset Berlin has been annoyed by the demand of the German colonists to have a voice in the government of the territory; and there have been continual quarrels between the farmers and the German authorities. When the Union Forces landed at Lüderitzbucht, no opposition was offered by the local colonists, who sent a Dane to the German Governor explaining their desire to surrender the town to the British; and, wherever the Union Forces went, they found Europeans ready to accept the new Government. The German colonist in South-West Africa had during all these years before his eyes an object-lesson in British South Africa, which proved the superiority of British colonial methods to those adopted at Berlin; while the finances of the German Protectorate were clogged by the immense weight of military expenditure, which not only roused opposition to colonial demands in the Reichstag but imposed heavy burdens on the colonist.

The increasing trade between the German Protectorate and the Cape, and the ever-growing tendency of the German settlers to visit Cape Town, to associate with its citizens, and to send their children to its schools, made for community of interest among all South Africans. At the German Club in Cape Town the social distinction between the military and the commercial man does not exist. The German newspaper published at Cape Town was a constant and persistent opponent of the Pan-German views published in the 'Hamburger Nachrichten' and other German papers. Slowly but surely there was growing up under the German flag a local patriotism which in another generation would certainly have exploded in a demand for local government. On the other hand, the native wars had left so deep an impression on the native that he refused to adapt himself to the new conditions and remained the implacable enemy of the German Administration, so that the soldiers were really needed to hold him down. One result of this state of affairs was that the railways of the Colony were built by Cape natives brought from Cape Town under contract; and

high wages had to be paid to induce them to come. There they told the local natives of the better land under the Union Jack.

According to the South African Constitution the Parliamentary elections had to be held before November 1915. Five parties had placed candidates before the electorate of South Africa when the polling took place on Oct. 20—the South African Party, the Unionists, the Nationalists, the Labour Party, and the International Socialists. The South African Party, headed by General Botha, took its stand on the doctrines on which the Union of South Africa was founded. It stood for the fusion of the British and Dutch races on the basis of the Treaty of Vereeniging. The Prime Minister said that he had undertaken to suppress the recent rebellion in order to save the honour of those who had sworn allegiance to the British Crown as one of the clauses of a solemn pact between the two races. His party announced that they would loyally discharge their obligations to the Empire, and would maintain the constitution which had been framed by South Africans for the purpose of insuring the continuance of peaceful, orderly and prosperous development. In reply to a Nationalist candidate, who opposed General Smuts' return for Pretoria West, the Government declared that, if the Nationalists again made 'an armed protest,' they would not hesitate once more to declare Martial Law; and even before the elections took place they went so far as to prohibit the sale of rifles and ammunition in the Orange Free State.

Sir Thomas Smartt, the Unionist Leader, was in general agreement with the Government policy, but he was prepared to go further in certain particulars. He announced that the Unionists stood for the retention and for the strengthening of the Imperial tie between Great Britain and the Union of South Africa.

The Nationalist Party, headed by General Hertzog, obviously had great difficulties in formulating a programme; but the common motto of the party throughout the Union was 'South Africa First,' and they criticised certain schemes of Imperial Federation which had been propounded in England. General Hertzog, however, while demanding an amnesty for the rebels, announced

himself in favour of retaining German South-West Africa after the conquest had been made. At a party congress in December 1913, General De Wet had put forward a curious scheme for getting over all difficulties within the South African Party, according to which the present Government should resign and ex-President Steyn should be invited to select a Prime Minister under whom all the leaders of the Afrikaner population could serve. It was never disclosed who this heaven-born leader was likely to be, and probably we shall never know, for the fantastic scheme was defeated then and there.

The Labour Party was split from top to bottom by the war. Mr Creswell, the old leader, joined the forces to fight in German South-West Africa; and the party grievances against the Government in respect of the drastic suppression of the Johannesburg strikes seem to have been forgotten. The taxation of land values, which would otherwise have been popular, did not interest the electors. The South African Labourites appear to have desired before everything else to insure the victory of their own country. The official organisation was split between Mr Creswell, who supported the Government policy, and Mr Andrews, who raised the standard of International Socialism.

The results of the elections are as follows:

South African Party	.	.	.	60	seats.
Unionists	.	.	.	40	"
Nationalists	.	.	.	27	"
Labour	.	.	.	3	"
International Socialists	.	.	.	0	"
				130	"

Among the South African Party are included six Independent Unionists, who advocated the abandonment of Unionism in favour of the South African Party. The party has thus become in reality a fusion between British and Dutch elements.

Among the Nationalist candidates there were seven elected in Cape Colony, all of whom urged reconciliation between the two wings of the old Dutch Party. They were not pledged to follow General Hertzog, and their programme was far more moderate than that put forward

in the Orange Free State, so that it is doubtful how far General Hertzog can rely on their support in Parliament.

Both Mr Creswell and Mr Andrews lost their seats; and the circumstances of the moment made it impossible to arrange the expected working agreement between the Nationalists and the Labour Party. The coloured electorate in Cape Colony supported the Government, for to them the conquest of the German Protectorate implied the liberation of the local natives from a tyranny. With the exception of one seat at Bloemfontein, General Hertzog swept the board in his own province, though some of his majorities were small. The Unionists lost ground to the South African Party in the province of Natal; and Mr Merriman has strengthened his position in the South African Party by winning a wonderful victory at Stellenbosch, which is the intellectual centre of the Afrikaner propaganda.

These results have enabled the Government to continue in office, although in fact they have not a majority over all parties combined. The South African Party is a centre block; and neither Unionists nor Nationalists dare turn out the Government, as there is no other organisation which can give South Africa the stable government it requires.

The problems which face the Union are very different from those facing a European community. The Native question must be solved; the whole commercial organisation of South Africa depends for its existence on European markets; and before another election takes place there must be a solution of three grave external problems, viz. (1) the government of the Protectorate of German South-West Africa, (2) the relations with Rhodesia, and (3) the renewal of the Mozambique Convention concerning Delagoa Bay, which expires in 1919. The Imperial Government has promised that South Africa shall be consulted on all these problems; and the result of the recent elections will ensure for Pretoria a powerful voice in their settlement.

R. C. HAWKIN.



## Art. 7.—WAR RELIEF AND WAR SERVICE.

1. *Memorandum on the steps taken for the Prevention and Relief of Distress due to the War, 1914.* [Cd. 7603.] Wyman, 1915.
2. *Report of the Administration of the Relief Fund up to 31st March, 1915.* [Cd. 7756.] Wyman, 1915.
3. *Interim Report of the Central Committee on Women's Employment.* [Cd. 7848.] Wyman, 1915.
4. *Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories.* Chap. IV, 'Women and Girls in Industry,' by Miss Anderson, H.M. Principal Lady Inspector of Factories. Wyman, 1915.
5. *Proceedings of Conference on War Relief and Personal Saving.* London, June 10, 11, 12, 1915.
6. *War Distress and War Help. A short catalogue of the leading War Help Societies.* By Helen Donald Smith. Murray, 1915.

IN August 1914 the mobilisation of the Fleet and the Army were accompanied by the almost equally rapid voluntary mobilisation of the civil population, intent on doing, and doing promptly, what in them lay to help the nation successfully through the tremendous struggle which lay before it. The practical sense of the nation at large realised at once when the war broke out that the country was involved in the greatest struggle known in its history—a life-and-death grapple with the greatest military power in the world. Faced by this tremendous task, every man and woman in this country asked the question, 'What can I do?' The young men answered in millions by joining the army and navy. Doctors, both men and women, answered by serving in war hospitals and field ambulances. Nurses, of course, had an equally ready answer. Young men on their way to training camps, and doctors and nurses, were among the comparatively small number of people who at the beginning of the war looked happy and satisfied, because they had found an obvious and certain way of helping their country through its great struggle. But the mass of men over military age, the women who were neither doctors nor nurses—what could they do? The answer

to this question quickly narrowed itself down to 'money or personal service, or both.'

The way in which this call to help the country was answered covers an immense field of activity. It will be impossible here to give anything like a complete survey of it. Only a few of the chief points can be indicated. The number of societies founded for the express purpose of doing war work is immense; and to them must be added societies of old standing which have either suspended their ordinary work or diverted it into new channels in order to help war distress or render war service. Miss Donald Smith's little book, giving names and addresses of societies of both types, enumerates 147 societies; but omissions will be readily detected by almost anyone who has had practical experience of war-relief work. This criticism detracts little from the value of Miss Donald Smith's compilation. A new edition of such a list would be needed at least once a month if it is to keep pace with the facts.

The first place in any account of War Relief must be given to the National Relief Fund founded by the Prince of Wales. War was declared at midnight on Aug. 4 and this fund was opened on Aug. 6. The co-operation of Lord Mayors, Mayors, and Chairmen of County Councils and Urban District Councils was invited; and they were requested to form Local Representative Committees to deal with the prevention and relief of distress owing to the war. The fund rapidly grew to very large proportions. It is probably the largest ever raised by voluntary contributions. In November 1915 it amounted to 5,615,905*l.*, of which a little less than half (2,673,000*l.*) had been allocated to various objects.

On Aug. 4, 1914, a letter was addressed by the Local Government Board to the Central (Unemployed) Body for London, asking, in view of the probability of serious lack of employment and dislocation of trade in consequence of the war, that schemes of work should be formulated for dealing with such an emergency. The result proved, however, that the distress among the general population was much less than had at first been feared. The absorption of large numbers of men in the new army partly accounted for this; and the demand on the part of the Government and the Governments of

our Allies for clothing and military stores of all kinds caused abnormal activity in many trades, calling for a corresponding demand for labour. Unemployment among men was quickly reduced to a very low figure. There was never any need for the opening of relief work for men; but for a time there was acute distress among women, especially those who had been employed in the luxury trades. The closing of the Stock Exchange also threw a large number of typists and shorthand writers (mainly women) out of work. Many such women, continually living as they did below the poverty line, were desperately hard hit by the war.

In September and October 1914, while the percentage of unemployed men registered at the Labour Exchanges was relatively small, the percentage of unemployed women was four times as great as usual. Gradually, however, the prospect for these women also brightened. The Queen opened her Work for Women Fund; and a committee was formed to administer it, to deal with the problem of the displacement of women's labour, and to devise schemes for its relief. The greatest and most widely reaching relief came, however, from another source—the placing of army orders in various trades on a quite unprecedented scale. Government orders for socks, shirts, boots, the production of cloth, the making of uniforms by the million, the packing of army stores, the production of munitions, caused an immense new demand for labour from both men and women, with the result that unemployment caused by the war was wiped out with comparative rapidity by new employment, also caused by the war. The manufacturing districts of England were worked to their fullest extent in supplying the needs not only of our own army but also of the armies of our Allies; for instance, it has recently been stated that the Allied Governments had placed orders in the textile districts of Lancashire and Yorkshire for 43,000,000 yards of cloth.

We do not overlook the fact that the ultimate economic result of this war expenditure tends to destruction of wealth rather than its production; but for the moment the problem of unemployment ceased to exist. In September 1915, after fourteen months of war, the rate of unemployment registered at Labour Exchanges

was only  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., the lowest on record. Throughout the year it fell continuously. There was a set-off against this, so far as the prosperity of the working classes was concerned, of a rise in prices; but it was computed that the sum paid in wages had risen by the end of July 1915 by 369,635*l.* weekly, and by the end of October by 519,484*l.*\* At the outset of the war this had not been foreseen; and almost every one anticipated more widely extended and far more severe economic distress than was actually experienced. It was to deal with this expected distress that the National Relief Fund was opened, and a large amount of private effort was also made.

The main principles of War Relief laid down by the Committees of the National Relief Fund and the Queen's Work for Women Fund were sound, and had valuable educational influence on private work of the same kind. The National Relief Fund made grants solely through the Local Representative Committees; the Central Committee on Women's Employment 'adopted the rule that the organisation and management of special relief work-rooms must be vested in a special sub-committee known as the Women's Employment Sub-committee of the Local Representative Committee.'<sup>†</sup> It is not surprising that this rule caused some disappointment to the promoters of many private charities who hoped to receive grants. But some rule of this kind was necessary in order to prevent the absorption of the fund by schemes which would have had the effect of retarding rather than promoting the adaptation of the industrial population to the new industrial conditions. It was not desirable to keep masses of working women engaged in relief workrooms on bare subsistence wages and very often under amateur, and consequently wasteful, management, when there was a large new demand growing up, capable of absorbing all the labour displaced by the war. As temporary expedients, these privately managed workrooms fulfilled a useful purpose; and the devotion and personal services offered by their organisers were often beyond all praise. Those which were best managed were

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\* 'Board of Trade and Labour Gazette,' July to November, 1915.

† P. 9, par. 19, 'Interim Report of the Central Committee on Women's Employment, 1915.'

able in many instances to adapt themselves to the lines prescribed by the Central Committee.

In deciding what types of employment should be permitted in relief workrooms, the Central Committee were guided by two main principles. First, the product of the employment must not compete with ordinary industry; and secondly, the work had to be of a character to maintain and if possible to improve the efficiency of the women employed. The second of these principles was readily understood and cheerfully accepted by the organisers of private relief workrooms, but the first called forth a storm of hostile criticism. It was, however, manifestly sound. When employment is scarce, what is wanted to relieve the situation is more employment, and not a mere transfer of the demand for articles of general consumption from the shops which ordinarily produce them to relief workrooms. When this happens there is no increase in the general volume of employment, but a transfer of employment from the (generally speaking) more efficient productive agencies to the less efficient.

The result of the enforcement of the rule that privately managed relief workrooms must not compete with ordinary industry, but must satisfy some new demand or replace a supply which had been closed by the war, presented great difficulties; but in not a few instances they were successfully grappled with. One highly satisfactory experiment, initiated in a privately managed workroom, was the production of first-rate artificial flowers. The ordinary shops, cut off from their usual sources of supply, became large buyers. Other successful experiments were made, notably by the Women's Emergency Corps and the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies, in the production of toys. Many artists thrown out of work by the war turned their dainty fancy to account in this field of industry; and the children of this country were probably never so well supplied with charming and original toys as in the winter of 1914. Manufacturers were stimulated to take up the production of toys; and it is hoped that a permanent business has been set up. The cleaning, cutting-up and conversion of old clothes into serviceable and pretty garments for children afforded a great field for taste and ingenuity. Really charming little children's overalls, for

instance, were made from legs of stockings which as usual had survived the wearing out of the feet. Another war-time industry converted the best parts of old kid gloves into soldiers' waistcoats.

These devices killed several birds with one stone. They provided employment for a number of women who would otherwise have been destitute; they produced articles of real utility which could not have been produced on ordinary commercial principles; they gave a great impulse to the movement for national thrift, so important in war time; they taught many who had never thought of it before the delight of making something out of nothing, and incidentally some of the main principles of political economy. A large amount of the credit for this is due to the rules laid down by the committee of the National Relief Fund, which refused grants to privately managed relief workrooms unless they conformed to the regulations laid down as a protection against competing with ordinary trade or pandering to private cupidity as to wages and hours of work. In the first instance the rate of wages to be paid was fixed at 3*d.* an hour for women over 18. The hours of work per week were limited to a maximum of 40; and thus 10*s.* a week was fixed as the maximum. It was recognised that this was a bare subsistence allowance; and, when the cost of living increased, this maximum was raised to 11*s.* 6*d.* a week. The women employed were compelled to register their names at a Labour Exchange so as to ensure their being drafted off to ordinary employment as soon as might be. The bare subsistence allowance paid to them as wages was fixed, so far as the 3*d.* an hour was concerned, with the desire of not further depressing the already very low rate of women's wages; and the maximum of 10*s.* (afterwards 11*s.* 6*d.*) a week, as a preventive to their settling down to employment in a relief workroom as a normal way of earning their living. On the whole these arrangements worked satisfactorily. The workrooms came into existence, and passed out of it again when the need for them came to an end, with less disturbance of ordinary employment than has attended any previous effort on a similar scale.

In the workrooms directly administered by the Central



Committee or by the Local Representative Committees none of the articles produced were allowed to be sold. They were all distributed gratuitously. Maternity outfits were made for maternity centres; large numbers of children's garments were put at the disposal of care committees; the needs of many thousands of destitute Belgian refugees in England, France and Holland were met or partly met; parcels of clothing were sent to relieve the distress of peasant families who had been ruined in the war area of France; all kinds of hospital requisites and comforts were also provided for our own wounded soldiers.

Out of the sum of over 2,500,000*l.* which had been spent by the National Relief Committee by November 1915, a very large proportion, probably three-fourths, was absorbed in the first few months of the war in paying the allowances due by the Government to soldiers' and sailors' dependents. The difficulties of the situation at the beginning of the war were enormous. Before war was declared, only 1500 soldiers' wives were in receipt of separation allowances, and these were paid monthly; marriages 'off the strength' were unrecognised; no relatives other than the wives who had married 'on the strength' were entitled to allowances. A series of changes took place with almost bewildering rapidity. First, it was quickly seen that payments should be made weekly instead of monthly; then wives not on the strength were recognised as existing; then 'unmarried wives' were also recognised. Next, parents, if dependent on sons who had joined the army, were added to the list of recipients; and lastly it was agreed that there was no reason why sailors' wives and dependents should be left out. In addition to all these changes, the scale of the allowances was rapidly augmented. The number of wives in receipt of allowances at the outbreak of war leapt up in a fortnight from 1500 to 250,000. In July 1914, in the London area alone, the number of *persons* receiving allowances through the agency of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association was only 353, of whom 243 were children; by Christmas, 1914, the number of *families* similarly helped had risen to 75,000. The administration of this work could only be carried through by the aid of the immense number of willing helpers who

came forward day by day to take part in the work. By Christmas these numbered nearly four thousand.

In the meantime the Pay Office had quite broken down. Some women received not a farthing of the allowance due to them for six or eight weeks; and, when the money was forthcoming, 15*l.* or 20*l.* were put into the hands of those who were unaccustomed to handle as many shillings. The result was, in many cases, as unfortunate as it was natural. The necessary funds for the dependents of soldiers and sailors were not provided by the War Office for the first few months of the war; they were paid from the National Relief Fund. A very strong protest will be made at the end of the war that the money thus advanced should be regarded as a loan and not as a gift. It was quite right for the Committee, acting as Trustees for the National Relief Fund, to come to the assistance of the Government in such an emergency; it is hardly too much to say that by doing so they saved the voluntary system of enlistment. But it would be absolutely wrong permanently to charge the fund for sums which ought to be defrayed from the National Exchequer. The payment of allowances to the dependents of soldiers and sailors is a national charge, and should be met by the taxpayers as a whole. It should not be taken from the fund created by voluntary subscriptions sent from every part of the British empire.

A little, but a very little, has been done by the National Relief Fund to alleviate distress caused by the war among the Professional Classes. A Professional Classes sub-committee was appointed, and grants were made, amounting in all to 4982*l.* up to March 31, 1915, to some score of organisations, such as the Artists' Benevolent Institution and the Central Bureau for the Employment of Women. In some ways the Professional Classes have been harder hit by the war than any other section of the community. Many artists, for instance, who had been earning a good income before the war, suddenly found their earnings reduced to nothing. There are special difficulties in dealing effectively and tactfully with such cases through what really became a Government department; and the most effective work for helping them has been carried on by privately managed societies, chief among which is the Professional Classes War Relief

Council, of which Major Leonard Darwin is the Chairman. This organisation aims at helping members of the Professional Classes who have lost heavily through the war, (1) by providing training so as to enable them to earn money in temporary employment and resume their normal occupations when the war is over ; (2) by educating their children ;\* (3) by providing medical advice and maternity assistance in special Nursing Homes. The Council has a loan fund, of which use has been made in exceptional cases. The distribution of aid is made in co-operation with the principal professional provident institutions as well as the societies engaged in Relief work. These have representatives on the Council ; and from them a number of special committees have been formed, each dealing with the profession or art of which its members have special knowledge.

Another effort, somewhat similar in character but more limited in scope, is the Professional Women's Patriotic Service Fund, organised by the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies. Its main idea was to bring together, for their mutual benefit, two groups of persons, viz. (1) ladies with good professional and educational qualification who had lost their work through the war ; (2) the numerous patriotic associations which were everywhere springing up for the purpose of dealing with the special needs of the country in war time. By bringing these two groups—the professional women who needed work and the societies which needed experienced and trained workers—into contact with each other, a service was rendered to both. The N.U.W.S.S. raised a fund for providing the salaries of the professional women thus engaged. It was distinctly understood from the beginning that it was no part of the scheme to employ 'unemployables' ; it was intended for the help of really competent women suitable for the employment suggested, and for the assistance of recognised organisations believed to be carrying on really patriotic work. The plan worked admirably. It helped a considerable number of professional women in the best possible way. They did not want doles ; they wanted, like every one else, to serve

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\* A grant has been received, since the above passage was written, from the National Relief Fund, to be used for educational work.

their country in the time of stress, but they could not do so without being paid, as they often had nothing but what they earned and very frequently had relatives dependent on them. Gradually, however, the need for the fund became less urgent. The withdrawal of men, in ever greater numbers, to the army rendered it necessary to open to professional as well as to industrial women occupations which had not hitherto been open to them. The fund was therefore closed in November 1915, after nearly a year's useful work.

One of the most efficient pieces of War Relief work which has been carried out since August 1914 is that which has been undertaken by the Young Men's Christian Association, in the provision for the use of the armies in training or in the field of tents or huts for rest, recreation, refreshment and religious services. Within ten days of the declaration of war 250 of these places had been provided. After fifteen months of war there were more than 1000. Every one is now familiar with their appearance. Those erected in the great London stations are open every day in the week and for twenty-four hours in each day; hundreds of the men arriving after a train journey sleep in them. On Sundays, in the camps, they are lent for the holding of religious services to all denominations in turn. A Church of England service may be followed by a Roman Catholic mass, or a Jewish, a Salvation Army or a Wesleyan service.

The Y.M.C.A. has also been particularly active in providing canteens, open day and night, in munition areas. It has received an extraordinary amount of help—money to the extent of 400,000*l.*, and personal service from men and women from every section of society. An active organiser of the Y.M.C.A. has recently stated that, in providing the personal service necessary for running their canteens at Woolwich all through the night, it has been necessary to make it a rule not to allow working girls, employed in ordinary business during the day, to serve on more than one night a week each. It must require no little self-sacrifice, after a day's work in a shop or a warehouse, to be ready to work all night in a canteen; yet there is any amount of this self-sacrifice to be had for the asking. Not a shilling of the 400,000*l.* subscribed has been spent on the ordinary work of the

Y.M.C.A.; and the profit made on the sale of refreshments and tobacco goes towards the expense of carrying on the work and extending it in other localities.

Some idea of the extent of the work done may be gathered from the fact that the resolution of the Y.M.C.A. to supply stationery free of cost to soldiers involves the provision of 12,000,000 sheets of writing paper per month. Another free gift of the Y.M.C.A. consisted of copies of the New Testament. When these had been given to those who wished to receive them, the Jews made an application and asked if they could not have the Psalms; the request was at once granted. Then the Roman Catholics said they did not see why they should be left out, and after consultation with their chaplains, Thomas à Kempis's 'Imitation' was provided for them. The whole account makes a wonderful and beautiful story, and affords an example of the purifying and stimulating effect of being 'up against the real thing.'

The experience gained during the last seventeen months illustrates the enormous value of organisation and training. No society founded on the spur of the moment could have done what the Y.M.C.A. did. When the war broke out, their machinery was all in readiness; they had their trained workers used to co-operation and mutual helpfulness; the motive power was there too. All that was necessary was to apply these things to the object in view. The same may be said of the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies. The organisation was there—the trained workers, the spirit of comradeship, and the readiness for personal self-sacrifice. All that was needed was to turn these into the channel which the national crisis indicated, first the relief of distress among women, and later a variety of activities having for their object to sustain, as far as might be, the vital energies of the nation during the tremendous strain to which it was subjected. Through their 600 societies, and many thousands of members covering the whole of Great Britain, the N.U.W.S.S. was able to equip and send out for service in France and Serbia six hospital units, officered entirely by women, to become responsible for more than 1500 beds, and to raise for this purpose over 77,000*l*. In the same way the Women's Co-operative Guild has done excellent national service since the war

began in stimulating new work for the preservation of infant life, and starting in many localities maternity centres under the schemes sanctioned by the Government immediately before the outbreak of the war. This has been their special piece of war work. They have done it all the more efficiently because they had been applying themselves to it and training themselves for it before the war began. The war did but stimulate their activities and emphasise their great national importance.

Another admirable example of timely preparation, even more directly aiming at present needs, is supplied by the Voluntary Aid Detachments, commonly known as the V.A.D.'s. This movement originated when the Territorial Army was formed, part of the official scheme being that each locality should organise its own medical service. The V.A.D.'s were started to bring to the aid of the regular medical and nursing staff the services, on an unpaid basis, of trained or partially-trained volunteers; and before the war they had spread over the country, and attained considerable numbers. As soon as the war broke out they were mobilised, and the control of the units was placed under military officers. Many hospitals were established, and formed local rallying points for the V.A.D.'s. By October last, 600 small hospitals, with a total of 25,000 beds, were opened under the control of the British Red Cross Society, connected with which there were 2448 V.A. Detachments, employing nearly 75,000 men and women. Under the Order of St John, which works in close connexion with the B.R.C.S., there were 150 hospitals and 749 V.A. Detachments, with a total membership of 25,000. These hospitals cost the nation nothing, so far as doctors and nurses are concerned, and only 2s. or 3s. per day per man for provisioning. In about 70 hospitals nothing whatever is paid out of public funds.

Last February a Selection Board, with the duty of selecting members for special service at home and abroad, was established, at the request of the War Office. This body, with a staff of seventy, all women, headed by Mrs C. W. Furse, sits at Devonshire House, kindly lent for the purpose. About 7000 members of the V.A.D. are now on special service under this Board, and some 2000 are waiting for appointments. The members of the



V.A.D. are ready to go anywhere and do anything. So far back as October 1914 they established a rest station for the sick and wounded at Boulogne. Great difficulties were met with, and much ingenuity was shown in utilising all sorts of makeshift appliances; but the plan 'caught on' and has proved itself of the greatest utility. In the first six months the Boulogne unit supplied no less than 80,000 sick and wounded with food. Recently there has been a great extension of V.A.D. work, as the military authorities are anxious to replace, so far as possible, the male personnel by women; and the V.A.D.'s have been called upon to find the necessary substitutes—clerks, storekeepers, telephone operators, cooks, etc. There is probably no department of war-work in connexion with which women have shown at once more public spirit and more skill and energy in organisation than the V.A.D.'s.

No account of war relief work, however brief, should omit to mention the services rendered in every part of the country by the Hospital Supply Depôts. One may be taken as an example of many. In this, which occupies four large houses in Kensington, 3000 ladies have enrolled themselves as voluntary workers. Their daily work turns out thousands upon thousands of hospital comforts and necessaries. These hospital depôts are models of exquisite cleanliness and also of thrift and economical management. No shred of anything is allowed to be wasted: the very ravellings and edges of cut or worn linen are gathered up and used to fill pillows with. Scraps from torn towels or sheets are used to make small cloths for surgeons to wipe their instruments upon. In a word, these hospital depôts are thrift incarnate, models of capable administration, compared with which the wasteful management of military camps should cause those responsible to hang their heads with shame.

The question will doubtless arise, what will be the permanent effect, if any, of the breaking down of party barriers and of social distinctions which has characterised so many national activities since the beginning of the war? Shall we, when once the war is over, drop back into the same narrow party hatred and strife which poisoned our politics before the war? Will Unionists

and Nationalists face each other with the same determined hostility, each prepared to risk even the horrors of civil war, rather than yield an inch in determining, for instance, a line of demarcation between their respective parties in Fermanagh and Tyrone? The common sense of the whole country, purified and strengthened by the fires of recent suffering and heroic endeavour, will surely rise up against such a monstrosity.

Among domestic problems, one of the sternest and most threatening comes from the antagonism between capital and labour. Has the war taught us nothing about this? At the beginning of August 1914 the whole organised labour party showed the same patriotism as the rest of the nation. All existing or pending strikes were abandoned, and since that time, though there have been two or three much-to-be-regretted strikes, *e.g.* of the miners in South Wales and of the ship-builders on the Clyde, there have been on the whole remarkably few disputes leading to a stoppage of work. The President of the Board of Trade, in November 1915, speaking of his experience as head of the department, dealing with strikes and lock-outs, said, 'Never in the last twenty years have there been fewer labour disputes; and there never has been such a small percentage leading to stoppage of work.' If we endeavour to forecast the future relations between capital and labour after the war is over, some new elements in the situation will have to be taken into account. Many of the men who represent respectively labour and capital will have been fighting side by side on the battlefields. They have learned a new sort of comradeship there. They have discovered that they are much more like each other than unlike. The men have learned to love and trust their officers; the officers are full of unbounded confidence and pride in their men. This good feeling will not dry up and vanish the moment the war is over.

The recent report of Miss Anderson, Chief Lady Inspector of Factories, is full of interest for the evidence it supplies of deep underlying sympathy, in spite of many superficial sources of friction, between capital and labour. When war broke out, and there was a sudden collapse of employment in many trades, employers and workers held together in the most remarkable way.

The employers realised the seriousness of the crisis, not only for themselves but for their workers, and strained every nerve, showing great resource and adaptability in the process, to keep things going and prevent the dismissal of their staff. Two short extracts from the report may be taken as typical:

'The firms in their own deep anxiety almost without exception showed much concern for their workers, and did their utmost to prevent the unexpected blow falling the heaviest on shoulders least able to bear it.' . . . 'One firm in the darkest days, who told me that they were "done, killed dead," were yet considering whether they could not utilise the factory kitchen to make bread for the displaced workers when hunger threatened. When the rush of Government orders came and unemployment ceased, the women showed an equally fine spirit. They worked enormously long hours in alternating day and night shifts without a murmur of complaint. They were too absorbed in their work and its objects "for the soldiers and sailors" to think of themselves. The patriotic spirit in which the work was done was indicated by such remarks as, "We would not work like this at any other time."'

And yet another element leading to a better mutual understanding may be a result of recent industrial developments. In munition work, and in other kinds of engineering, as well as in fruit-picking and harvesting, etc., men and women, who in ordinary life are members of the capitalist class, have during the last few months been doing industrial work. Their new experience will have given them an insight into the labour point of view, which they could hardly have acquired in any other way. One or two instances may be quoted. A gentleman, over military age, working on a night shift in a munition factory, was white with indignation because he and his fellow-workmen were accused of being slackers and wilfully limiting output, when the truth was that they had been held up between 2 and 4 a.m. by the non-supply of the material necessary for their labour. Again, a group of university women undertook the gathering of raspberries on a fruit farm. They agreed to pick the fruit at  $\frac{1}{2}d.$  a pound. They were required to buy their food at a canteen provided by the

employer and at prices under his sole control. At the end of a week, instead of having anything to receive, the balance of the account was against them. They know more now as to where the shoe pinches the industrial woman than years of previous study could have taught them.

It can hardly be doubted that the experiences just quoted, which could be paralleled by hundreds all over the country, will enable large numbers of intelligent men and women belonging to the capitalist classes to understand and express to others the problems of labour more or less from the labour point of view. It should lead to greater power to understand one another and a greater desire to remove removable grievances. It may be asked, Is any similar process taking place among the working classes? Not certainly to so large an extent, but the comradeship in the trenches and in the workshop must surely have had some good effect in this direction also. It must be remembered to what a very large extent the press, and current literature generally, express the capitalist point of view. The employing class is much more articulate than the employed. They can and do constantly put their own point of view before the public. It is a much more urgent demand for the moment that the point of view of the workman should find expression ; and this is probably secured, to a far larger extent than before the war, by the industrial experiences of non-industrial men and women during the war.

Another change which will leave a lasting mark upon professional and industrial conditions is the degree to which the military needs of the nation have rendered it necessary to make use of the professional and industrial capacities of women. When English women doctors in September 1914 offered to take out a hospital unit to France officered entirely by women, they were refused recognition by the British Red Cross, and had therefore to place themselves under the French Red Cross. These ladies did such fine practical work for our wounded soldiers that in March 1915 Surgeon-General Sir Alfred Keogh put them in charge of a large military hospital in London of 520 beds, and said he would gladly put them in charge of a hospital of 1000 beds if they would consent to undertake it. The British Red Cross no longer refuses to recognise hospitals under the control of women doctors.

They have been 'up against the real thing,' and know now that all skilled aid available should be not only accepted but welcomed, so as to relieve so far as may be the inevitable sufferings of our soldiers. The shortage of doctors at home has opened many professional posts to women from which, down to 1914, they had been rigorously excluded. The London School of Medicine for Women finds itself under the necessity of increasing its accommodation for students by nearly 50 per cent. In 1900 the average entry was 35, rising later to 60. In the current year 110 new students entered the school.

A similar change is taking place in the industrial world. Down to the present year women, speaking generally, have been excluded from the skilled trades. The trade unionists explain that they do not object to the competition of women because they are women, but because they are so frequently used by employers to provide cheap labour and to undercut men. It should be fully recognised that the trade unionists have done a valuable national service in building up, by years of effort and self-sacrifice, a rate of wages which represents a reasonably good standard of living, and that it would be a national misfortune seriously to lower the rate thus laboriously secured. But the question arises whether they would not have done better by taking the women along with them, by admitting them to their unions and extending the hand of brotherhood to them. According to their own showing, they fear the cupidity of employers who would use the women as a means of lowering the wages of men. But by the very action of the trade unions, in thrusting the women out of the skilled trades and reducing the general level of their wages, the difference between the cost to the employer of men's and women's labour is increased, and thus the temptation to the employer to supplant male by female labour is increased also.\*

That in the richest country in the world large numbers of women should be normally in receipt of less than subsistence wages is not only a scandal, it represents a serious

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\* Some unions have already altered their rules since the beginning of the war and have admitted women to membership, e.g. the National Union of Railwaymen and the Railway Clerks Association.

national danger. These women must be ill-nourished and consequently suffering from low vitality. That this is so is proved by the figures regarding sickness among working women furnished by the Insurance Act. The sum required to provide sickness benefit for women is far beyond anything which was allowed for by actuarial calculation. Even apart from the moral problems suggested by such a condition of things, the increased temptations to drink and other lapses, how is the nation to secure a healthy and vigorous childhood if large numbers of mothers are underfed and habitually below par? The waste of infant life now going on is far larger than it ought to be. It is reckoned to amount to at least 80,000 a year; and, if pre-natal deaths are taken into account, this number may probably be doubled. In comparison with these figures, even the tremendous and tragic loss of life in the war (roughly 120,000 up to the end of 1915) is numerically less important.

The experience of women's industrial capacity gained during the war should put new power into the hands of those who for years have been studying, almost with despair, the problem of the sweated woman wage-earner. Women have shown a very high degree of industrial efficiency in the new work in which they have been engaged; they have done well not merely in the mechanical feeding of automatic machines but in work which requires a high degree of technical skill. About the middle of November almost every newspaper broke out into articles in praise of the industrial efficiency of women in munition work. Some of these articles tell a tale which appears almost too good to be true. But the prevalent notion that a woman in a workshop can only perform automatic tasks, requiring neither strength nor skill, should have received its death-blow; except that, as Carlyle said, things often go on living long after their brains have been knocked out. While it is probably desirable to take a considerable pinch of salt with many of the articles referred to (some of them stated, for instance, that one woman can do the work of two men), it is safe to take the evidence of the well-known technical journal 'The Engineer' as affording proof that, given opportunities of training, women can and do acquire a high standard of skill and efficiency:



'There is a widespread idea that the only machines which women can work are automatic or semi-automatic tools with which it is impossible to make mistakes. This idea is being daily disproved in the factory to which we have referred above, where some most delicate operations necessitating the exercise of great skill and high intelligence are being performed. We need only mention one case, but it will appeal to every mechanical engineer. In a certain screwing operation it was customary, before the employment of women, to rough the thread out with the tool and then to finish it off with taps. Some trouble having arisen owing to the wearing of the taps, the women of their own initiative did away with the second operation and are now accurately chasing the threads to gauge with the tool alone. This is work of which any mechanic might feel proud. . . . In fact it may be stated with absolute truth that women have shown themselves perfectly capable of performing operations which hitherto have been exclusively carried out by men' ('The Engineer,' Aug. 20, 1915).

There can be little doubt that the experience gained of women's industrial efficiency during the war will have the effect of putting an end to their exclusion from the skilled trades. This in itself will give a great lift to the industrial status of women. The practical problem will be to raise this without lowering the industrial status of men. To use and develop the powers and capabilities of all its citizens, whether men or women, should be the aim of every civilised state. At present women have not only been excluded from what are known as men's trades, they have also been kept out, in a large degree, from what are universally known as women's trades, such as catering, housekeeping and cooking. The disgraceful waste which has characterised the administration of the training camps for soldiers is largely due to the fact that women have not been put to do their own job. If the necessary war economies teach us a truer national economy, for use in peace as well as war, namely, the desirability of giving to every individual a chance of doing the best work which nature and training has fitted him or her for, a new illustration will have been given of the power which has been granted to man to wrest a soul of goodness from things evil.

M. G. FAWCETT.

Art. 8.—GERMAN METHODS OF PENETRATION IN  
BELGIUM BEFORE AND DURING THE WAR.

1. *The German Mole, a Study of the Art of Peaceful penetration.* By Jules Claes. With a Preface by J. Holland Rose. Bell, 1915.
2. (a) *Histoire belge du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg.*  
(b) *Histoire belge de la Prusse Rhénane.* Deux brochures par Pierre Nothomb. Paris: Perrin, 1915.
3. *L'Effort de l'Allemagne pour diviser et teutoniser la Belgique.* Par Fernand Passelecq. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915.
4. *German Socialists and Belgium.* By Emile Royer. Preface by Emile Vandervelde. Allen and Unwin, 1915.
5. *Pastoral Letter of Cardinal Mercier.* Burns and Oates, 1915.
6. *Protestation de Monseigneur Heylen, évêque de Namur.* La Haye: Office belge, 1915. *English translation.* Burns and Oates, 1915.
7. *Reports on the violations of the Rights of Nations and of the Laws and Customs of War.* Two vols. Published on behalf of the Belgian Legation. Wyman, 1915, 1916.

THE object-lesson afforded by German efforts in Belgium before and during the war serves, perhaps, as the most potent stimulant to the Allies in their unshakable determination to prosecute the campaign until a definite decision has been obtained, which will safeguard Europe against the ambition of Germany. Nowhere has the process of 'peaceful penetration' been more patiently carried out. Nowhere in a like degree has military success been looked upon as merely a prelude to what is regarded as a natural union with the Empire of territory greedily coveted for many years. Nowhere has the failure of attempts at conquest by pacific methods, by intellectual and moral union, been more clearly demonstrated. Of the long and costly efforts which sought to naturalise German trade, German gold and German labour in Belgium, no trace remains at the present time. All the expectations of the German mind founded on the probable break-up, to its own profit, of the Belgian provinces, have been falsified by the unanimity of an unconquered people. The German

effort has achieved nothing but a simple military occupation. No relationships, economic, intellectual or moral, have followed on the triumph of a power which knows no distinction between right and wrong, and whose very existence depends on arms and the perpetual display of armed force.

We must realise how widely this result differed from the realities and the dreams of German 'penetration' in Belgium before the war, if we wish to measure the extent of its defeat. We must measure the volume of these disappointed ambitions if we are to realise the danger which Belgium is escaping, thanks to the vigour of her national character, if we are to consider the claim which her resistance has justified to a new place in the European system which the victory of the Allies will call into being, a claim which might well be made the subject at the present time of preliminary investigation and discussion. In view of the recent publication of certain works upon the subject we propose to trace the process of preparation which Belgium has undergone at the hands of Germany with a view to a long-contemplated annexation and the events which have brought Europe face to face with the situation as it stands—an ancient people robbed of all means of lawful defence, which, though standing in the vanguard of civilisation, has been overwhelmed by barbarism, but remains true to itself.

A detailed history of the 'penetration' of Belgium by Germany before the war has yet to be written; the appropriation of the port of Antwerp by German traffic was but one step in the process. To denounce the fact, as French writers did periodically, was merely to repeat a commonplace, and tended to range in opposition to France the material interests of Belgian trade. In reality the fact, by itself, gave no especial cause for alarm; and, while French national writers proclaimed 'Antwerp a German port,' France herself, like Italy and England, was the victim of a process of 'penetration' insidious, unceasing, and equally serious.

Owing in both cases to geographical position, the 'hinterland' of Antwerp, like that of Rotterdam, is Germanic; and there was nothing surprising or abnormal

in the fact that 90 per cent. of the trade of the port was German. What *was* surprising was the pride with which the people of Antwerp and certain other classes of Belgians regarded this foreign traffic, which, apart from port and pilotage dues and the freight on railway carriage between Antwerp and the frontier, brought in no profit to the nation. The shipping contractors, the forwarding agents, were German to a man; and German too were the goods, whether loading or unloading. Nothing impressed the fact more strikingly than the endless range of warehouses belonging to the North German Lloyd, the first thing to meet the eye of any visitor to the port. If, then, at the end of the war we see, as we hope to see, German trade desert Antwerp by choice or of necessity, Belgium herself will be none the poorer; the compensation she will gain by developing the English trade and her own will be doubled by the conviction, now at last forced upon her, that Antwerp was being appropriated slowly but surely by the German State.

A 'State within a State' was the practical result of the presence in the commercial capital of Belgium of an organised German colony, where every one, from the humblest clerk to the most powerful capitalist, was intent on the one object of 'Deutschtum'—conquest and annexation. Thirty or forty years ago German families established themselves permanently at Antwerp and acquired, together with the rights of citizenship, that attachment to the city, its traditions and its glory, which has for centuries marked the inhabitants. Patriotism in Belgium has its foundation in the spirit of the Commune; and this spirit flourishes most strongly in our cities beneath the shadow of their belfries, those symbols of Communal privilege. Thoroughly local at heart, the Belgian lives, grows and dies within the radius of his native town.

It has always been characteristic of Antwerp that she has imbued with her own municipal spirit the medley of strangers within her gates. A friend of mine, an author of great talent, has written a eulogy of the city of Antwerp, in which, after quoting from the town-registers cases of foreign names borne by undoubted citizens, he concludes with this picturesque touch, 'Antwerp has taken to herself many foreign lovers, but the children

she has borne have all been *Anversois*.' And, in fact, when we find agents, ship's painters, sea-captains, rich merchants and city aldermen who bear the names of Spanish grandees, Portuguese 'Conquistadors,' Dutch navigators and Hanse merchants, we can appreciate the power of assimilation possessed by their mother-city, the more so that in spite of its modern wealth and development, Antwerp has retained its patriarchal and homely habits, and that its ceremonial, now as in the 17th century, is traditional and religious in character. The true Antwerp is to be seen in the crowds who pour out of the churches on a Sunday morning or in the families who on *fête* days throng the Place de Meir, waiting for the important mid-day meal, or watch the processions of decorated cars, each with its freight of rosy-cheeked damsels grouped after some design of Rubens.

It is only during the last twenty or thirty years that the Germanic influx has added to this people, so gay and bright, a new element, under whose influence the aspect of Antwerp has tended in the direction of flat uniformity, while its aspirations have been guided towards a future at variance with its historic destiny. German-sounding names have always been heard in Antwerp; during recent times they have increased notably, and those who bear them have abandoned the habits which their fathers acquired in a generation during which they had become first naturalised *Anversois* and then naturalised Belgians. The city no longer assimilates the Germans whom she has attracted; they now live apart as a distinct colony. The majority spend only a part of their lives at Antwerp, and end by returning to make their homes in Germany, while all go to Germany for their holidays or to serve their time in the army. The greater part of them no longer apply to be naturalised as Belgians or seek to contract family ties in Belgium. They form among themselves an exclusive society; they have their clubs, their schools, their churches; they celebrate their own national *fêtes* and hold aloof from the life of the city.

Before long a new development takes place. Certain prominent members of the colony become enrolled in the ranks of the Belgian authorities, force their way into

social clubs and political associations, seek to influence directly the world of art and pleasure, and even the movements of party politics. It suddenly becomes known that musical and theatrical enterprises are under the absolute control of Germans, who patronise and protect them. The tendency of a certain political club is explained by the Teutonic friendships and relationships of its members; and individuals, so closely identified for generations with the life of the city that their German origin has been forgotten, now revert to their former status under the fatal influence of these new-comers.

It was material interest, and nothing else, which prevented certain persons, more far-sighted than the rest, from raising a cry of alarm and from bestirring themselves and urging those about them to cast off these dangerous ties. The German hold over Antwerp is in no sense intellectual or moral; it is due to no similarity of race or habits; it is purely economic and financial. Very few of these confederacies are consciously formed. Some, even at the present time, are acknowledged more or less openly, but many remain latent, unsuspected by their victims and even by their authors, and encouraged by the double fiction of a neutrality guarded by land and by the supposed superiority of the German in business.

This latter prejudice is not peculiar to Antwerp; it is found throughout Belgium, and is shared without question by the business world in England, France and Italy. At Antwerp it is intensified by the pressing needs of the moment and the growing interdependence between the individual advantages of the Belgian and the all-embracing enterprise of the German. To-day our eyes are opened, and we see clearly the beginning and in certain cases the fulfilment of the scheme of expropriation. It has been seriously observed by men well known in the business world, that this war was after all a blessing, in that it put a stop once for all to that annexation which must have been the inevitable result of the conquest by 'peaceful penetration.'

A book has just appeared, exceedingly plain-spoken, though perhaps insufficiently supported by statistics, which denounces vigorously the instruments of that conquest. Its title is 'The German Mole,' and it is the work of M. Jules Claes, the editor of 'la Métropole.'



the well-known Antwerp paper. Dr Holland Rose of the University of Cambridge recommends it to the British public in a forcible introduction; it presents a lively picture of the conquering force of those two forerunners of the German eagle—'Employees' and Capital.

So far back as 1897 M. Carteron, Consul General of France, described in the '*Moniteur officiel du Commerce*' the methods of the German clerk. He shows him to be more punctual, more obsequious, more intelligent than his colleagues, willing even to work without salary. He goes on to describe how the German, little by little, elbows out his competitors and, with an eye to partnership, makes himself indispensable to his employer; how finally, with the aid of German capital, he rids himself of that employer or uses him as the stalking-horse of a business which has become, thanks to the clerk's untiring efforts, a German business. If he falls under suspicion or is compelled through want of time to cut short his stay in the house which he entered as an unpaid worker, the clerk will have contrived to learn enough to enable him to start in opposition. When at last he disappears and returns home, he takes with him information gleaned from his employer's books and even from his waste-paper basket, which makes it possible for him to entice away Belgian customers for the benefit of some German house, at whose disposal he places the spoils which he has gathered during his years or months of apprenticeship.

The German employees in Belgium were sufficiently numerous to allow of the existence of two societies of German clerks, each having a branch at Antwerp. One of them, the Hamburg Association for Commercial Employees, not only found situations in Belgium for its members, but it organised evening classes and lectures, and supported by monthly payments the clerks who gave their services gratuitously to the more important firms. The German clerk never works alone; he has behind him the silent support of that vast engine of conquest, German professional education, which is not only admirably adapted for the technical training of the employee but is saturated throughout with a spirit of expansion, invasion and aggression. This spirit is based on the fundamental idea of the superiority of a people created

for the subjugation of others. All the moral forces of authority, patriotism and religion are utilised—as in some course of primary instruction—to make of the young German an instrument of conquest. The pale clerk, cringing and obsequious, nourishes within him the appetites of a beast of prey and the instincts of brute force. He regards himself as invincible, and his modesty is nothing but a blind. He should be observed at the meetings of those powerful associations which he has established on the scene of his labours or at the celebration of his national festivities. The 'Hochs' which he and his brethren shout together, the strains of conquest which he raises in unison with a thousand others, are but the outlets of a zeal which sends him forth to conquer the world. How many of these scribblers who laboured, alert and absorbed, at their desks in banks and great merchant houses, have marched to the attack at Liège, Namur and Antwerp with the same passionate ardour!

To the complaints of Belgian employees, displaced or set on one side by this German invasion, unbiassed opinions opposed the argument of the over-population of Germany and the rise in its birth-rate—one more superstition, one more fable proclaimed as fact by German ambition! In proportion to the territory occupied, Belgium is still more over-populated than Germany; and, if we follow the same line of reasoning, it was the Belgians who should have closed the door against any invasion from without. It is needless to add that in all business enterprises which were wholly or chiefly German, the inferior ranks of the staff were recruited from Germans exclusively. In a previous passage I have traced the steps by which in certain Belgian business houses some German clerk would end by becoming a principal; and this not uncommonly happened, when the employee, the son or nephew of some rich German who had first made himself useful by his personal services, rendered himself finally indispensable by his ability to bring in capital at a critical moment. But in many business houses wholly or partly German, well-known Belgians were retained or brought in to fill important positions, with a view to profit by the fact of their nationality and of the growing influence of

wealth on the lives of their fellow-countrymen. Germans who had been naturalised a generation or two ago served as a link between the two races, though instances were not uncommon of well-known Belgians belonging to old and honourable families, universally respected and of great social weight, whose careers and interests were completely subordinated to German business schemes.

German finance had long ere this accepted its mission of conquest. It had even gained a footing in industrial concerns connected with the defence of Belgium, such, for instance, as the 'Société Nationale des Armes de Guerre' at Herstal near Liège; it was represented on the boards of various Belgian banks; and it was a well-known fact that one of the great German financiers of Antwerp was a director of nineteen Belgian companies, one of his sons of seven, another of five, a third son of eight, and another of his relations of eight such undertakings. Three banks exclusively German, the 'Deutsche Bank,' the 'Dresdner Bank,' and the 'Discontogesellschaft,' were some years ago established at Antwerp and Brussels; and thereupon the subvention of native industries by German funds became a permanent and recognised fact. German financial activity asserted itself with a boldness which foreshadowed the insolence of the ultimatum when on the evening of August 2, 1914, the German Minister with smiling hypocrisy protested to the Belgian Minister of foreign affairs 'that he was grieved that Belgium should look upon the German demand as an unfriendly act!'

The hour was, in fact, drawing nigh; and observers less blind than were the Belgians might have recognised, as a sign of it, the increasing disregard of appearances in the employment of German money. For it was German money, whether its origin was concealed under the well-known names of Von Bary or Von Malinkrodt, or under names (which I forbear to mention here) of Belgians who had become the tools of the German commercial system; it was German money which subsidised those German schools, in which generations were brought up in conformity with an ideal directly opposed to the spirit of the nation which gave them hospitality, those schools from which issued the swarms of spies who returned last summer in company with invading Uhlans

and commandeering commissioners. It was thanks to German money, amassed and accumulated on Belgian soil, that the subscription sent from Antwerp to the Imperial Chancellor in 1913, to commemorate—by way of a direct contribution to the increase of the German army—the centenary of the awakening of the robber nation, reached a fabulous sum.

Again, it was German money which supported in Belgium four newspapers in the German tongue, entirely devoted to the cause of *Deutschtum*. One of these bore next its title the Imperial eagle; another published on the morning of Aug. 2, 1914, an 'official' note declaring 'that Germany had given her assurance to Belgium that she would respect Belgian neutrality'; a third, in the arrogance of anticipated conquest, indulged in indiscreet observations on the politics of the country which gave it shelter; while the last did its best to promote discord on the occasion of the Belgian elections. And what of the correspondents in Belgium of the German newspapers? Assured of favours and distinctions and paid on a scale unknown to the rest of the literary profession, they systematically misrepresented all contemporary events with an eye to that future which it was their business to prepare for.

Thus Germany in Belgium paved the way for annexation through her three agents of 'Kultur'—the school-master, the mitrailleuse, and a venal press. Money, too, in itself a means of conquest and penetration, intensified the threefold effort of the school, the army, and the newspaper.

The failure which followed all these years of preparation may well have had a paralysing effect upon the minds of those Germans who left Belgium shortly before the war. They had been warned to leave by a secret message—a clear proof of premeditation, if proof had not been furnished by what had gone before. Nearly all have come back. Some returned in military uniforms; and of these the least to be pitied are those who fell, struck down by Belgian bullets, atoning with their blood for their long, if in some cases unconscious treachery. Other Germans returned simply to resume the place which they had abandoned for the moment in the economic

and social life of Belgium. Were they uneasy? Belgium was changed beyond recognition. Was this the nation they had known, so hardworking and practical, so devoted to business? Not a factory would agree to work for the enemy; the railways could find no engine-drivers to convey German troops;\* the most hospitable houses had closed their shutters rather than look upon the face of the guest of yesterday. Streets, squares, the countryside, were wrapped in an atmosphere of hatred and scorn, and were plunged in a silence more eloquent than a string of abusive epithets.

It must be admitted, however, that the German, to do him justice, is not easily discouraged. Were the war to end to-morrow in the ruin of his plans and ambitions, he would forthwith revive his old campaign of 'penetration' with a view to the economic conquest of the territories from which he had been driven out. For this reason it will not be enough for the Allies to restore to Belgium her political independence, and to make good, so far as possible, her material losses; they must secure her once for all against the designs of her foe, defeated though he may be. Solid guarantees are indispensable in the case of a country placed in the forefront of Europe's defences against the Germanic flood. This question claims the immediate attention of statesmen and diplomatists.

From a slightly different point of view the same question engrosses public opinion among the Belgians themselves, whether they be soldiers ennobled by their efforts in the ranks of a sorely tried army or the dwellers in the invaded territory, trodden under foot indeed but at the present time more intact morally and more determined than ever. All Belgians are unanimous in their firm belief that they as a nation are unconquerable; and they have proudly repelled all German attempts to create disunion within, or to bring about an intellectual and moral assimilation with the conqueror.

Before describing, on the evidence of a Belgian writer who has followed closely this second German discomfiture, it is as well to point out that, in the opinion of

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\* On this resistance of the workmen, see the 18th and 19th reports of the Belgian Official Commission.

many, such a discomfiture was inevitable; and that the belief in its own greatness felt by the Belgian nation after its grievous trial (a feeling which must of necessity be taken into account in framing the conditions of peace) is but the logical culmination of the history of the Belgian provinces. Falsifying this page of history as they falsify everything else in the process of subordinating the universe to the idea of *Deutschtum*, German professors, mobilised for the purpose, speak of annexation as 'resumption,' and pretend to regard it as a 'return' of the Belgian people to the national centre of their race, their language and their modes of thought. This childish and arbitrary Pangermanism has been dreaded by some as a menace to Belgium; and some excitable minds have been so far carried away by the conventional superiority of all that comes from beyond the Rhine that they have become infected by the contagion. But the body of the nation has shown itself proof against all such attacks. The ethnic position of Belgium is sufficiently well defined to render it secure against assimilation by any process of intellectual invasion.

If it be said, on the other side, that Belgian nationality is threatened by France as much as by Germany, the reply is clear. The French language—the language of wit and civilisation—is no instrument of annexation; it does not affect the national character of Belgium or the spirit of race. It is and it will remain in Belgium the language of thought and of society, but it involves in no sense the predominance of the Latin element. It is a radical error, contradicted by all history, to maintain that Belgium is ethnically and morally a dependency of France.

It was a still more flagrant blunder to brand with the iron of German slavery the desire of the Flemings to honour the language of their province, so closely bound up with their habits and their national life. The twofold origin of Belgium fits in with the distribution of its land and sea; and geographical reasons have combined to unite, from the very beginning, this agglomerate of peoples. On the partition of the empire of Charlemagne, certain border-territories came into being at the point of political and social confluence of the great European race-streams. These territories received



the name of Lotharingia; and of that Lotharingia Belgium is—to put it shortly—the direct heir, less in extent but contemporaneous in origin. When the end comes of the great upheaval—the convulsions of a second birth—which we are passing through, this fact will have to be borne in mind.

It is true that a stranger, in spite of the light thrown upon the subject by such Belgian historians as Godefroid Kurth and Henri Pirenne, would not recognise in modern Belgium these traces of a great past. At the time of the Napoleonic wars the true meaning of Belgium's destiny was lost sight of.\* The provinces which an untamed and stubborn instinct had preserved intact through the centuries, and which, under the rule of a series of princes whose merits varied but whose claims were legitimate, clung persistently to their peculiar laws and their autonomous commercial institutions—these provinces became involved in the arbitrary fluctuations of a policy which took no account of the principle of nationality. United to the Dutch Netherlands in defiance of the definite rupture of the 16th century, they were in 1815 deprived—to the advantage of Prussia—of territories small in extent but of the highest importance. The movement of 1830, spontaneous though it was, was not accepted by the great Powers as the resumption by Belgium of her ancient independence. By the imposition of forced neutrality, coupled with an arbitrary and fatal act of dismemberment (of which the most important, though not the only feature was the separation of Luxembourg, a Belgian province), Belgium, while becoming an independent kingdom, was exposed, without means of defence, to the danger which overwhelms her to-day.

In the face of such a misconception of the real state of things on the part of those very people who had accepted the principle of Belgian nationality, it is not surprising that Prussia, a petty kingdom which had grown by robbery and intrigue, having once established her predominance in German-speaking countries, should look with covetous eyes on the territories which bordered her empire. It was Prussia that forged the legend of an

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\* M. Pierre Nothomb, in two pamphlets recently published, has shown how this came about.

ethnic and linguistic relationship, the futility of which we propose to demonstrate.

Under the title 'The effort of Germany to divide and germanise Belgium,' M. Passelecq, the head of the Belgian Record Office, has written a pamphlet, supported by much documentary evidence, in which he describes the means employed by the power in occupation to reap the harvest grown from seed sown long ago in the coveted soil. The plan was a simple one—to exploit for the benefit of Pan-germanism a language question which had long been agitating the Flemish population of Belgium. In the event of victory, the end was to be realised by the absorption, in the form of a 'Reichsland,' of Belgian, French, and Zeeland Flanders; and the province so created was to enjoy a form of administrative and even political autonomy.

In the event of a reverse, this plan was to serve, as a secondary object, to detach the Flemings from the national conception, and to awaken in them a separatist spirit which would render impossible the reconstruction of an undivided Belgium. If it came to the worst and a forced evacuation wrecked the plan altogether, the seeds of discord would be left behind and their growth favoured by the measures taken by the German authorities during their temporary occupation, for the benefit of the Flemish cause. The fact that Germany, almost from the outset, was compelled to confine herself to this last expedient, is a sufficient proof of the failure in Belgian eyes of her military efforts and of the invincible attachment of the Belgians to their national idea. Germany continues her attempts to flatter the Flemings, to promise them the realisation of certain reforms for which they had agitated before the war, and even to introduce these reforms by her own authority or in conjunction with certain individuals of no standing or moral authority. All these manoeuvres have failed.

Professors in government employ make a boast of the dexterity of Germany and the excellence of her intentions. 'The ambitions of the Flemings and their position in view of the persistence of the Walloons seem to be the points on which the German lever will work effectually with a view to a healthy development of

Belgium in the future.' So wrote, in February 1915, Dr P. Osswald of Leipzig, when republishing an article written originally in May 1914. Dr Conrad Borchling, of Hamburg, is eager to emphasise the meaning of that 'healthy development of Belgium in the future.' 'There is,' he says, 'a German race which must be preserved from the danger of being ringed round by Latin elements.' On the steps to be taken with a view to this preservation all the writers do not agree; but no one of them doubts the success which attends any measure based on the separation of races. 'All who know the country,' writes Herr Nuese, 'are in agreement on this point. The Flemings, being of Low-German race, adapt themselves rapidly to the German nature.' Herr Ruhemann, who has federalist leanings, advocates the creation of two new political bodies; but on one point he expresses himself with confidence. 'We shall have no difficulty in persuading the Flemings to accept our friendship when once we have given them political liberty.' In all, upwards of ten professors, doctors and publicists have offered their recipes for serving up the Flemings with German sauce.

There is already a considerable body of literature on this subject. A secret agent, one of those individuals whose presence in Belgium before the war presented an enigma now partially explained, drew up as an offering to Marshal von den Goltz, the first German Governor of Belgium, a programme of 'measures calculated to win over the Flemings to the Emperor and the Empire.' This document, which eventually found its way into the hands of the Belgian Government at Havre, is well worth perusal. It contains a proclamation to the Flemish people, recapitulating and undertaking to realise all the most extravagant claims of the leaders of the linguistic movement before the war.

The measures taken by the German authorities in Belgium are naturally founded on the theoretic contentions of professors and the practical information of secret agents. The German machine, whether it be intellectual, administrative or military, works with characteristic regularity; and the chosen moment for action seems to have been the month of February 1915. At one and the same time a course of instruction in the Flemish

language, ostensibly for the benefit of German officers, was organised, the use of French in official transactions was forbidden, the names of towns were transformed, French street names were abolished, and the use of the French language in public notices was prohibited. It was also announced that a Flemish University was about to be founded at Ghent. On the other hand, in the prisoners' camps in Germany, the soldiers of Flemish origin were separated from the rest; and on the Dutch frontier facilities were accorded to Belgian students who were attending the University of Utrecht. Simultaneously anonymous pamphlets made their appearance, having been mysteriously thrust into letter-boxes by hands not unknown to the German police—pamphlets, violent and controversial in tone, such as might well sow suspicion between Flemings and Walloons.

Finally the press came into play; a press of a peculiar nature, worked under names and by a staff unknown before the war, but intimately connected with the occupying power; a press of which the organisation has been revealed to us by Prof. Friedrich Wilhelm von Bissing, a son of the second Governor of Belgium, in an ingenuous communication made to the 'Süddeutsche Monatshefte,' in which he describes as subdivisions of the political department of the central government, the Flemish Bureau (*Flamenausschuss*) and the Press Bureau (*Pressausschuss*). The principal Flemish organ of this servile press, the 'Vlaamsche Post,' may be judged by the following passage: 'The realisation of Flemish aspirations is incompatible with Belgian unity.' Forthwith the whole body of German newspaper correspondents in Belgium, whose business it was to give support and publicity to the manœuvre, proceeded to enlarge upon these incidents, artificially brought about by a hostile government, and to spread abroad in Germany and in neutral countries the falsehood of a Belgium whose racial disunion was brought to light by the invasion, and ripe for separation and annexation.

In Holland unexpected support has been given to this exclusively German campaign. A philological society, the 'Algemeen Nederlandsch Verbond,' dazzled by the German display or moved by a ridiculous ambition, has transformed itself into a meddlesome political organ,

and has ventured to interpret, in the sense of 'Pan-Neerlandism,' a movement whose true origin we have just disclosed. The movement is, however, in no sense Belgian. Of that fact the best proof is the consistent unanimity with which Belgians alike repudiate the efforts of the Germans to divide them, and support without flinching the burden of military occupation.

Summoned to aid in a war of conquest, German theorists have systematically ignored the truth in founding their scheme of political 'penetration' on a supposed incompatibility between the two sections of the Belgian conglomerate. In the course of centuries the union of Flemings and Walloons in common toil and common struggles has, without confusing their separate origins, created a national spirit. It is there, an actual fact, which it is as useless to explain or analyse as it is to attempt to gainsay it. It exists. Of its existence the war has furnished a most notable and sanguinary proof; and the German occupation strengthens it from day to day. Born in a moment of trial, the Belgian Union gains energy from the trial itself. If there have been deviations of conduct or of language on the part of certain individuals, such occurrences, condemned and repudiated as they have been by the public at large, have only served to emphasise still further the solid resistance of the nation as a whole. Those among the Flemings who are qualified to speak and who, being safe from the invader, can speak freely, express themselves with noble resolution. This is their reply to the German intrigue:

'The undersigned Belgian Flemings feel bound to make the following declaration:

'(1) They cannot accept, nor do they desire, any favour at variance with the law of Belgium which the German Government might wish to bestow on them.

'(2) They affirm that certain newspapers now appear here [in the occupied part of Belgium], which, under a show of attachment to the Flemish cause, serve quite other interests than those of Belgium, and represent no section of the Flemish movement.

'(3) They appeal to their compatriots, both Flemings and Walloons, to refrain from all dispute on the language question, so long as liberty of action in Belgium is fettered by a foreign occupation.'

As for those who are condemned to silence under the military rule of the invader, it is a German organ which places upon record their unshakable loyalty. The 'Vorwärts' of July 29, 1915, in view of what has actually happened, condemns German expectations founded on Flemish sympathies. After remarking that 'It is precisely in relation to the Flemish movement that illusions in Germany have been plentiful enough,' the paper proceeds to make ponderous fun of the astounding ignorance of national psychology betrayed during the past year by various experts in German nationalism.

In order to complete our description of some of the recognised methods of German 'penetration' in Belgium after the invasion, we must not omit the curious advances made by certain Socialists of Berlin to the Socialists of Brussels. M. Emile Royer, a Belgian Socialist deputy, has recently published a pamphlet, excellent as an effort of propaganda, on the German social democrats and the war. In Chapter XI he describes the visits of 'citoyens' Noske and Koster to the 'Maison du Peuple' at Brussels:

'During September the Brussels Socialists received at the Maison du Peuple a visit from two other militant social democrats, Noske, a member of the Reichstag, and Koster, the editor of the "Hamburg Echo." It appeared from the behaviour of these two "comrades" that they were in fact semi-official emissaries of the German authorities. They offered to interpose with the German civil governor in order to obtain the necessary flour required for the bakery of the Maison du Peuple. Their offer was declined, but there was some discussion and the Belgians heard some remarkable statements.

'Noske and Koster could not understand why the Belgian Socialists, like the rest of the nation, had opposed the German invasion, inasmuch as they would have got ample compensation for all damages, and would have received the benefit of universal suffrage as well as certain legislation relating to insurance which they had not succeeded in obtaining from their own Government.'

In addition to this mobilisation of revolutionary forces to persuade Belgian Socialists that it was to their advantage to become Prussians, there was a corresponding mobilisation of religious forces with a view to persuading



the Belgian clergy to share in the benefits of 'Gott mit uns.' The movement was insidious and multiform. We have not as yet such materials as would enable us to give particulars, but we can draw our conclusions as to the arguments from the machinery set in motion by the German propaganda in Spain and Italy with the object of convincing Catholics that it was necessary for religion that Germany should triumph. A complete stop was put to the movement at Christmas 1914 by a thunderbolt in the shape of Cardinal Mercier's pastoral letter, followed as it was, after a short interval, by the solemn protest of the Bishop of Namur. From that time forward the Socialists, who had listened with amazement to the German emissaries in the service of the Kaiser, have frequented the churches and taken part in the manifestations of enthusiastic patriotism which have found a refuge there; and if any German professor, specialising in politics or theology, holds sanguine views as to the conquest of Belgium, founded on the political and religious differences so acute before the war, he, like his brother professors of ethnography and languages, is the victim of his own imagination.

For it is not everything to possess the first army in the world and the strongest civil administration; it is not even sufficient to possess an intelligence trained to blind obedience or to command the services of a multitude of picked men. To assimilate the soul of a people there are needed that moral superiority, that traditional pre-eminence in justice and truth, of which Germany is altogether ignorant. Above all there are needed a respect for honour and a sense of liberty which are not to be learnt in that school of arrogance and brutality which propounds the doctrines of *Deutschtum*. Belgium has served already as a stumbling-block to the German armies; her task at the present time is to sift out German errors. This is why Belgium lives and will live; and this is why the new Europe will be bound to welcome her as a united and powerful state.

HENRI DAVIGNON.

## Art. 9.—THE CENSORSHIP AND ITS EFFECTS.

## I.—IN ENGLAND.

THE Censorship is a plant of foreign growth which could not be expected to take kindly to our soil. Britain has long cherished the belief that a free press, restrained and chastened by the law of libel, is the antiseptic of public life. With difficulty we conceived of a *régime* in which a press law puts newspapers at the mercy of the Government, and not the popular taste or an editor's judgment but 'reasons of State' determine the inclusion of news. We had fought our old wars with eminent correspondents ranging freely over the battle-fields, making and marring the reputations of generals, and enabling readers at home to follow a campaign as closely as they could follow a debate in the House of Commons. But the complex and mechanical character of modern war was bound to curtail this freedom; and the intense gravity of the present struggle—a contest for dear life between contiguous nations—made a rigid censorship a sheer necessity. The very fact that it was a strife less of armies than of peoples imposed reticence upon popular means of information and expression. But, since we were new to the business and highly unbureaucratic in temperament, we found many difficulties in our way. We had no very clear notion of what we wanted to be at; and, in consequence, our censors were apt to do those things which they ought not to have done and leave undone those things which they ought to have done. It may be worth while, after nearly eighteen months' experience of it, to try to clarify our views on this alien but indispensable institution.

A single principle, to which no exceptions can be admitted, must govern its working. The Censorship is to be used for the purpose of winning the war and for no other. This sounds a truism, but it has been by no means universally accepted. Military and naval information or criticism which may handicap our fighting strength must be suppressed. Political information or criticism which may cripple our diplomacy or make trouble with neutrals, or give any military assistance to our opponents, must be forbidden. But no public

man and no Ministry is entitled to shelter behind the Censorship and thereby escape that popular supervision which is essential to our system of government. It will be seen that the rule is easy enough to interpret when only military and naval matters are concerned, but that it becomes more difficult when we get to civil affairs. 'Considerations of public policy' is a resounding phrase, but it is capable of great abuse. It seems so reasonable at first sight to argue that attacks upon a Government which is conducting the war must tend to the weakening of that Government and so to the handicapping of the national effort. Both Lord Curzon and Lord Lansdowne, in the debate in the House of Lords on Nov. 8, 1915, used language which seems to bear this construction. They did not object, they said, to attacks upon Ministers as ordinary incidents of political warfare, but in time of war they reprobated such attacks as 'weakening the spirit and injuring the cause of the country.' In the debate on Nov. 3, the Lord Chancellor—formerly, as Sir Stanley Buckmaster, in charge of the Press Bureau—said frankly:

'If newspapers are to be conducted on the principle of concentrating their fire at one moment upon one Minister in order to get rid of him, and then upon another Minister, it may well be a matter for further consideration whether the liberty hitherto enjoyed may not be even further curtailed.'

It is difficult to believe that these speakers had seriously considered the views to which they gave expression. For they amounted to nothing less than a claim for the immunity of every Minister from criticism during the course of the war. It is a claim which cannot for a moment be allowed, and for a very simple reason. In a democracy such as Britain, Ministers draw their power from the people; and the condition of their tenure is that the people can criticise and if necessary dismiss them. That is usually done by a General Election; but, if a General Election is undesirable, there is all the more reason for maintaining other channels for the expression of popular opinion. We have never professed to be governed by experts. Men win their way to office, not because they are competent administrators in this or that department, but because they have caught the fancy of

the public by some gift of debate or platform rhetoric. At any one moment you will find fifty men in the City of London far abler financiers than the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and a hundred captains of industry better fitted to manage a great department than the Presidents of the Board of Trade or the Local Government Board. But administrative capacity is not the only or the main desideratum in a Minister. We set up men who are amateurs because they have a gift of speech or (sometimes) of character, on the understanding that they will use the knowledge of the experts and above all take pains to ascertain and give expression to the general will of their countrymen. We set civilians at the Admiralty and the War Office for the same purpose. Under a bureaucracy this does not happen. There the ablest departmentalist goes to the proper department. But Britain is not a bureaucracy, and prefers to trust men who are supposed to be in touch with popular feeling and opinion rather than acknowledged experts.

Now, such a system is ridiculous unless popular opinion has a chance of making itself felt. Otherwise we have a bureaucracy without any of the merits of a bureaucracy. The claims made by Lords Curzon, Lansdowne and Buckmaster cut at the very root of our constitutional practice. Stupid attacks upon Ministers are highly objectionable, but even stupid attacks are better than compulsory silence. Our political system gives us no guarantee for administrative capacity in our Ministers. They may possess it, but, if so, it is by accident; they have reached their position by being good politicians, by their skill in dealing with words and formulas and not with facts. It is the nation's business in a life-and-death struggle to make a zealous inquest for competence; and for this free criticism is essential. Ministers are responsible *to* the nation, and the nation is responsible *for* Ministers. Failure is met by dismissal, for the nation is partly to blame. The other way, the old way, when the nation had no responsibility, was to send blundering statesmen to the scaffold. That is the logical culmination of the policy of suppressing criticism and disowning the nation's partnership.

If a Minister possesses the confidence of the people, attacks upon him will only discredit the critics and settle

him more securely in his place. A proof of this was the complete failure of the journalistic attack on Lord Kitchener in the early summer. From that curious incident another principle emerges. The large majority of those who repudiated the attacks on the Secretary of State for War did so not because they regarded his work in office as unimpeachable, and not because he was a member of the Government, but because he was the most prominent British soldier. It is fair to say that Lord Kitchener's military aspect has never been obscured by his civilian office. There is a sound instinct in the British people that Generals and Admirals should not be criticised during the conduct of a campaign. They do not wish to see a repetition of the kind of newspaper onslaught, conducted by armchair strategists, which disfigured the Northern press in the first stages of the American Civil War. They feel that the right target for criticism is not the commander, but the Ministry who appointed him or retains him in office. One of the main objections to the soldier at the War Office or the sailor at the Admiralty is that their service character inevitably blankets much wholesome criticism. The civilian Minister who has obtained his place by means of the political game, and not the General who has a long record of ill-paid and laborious service, is the fitting object for a nation's criticism.

So much being premised, let us turn to the actual work of the British Censorship. It is concerned with two classes of subject—civilian matters which have a bearing on the campaign, and military and naval information. In both spheres it should work along clear and well-recognised lines which the nation can understand, and not according to the caprice of individuals. It should be handled discreetly and carefully, since it is an exotic in unnatural surroundings; but it should be handled consistently and boldly, for otherwise it does not justify its existence. There is no use playing at Censorship. If it is worth doing at all it is worth doing whole-heartedly. The Government have ample powers to enforce their decisions; and we trust there will be no repetition of the spectacle of a Minister wasting hours in the House of Commons lamenting the sins of the newspapers, when he had the remedy in his own hands.

The Censorship, being a novelty, was bound to blunder, and from the start it had few friends. All its trivial mistakes have been advertised to the world, and its emendations of Browning and Mr Kipling have gone far to make it a laughing-stock. In our opinion too much has been made of these slips, which might have been made by hustled and overworked men in the best-run department. Far more important is the lack of any clear or continuous policy. On the civil side it would seem that its sins have been more of omission than of commission. Sir John Simon appears to have based its practice—or rather its policy—upon what might or might not hearten Germany. But it is a matter of very small moment what Germany thinks. We are not going to win the war by depressing German spirits or to lose it by raising them. Her own authorities, untrammelled by narrow notions of veracity, will in any case look after the second task. The important point is that we should not depress the temper of our own people or our Allies, and that we should not allow anything to be printed which increases our diplomatic difficulties with neutrals.

No doubt the questions raised are intricate, and the Foreign Office has lately given up the attempt and cast the onus on the newspapers themselves. That is to admit the breakdown of the Censorship in a field where, if properly handled, it might have done real service. We do not attach so much importance to pessimistic articles, foolish as they may be, and to such performances as the 'Daily Mail' map of the Near East, of which Sir John Simon complained. In the colouring which is given by editors to published news it is practically impossible to draw a line between what is and what is not desirable on grounds of public policy. Optimism and pessimism are alternating moods in every belligerent nation; and it would be difficult to repress their expression in print, though there is little doubt that the gloom of certain sections of the British press has had a malign influence on the attitude of some of the minor neutrals. But with definite questions of fact we are on stronger ground. The futile offer of Cyprus to Greece was an item of news which should have been rigorously censored. It placed Britain in a humiliating position, and was used with disastrous effect by German



propagandists. Again, we have to deal at the moment with certain hesitating neutrals. Attacks upon these neutrals, especially Greece, which appear in our press, are at once seized upon by Germany for broadcast publication and undoubtedly add to the difficulties of our diplomacy. In July, while Russia was struggling for her life in her great retreat, a miners' strike broke out in South Wales, and for days our papers were full of it. It would have been well if not a word had been allowed to be printed. The story made a bad impression in France, and for a while had a most serious effect on Russian opinion. Russia herself had grave labour difficulties in the early autumn, but scarcely a hint of them was permitted to appear in the press. Our publicity led to a great deal of recrimination in our own country and among our Allies, and by generating suspicion and uneasiness weakened our combined effort. The same is true of the vapourings of certain unconsidered journalists about the necessity at all costs of clinging to what they call the 'voluntary' principle. Nations which are deeply in earnest and have greatly suffered do not understand these whimsies, and they misread in consequence the temper of Britain.

These are civilian matters, but they have a direct military consequence. A Censorship, directed to the single end of helping to win the war, might reasonably have put the screw on. Let us repeat that it is not what Germany thinks that matters, but what effect certain news will have on our Allies and on neutrals. Our diplomacy has a most thankless task, which is scarcely appreciated by the nation. With no conspicuous land victories to point to, we occupy in our negotiations the position of a card-player who has never in his hand a card that can take a trick. Our efforts at influencing public opinion in neutral countries have not been conducted with much energy or intelligence. We are novices at the game, and Germany, since the days of Bismarck, is an expert. But we might avoid giving the enemy the choicest material for his propaganda.

The work of the Censorship becomes simpler when we turn to matters directly concerned with the fighting services. Let us be quite frank on the subject. If complete secrecy were necessary to help us to win, we should

advocate complete secrecy—the suppression of the name of every commander, of the mention of any action, of all lists of casualties, of all newspaper comment of any sort or kind. The feelings of editors and journalists and newspaper readers are of no consequence in comparison with military and naval needs. There is only one thing that matters—to win the victory. But, by universal consent, such complete secrecy is not a military necessity for any country. By universal consent, it would even be a hindrance to military success. The temper of the nation behind the fighting men must be considered, for it is the spirit of a nation which creates armies and uses them to win battles. In Britain especially, where our armies are still volunteers, it is the more necessary to keep bright and keen the temper of that civilian population which is the supply-ground of our military endeavour. But let us be clear about what is wanted. Full tactical and strategical accounts would be welcomed by all students of war, but they are luxuries, not necessities. The two things needful are such published information as will (1) meet the natural desires of those who have given kith and kin to the field to know what is happening and to derive that pride and confidence which are the best aids to recruiting, and (2) will give our troops the feeling that their work is recognised and that, when they give their best, that best will be made known to their countrymen.

This necessity is recognised by all the combatants, but their practice varies. In Britain alone we have published despatches from the Commander-in-Chief, in which the man responsible for operations gives a general account of a series of actions, distributes praise to various services and commanders, and occasionally adds his own estimate of the situation. They are supplemented by irregular *communiqués* on special incidents. We in Britain are apt to forget what we possess in these despatches. They are not complete narratives, but no other nation is presented with such summaries from time to time prepared by the highest military authority. Germany issues daily *communiqués* which are now regarded with a natural suspicion. France and Italy publish a clear daily summary of operations; Russia does the same, and at intervals sends out more comprehensive statements which

are remarkable for their candour and balance. Germany and Britain publish casualty lists; France, Italy and Russia do not. In addition a limited number of war correspondents are permitted with all the armies. They write impressions of the fringes of the fighting, and occasionally are allowed to do justice to the doings of special units. Much brilliant writing has been the result, which has done something to enable civilians to visualise the war. But, as a rule, the correspondence is greatly delayed, and is so strictly censored that only generalities emerge. For speedy and specific information we must depend upon the official publications.

At first sight it would appear that Britain receives far more in the way of news than any of the other combatants.—But the question we have to consider is whether the news is of the right kind, the kind which serves a vital military purpose by heartening the troops and the nation behind them.—In one respect, and that the most important, it seems to us to fall short. We do not hear enough of the work of battalions. The consequence is that people at home are deprived of the chance of legitimate pride in the doings of their kin, and the troops in the field do not receive that recognition which is their only reward.

The *communiqués* issued immediately after an action have, with scarcely an exception, not mentioned battalions. The Commander-in-Chief's despatches, published many weeks afterwards when the first eager interest has gone, have occasionally referred to units, but on no fixed principle. One or two correspondents have been allowed, months later, to describe the battalion work in engagements like the first and second battles of Ypres and the battle of Festubert; but obviously a correspondent has not the necessary knowledge and perspective, and he will always be apt to praise the men he has seen and omit others who may have played a greater part. The consequence is that some battalions that have fought since Mons have never had any official recognition, though the whole army knows their worth. This is hard for the battalions and hard for their belongings at home. A soldier has few rewards, but glory is supposed to be one of them.

We may learn something from the practice of our

opponents and our Allies. The Germans are extraordinarily free with their military information, at least so far as the eastern theatre is concerned. They publish the names of their Army and Corps Commanders, and often mention the corps engaged in a successful movement. (The French zealously suppress the names of their generals, and rarely allow a corps to be specified, though they occasionally give some broad designation, like Burgundians or men of Picardy, which allows it to be identified.) But both France and Germany in their different ways do immediate justice to battalion work.) In the German *communiqués* we are repeatedly told that this or that regiment has distinguished itself. The French do not give this information in their *communiqués*, but they have other means. Their system of 'citations,' far more thorough than our 'mentions in despatches,' enables them to publish to the French people the achievements of the humblest private. If a man is *cité*, he receives a copy of the *citation* on good paper, which he can frame and treasure as an heirloom. Besides, there is the admirable 'Bulletin des Armées,' which circulates among the troops and contains a full list of all meritorious deeds of individuals and units. The French or German soldier realises that, if he does well, it will be known without fail throughout the army and among his friends at home. It may seem a small thing, but it is one of those small things which have an incalculable effect upon the spirit of troops. In Britain, with our quasi-voluntary armies, the need for some such machinery is obviously far greater. We have become in eighteen months a military Power of the first order, and we may well take a leaf from the book of those other military Powers which do not depend as we do upon volunteers. If France and Germany think it worth while to consider public opinion and the feelings of their conscripts, how much more is it the duty of Britain?

— This is a military question, in the hands of the military authorities. The Press Bureau is only a conduit pipe to transmit what has been sanctioned by the War Office and General Headquarters. Probably five Staff officers out of six would admit the desirability of publishing the details of the work of battalions; and there can be no doubt of the view of regimental officers. The few soldiers

who would object are those who have acquired a passion for secrecy for its own sake, or who cherish a blind dislike of the press. As to the first point, one type of professional man will always try to make a mystery out of his craft, and will refuse to bring to bear upon it the light of reason. Such a type is blind to the political grounds for a certain kind of publicity. Yet there is not only a political justification, but a sound military purpose—the necessity of keeping the troops in the field in good heart and of making certain that recruits of the right kind will be forthcoming from home. As to the second point a great deal of nonsense is often talked. The press has many sins to its charge, and no doubt the war correspondent of other days was often a nuisance. His real offence was that he was apt, by booming this or that general, to create popular reputations which had often a slender basis in fact. But the enormities with which he has been credited are largely fictitious. The stories of how Archibald Forbes revealed to the Germans through a despatch the French movements before Sedan, and how Gortschakov derived valuable information during the Crimean war from Russell's letters to 'The Times,' have long ago been exploded.

There will always be many matters in which the most rigid Censorship is right. Dispositions, numbers, plans, the situation of the various headquarters, gun positions, routes of transport, experiments—these are eternally confidential. So, too, should be all the details of an army before an action. On such matters no Censorship could be too stringent. Moreover, a censor's judgment should always lean against publicity; and, when there is the slightest doubt, the decision should be for suppression. Even when it is morally certain that the enemy is in possession of certain information, it is wise to run no risk and to assume that he is ignorant. But these rules cannot apply to the work of battalions when an action is over. The enemy will have prisoners or dead in his lines; and the identity discs will enable him to discover what troops have been against him, in the unlikely event of his not knowing all about them before. It will be of no assistance to him to know what battalions constituted what brigade when the battle is over. As for the work of these battalions, he knows all about it from

first-hand experience. To say that the 1st Blankshires took a redoubt will be no news to him, though he may deny it in his *communiqués*. But, if we suppress all mention of the gallant Blankshires, they will have nothing to console them for their certain losses; the relations of the dead will have no fine tale to relieve their sorrow; and Blankshire will miss the best of all incentives to recruiting. Those who have undertaken this work know that in every district by far the strongest appeal is made by pointing to the achievements of the local battalion.

Take the case of Loos. There a very remarkable advance was made, an advance which in certain circumstances might have led to a decisive victory. Some of the best work was done by divisions of the New Army. The nation at home was strung to a high pitch of expectation, and any gossip was avidly seized upon. Presently the wounded returned and they told a confused tale, mentioning among other things the failure—not difficult to explain—of one of the new divisions. The consequence was that no recruiting advantage was gained by the splendid performance of certain of the new troops; and for some weeks the new divisions in general lay under a most undeserved stigma. Sir John French's despatch put the main lines of the action in their proper light, but the country still lacks the details of a great story. This story, let it be repeated, is not wanted for the delectation of newspaper readers at large, but for two purposes, both directly subservient to the conduct of the war—to stimulate the formation of future armies and to convince the men in the field that the nation is aware of their prowess.

We do not suppose that any responsible soldier will differ from the views which we have expressed, but the trouble is that there is no machinery to mend matters. The ordinary despatch is prepared by the digestion at headquarters of a large number of army, corps, divisional and brigade reports. Obviously a busy Commander-in-Chief and his Staff have not the time in despatches of a moderate length to do justice to the work of battalions. In some conspicuous cases, like the performance of the 2nd Worcesters at the first battle of Ypres, there may be a regimental reference, but details of this kind would be out of perspective in the normal despatch. Nor does



the remedy seem to be the granting of wider facilities to accredited war correspondents. The best correspondents will produce a patchy, and therefore an unfair, account. It is work for a Staff officer with full knowledge of the orders, with the chance of studying the scene, and with access to all the troops concerned. In the earlier months of the war two distinguished soldiers acted as 'Eye-witnesses,' and wrote many illuminating but highly generalised articles on the campaign. It seems to us that 'Eye-witness' might well be revived with a different mission. One or two Staff officers, gifted, as so many of them are, with the power of weighing evidence and describing intelligibly a complex operation, would do invaluable work if they collected the details of battalion fighting, and within a reasonable time after an action gave them to the world. For one thing this plan would preserve a great deal of tactical history which is now being lost. It would be a real aid to the preparation of the official despatches, for the digestion of a number of reports is not the same thing as first-hand knowledge passed through the medium of a single mind. It would do for our battalions what France and Germany now do for theirs, and give every man in the fighting line the confidence that his work would not be overlooked. Finally, it would provide the nation at home with what it deserves to have, since it has voluntarily provided the fighting men—with what it must have if its spirit is to be kept keen and its resolution high.

Much nonsense has been talked by scaremongers about what they call 'the truth about the war,' as if there was some dark mystery being kept hid by the men in power. There is no such sinister secret. The 'truth about the war' is perfectly well known to every civilian who takes the pains to inform himself and has some rudiments of military knowledge. But there are truths which get suppressed because it is nobody's business to publish them, truths which the enemy knows all about, truths which should be proclaimed on every housetop because they can only hearten and invigorate the nation. The chief is the wonderful record of our fighting men. What Mr Redmond has rightly asked for on behalf of the Irish troops, the nation is justified in demanding on behalf of the whole army. Germany has made an

elaborate business of publicity and uses the press as a branch of her military machine. She sows tares in every neutral field and does her foolish best to creep in by night to the Allied furrows. We have failed to emulate her activity, and perhaps it is as well. England would not be England if she could play that game as adroitly as her enemies. Other Powers may use their press to spread false news and mislead the foe; our traditions of freedom and candour make it difficult for us to follow suit. Our press will never lend itself readily to Government control; but, if it cannot be adapted to cripple the enemy's strength, let us see that neither by sins of omission nor of commission it cripples our own.

## II.—IN AMERICA.

ONE thing is abundantly clear to those who have followed the War in the American newspapers—that the British Government appreciates neither the uses nor the dangers of publicity. It knows neither how to direct it nor how it affects national success. It has grasped one elementary fact—that certain information must be concealed from the enemy; but beyond that it has not advanced a single step. If there was nothing to be gained by the publication of news but the gratification of curiosity and the allaying of anxiety, the authorities might be right in dropping a veil of mystery over the War. But there are other nations besides the combatants; and to them England looks not only for sympathy, but material and financial aid. The Censorship must be considered as it affects these, as well as the belligerent Powers.

Hitherto, the Government has been singularly fortunate in its relations with the United States. There the British and French raised an enormous loan. They induced the bankers, against strong opposition from the pro-German financiers, to advance \$500,000,000 upon no more specific security than the Allies' promises to pay. Moreover, it is not at all unlikely that before long recourse will be made again to the coffers of Wall Street. Again, it is to the United States that the Allies, and Great Britain as much as any of them, are looking for

the supplies of munitions, of clothing, of draft animals, of drugs, and of all the innumerable commodities, without which the conflict could not be carried on for a month. From the United States Europe is drawing more than its ordinary quantity of grain and raw materials for the support of its armies in the field; yet against the United States Great Britain is using her great naval power and enforcing justifiable, but to the American shipper none the less galling, supervision over foreign trade.

Common prudence, then, should impel the British Government to see that its side of the great argument is properly set forth in America, and, to use an Americanism, that 'the Allies put up a good front.' Such news should be cabled across the Atlantic as would hearten their friends and induce confidence in their ultimate success, so that bankers and manufacturers might be encouraged to put their capital at the service of the British, French and Russian Governments, without misgivings concerning the safety of their investments. As things are, it is not the Censor's fault that the American, for sheer business reasons, has not buttoned up his pocket and asked to be shown the colour of British gold before accepting a single order for munitions or merchandise.

For what is the news vouchsafed to him, on which he must build his confidence? From the actual battle-fronts he gets day by day brief paragraphs bristling with proper names, hardly more comprehensible than chemical formulæ. From the neutral capitals he learns of diplomatic activities that too often bode no good for the Allies. From special correspondents in England he hears of awful conditions in the trenches, or heroic deeds that only bring out the enormous difficulties of victory. From special correspondents in Germany, on the other hand, he gets glowing descriptions of Prussian thoroughness and morale, and the carefully coloured matter that the Wilhelmstrasse doles out to the American writer. Sayville, with only its wireless, can manage to supply the United States with the announcement of German successes every day; while all that the cables from England can do is to send word of strikes and political differences, despairing appeals for recruits and pessimistic speeches in Parliament. Truly, if it were not for their abounding

belief in the justice of the Allied cause and the race-pride that will not hear of defeat, even the pro-Ally Americans might despair of the downfall of Germany.

The Government should remember the enormous difference between the experience of England and that of the neutral nations in this War. Away from England the great crisis has produced no atmosphere. No one can realise what the War is until he has lived for a while under its shadow. He can appreciate neither its curse nor its blessing; he has no idea of what it has brought nor what it has taken away. To him, isolated facts stand out without proper background or perspective; and, since the Government has chosen to paint its scanty disclosures in such dull grey tones, the colour of the unofficial information is startlingly vivid. In England there is abundant and obvious evidence of self-sacrifice, patriotism and determination; but in foreign lands, these things are not perceived; and there is nothing to reduce unfortunate incidents to their true value.

In England a true conception of the condition of affairs is helped by the tales that fly from mouth to mouth, the abundance of which has been such a curious consequence of the muzzling of the Press. In London, in truth, Rumour has come into its own again; and at every street-corner one can hear a new tale from a 'man just back from the Front,' or a 'close friend of a Minister.' One statement sets off another; the average person takes what he hears lightly; and in the end a fair balance is struck. But in America these same rumours receive an altogether undue importance. They come from fewer persons; they have acquired the prestige of the 3000 miles they have travelled; and they are seized by the newspapers as additions to the regular despatches of unquestioned authenticity. Thus mere scraps of club-gossip acquire the dignity of semi-official statements; and that they have in the main favoured the Allies is as much the result of good luck as anything else.

No one wants the newspapers to publish a line that would assist the Germans; but there is no reason why the American public should not be given news that would assist the Government, and be kept posted up on matters which would encourage the friends of the

Allies throughout the world. Once or twice Mr Balfour has been persuaded to write letters or grant interviews for publication; and the relief they afforded to those filled with anxiety is a token of how much can be accomplished by lifting the veil with discretion and authority. For months last summer the Government maintained an obstinate silence with regard to the submarine peril and the way it was being met, which made it very difficult for Englishmen in America to uphold the prestige of the Fleet. At the date of writing, an intricate and technical dispute concerning shipping is clouding the relations between Great Britain and the United States, the British side of which might well be given to the Press with the happiest results. Why should not the Government call in the aid of a competent writer, possessing adequate knowledge and gifted with the art of clear, terse and popular expression, supply him with the requisite information—'inspire' him, in fact—and let him supply a leading New York journal with such a statement. We undertake to say there would be no need to add the words, 'American papers, please copy.'

The Censor, in short, should be entrusted with positive as well as negative functions. He should be required to supply the newspapers with material for articles on all matters, the publication of which would assist the cause of the Allies. He should realise that, in this World-War, all men are interested and all men are anxious; and that the more it depends upon the success of attrition, the more the belligerents will need the sympathy and aid of the neutrals. Without deviating a hair's breadth from the truth, he can do much to spread confidence in the ultimate victory of the Quadruple Entente; and, if he does that, he will bring that victory appreciably nearer. News the neutral peoples will have, whether Whitehall wishes it or not; and it depends mainly upon the British Cabinet whether that news will be to the country a hindrance or a help.

## Art. 10.—BRITISH DIPLOMACY IN THE NEAR EAST.

1. *The War and Democracy.* By R. W. Seton-Watson, and others. Macmillan, 1914.
2. *The War and the Balkans.* By Noel Buxton, M.P., and C. R. Buxton. Allen & Unwin, 1915.
3. *Roumania and the Great War.* By R. W. Seton-Watson. Constable, 1915.
4. *Nationalism and War in the Near East.* By a Diplomatist. Edited by Lord Courtney. Clarendon Press, 1915.
5. *La question du Bosphore et des Dardanelles.* By N. Dascovici. Geneva: Georg & Cie., 1915.

THE trend of British policy in the Near East in recent years was summed up by His Majesty's Ambassador in Petrograd in seven words, when, in response to the hope expressed by the Russian Foreign Minister that Great Britain would not fail to proclaim her solidarity with Russia and France, he pointed out that 'direct British interests in Serbia were nil.'\* From an economic point of view, in the mouth of a British Consul, the statement would have been literally true. As a guiding principle in relation to the possibility of the gravest developments in the Near East, the dictum can only give rise to amazement. That M. Sazonoff evidently shared this feeling is shown by the pointed rebuke which Sir George Buchanan naïvely records, when he adds: 'To this M. Sazonoff replied that we must not forget that the general European question was involved, the Serbian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.'\* The cogency of the Russian Foreign Minister's remarks requires no emphasis to-day, but in July 1914 Sir Edward Grey, having read his view of British interests in the Near East, could still telegraph to Sir G. Buchanan: 'I entirely approve what you said.'

Criticism on British diplomacy in the Near East is based on its failure, both before and during the war, to realise that the Near Eastern question, in whatever form it might be raised, was a part of the general European

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\* White Paper, Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914), [Cd. 7467], No. 6.



question, and that Great Britain could not afford to hold aloof from the problems it involved. Two factors of a general character contributed to prevent the Government in power before the outbreak of war from paying the necessary attention to the subject: (1) the practice of living diplomatically from hand to mouth, and (2) the conviction that there was nothing incompatible between the aims of Germany and British interests, and that consequently the two Powers could be brought together into a friendly *rapprochement* without any serious sacrifice of the ambitions of the one or the principles of the other. The ingenuousness of our diplomatic record, which has consisted in the main of a series of efforts to cope with each fresh situation as it has arisen, is as much a proof of the absence of all sinister designs as our unpreparedness for this war is proof of the absence of any desire to provoke a quarrel with Germany. But ingenuousness can be carried too far, when the existence of a nation is at stake. The trumpet call of Germany's designs upon the Near East has been too loud and insistent to go unmarked; and the fact that the British Government could ignore it can only be explained by the second of the contributory causes mentioned above, its belief that by preaching peace in Berlin often enough it would finally divert German ambitions into innocuous and praiseworthy channels. How strong was this belief and how powerfully it was allowed to influence British policy may be gauged from Sir E. Grey's enunciation of his desires and hopes on July 30, 1914, four days before the declaration of war between Germany and Britain. In a telegram despatched that day to the British Ambassador in Berlin he said:\*

'If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavours will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis; and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been

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\* White Paper, Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914), [Cd. 7467], No. 101.

too utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite *rapprochement* between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.'

In the light of our present knowledge it would be difficult to pen a statement that would do more credit to the British Government's good intentions, or more clearly emphasise its failure to understand Germany's policy or to fathom German designs.

If there had been reason to suppose that Germany had no political ambitions in Europe, there would have been some excuse, in the interests of European peace, for keeping an open mind on her activities in the Near East and finding in them, as we affected to find in the Baghdad Railway scheme, merely a legitimate outlet for commercial enterprise. But the Germany with whom Sir Edward Grey on July 30, 1914, still hoped to be able to conclude 'some more definite *rapprochement*' was the Germany who in 1905 had coerced France and in 1909 had coerced Russia, by threats of war, and in 1911 had sent the 'Panther' to Agadir. It was the same Germany who had rejected every overture of the British Government 'to promote cordial friendship as the only alternative to constant liability to friction'; had added to her navy while Great Britain moderated her naval construction; and, when Lord Haldane tried his persuasive powers in Berlin (February 1912), had replied by an addition to the peace strength of her army, following it up the next year with a further increase of sixty per cent. Lord Haldane's mission, as he has since told the country, made him 'painfully conscious that there was at least the chance of a terrible war.'\* He had come away from Berlin, he told an American correspondent, 'feeling uneasy. Germany was piling up armaments. She showed no disposition to restrict her naval development.'†

\* Address, Hampstead Garden Suburb Institute, Nov. 17, 1915.

† It is of interest to note that a few weeks after Lord Haldane had returned, 'feeling uneasy' over the chance of a terrible war, and had done 'all that in him lay, all that seemed to him to be possible to bring home that information to the minds of his colleagues,' one of the latter, Mr

If now we examine the *Drang nach Osten* in the light of the attitude which Germany had taken up in regard to European politics in general, we shall find little in it to confirm the comfortable theory that German intentions were limited to legitimate enterprise of an economic character. The first warning note was sounded in the spring of 1898 on the occasion of the Emperor William's visit to Palestine—his second visit to the East, including Constantinople, and undertaken at a time when European feeling had been outraged by the systematic massacre of Abdul Hamid's Armenian subjects. Speaking at Damascus, the German Emperor, who could not count a single Moslem among his subjects, declared that 'the 300,000,000 Mohammedans, who, dwelling dispersed throughout the East, reverence in his Majesty the Sultan Abdul Hamid their Khalif, may rest assured that at all times the German Emperor will be their friend.' A clearer enunciation of a resolve to use Turkey and the East for the purposes of a German world-policy could hardly have been given. It was followed by the sedulous cultivation of close relationship between Abdul Hamid and Germany, with the constant intensifying of Turkey's economic dependence upon Berlin as a result.

The revolution of July 1908 offered an opportunity for a watchful diplomacy to checkmate German designs in the Ottoman Empire. It was not taken. The Liberal element in Constantinople did not receive the support it required to maintain the revolutionary movement on sound lines. Young Turkey surrendered the direction of its affairs to a clique which proceeded to govern in the interests of the Committee of Union and Progress rather than in those of the country itself. Germany, momentarily put out of her stride by Abdul Hamid's fall, lost no time in regaining her place at the side of Turkey's rulers. That the new *régime* entailed neither new principles nor new methods was quickly shown by the 'Turkification' of Macedonia. When the Great Powers were compelled to take note of this process, Germany intervened to prevent direct pressure being put upon the

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J. A. Pease, speaking at the annual meeting of the Peace Society at the Mansion House, stated that Lord Haldane's visit to Germany had proved 'a real asset towards permanent good relations with the German Government and the German people.' 'Talibus insidiis . . . credita res.'

Turks. But her championship of the oppression of the peoples of Macedonia overreached itself. The Balkan States realised that with Germany's support the Turkish Government would be able so to modify the form of administration, without removing in any way the disabilities under which their kinsfolk suffered, that the possibility of effecting real reforms would become more remote than ever. They agreed, accordingly, to take the question of Macedonian reform out of the hands of the Great Powers and to deal with it themselves.

The result of the First Balkan War was wholly disconcerting to the plans of Germany and Austria-Hungary, who proceeded, in a manner entirely in keeping with the tactics adopted in regard to Morocco and the Bosnian annexation, to break up the Balkan League. By vetoing Serbian expansion to the Adriatic, Austria-Hungary compelled Serbia to seek an economic outlet down the valley of the Vardar towards the Ægean Sea. Dissensions at once began between Sofia and Belgrade, and these are known to have been actively encouraged from Vienna,\* while Magyar influences were brought to bear upon King Ferdinand, and war material was sent down the Danube from Hungary to Bulgaria. The result of the Second Balkan War proved even more annoying to the Central Powers than the First. For the moment the German Emperor sought to make a virtue of a necessity, and ranged himself on the side of the victors by taking credit for the Treaty of Bucarest. The real view of the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments, however, was revealed by the latter's resolve to readjust conditions in the Near East to its own liking by an unprovoked attack on Serbia. Peace was signed at Bucarest on Aug. 9, 1913; but on the previous day the Vienna Government had approached Italy and Germany with a view to bring into operation the Triple Alliance for action against Serbia.† The Italian Government refused to recognise the existence of a *casus fœderis*; and Austria-Hungary was dissuaded from her purpose—for eleven months only, as subsequent events proved. The murder

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\* 'The War and Democracy,' p. 148.

† Speech of Signor Giolitti before the Italian Chamber of Deputies, Dec. 5, 1914.

of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, at Serajevo, on June 28, 1914, provided the necessary pretext for aggression against Serbia. The events connected with the outbreak of the present war not only confirmed the solidarity of the alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary,\* but proved both Powers ready to risk everything for the success of the *Drang nach Osten*.

From this necessarily incomplete review of events in recent years two points would seem to be established: first, that Germany had deliberately embarked on a policy aiming at the hegemony of Europe, and, secondly, that she was using Austria-Hungary and the Near East to further or to round off her designs.

If the line of reasoning followed in these pages be correct, Germany's activities in the Near East—quite apart from any ulterior designs in the direction of Egypt or the Persian Gulf, which could only serve to put Great Britain doubly on her guard—required just as close watching as, say, the attempted *coup* in connexion with Morocco. This, however, was not the view of the British Government. Reference has already been made to Sir George Buchanan's dictum that direct British interests in Serbia were nil. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had insisted upon this point in 1908 at the time of the crisis which originated in the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. M. Iswolski, the Russian Foreign Minister, was in London at that time.

'I told him definitely then,' Sir E. Grey informed the House of Commons on Aug. 3, 1914, 'this being a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I did not consider that public opinion in this country would justify us in promising to give anything more than diplomatic support.'

Sir E. Grey's aloofness from this 'Balkan affair' may be contrasted with King Edward's attitude as described by Lord Redesdale in his recent 'Memories':

'It was the 8th of October that the King received the news at Balmoral, and no one who was there can forget how

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\* The German White Book states: 'We permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia.'

terribly he was upset. Never did I see him so moved. . . . The King was indignant, for nobody knew better than he the danger of tampering with the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin, and he saw that to make any change in the Turkish Provinces was to light a fuse which, sooner or later, was bound to fire a powder magazine. . . . His forecast of the danger, which he communicated at the time to me, showed him to be possessed of the prevision which marks the statesman. Every word that he uttered that day has come true.'

The British Government's failure to grasp the significance of the Balkan question was due in part, as we have seen, to a desire to believe that Germany's designs were innocuous. It was brought about mainly, however, it is to be feared, by ignorance and indifference; and to these prime causes may be traced the diplomatic and military failures in the Near East for the first sixteen months of the war.

Dealing with first beginnings, Sir E. Grey has said (House of Commons, Oct. 14, 1915):

'At the outset of the war, when Serbia was the only Balkan country engaged in it, we desired that the war should not spread in the Near East. We did not seek then to bring any other country into it, lest, by bringing in any one country on our side, we should precipitate conflict with another, and unnecessarily and to no good purpose enlarge the area of the war.'

Accordingly Turkey—Germany's special preserve in the Near East—was given the assurance that, if she remained neutral, the Allies would see that in the terms of peace Turkey and Turkey's territory should not suffer. But on Sept. 28, 1915, Sir E. Grey stated that Turkey was being made dependent upon Germany, 'in order to realise the German aspiration of German influence from Berlin to Baghdad.' In the face of such an aspiration, which should have been known to the British Government long before the war, why, it may be asked, was it assumed that the mere assurance of territorial integrity would save Turkey from German designs? Who can doubt that a grave mistake was made when the 'Goeben' and the 'Breslau,' having escaped into Turkish waters, were left immune to carry out those designs?



The feeling aroused in Turkey against Great Britain by the appropriation (on payment) of two Turkish men-of-war was a matter of common knowledge; and it required no great acumen to conceive the possibility of Turkey being forced into the war on Germany's side by the argument of the 'Goeben's' guns.

Full allowance, let it be stated here, must be made for the difficulty under which the Allies have laboured in achieving unity of direction both in diplomacy and in strategy. Every important step, Mr Asquith has informed us, 'has had, naturally and necessarily, to be taken in consultation and in concert between three and latterly four different Powers. With the best goodwill in the world and with the most genuine common purpose, there must be differences of angle and of point of view in an operation of that kind.' If ever there was to be an exception to the rule of consultation—which can hardly have applied to the original attempt to capture or engage the 'Goeben' and the 'Breslau'—it was when, twenty-four hours after their arrival off Constantinople, the Turks had shown their unwillingness or inability to keep within the strict letter of neutrality. But Great Britain failed to bring either the German ships or Turkey to book; and from that time until now misfortune has dogged the steps of the Entente Powers in the Near East.

No explanation has been offered on behalf of the Government to justify the belief that the war could be prevented from spreading to the Near East. It was conceivable that there should be a war between the Great Powers which would leave the Balkans entirely outside the struggle. What was not conceivable was that a European war, which concerned one Balkan State, should leave the others unaffected. But this was the contention of the British Government, and formed the basis of its policy. The war originated with Serbia; as a result of it that country would either have to go under, or would emerge greater and more powerful. In neither case could the other Balkan States remain indifferent to the course of events; but they would be the more profoundly affected by a victory of the Entente Powers, which must entail the aggrandisement of Serbia. The very fact, therefore, that the Allied Governments 'were out to win,' indeed could not afford to contemplate a

German victory, vitiated at the outset the policy which the British Government adopted towards the Balkans.

A correspondent of 'The Times,' who writes over the pen-name 'Vidi,' has made the following statement :

'In August and again in September, 1914, I and others sought to convince some of the leading diplomatists and statesmen of the Allies that the Balkans would be the pivot of the war. Our argument was that Serbia had been attacked less because of Austrian animosity against her than because she barred the German road to the East; and that the essential task of Allied diplomacy should be to draw all the Balkan States into alliance with us, on the basis of a settlement in accordance with the principle of nationality, before Turkey came into the war against us. I had reason to know the Young Turkish leaders had long been determined to side with Austria and Germany. We were then assured that Balkan affairs were comparative "trifles," which would settle themselves as soon as we had beaten the Germans in the West.'

The present writer is able to state that the views of Balkan affairs to which 'Vidi' bears witness were held in official quarters both at that time and later. Sir Edward Grey was merely expressing the same opinion in different words when he said that the British Government desired that the war should not spread in the Near East. There was only one way in which that desire could be realised, and that was by drawing all the Balkan States into alliance with the Entente Powers. To regard Balkan affairs as of no account, to adopt towards the dispute between Bulgaria and Serbia the attitude that we must needs support our Ally and refuse to listen to Bulgaria, implied failure to appreciate not only the significance of the Balkan question, but also the military importance of the Balkan States. The contention of the British Government that the war was a concern of the Great Powers and for that reason ought not to extend to the Near East was noble, but entirely unpractical. It ignored the past relations between Germany and the Near East, and was based on the gratuitous supposition that the Central Powers would commit themselves to a similar self-denying ordinance. On Aug. 3, 1914, a warning note against the reasonableness of this amiable doctrine had already been sounded

from Rumania, when King Carol had proposed to his State Council that full military support should be given to Germany and Austria. Other counsels, as we know, prevailed; but the suggestion did not augur well for the idea of keeping the war away from the Balkans, or at least it showed that other influences would inevitably be brought to bear upon the States to induce them to intervene in the war.

As all the Balkan States, from the nature of the struggle and of the principles for which it was being fought, were affected by the outbreak of war, it was the duty of the Entente Powers to make them party to it. The Second Balkan War had left them divided into two camps; and the mutually hostile feeling in the Peninsula would naturally find expression in hostile acts, unless a special effort were made to bring the countries together. As Serbia was already fighting on the side of the Entente, the Central Powers could not hope to revive the Balkan *bloc* for their benefit. Their line of action, therefore, would be to exploit to their own advantage Bulgarian hostility to Serbia, and to rely on bringing in Rumania and Greece on their side by other arguments *ad hoc*. The best way to counteract this policy—the only way which offered any chance of success—lay in bringing the Balkans once more together in a federation for their mutual benefit. They would thus have been safeguarded against German intrigue; and, if they were to take part in the war, it would be as a powerful unit of over a million men, capable of exercising probably decisive influence over the course of the military operations. In a number of public statements the British Government has declared that Balkan union was the end it kept in view. Unfortunately, however, the methods adopted to achieve that end could be relied upon to render its attainment impossible.

There is no clear indication as to the exact time when the British Government abandoned its first idea of keeping the war out of the Near East. The idea can hardly have survived the declaration of war against Turkey on Nov. 5; it ought not to have survived the arrival of the 'Goeben' and the 'Breslau' at Constantinople on Aug. 16. Some allowance must be made for the pre-occupations of the Allied Governments during the retreat

from Mons; but the turn of the tide in France had come on Sept. 5, when the Battle of the Marne began, and two days previously the arrival of six hundred Germans at Constantinople indicated what was brewing in Turkey. Even after the Porte had thrown in its lot with Germany there was plenty of time to reconstitute the Balkan bloc, either for military action or for purposes of neutrality, according to the predilections of the individual States. *Before the summer of 1915 Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece, each in turn, offered to join the Entente Powers on terms which would have been readily accepted later and would have been accepted at the time, if the Allies had grasped the significance of the Balkans.* We have Mr Asquith's own statement (House of Commons, Nov. 2, 1915) that 'ever since the beginning of the war, and especially since Turkey entered into it, we (the Allied Governments) have not ceased or slackened in our efforts to promote united action among the Balkan States and Rumania.' What a tragedy that, with such a clear conception of what was required of them, the Allied Governments should have set about their task in the one way calculated to defeat their ends! It will be generally admitted that nothing is more likely to antagonise a number of people mutually suspicious of one another than to know of secret negotiations being carried on with each one behind the backs of the others. Yet at one time or another, in the midst of those ceaseless efforts to promote united action among the Balkan States, the Allied Governments—over and above the understanding that Serbia would receive substantial concessions at the end of the war, affecting the whole position in the Balkans—were responsible for offers to Rumania, that might be prejudicial to Serbia; offers to Bulgaria, at the expense of Serbia and Greece; offers to Greece, again affecting the equilibrium of the Near East; an agreement with Italy which could only create dismay in Serbia and anxiety in Greece; and an arrangement regarding the future of Constantinople and the Dardanelles, the mere rumour of which was enough to make every Balkan State doubt the wisdom of throwing in its lot with the Entente Powers.

When the inner history of the war comes to be written, perhaps the most astounding feature in the Allies' conduct of it will be found to be their omission,

persisted in for fifteen months, to secure unity of direction whether for their diplomacy or for their strategy. As they were not the aggressors, there was nothing to prevent them from laying their diplomatic cards upon the table. They were fighting the cause of small nations; and the Balkans are the headquarters of that cause. A round-table conference of the Balkan States under the ægis of the Triple Entente, at which the details of an adjustment on the principle of nationality had to be settled within a given time, would have evolved an agreement in two parts, one of accepted changes, the other of changes proposed but contested. The duty of the Entente Powers would have been to pass judgment on the latter and to enforce their arbitration, while gilding the pill as far as possible with the offer of such compensation as it might be in their power to give at the end of a victorious war. Whether such a course would only have been possible with a Bismarck among the Allies others can judge; certainly the British Government had had experience before the war of the hopelessness of achieving united action among a number of States without such a conference, and experience of the success attending round-table discussions. No doubt difficulties would have had to be overcome, and, if only peace-time persuasion was to be allowed, some of the difficulties might have proved insuperable. But war calls for different methods from those that are suitable in peace; and the Allies' cause surely justified decisive action.

Instead of insisting upon a round-table conference, the Entente Powers elected to deal individually with the Balkan States. Even so, if the negotiations could have been carried out on sound lines, Balkan union might have been achieved. The negotiations failed for two reasons—because they ignored local conditions, in which term have to be included the national aims and the enemy's machinations; and because they were never supported either by a show of decision or by military strength. At the same time the omission to take other States into their confidence prejudiced the Allies' efforts in each State.

Germany herself at one time was so convinced that the position in the Balkans was wholly in favour of the

Allies that her earlier efforts were directed to securing the maintenance of neutrality by Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece. It was only when the Allies spoiled their own case that German intrigues were 'speeded up' with a view to having neutrality superseded by active co-operation on the side of the Central Powers. Thus, for the first three months of the war, both the belligerent groups were bidding for the neutrality of Rumania. One of the earliest mistakes made by Allied diplomacy was to offer Rumania for her neutrality practically all that could be conceded to her in return for her military co-operation. It would be an injustice to the late King Carol to regard him as merely the Hohenzollern in his attitude towards the European war. At the Crown Council held at Sinaia on Aug. 3, 1914, he proposed intervention on the side of the Central Powers, because he held that this would be the last struggle between the German Powers and Slavdom in which victory would side with the former. His foremost concern, I believe, was for his adopted country. He wished to see Rumania recover Bessarabia as the reward for her support of a victorious Austria, and then in the course of the next two decades, having made her peace with Russia, to be in at the death of Austria-Hungary, receiving the remainder of the Rumanian heritage in the annexation of Transylvania.

King Carol was unable to carry the Council with him. The country at the outbreak of the war was frankly in favour of intervention on the side of the Triple Entente; but the interventionists were somewhat taken aback to find that Russia had promised Rumania all she wanted in Transylvania in return for mere neutrality. In spite of this fact the Rumanian Government was still prepared to do the right thing, and it set about to find further support for a declaration of war. When the overtures to Greece failed owing to the latter's distrust of Bulgaria, the Rumanians turned to Italy. They counted on being party to any negotiations between Italy and the Entente, with a view to entering the war simultaneously with Italy. But, for reasons not revealed, the Allies deliberately kept the Rumanians in the dark regarding the progress of the negotiations, so that the Italian declaration of war, coming when it did, took Bucarest by surprise.



Meanwhile the negotiations with Russia had been dragging on with complete indifference to all considerations of urgency. The Rumanian Government, which not unnaturally placed a higher value on its military co-operation than Russia had on its mere neutrality, felt that it could only abandon that neutrality on the strength of a definite agreement with Russia, duly ratified by her Allies. It made no attempt to urge the question of Bessarabia; in regard to the Bukovina it asked that the River Pruth should continue to be the boundary between Rumania and Russia, and claimed the Banat in order to have a satisfactory geographical frontier on the west. Russia demurred to the Pruth line, as it meant that Czernowitz would become Rumanian, and proposed instead the Sereth; Great Britain objected to the whole of the Banat being Rumanian on the ground that the Serbians required the part of it opposite Belgrade for the protection of their capital. By the time the Allies' objections were overcome the military position dominated the negotiations. Rumania hesitated to commit herself to a formal agreement for fear lest premature disclosure of the fact might launch the Austro-German forces against her, while the Russians would not be at hand to help. At this time, moreover, the question of munitions was uppermost in all countries; and the Rumanian Government found that it was by no means adequately equipped for a long campaign, with the prospect of being cut off from further supplies, if Bulgaria were to join the Central Powers.

In the case of Rumania, then, it would appear that, at the time when she was ready to intervene, the diplomacy of the Allies made it impossible for her to take the step. The opportunity once lost, a variety of circumstances arose to confirm the Rumanian Government in its resolve to bide its time. It has not necessarily abandoned the idea of joining the Entente Powers; but it will put off the day of intervention as long as possible for the reason that a short campaign is preferable to a long one. Here, however, it may be pointed out that responsible people in Rumania, who are not pronounced interventionists, have maintained that the country might not be able to remain neutral, if the Central Powers should succeed in obtaining command of the Danube and the land route to

Constantinople. The danger to the Allied cause lies in the possibility of Austro-German intrigues seizing the military situation of the moment to effect some political *coup* which would deprive the country of the power to act according to its inclinations.

Whatever views the British Government may hold to-day on the subject, the fact remains that up to the eleventh hour it chose to ignore the existence of German propaganda in the Near East, either from failure to believe in its efficacy, or owing to the idea that the propaganda could only be counteracted by a resort to similar methods—an unthinkable course on the part of Britain. Other methods, however, were available, involving neither bribes nor intrigue, but they have not been adopted. No amount of expense incurred in having bald, unconvincing messages sent broadcast without reference to local conditions could provide an adequate substitute for the personal touch. The Germans appreciated this point. They recognised the necessity of agents on the spot; and, as these could not command British tact, they supplied them with Teutonic gold as a substitute. Various estimates have appeared of the sums spent in the Balkans on German propaganda. If it be true that one agent has absconded with 200,000*l.*, the statement that 2,000,000*l.* have been spent in Rumania alone will be within the mark. This sum will have been devoted to the purchase of certain newspapers, to subsidies to others, to personal subventions, and to various devices employed to distract the Rumanian public from the subject of intervention. Similar work has been carried on in Bulgaria and Greece.

If the diplomacy of the Entente Powers has been remiss in Rumania, it can only be termed criminally at fault in regard to Bulgaria. Germane to the subject are the following Ministerial statements. Lord Crewe, in the House of Lords, on Oct. 14, 1915, said :

‘The Allies all through have had in their minds and cherished the hope of the promotion of Balkan union. . . . Germany, Austria and Turkey, *for ever so many years past*, have gone to work in precisely the opposite way. Their object, their purpose has been not to unite, but to divide the Balkan States. . . . We did not originally assume that Bulgaria was or need be hostile to us in the first instance.’

Sir E. Grey had previously reviewed the situation in much the same terms on Sept. 28 :

'The policy of Germany has been to create for her own purposes disunion and war between the Balkan States. . . . She first made use of Austria-Hungary to precipitate a European war. . . . Turkey was gratuitously forced by Germany into this war. . . . *In the same way, it would naturally be Germany's policy to use any Balkan State she could influence to further this plan.*'

At a later date (Nov. 11, 1915), in reply to a question in the House of Commons, Sir E. Grey said :

'The German and Austrian sympathies of the King of the Bulgarians have *always* been known ; and reports of Bulgarian negotiations with Turkey under German influence came from various Balkan sources as early as April.'

It is obvious that, if the British Government was in possession of all the knowledge that is claimed in the above statements—Germany's work 'for ever so many years past' in the Balkans, and the sympathies of King Ferdinand—and realised that it would 'naturally be Germany's policy to use any Balkan State she could influence,' as she had used Turkey, for her own ends, then it was the paramount duty of the Government at the very outset of the war, at any rate immediately after the defection of Turkey (which really dates from August, although war was not declared until Nov. 5), to bring the Balkans into line. The fact that, in discussing the conduct of the war on Nov. 2, Mr Asquith chose to emphasise the point that 'the efforts of diplomacy *ever since August and September last* in that direction (to promote united action among the Balkan States) have been ceaseless and untiring,' is an indication that the latter-day efforts compared favourably with the previous steps. But the time for the 'ceaseless and untiring efforts' was in August and September 1914. The nature of the steps taken in the first twelve months of the war may be gauged by the fact that the British Minister at Sofia had no official audience of King Ferdinand from the outbreak or earlier days of European

hostilities until the date of his farewell audience.\* As King Ferdinand's 'German and Austrian sympathies' and German efforts to promote disunion in the Balkans were so well known to the British Government, it would seem to have been incumbent upon the latter to take the precaution of being represented in Sofia by a man who could be relied upon as a *persona gratissima* at the Bulgarian Court to counteract in some measure those sympathies. The diplomatic situation in Sofia has been a matter of common knowledge for some years to all who have kept in touch with Near Eastern affairs. Sir Edward Grey's attention was directly called to it, but, unless we are mistaken, he adopted the view—until July 9, 1915—that so long as a diplomatist pleases the Foreign Office, it does not matter whether he is pleasing to the people among whom he lives and to the Court to which he is accredited.

In view of the grave handicap under which British diplomacy laboured, the actual course of the negotiations with Bulgaria is almost of minor importance. As in the case of Rumania, a substantial offer of territorial concessions was first made to Bulgaria in return for her neutrality; and this offer did not predispose her to value her military co-operation lightly. It was not until May that a definite bid appears to have been made for Bulgaria's support against Turkey. She was then offered the portion of Macedonia which formed the 'uncontested zone' of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912, together with Kavalla, which is Greek. If such an offer had been made three months earlier, it might have met with a different response. The bombardment of the Dardanelles on Feb. 25 had made a great impression on the Balkan States. It brought a sudden accession of strength to the ranks of the interventionists in Bulgaria; and, if these could have gained a sympathetic hearing from the British representative, an appeal would have reached His Majesty's Government to make

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\* In reply to a question in the House of Commons, Dec. 8, 1915, Sir E. Grey said: 'His Majesty's Minister at Sofia was granted leave of absence, and left Sofia on July 9. The diplomatic negotiations in progress at that time had reached a stage at which a change in the person of our representative was considered desirable.'

in March the offer which it postponed until May. By the end of May not only had the glamour of the attack on the Dardanelles passed, but the military situation in general was undergoing serious modifications owing to the Russian retirement. On May 16, it will be remembered, the Russians had already withdrawn to the San; on June 3, Przemyśl had been retaken. German influence was making headway at Sofia. The Bulgarian Government replied to the Allies' overtures on June 15 by asking for further details; and some confirmation of the inference drawn above from Mr Asquith's words—that the Allied Governments' 'ceaseless and untiring efforts' were not conspicuous before August—may be derived from the circumstance that some two months passed before they replied to the Bulgarian Note. In the meantime the conclusion of the Dedeagatch Railway agreement with Turkey on July 22 showed that the Bulgarian Government had already chosen its side in the war, even if a definite treaty with Germany had not already been in existence since March or April—as is asserted on good authority. No doubt it was necessary for the Allies to reconcile Serbia and Greece to the concessions at their expense which had been offered to Bulgaria without previous reference to them.

The task of gaining Serbia's formal consent to the transfer of some of her territory to Bulgaria took time. At an earlier stage of the war, when the British Government's view of the Balkan question was coloured by the single consideration that Serbia was our ally and Bulgaria was not, there had been a tendency to accept unquestioningly the Serbian estimate of everything to do with Bulgaria. Little wonder, then, that after the hard facts of nearly a year's struggle the Serbian Government should be taken aback to find that the Entente Powers were prepared to take the Bulgarian view, not only of everything Bulgarian, but of Serbian affairs as well. Their proposals were altogether unacceptable; and for weeks the Serbian Government could not bring itself to agree to them. Serbia was still a constitutional country in being, and the Ministry had no authority to alienate national territory without the consent of Parliament convened for this purpose. There was the further consideration that Serbia stood pledged to Greece by the

terms of the alliance not to cede to a third party the Monastir and Ochrida districts. One of the tragedies of the war is this action of Serbia, virtually jeopardising her existence in order to honour an agreement which Greece was about to repudiate at the first opportunity. It was not until a somewhat dictatorial Note had been handed to the Serbian Government from the Entente Powers (Aug. 4) that M. Pasitch, in the face of the growing menace of an Austro-German invasion, and knowing that Greece was also being subjected to *force majeure*, gave way.

If in a long list of mistakes room can be found for minor errors of judgment, reference may be permitted here to the failure of the Allies to make the most of the assets they had in the Serbian and Greek Premiers. The diplomatic methods employed aggravated the difficulties of M. Pasitch's position, handicapped as he was by the strong consensus of military opinion against the surrender of territory to Bulgaria; they cannot be said to have given M. Venizelos any real support. The unpardonable practice of negotiating with each country behind the backs of the others, it cannot be insisted upon too often, went a long way towards defeating the aims of the Entente. It created distrust and provided the opponents of intervention with an unfailing reservoir of objections which it was difficult to refute.

From the end of July to Sept. 19, when mobilisation began, and until hostilities actually broke out, the Bulgarian Government played with the Allies, just as the Porte had done for two months, while military preparations were being made under German direction. Even at this time the diplomacy of the Entente contrived to defeat its own ends. There was reason to believe that the Bulgarian agreement with Germany provided that the Bulgarian army should not co-operate until the Austro-German forces had achieved a success in Serbia. They had already been driven back twice and with difficulty had secured foothold south of the Danube a third time, when the Russian ultimatum enabled Bulgaria to come to their rescue. If there was to be a question of an ultimatum, it ought to have been delivered several weeks earlier. Speaking in the House of Commons on Oct. 14, Sir E. Grey said :



'In my opinion, it is clear that nothing but a decided and preponderating advantage to the Allies in the course of the military events in Europe during the last few months would have enabled us to make the policy of Balkan agreement prevail over the opposite policy of bringing about Balkan war.'

Yet, when the Serbian Government expressed the opinion that the right military policy was to attack Bulgaria before her mobilisation was complete, and Sir E. Grey was 'pressed' for his opinion on Sept. 27 (eight days before the Russian ultimatum), he gave the chilling reply that 'all the political and diplomatic arguments were against such action' (Lord R. Cecil, in the House of Commons, Nov. 9, 1915). The British Foreign Office holds that in this reply there was no refusal of permission to attack Bulgaria; but it is evident how the Serbian Government regarded the message. What is not so evident is why Sir E. Grey, when he had decided that the one thing needed was a military success, should have invoked 'diplomatic arguments,' which, in so far as they concerned the Balkans and were those of the Entente Powers, had long since been proved bankrupt of both force and logic.

In the category of obstacles for which the Allies had only themselves to thank, mention must be made of the misgivings caused in every country in the Near East at the prospect of seeing, at the end of the war, Russia established at Constantinople in control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Entente diplomacy has kept its own secret, but at the expense of allowing the conviction to gain ground that an Anglo-Franco-Russian agreement exists which satisfies Russian aspirations in this direction. M. Sazonoff's remarks on the subject in the Duma last February were vague. Sir E. Grey, in answer to a question, stated that the report he had seen represented M. Sazonoff to say that the events on the Russo-Turkish frontier would bring Russia nearer to the realisation of the political and economic problems bound up with the question of Russia's access to the open sea. 'That,' added Sir E. Grey, 'is an aspiration with which we are in entire sympathy. The precise form in which it will be realised will, no doubt, be settled in the terms of peace.' In view of the significant trend given to the

discussion of the question in the press of the Entente Powers, M. Sazonoff's vague words were not thought in the Balkans to leave the matter as open as the British Foreign Secretary desired to represent it. This opinion found some confirmation in a statement made shortly afterwards by Prince Trubetskoy in a Russian paper that Russia 'must have power by force of arms to prevent the men-of-war of any other State from negotiating the waters of the Sea of Marmora and the Black Sea'—a clear hint not only of the Dardanelles being in Russia's hands, but of being fortified by her anew.

Whatever may be the understanding between Great Britain and Russia in regard to the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, there can be no doubt as to the steps taken by Germany to play upon the fears of the Balkan States; for the question is one that intimately affects Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece, in addition to Turkey.\* In the case of the latter, the assertion that Great Britain and Russia are in league to rob them of Constantinople will have been used to rouse the ardour of the Turks for a war for which originally they had no liking. To Rumania the freedom of the waterway between the Black Sea and the *Ægean* is even more important from an economic point of view than it is for Russia.† With a port on the *Ægean*, Bulgaria is less dependent than Rumania on a free outlet from the Black Sea; but some time must elapse before Dedeagatch ranks with Varna and Burgas. The Bulgarian attitude, however, would be determined by traditional misgivings in regard to the altruism of Russian activities in the Balkans. Greece, again, is interested as a maritime State. It offered her little encouragement in respect of the present intentions of the Allies, and still less hope for the future, to find that Russia had stipulated that, in the event of the Dardanelles being forced, the Greek fleet should not be

\* The German press publishes a version of the Anglo-Russian agreement—'vouched for officially by the Bulgarian Government'—according to which Russia is to have Constantinople, but Great Britain is to occupy the islands in the Sea of Marmora and those which command the entrance to the Dardanelles.

† Russia exports 20 per cent., Rumania 55 per cent. of the total of her agricultural products. The author of '*La question du Bosphore et des Dardanelles*' states the Rumanian case against Russian occupation and in favour of the internationalisation of the waterway.

allowed to approach within a certain distance of Constantinople.

Greece, however, has had many other pre-occupations than the future status of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. Fate was unkind to the Entente in developing in King Constantine a spirit of contrariness; but opportunities of securing Greek co-operation had been thrown away before this trait had become fixed. The project of forcing the Dardanelles was first mooted in British Government and naval circles in November 1914. By January the scheme was beginning to mature; and, in order to supplement the Allies' military deficiencies, overtures were made to Greece for her co-operation. She was to cede Kavalla and receive the western end of Asia Minor. Without entering into the merits of this bargain, it may be pointed out that the appearance of Greece as a Euro-Asiatic Power could not fail to affect the relative positions of the countries in the Near East, and therefore should have formed part of a comprehensive settlement of the Near Eastern question, with all the States privy to it. At one time King Constantine was not opposed to Greek co-operation with the Allies; but, in view of the danger which he feared from Germany and Bulgaria, he stipulated for a guarantee of territorial integrity for a period of five years after the conclusion of the war. To a certain extent this request was equivalent to a desire for a definite and final settlement of the Near Eastern question as a whole; for the guarantee of Greece's integrity predicated the contentment of Bulgaria and, *ergo*, peace in the Near East.

With a different handling of the problem King Constantine's stipulation might have been met. M. Venizelos, of a more open nature and taking a broader view of things than his Sovereign, was prepared to give the Allies the support of Greece unreservedly, in the certainty that the result of the war fought out in this way must carry with it the settlement of the Near Eastern question once and for all. The Allied Governments, not seeing the wood from paying too close attention to the trees, could not give King Constantine his guarantee because it raised the question of Kavalla (which they wished Bulgaria to regard as already decided in her favour), and entailed—the one thing they

seemed resolved to avoid—a round-table conference and the settlement of the Balkan problem. M. Venizelos tried to force the King's hand by resigning, but King Constantine defied him and the Constitution; and so far the Greek public has condoned the offence.

Its acquiescence is to be explained partly by the military prestige which the King acquired in the First and Second Balkan Wars, but still more by the popular superstition that has grown round his recovery from his illness. There had been a public demand that the sacred Ikon from Tenos should be used; but, so long as the German physicians had hopes of saving their patient's life, they refused to countenance any such (from their point of view) quackery. Only when they had virtually despaired of the King's recovery was their veto withdrawn. The Ikon was brought in procession to the Royal bedside, and, in raising himself to kiss it, King Constantine must have brought about the rupture required to remove the evil which had defied the doctors' efforts. He experienced almost immediate relief. The Ikon had performed its miracle. M. Venizelos is correct in saying that the theory of Divine Right does not hold in Greece; but a King who is the object of the miraculous intervention of Providence can hardly do wrong—whatever the Constitution has to say on the subject.

King Constantine has held his ground, and M. Venizelos and the Constitution have been twice defied. Whether a little more tactful conduct of the negotiations with Greece on the part of the Allies would have led to different results it is not possible to say. Greek feeling was embittered by the peremptory manner in which the question of Kavalla was ultimately raised, and still more by the exasperating methods of enforcing the right of search at sea on Greek ships. Two ways were open to the Allies, either to continue the negotiations on the most friendly lines possible, or to resort to an ultimatum and the exercise or display of force. The course actually adopted was to continue negotiations of a 'milk and water' order in Athens, while at sea no attempt was made to spare Greek feelings.\* Meanwhile the King and

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\* See, in this connexion, an interview with the Greek Premier, M. Skoulondis, published in the 'Daily Chronicle,' Dec. 23, 1915.

probably a number of his subjects came more and more under German influence. Not only did he adopt a thoroughly German attitude towards Greece's pledge to Serbia, but his repudiation of the treaty has been acquiesced in by the country.

Nothing could have courted failure so surely in dealing with the Balkan States as the indecision which characterised the diplomacy of the Entente Powers and especially of the British Government. The latter allowed itself to be deceived all along the line by Germany, and, even when hostilities broke out, refused to admit the importance of the Balkans in relation to the war. Thus, when the Allies could have secured the support of the neutral States, *they would not*. Months later, when the axioms of the Near Eastern question had been learned in the stern school of defeat, the Allies would, but *they could not*. No doubt they will worry through, and a spirit of invincible complacency bids us regard the worst blunders as merely the misfortunes of war, for which no responsibility can attach. The adage that as you make your bed so you must lie applies, perhaps, to a nation which leaves the conduct of a war for its very existence to a Government which did not believe in war, would not prepare for war, and had made no study of war. But the Balkans had a right to expect better things of the high priests of Pacifism. If ever a question needed a pacific settlement, so far as the States directly affected were concerned, it was the Near Eastern problem. At the hands of the Allies, however, it was neglected, until it stood committed to the arbitrament of war. But war between the Balkan States can bring no final settlement in the Near East. Bulgaria by rights ought to have received concessions in Macedonia. If she does not receive them, the apple of discord remains; if she receives them, her perfidy will be rewarded at the expense of our Allies. The failure to understand the Near Eastern question has led to grave military difficulties; but the penalty of ignorance and indifference will, unfortunately, not end there.

Art. 11.—BELGIAN REFUGEES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

1. *First Report of the Departmental Committee appointed to consider and report on questions arising in connection with the reception and employment of the Belgian Refugees in this country.* [Cd. 7750.] Wyman, 1914.
2. *Minutes of evidence taken before the Departmental Committee [etc., as above].* [Cd. 7779.] Wyman, 1915.

THERE is no single phase of the war which has more touched the hearts and imaginations of the British people than the fate of Belgium. By the noble stand made in the cause of liberty and independence by this little nation against the aggression of a mighty power, by the splendid heroism of its people, and by their unparalleled sufferings, chords of sympathy have been struck which have vibrated throughout the Empire. Mingled with an infinite compassion for the oppressed of this martyr kingdom and a consuming fire of indignation at the barbarous deeds of its oppressors, has been a steadfast determination to right the wrongs that have been perpetrated largely in pursuit of a mean-spirited policy of revenge. It would be idle to assert that the flame of righteous anger is still burning with the same fierceness as when, in the beginning of the war, every day brought to our shores cargoes of hapless refugees, driven forth by the German invasion from their peaceful Flemish homes. An unhappy sequence of events has made us only too familiar with German frightfulness; and it may be that our senses have grown dull to crimes which, although by repetition in varied spheres they have lost nothing of their turpitude, do not make the same fresh appeal as did the initial deeds of horror. Interest, too, in the cause of the victims may possibly have lost some of its intensity, owing to the prolonged nature of the struggle, which has brought with it new objects of benevolence and poignant anxieties for those nearest and dearest to us. But, even if we would, we cannot divest ourselves of our responsibilities. It is our bounden duty both to care for the fugitives to-day, and in the future to safeguard their devastated fatherland. Pledges have



been given which carry with them a solemn obligation, one neither to be evaded nor broken without loss of national honour. The Premier's words spoken at the Mansion House on Nov. 9, 1914, and re-affirmed later, are the pith and marrow of this unwritten contract. 'We shall never sheath the sword,' he said, 'until Belgium recovers, in full measure, all and more than all that she has sacrificed.' And in his contribution to 'King Albert's Book' Mr Asquith writes:

'Belgium has deserved well of the world. She has placed us under an obligation which as a nation we shall not forget. We assure her to-day in the name of this United Kingdom, and of the whole Empire, that she may count to the end on our whole-hearted and unflinching support.'

Speaking with all the authority of his great position as Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey has strikingly reinforced the Premier's view of our indebtedness to Belgium in these words:

'The wrongs done to Belgium have brought home to us that we must spare nothing and if need be must spend everything to secure justice for her and freedom for us all.'

In the same spirit of frank acknowledgment, Lord Curzon, in the publication referred to, paid a generous tribute to our heroic ally.

'Belgium, by her conduct and still more by her example, has rendered a priceless service to humanity, for she has once more taught the world the sublime truth that national honour is preferable to national security, and that, though the body may be destroyed, the spirit is immortal. For the moment a crown of thorns has been pressed down upon her temples, but Europe, nay the civilised world will see to it that she is healed of her grievous wounds; and some day, let us hope before long, she will live again in the recovered prosperity of her people, and the admiring gratitude of mankind.'

These declarations might be multiplied indefinitely, but the citations made are sufficient to prove that there is no room for apathy, weariness or parsimony in the work we have undertaken on behalf of the refugees.

If we did hesitate—and I am afraid, from certain experiences that I have had, that in some quarters such a disposition does exist—it is only necessary, in order to cure us of any such weakness, to consider for a moment how much is involved in the manner in which our obligations are discharged. This is no simple question of domestic charity which entails in the tightening of our purse-strings a passing reflection on our generosity, but it is a matter which has a serious international aspect. The world is watching us with a closeness of scrutiny that has seldom been exhibited with regard to a purely charitable movement. The Belgians themselves are perhaps wondering whether, after all, they may not be outstaying their welcome, and are glancing about them anxiously to detect any indication on our part of waning interest or wavering support. For the good name of our country we must see that there is no room for doubt as to the nature of our intentions. Our exertions must not be remitted until the last Belgian has been replaced on Belgian soil, a self-reliant citizen ready to take his part in the great work of reconstruction which his country will have to face.

These general reflections on the nation's duty to Belgium have been placed as a foreword to this article because I feel deeply that there can be no adequate appreciation of the work done on behalf of the Belgian refugees that does not take strict account of the considerations which I have brought forward. Yet I admit there might be excuse found in the vastness and complexity of the duty we have undertaken, not perhaps for hesitation or indifference but for doubt as to our ability, amid the myriad demands made upon us in this world-war, to do full justice to it. For never before in our history have we been called upon to do so much in so short a time for a fugitive population which has sought refuge on our shores.

How extensive the influx of the Belgians has been may be illustrated by some figures supplied me by the Registrar-General, whose department has carried out a notable work in registering the refugees. The system on which the registration has been based enables a fairly accurate picture to be formed of the numerical strength,

social and industrial characteristics, and sex and age of the Belgian community in our midst; but I may say that, for various reasons, the register does not profess to be absolutely complete. Of these the chief one is that, apart from the ordinary refugees who in one way or another are or have been recipients of public hospitality, there is an important class of well-to-do and fairly well-to-do people, who have supported themselves and have not come upon the register, either because they have failed to appreciate the need for registration or are ignorant of the fact that registration is required. It is difficult, therefore, accurately to estimate the strength of this non-registered section; but the view of those who are in the best position to form an opinion on the subject is that it cannot fall very far short of 50,000. It will, consequently, be necessary to add this number to the total given by the Registrar-General in order to arrive at a fair approximation of the Belgian refugee population. The following are the official figures:

Under 5, both sexes	.	.	.	18,500
5 to 15	"	"	.	33,500
15 to 25	"	"	.	39,000
25 to 65	"	"	.	103,500
Over 65	"	"	.	5,500
				<hr/>
				200,000

The figure given for the refugees from 15 to 25 is merely nominal, owing to the fact that males of military age in considerable numbers have left this country and joined the Belgian Army in Flanders. It is probable, therefore, that the total of 200,000 is somewhat in excess of the actual figure that these registered refugees represent at the present time. On the whole, however, after reviewing the facts we may conclude that the refugee population is something between 200,000 and 250,000. This is not a very satisfactory statement; but, knowing as I do from bitter experience the difficulties of obtaining close estimates in consequence of the constant movement of the Belgians and the neglect of large numbers to register, I put it forward as the most complete estimate possible without more thoroughgoing measures than have as yet been found to be possible. In regard to the sex of the refugees the following details are of interest:

Infants up to 5	.	.	.	not distinguished.
5 to 15, an excess of about	.	.	.	1000 males.
15 to 25	"	"	.	2000 females.
25 to 65	"	"	.	3500 males.
Over 65	"	"	.	2000 females.

These figures, it should be stated, are only estimates ; and no reliable classification of females has yet been made. Generally speaking, however, it may be taken that the two sexes are about equally represented.

Some interesting facts are also revealed from the analysis of the domiciliary features of the official returns. It has been widely assumed that our Belgian guests are fairly representative of the general population of Belgium in both its urban and rural aspects. Such, however, is far from being the case, for the overwhelming majority of the refugees are from the towns. The largest proportional influx was from Antwerp, Malines, Ostend, Louvain, and Charleroi, and the smallest from the agricultural provinces of Namur, Limbourg and Luxembourg. Antwerp (including the suburbs) and Ostend, probably the most cosmopolitan and unrepresentative towns in Belgium, have sent about one-third of the total number of refugees. The three agricultural provinces, with double the population of those two towns, have not contributed five per cent. These figures, it should be stated, do not include soldiers.

So great has been the rush of important events in the past momentous year that the arrival of the refugees seems now to be almost ancient history. Yet vivid memories of those stirring days still linger amongst those who were privileged to be instrumental in receiving this broken and forlorn multitude, and affording them as far as might be the alleviation of which their harassed minds and weary bodies stood so greatly in need. The picture of those waves of human misery breaking on our shores in the autumn days of 1914 is indeed one which will not be obliterated so long as Britain cherishes the traditions of her right to befriend the helpless and the suffering.

One striking circumstance must especially be noted, because it exercised and indeed continues to exercise a wide influence on the present problem. After the fall

of Antwerp and Ostend had destroyed the last hope that some outside power would stand between them and their oppressors, the exodus assumed enormous proportions. It is officially calculated that within a comparatively short lapse of time from the date (October 1914) when those towns fell into the enemy's hands, a million refugees—about a seventh of the total population—had abandoned Belgian soil. More than half the number fled to Holland; some thousands, especially from the Ardennes and the southern provinces, went to France; and the remainder sought refuge in England. So early as Aug. 24, 1914, a War Refugees Committee had been formed in London by Lady Lugard, the Hon. Mrs Alfred Lyttelton, and Lord Gladstone, to deal with the exiles as they landed at our ports. But the actual extent of the catastrophe which had overwhelmed the Belgian nation was not fully realised until the period indicated, when the German conquest was rounded off by the occupation of Antwerp and the coast. The immigration then became so great, that the severest strain was put upon an organisation which had had everything to improvise at short notice and without any real experience to guide the workers. How severe a strain it was may well be imagined when it is considered what difficult and delicate questions must inevitably arise in dealing with myriads of distressed and bewildered foreigners of both sexes, of all ages and social conditions, suddenly stranded, without resources and often even without adequate clothing, in a strange land. At Folkestone alone, in one week after the fall of Ostend, no less than 26,000 Belgians were disembarked, while, at the same port, between Sept. 20 and Oct. 24, as many as 35,000 refugees, all destitute, were met at the pier and dispatched to London.

These figures speak eloquently for themselves. They convey an impression of unrelenting labour, sustained zeal, tact and resourcefulness, which cannot be too widely recognised. But the refugee staff, who were with a few exceptions voluntary workers, could not perform the impossible; and their inability to sort out and classify these thousands of refugees as they poured in, either at their port of arrival or at the receiving house at Aldwych, proved eventually to be a source of difficulty.

In the rush of a never-ending struggle to meet the immediate needs of human derelicts, many of them in the last stage of exhaustion from exposure and lack of proper sustenance, and all under the dark shadow of their terrible experiences, there was no time to make any but the most superficial investigation into the nature of their individual status and occupation; and these questions afterwards became of considerable importance. As a consequence there were some curious anomalies in the distribution of industrial units, anomalies which were increased by the rule to which I shall refer later prohibiting refugees from being sent to certain areas. Fishermen and seafaring folk were sent to inland centres in the heart of England; homes were found for miners in areas remote from the mining districts; and mechanics received hospitality in purely agricultural counties in the south in which they were least likely to be able to exercise their calling. This was subsequently remedied to a large extent by a system of redistribution, but it has not been easy in all cases to effect transfers; the hosts have often demurred to parting with their Belgian guests, and refugees who have found pleasant temporary homes have shown a natural reluctance to exchange them for others of which they knew nothing.

When the refugees first arrived in this country, few of us realised that the question of their distribution according to vocation would assume the importance that it ultimately attained. The almost universal view entertained in the early period of the war was that there would be serious industrial disturbance resulting in widespread unemployment, and that it would not be possible to find profitable occupation for the refugees without prejudicing the interests of our own workers. Happily, as events proved, instead of any stagnation in the labour market being caused by the war exactly the opposite effect was produced. Thus it came about that Belgian labour, far from being an embarrassing superfluity, ultimately proved in many ways to be a welcome and serviceable addition to our own domestic supply.

Long before this stage was reached, the Government had been constrained to give serious attention to the question of finding occupation for the adult refugees. It was very properly felt that these unfortunate people



could not be left to follow a life of idleness without serious danger to their moral well-being and industrial efficiency. The very profusion and spontaneity of the hospitality extended to them added to the necessity, for many of the refugees were so comfortably placed that there was no real incentive to exertion; and irregular habits were being acquired, which it might be difficult afterwards to shake off. The Belgian Government heartily concurred in the view that it was desirable that the refugees should be employed; and King Albert himself in a pathetic appeal expressed the hope that his people would not be pauperised by having their wants supplied without making any industrial return. Acting in the spirit of this touching communication from the heroic head of the Belgian nation—though the appeal was not actually made until some time afterwards—the Government, through Mr Herbert Samuel, then President of the Local Government Board, appointed a Departmental Committee,\* of which I was nominated chairman, to consider and report on questions arising from the reception of the Belgian refugees in this country, particularly what action could properly be taken with a view to finding occupation for the refugees which would not compete with the employment of available British labour.

To co-operate with the Departmental Committee, the King of the Belgians set his seal to a Royal Decree appointing an 'Official Committee of Belgians for Great Britain,' of which M. Berryer, Minister of the Interior, was President; and among the most prominent of its members were Count Goblet d'Alviella, His Excellency Baron Goffinet, and M. le Chevalier Edmond Carton de Wiart. Throughout the enquiry this eminent body of Belgian experts acted in close communication with the Departmental Committee; and I may take this opportunity of re-affirming the view expressed in the official report, that their co-operation was most valuable and

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\* The members of this Departmental Committee were as follows: Sir Ernest Hatch, Bart., Chairman; the Rt Rev. Monsignor Bidwell, D.D.; Mr C. W. Bowerman, M.P.; Sir F. Cawley, Bart., M.P.; Sir T. H. Elliott, K.C.B.; Mr Harry Gosling; Right Hon. Arthur Henderson, M.P.; Miss Susan Lawrence; Hon. Mrs Alfred Lyttelton; Mr R. S. Meiklejohn, C.B.; Mr H. Pike Pease, M.P.; Rt Hon. the Earl of Plymouth, C.B.; Mr C. F. Rey; Mr R. Smillie; Mr. J. Dundas White, M.P.; and Mr Basil Williams.

helped materially to a right understanding of the many difficult points that came before us for consideration.

It is unnecessary to go at any length into the proceedings of the Departmental Committee. Any one who is sufficiently interested in the occupation phase of the refugee problem will find in the report of the Committee [Cd. 7750] and the Minutes of the Evidence that accompanied it [Cd. 7779] a complete account of its activities. Suffice it here to give in the barest outline the conclusions at which we arrived. First, before any definite recommendations on the subject of employment could be made, we held that it was necessary (1) that we should be supplied with a reliable classification of the refugees; (2) that it should be decided whether any refugees might reside in prohibited areas; and (3) that the terms and conditions under which the refugees might be employed should be clearly defined.

In each instance our requirement was met. The Registrar-General was instructed to prepare a central register of refugees; and he immediately organised a large staff with that object. Subsequently forms of registration in English, French and Flemish were issued asking for the necessary information. Every effort was made to ensure the completeness of the register, but, for the reasons I have already given, the number of refugees in our midst still remains indefinite. In the matter of prohibited areas the authorities decided that, in view of the danger of German spies passing as Belgians, an absolute prohibition should be made against refugees being sent to certain parts of the coast and other places where serious damage might be done or information of value to the enemy be obtained; and that, in the case of refugees already resident in these localities, a special investigation should be made as to their *bona fides* in order to determine whether or not it was desirable to remove them. The third and the most important of the preliminary points—that as to the conditions for the employment of refugees—was decided by the affirmation of the following two principles: (1) that no Belgian labour should be employed until every reasonable effort had been made to find British labour either through the agency of the labour exchanges or otherwise; (2) that no Belgian labour should be employed at rates of wages lower, or on conditions

less favourable, than those generally observed in the district concerned. These cardinal principles governed all subsequent efforts to provide occupation; and it is to the rigid adhesion to them that I attribute the absence of serious friction which marked the absorption of a very considerable body of Belgian labour into our working community.

Our investigations, assisted and supplemented in the later stages of the enquiry by the register, showed that the refugees were roughly divided into three main groups: (1) workers qualified to fill vacancies in industries in which a shortage of British labour exists, such as armament workers, glass blowers, woollen workers, miners, motor mechanics, and agricultural labourers; (2) workers qualified for and in need of employment, for whom no opportunities in British industries exist, such as tailors, ironmongers, jewellers, milliners, dressmakers, printers, bookbinders, makers of fancy-goods, and cabinet-makers; and (3) other special classes, mainly of a professional character, such as Government officials, employers, clerks, musicians, teachers, authors and lawyers.

In dealing with the first of the groups a series of conditions was elaborated, designed to protect the interests both of British and Belgian labour in the filling of vacancies in industries in which there was a dearth of labour. The second group presented greater difficulty, and the third greater still. Eventually, however, it was decided that, so far at least as the second group was concerned, the occupation needs of the refugees might to some extent be met by the establishment at various centres of workshops in which might be manufactured clothes, furniture and other household articles, to be placed at the disposal of the Belgian Government, for the use of the Belgian people at the close of the war. Finally, we recommended that a Central Authority should be constituted to advise and assist local refugee committees and to exercise a general supervision.

Such were the conclusions in the report to which the members of the Departmental Committee affixed their signatures in the closing days of 1914. The labour position then was still to a certain extent obscure; and the problem, so far as the refugees were concerned, was additionally complicated by the continuous arrival of

refugees representing, in the main, batches of unfortunates passed on to us by hospitable Holland, who had a larger proportion than she could well manage. How considerable the immigration continued to be for some little time is shown in the following table, for which I am also indebted to the Registrar-General :

Arrivals from Jan. to March, 1915 .	1000 per day.
" " April to June . . . . .	300 "
" in July . . . . .	200 "
" " Aug. . . . .	150 "
" " Sept. . . . .	110 "
" " Oct. . . . .	50 "
" " Nov. . . . .	100 "

The later figures in this list are to some extent counterbalanced by departures of refugees, a certain number of whom have returned to Belgium. The departures (notified) exclusive of the military are given as follows :

April—June . . . . .	60 per day.
July . . . . .	55 "
Aug. . . . .	62 "
Sept. . . . .	63 "
Oct. . . . .	50 "
Nov. . . . .	28 "

Making full allowance for this return movement, we find that the demands on our hospitality enormously increased during the past year. If the early anticipations of slack trade and diminished employment had been realised, the position would have been one of great perplexity ; but, as I have indicated, instead of depression in the labour market there was with the lapse of time a notable increase in the demand for almost all classes of labour. To this extent the task of providing the refugees with work was lightened ; and it is interesting to note that, of 60,000 who were employed in their own country, employment here has been found for at least 70 per cent. There were, however, still serious difficulties to be faced with regard to certain classes, chiefly in the third group, who were unable to take advantage of the openings for employment provided in the ordinary way.

The Government promptly acted on the conclusions of the Departmental Committee by setting up, in the

opening days of 1915, a Government Commission charged with the duty of putting into execution 'the recommendations for providing occupation for the Belgian refugees in this country' contained in that Committee's report. It consisted, in addition to myself, of three members of the Departmental Committee, Sir Thomas Elliott, K.C.B., the Rt Hon. Arthur Henderson, M.P.—whose place was subsequently taken by Mr C. W. Bowerman, M.P.—and Miss Susan Lawrence; the Earl of Lytton from the War Refugees Committee; Baron Goffinet, M. Ch. Lejeune and M. Lambert Jadot from the Official Committee of Belgians, and the Rt Hon. Sir T. Vesey Strong, K.C.V.O. The Belgian members of the Commission kept us in touch with the exclusively Belgian aspect of the problem with which we had to deal, and their services cannot be too highly rated. We were fortunate, too, in having a Belgian Technical Sub-Committee to advise us on the special features of the workshop schemes which came under our supervision and of which I shall have something to say later. Nor must I omit to mention the invaluable services of M. Paquet, in his work in connexion with the Official Belgian Committee. M. C. Paquet, who speaks English, French and Flemish with equal fluency, was an indispensable intermediary between our official body and the refugees on the occasion of the tours made in furtherance of the objects of the Commission; and his highly effective oratory, addressed to the two sections of the Belgian race in their own tongue, invariably made a great and salutary impression.

Before the Commission had proceeded far with its work, it became clear that it would be confronted by some serious difficulties. The old trouble arising out of the lack of effective classification re-appeared to perplex and hamper us. Without accurate statistical knowledge of the numbers and distribution of the refugees and their previous occupations in Belgium, it was impossible to formulate our plans with any regard to completeness and finality. Our perplexity was the greater because of the character of the local refugee organisations, which sprang spontaneously into existence in all parts of the country, and took upon their shoulders the burden of relief which the Government had promised. These

bodies were created wholly for the purpose of hospitality, and in many instances possessed no connecting link with any other authority. A good many of them are quite small, and mainly composed of a few ladies whose sympathies on behalf of the Belgians have been keenly aroused, and who conduct a small hostel or assume responsibility for the maintenance of a limited number of refugees entrusted to them by the authorities at Aldwych. Altogether I believe there are as many as 4000 separate Belgian refugee organisations in the kingdom, with an aggregate membership of about 80,000. In other words, for every three refugees there is some public-spirited member of the community to look after their interests. This is highly gratifying as a testimony to the public devotion to the Belgian cause; but, when it is necessary to carry out a common policy and get reliable data to ensure that it is properly directed, the correspondence entailed becomes a formidable task.

On mature consideration we decided to grapple with the twin difficulty by enlisting the aid of the local authorities, and endeavouring to induce them to form central committees for refugee purposes; such bodies to be made up of members of the local authorities, employers, women workers, and representatives of organised labour and of the existing local refugee committees. The system on the whole worked well, when the necessity for action on the lines indicated had been brought home to the local bodies. With a few conspicuous exceptions the counties readily came into line, and either created special committees or, as was more commonly done, placed the services of the County Relief Committee at the disposal of the Commission. Where the counties failed, it became necessary to adopt special measures. In the Boroughs and Urban Districts there was not the same need to appoint a Special Employment Committee, because, in many cases, the local refugee committees, established in the early days of the movement, were themselves fully competent to deal with the question of the employment of refugees, and had in some instances already given it close and active attention. In certain of the large cities and boroughs, excellent and comprehensive machinery had been set up in direct conjunction with, and often under the control of, the



Corporation. In other important places, on the other hand, the measures taken were found to be inadequate; and pressure was consequently brought to bear by the Commission, with the result that strong and representative committees and sub-committees were formed. As an example, the case of Manchester may be specially mentioned. In February, when the Commission first gave attention to the local situation, the care of the refugees was in the hands of a refugee committee of no official standing. This gave place in April to a numerous and strong committee under the chairmanship of the Lord Mayor, with highly efficient and representative sub-committees for various purposes.

London presented special features of difficulty owing to the circumstance that the great majority of the refugees there have not been specially allocated, as they have been in the large provincial centres, to the care of committees having a recognised status, and have been receiving hospitality either from private individuals or from groups of individuals. A further difficulty arose from the fact that the system of registration in the metropolis differs from that in other parts of the country, in that it has been carried out direct by the Registrar-General and not through the police authorities of the district. In consequence of these obstacles to local action it was decided not to press for the appointment of central committees, but to endeavour to secure the information required by special official measures. In the case of Scotland, the Glasgow Corporation, through a specially appointed committee, had acted as the central authority for the refugees in the whole of the country; and it was found possible to leave the work north of the Border to their very competent hands.

Though organisation occupied a large share of our energies and attention, the work of the Commission was by no means only routine or prosaic in character. In some of its phases it was intensely human. We were brought to feel that we were not dealing with an ordinary movement calling for merely conventional treatment, but with one which could only be successfully handled by a readiness to make new departures where such seemed to be necessary. The valuable thing we found to be the personal touch. People who would have resented the formal

style of official business responded warmly to our requests when they were made through the medium of friendly communications either oral or written. At Winchester House, St James's Square, where our headquarters were fixed, we had a daily succession of visitors from all parts anxious for help or guidance. In the morning it would be a deputation from a great industrial town, headed by the Chief Magistrate or the Town Clerk, in search of advice as to the best means of employment. They would be followed by a group of Trade Unionists with a complaint to make in reference to wages or conditions of labour. As soon as their story had been unravelled with the assistance of experts on our body and they had been sent away, happy in the assurance that their grievance would be remedied, our attention was occupied by the enquiries of a party of Belgians looking for means of occupation, or of ladies from distant counties, who stood in need of our assistance in dealing with important questions of organisation. And so the work went on in an atmosphere of friendly activity, interrupted only by our regular meetings, when all questions which had cropped up during the week were reviewed and brought into focus.

It was soon discovered by the Commission that, if their operations were to be really effective, it would be necessary to visit the principal centres in the country wherever refugees in any number were located. This was necessary in furtherance of our own plans for the collection of reliable statistics and the establishment of efficient organisations, but it was still more important as a means of rallying workers and stimulating public sympathy, which without outside appreciation of work accomplished was apt to flag. A good many tours were accordingly planned with this object. Acting on the wishes of my colleagues, I took the leading part in this mission, but on several occasions was accompanied by Sir T. Vesey Strong and Count Goblet d'Alviella, and on a few by the Chevalier Carton de Wiart. Frequently, too, we had the assistance of M. Paquet, to whose excellent qualities I have previously referred. Our excursions took us practically throughout the length and breadth of the kingdom, and we met with a never-failing interest in our mission. Even when we had

been warned in advance that the popularity of the Belgian cause was waning, we found a ready and even enthusiastic response to our appeals against leaving the refugees to the degradation of idleness.

In several centres which we visited in the early period of our tours, we found that the aims which the Commission had in view had to a certain extent been anticipated. In Bradford the local authority had set up an elaborate system of workshops and training classes, designed to sustain the moral fibre of the Belgians and place them in a position to earn a portion at least of the cost of their maintenance. In the training classes instruction is given in wood-working, dress-making, millinery and boot-repairing; and in the associated workshops the acquired skill is turned to practical account. Generally speaking, the municipally-owned building in which the classes and workshops are housed fills the part of a Belgian Institute, and is a much-appreciated rallying-place for the Belgian community of the locality. We were greatly struck with the excellent method and order which everywhere prevailed. Indeed, so impressed were we with the thoroughgoing manner in which the Bradford people had essayed to solve the difficult problem of providing occupation for the Belgians, that, in dealing with other authorities, we frequently cited their example as an illustration of what was desirable and practicable in the development of such schemes.

In another direction, at Hyde in Cheshire, we found an equally gratifying example of public spirit and intelligent effort in a workshop created on the personal initiative of the mayor. There, on the difficulty arising, which had arisen elsewhere, as to the provision of employment for a miscellaneous class of refugees, the chief magistrate took the bull by the horns in a delightfully vigorous way. He first called the male refugees together and had a heart-to-heart talk with them. 'Did they want work?' he asked. The reply was, 'Yes.' 'Very well, then,' he said in effect, 'come on.' A useful workshop was quickly settled upon by securing the lease of two rooms next to the mayor's own factory, the motive power from which was readily made available for working the circular saws, lathes, etc. These articles of machinery were lent by local friends; and tools were provided as

the result of a subscription privately raised by the mayor. In this way, in the shortest possible time, the workshop was equipped and in full swing, with a number of male refugees at work, producing furniture and articles likely to be useful to the Belgians when they return to their own country.

Elsewhere also the workshop idea had been taken up at an early period more or less successfully. At Painswick a self-supporting industry in chair and basket-making and tailoring was created on a co-operative basis. Hammersmith and Chelsea also entered wholeheartedly into the spirit of the movement; and other places found occupation for its refugees in the manufacture of toys and cigar and cigarette cases. Leeds, too, was associated with the workshop idea, though at the outset it gave its chief attention to a project in which, under the direction of Mr A. S. Galt, of the Leeds University, and Professor Seton, the head of the Agricultural Department there, a body of refugees were employed in the cultivation of a patch of moorland on intensive principles. The subject is a very interesting one; it represents, perhaps, the best example we have of the peculiar skill of the Belgians in making two blades of grass grow where only one grew before, and I shall again have occasion to mention it. In quite another direction, on the south coast, we came across an unofficial workshop system of a rather curious kind. An enterprising Belgian, who had been driven out of his native town where he had carried on the business, gathered about him a certain number of his compatriots and started rabbit-skin pulling. The fur of the rabbit is an important factor in the manufacture of felt hats; and the 'pulling' is the process by which it is removed from the skin. The industry is one which is almost, if not entirely, peculiar to Belgium; and the prompt setting up of this south coast business probably saved our hat manufacturers some inconvenience.

One feature of refugee industry which constantly impressed us in the course of our tours was the remarkable adaptability of the Belgians. They rarely seemed at a loss when the real push came, and they had to make the best of the new industrial world in which they found themselves. In the workshop at Hyde, to which I have

referred, I found a stoker, a compositor, a bicycle maker, a copper engraver, a dockhand, a sculptor and a commercial traveller, all working amicably together. At Bradford, in the wood-working room on the occasion of our visit, we observed a schoolmaster, an Antwerp policeman, an engineer, a clerk, and a diamond-cutter engaged side by side; while in the adjoining boot-repairing room, controlled by a Mons shoemaker, there was an assortment which brought together a mosaic worker, a carter and a dock labourer.

Perhaps the most extraordinary transformation in the industrial way in connexion with the refugees was one effected at Northampton, where a 'cannon-ball maker' became 'a pork-pie maker's assistant.' I rather think that this curious change did not long survive the appeal that was issued for munition workers. At all events, as the year 1915 advanced, there was an increasing, and to the Commission welcome demand for refugee assistance in the great work of supplying the indispensable munitions to the forces at the front. The assistance of the refugees was cordially and even eagerly sought by the heads of the great war industries; and we were much interested to find at a military saddle factory forty-five refugees employed in making army saddles, none of whom had had any previous experience of the work. They had been engaged to reinforce the ordinary staff, and, after two or three weeks' preliminary training, had proved to be sufficiently expert to take their places by the side of the regular operatives. Amongst the refugees so employed were lapidaries, clerks, general labourers, machinists, painters, printers, and cabinet-makers. Apart from the labour requirements of the British munition factories which the refugees were called upon to meet, a special demand for Belgian labour was created by the establishment by the Belgian Government, early in 1915, of two important factories for the manufacture of munitions at Twickenham and Letchworth. At these two works some 3500 Belgians, largely of the refugee class, are continuously employed, with advantage to themselves and to the satisfaction of their Government.

When the Belgian immigration first took place, great expectations were formed of the possibilities of acclimatising in this country with the assistance of the refugees

those methods of intensive culture for which Belgium is famous. Experience, however, has shown that the openings for such development are fewer than was popularly believed. In the first place, there is an extremely limited class to draw upon for instructors. It has already been stated that the three agricultural provinces of Belgium only contribute five per cent. of the refugees. In further illustration of the low proportion of agriculturists in the refugee ranks, it may be stated that out of 61,222 persons, whose avocations have been accurately classified, only 1668 are registered as having been engaged in agricultural work. A further analysis of the statistics shows that of the total number of agriculturists 768 are stated to be farmers, 442 farm labourers, 39 market gardeners, 252 gardeners, and the remaining 167 are placed as nurserymen, seedsmen, woodmen, etc., the labour of all of whom was almost immediately absorbed. Certain proposals were none the less laid before the departmental committee with the object of utilising the agricultural skill of the refugees; but the Board of Agriculture decided that the increased yield to be expected from these Belgian methods was insufficient to warrant the outlay of capital which would be required, and that no useful purpose would be served in promoting them.

A number of independent experiments in intensive culture, under refugee guidance, have, however, been carried out. Certain of these are in connexion with agricultural colleges and county educational institutions; and, in most of these cases, the results have been satisfactory. One of the most interesting of these experimental demonstrations was given by the Cornwall County Council with the object of instructing market and cottage gardeners in the practice of growing several crops on the same land, in the same year, by taking advantage of a judicious system of intercropping. In Belgium and Holland a much greater weight and variety of vegetables are obtained from the land than is general in England; and the results of the experiments will determine which of the systems of cropping, used with such success in those countries, are practicable here. New vegetables not usually grown in this country are being cultivated, in order to ascertain whether they can be successfully produced in England. The experiments have been most



successful; and it is the view of the local authorities that they will be of lasting good to British horticulture. At Cambridge a similar scheme has been undertaken by the Cambridge Refugee Committee in co-operation with Girton College. Courses of instruction in the cultivation of fruit, vegetables and salad plants are given; and the syllabus also includes the formation of a garden, the preparation of soils, the care and management of plants, the application of manures, greenhouses, hotbeds and frames, and the treatment of plant diseases, etc. So far as it has gone, the experiment has abundantly justified the enterprise. I must not, before leaving this branch of the subject, omit to mention the highly practical experiment in market gardening which the Bradford Corporation is carrying out at the City's Sewage Works at Esholt.

If one section of refugee work may be said to be more onerous than another, it is that which concerns the professional and commercial classes. Many of these are people of distinction in their own country; almost all of them have been in positions of comfort and responsibility. On the one hand, it was impossible to deal with them as you would with classes either inured to manual labour or indirectly associated with it; on the other, it was hopeless to expect to find openings for them in their own walks of life, firstly because of differences of language and customs, and secondly, and most important of all, because our own professional classes were suffering so keenly from the war. Viewing the question from all standpoints, it seemed that the utmost that could be hoped for was that a small proportion of our Belgian friends of the professional class would find occupation in some congenial line, if not in their own calling, and that the remainder would receive such considerate treatment as their past sufferings and their present painful position demanded.

These anticipations were generally speaking realised. The University of Cambridge, with a true fraternity of sentiment, in the early days of the migration offered to provide a home for the University of Louvain, the destruction of whose historic buildings remains one of the foulest episodes of the war. The offer was gratefully received by the Rector of Louvain, but he could not

fully avail himself of it because the conditions in Belgium made it impossible to transfer the Louvain University, as a body, to Cambridge. In consequence of this reply, the Belgian University Committee at Cambridge decided to invite professors and students from the four Belgian Universities, Louvain, Liège, Ghent and Brussels, to continue, so far as might be, such studies as could be carried on in Cambridge. Following upon this decision, arrangements were made for the organisation of a course of lectures for the purpose of instruction on the lines adopted by the Belgian Universities so as—with the limited capacities of a necessarily incomplete staff—to suit the individual requirements of the students. The teaching staff of the University cordially co-operated in the arrangements; and eventually, under the direction of Professor Dejacq, courses of lectures in Philosophy and Literature, Law, Commerce, Medicine, Natural Sciences, Engineering, and Agriculture were provided. In addition to these university courses, elementary and advanced classes were established in English and English literature; and English lessons were given by a considerable body of voluntary helpers. 187 Belgian students availed themselves of the facilities offered.

Towards the end of the Easter term, the question was considered of the desirability of continuing the arrangements for another year. It then appeared that there would be considerable difficulty in providing regular courses for so long a period, owing to the departure of those Belgian Professors who had obtained employment and the natural desire of the students to earn their own living. In view of these circumstances the University Committee decided that the invitation to the professors and their families should be extended until the Belgian Government should have resumed its authority in Belgium, but that, except in a few cases, no students should be retained. Some of the professors and most of the students shortly afterwards departed. Thirty-seven enlisted and three joined the ranks of non-combatants in the Belgian Army, while thirty-four obtained work in munition factories. The record is one which does the highest honour to Cambridge and constitutes an interesting page in the annals of that historic seat of learning. Nor was Oxford behind her sister university in her welcome to

the outcasts; committees were formed to supervise the necessary arrangements for hospitality and to undertake the care of Belgian students who had accompanied their teachers in exile.

In other branches, also, the professional class of refugees were the recipients of special attention at the hands of organised bodies. An institution for the medical section exists in the Belgian Doctors and Pharmacists Relief Fund, which was formed under the chairmanship of Sir Rickman Godlee in November 1914. In spite of the difficulties which at first arose out of the requirements of the Medical Act and Pharmacy Acts, this organisation has been most helpful. Employment has been found for a great many doctors through the agency of the committee. In addition, considerable numbers have joined or rejoined the Belgian Army. The pharmacists have also been materially helped; and a number of technical chemists have found employment through the Institute of Chemistry.

The Law Societies, too, have done their part in this excellent work. Various causes have contributed to hinder the exercise of their calling by more than a few of the 354 refugees of legal qualifications ascertained to be in this country, but money has been liberally subscribed and generous hospitality has been provided. Refugees with educational qualifications were a rather numerous body in the early period of the movement—there were officially stated to be 493 in the country in December 1914—but since then a great many have returned to Belgium at the request of the Belgian Government. Of the remainder, a fair proportion found service with our educational authorities chiefly as teachers of Belgian children.

There still remain a number of Belgians of the better class who belong to no profession and have, therefore, no kindred associations to which to look for relief. Though willing enough to work, no employment can be found for them; among these, moreover, there are women and children who are quite incapable of providing for themselves. To help these unhappy people a committee has been organised by Lady Lugard which has been of inestimable benefit. It has succeeded in obtaining the loan of several fine houses which have been furnished

out of funds privately subscribed; it has not, however, been able to cope with the difficulty as thoroughly as the crying needs of the situation demand.

This brief survey gives a very inadequate impression of the relief provided for what I may describe as the 'intellectual' class of refugees. The facts and figures take no account of the efforts to alleviate their lot, made by small groups and individuals. But up and down the country, in almost every town of importance and in many villages, may be found Belgian families living as guests in English homes or in houses and small hostels maintained by private subscriptions. Amongst them are musicians and artists who seek to make some return for the hospitality given them by devoting their talents to some local object—an art exhibition, a concert or some similar form of entertainment. The best of relations mark the intercourse between hosts and guests; and ties have been formed which we may confidently hope will long outlive this eventful period of Belgian exile.

It would be a serious omission if I were to close this narrative without a special reference to what has been done in Scotland. Without in the least detracting from the work that has been accomplished in other parts of the kingdom, I may say that north of the border there has been manifested a zeal on behalf of the refugees which has stamped the operations there with a special hall-mark of successful practical philanthropy. Business capacity has gone hand-in-hand with enthusiasm and a profuse generosity which has never yet failed when the needs of the moment were properly explained. To Glasgow belongs the chief distinction of organising this good work. Owing to the circumstance that a large part of Scotland, including Edinburgh, was situated within the prohibited areas, the city by the Clyde had to act as a sort of refugee clearing-house for the entire country. It took up the work cheerfully and methodically, as from its record might have been expected, and made the requisite arrangements for the housing and care of the large number of refugees sent to it from the south. The duty of looking after the interests of the refugees was entrusted to an influential corporation committee. This body, placing itself in communication with the leading local authorities in Scotland, enlisted

a wide measure of public support for the refugee cause, and created in time what was to all intents and purposes a national movement. As the result of public appeals and meetings held in many of the larger towns of Scotland, there was raised, up to the 31st of October last, no less a sum than 75,440*l.*, against which had to be set an expenditure up to that date of 48,467*l.* These figures do not, however, give a true indication of what Scotland has done, for they take no account of the contributions of churches and other organisations which have maintained refugees without asking for any financial assistance from the Glasgow Committee. To select one example, three congregations of the United Free Church of Scotland in Glasgow are together contributing 8000*l.* per annum towards the maintenance of refugees.

As Chairman of the Government Commission I paid two visits to Scotland, and can from my own personal experience testify to the splendid spirit that prevails there. The meetings I addressed were marked by great enthusiasm, and on all hands a readiness to assist was shown, which was most encouraging. On the occasion of my last visit I had the great pleasure of assisting in a development of the refugee work of a most interesting and useful character. As I have mentioned, large and important areas in Scotland are closed to the refugees under the Defence of the Realm Act. This exclusion from the work which was being done on behalf of the Belgians was acutely felt by the people of the prohibited areas; and, in order to meet their wishes, arrangements were made by which particular burghs accepted responsibility for the upkeep in Glasgow of a refugee hostel designated by their name and under their own supervision. The idea, at first tentatively adopted, met with wide support in the closed areas. I was, indeed, much struck, during a series of visits I paid to the principal districts of the north from which refugees are excluded, with the strong sympathy and keen desire to be helpful that everywhere prevailed. In consequence of the appeal made for support, a whole series of hostels were established in Glasgow, adding very largely to the existing facilities for refugee hospitality. The list of such hostels already open embraces institutions identified with Edinburgh, Aberdeen, Dundee, Inverness,

Kirkcaldy, Buckie, St Andrews, Coupar Angus, Cupar Fife, Greenock, and Scottish Universities Students. Additional hostels are in course of development for Thurso and other places. Thus, even when they cannot play the rôle of host directly, Scottish people are intimately associating themselves with the care of the refugees.

In all this good work that is being done throughout the kingdom on behalf of expatriated Belgians the best side of our national character has been brought out. And may we not say the same of the Belgians? At different times we have heard public criticisms of their character which have been formed on hasty judgments. We have also, many of us probably, had brought to our knowledge isolated incidents which have not redounded to their credit. But, when the worst has been said that can be said, it only amounts to this—that amongst a huge miscellaneous body of people, drawn a good many of them from the working-class districts of the cosmopolitan seaports of Antwerp and Ostend, some have proved of low moral character and others have not shown that strength of purpose and industry that could be wished. After all, we may ask ourselves, whether any similar portion of our own population, suddenly transplanted to foreign soil and subjected to all the mischievous influences that are proverbially lying in wait for idle hands, would have acted better or even so well? However that may be, I have no hesitation in declaring that the refugees in the main have shown themselves worthy of their country in their exile.

While on this question of Belgian character I cannot refrain from paying a tribute to the admirable work that is done at Edmonton in connexion with what I may, perhaps, describe as refugee misfits. At this Greater London centre there are two establishments—one exclusively for men and the other for families and women—to which are drafted, from all parts of the country, refugees who, in one way or another, have not managed to get on well with their local hosts, or for whom no suitable opening under private auspices could be found. The institutions are under the general control of the Metropolitan Asylums Board—a body which has in many ways rendered great service to the cause; they are managed by two experienced officials of the Board, Mr



and Mrs Pallin; and ever since they were opened, they have been continuously occupied, the numbers varying with the ebb and flow of refugees at the central receiving dépôts. Usually about 300 inmates are accommodated at the principal institution, and rather less than that number at the family home—Millfield House.

At the outset Mr Pallin had some difficulty in persuading the inmates under his control that some return in the shape of labour must be made for their keep, but by the exercise of rare tact and a judicious use of simple arguments, based on the moral obligation of the refugee to do some work for his living, all the inmates submitted to the rule of 'work for all.' Some were employed in cultivating the land about the institution, or in superior horticultural operations in a long range of glass-houses in the grounds; others were engaged in workshops in repairing boots and making clothes for the refugees; others, again, had allotted to them what proved to be the congenial task of cleaning and decorating the interior of the building. The whole of the domestic work of the establishment is done by refugees. At Millfield House the same strict rule of discipline tempered by tact is applied with great advantage; and the place affords a delightful spectacle of an ordered and happy community. Well may it be said that, if these Edmonton institutions show the worst side of the refugees, the best must indeed be good.

How is the position of the refugees in this country likely to affect the future? The first thought that arises is, will the presence of this large body of Belgians, widely dispersed as it is amongst our population, have any permanent influence on our life? At the outset, a strong belief prevailed that history would repeat itself, and that we should see reproduced in a different form the experience of the 17th century, when the Huguenot immigrants gave a notable impetus to our industry by bringing their looms across the sea and setting up here silk and woollen industries. But there is really no parallel between the present immigration and that of two centuries ago. Unlike the Huguenot and the earlier Flemish colonists who were permanently alienated from their homes, our Belgian friends are only sojourners amongst us; and all arrangements in regard to them are made

with this end in view. In such circumstances there can be no question of the establishment here by the refugees of new industries on an extensive scale. In regard to intensive culture some lasting effects may be produced; and in a small way, as for example in the case of the rabbit-skin pulling industry on the south coast, new enterprises of a minor kind may be developed, but these represent about the full limit of what may be looked for in a material sense.

The real good that will be done will consist in broadening the outlook of our people, and bringing home to them in a salutary way the fact that our interests and those of adjacent nations on the continent are intermingled, and that our old happy insular way of looking at things must be abandoned, with a good many other cherished but mistaken habits. On the part of the Belgians, too, the contact they will have had with our countrymen will do good in inculcating sound knowledge of our customs and ways of looking at things, and in strengthening friendly ties which in late years had become somewhat relaxed owing to international controversies that had arisen. It must, however, always be borne in mind that the sentiments of the Belgians as well as the final verdict of history will largely be influenced by the manner in which we meet our obligations to them in the days yet to come. A half-hearted policy, cavilling here at a small concession asked, grudging there an insignificant contribution required, and ruling everything with a pedantic regularity, will inevitably chill and ultimately alienate our friends. On the other hand, a free and generous recognition of our responsibilities, in harmony with our traditions and in accordance, I am sure, with the wishes of the nation, will establish this exile of the Belgians in the United Kingdom as one of the most agreeable experiences of the bitter period of their martyrdom.

ERNEST HATCH.

## Art. 12.—THE COURSE OF THE WAR.

ABOUT the middle of September reports emanating from various neutral sources intimated that movements of hostile troops were being effected in Germany and Austria-Hungary. The transit of letters and newspapers from Austria-Hungary to neutral countries was said to have been interrupted. The Dutch-Belgian frontier was closed; passenger traffic between Holland and Germany was restricted and closely scrutinised; and similar measures were in operation to prevent the leakage of news from Germany to Switzerland. Such information admitted of various interpretations, and on some previous occasions had proved misleading. Statements of a less authentic nature referred to the passage of troop-trains through Aix la Chapelle towards France, and to a concentration of troops on the northern frontier of Serbia.

As had previously happened in similar circumstances, there were rumours of a withdrawal of German and Austrian troops from the eastern front, which, in the absence of any official corroboration, were clearly conjectural. Although there were signs that the enemy's offensive campaign in Russia was coming to an end, it seemed unlikely that the hostile armies would be materially weakened until a defensive line were secured which would give some promise of being held successfully by reduced forces against the growing strength of Russia, while the offensive was being pursued in another theatre of war. The chief requirements of such a line, under present-day conditions, would be fulfilled by insurmountable obstacles on either flank, and a lateral railway at a safe and convenient distance behind the front, to facilitate the distribution of supplies and the movement of reinforcements from point to point. It was apparent that the Germans, after they had failed to inflict a decisive defeat on the Russian armies, had set their minds on gaining possession of Rovno and the railway leading thence across the Pinsk Marshes, and through Baranowisch and Wilna, to Dwinsk. The acquisition of the line of the Dwina between Dwinsk and Riga would then enable them to establish their left flank securely on the sea, while their right flank would rest on the neutral frontier of Roumania.

The enemy were still far from having attained these objects. The lateral railway was in their possession between Baranowischi and the neighbourhood of Dwinsk; and on this portion of the front they were constructing strong entrenchments, and laying field railways to facilitate the local distribution of supplies. But the Russians were successfully defending the line of the Dwina, and in Wolhynia and Galicia they were holding the Austro-German armies at bay on the Styr and the Strypa. The Russians, in fact, had the best of the situation on the most important sections of the front; those, namely, where they may take the offensive under the most favourable conditions, strategically, when the weather and their increasing resources admit of the resumption of operations on a large scale.

To obviate reverting to the Russian theatre of war, it may be recorded in this place that the position remains practically unchanged. The Russians have defeated all attempts to capture Dwinsk, and are in firm possession of the line of the Dwina. They have improved their positions by driving the Germans back in the coast region to within a few miles of Tukcum, where they are threatening the Windau-Mitau railway and the left flank of the hostile forces encircling Riga. No material change is anticipated on this portion of the front until the spring; for, although the freezing of the rivers and marshes might be expected, in a normal season, to admit of a resumption of activity, an exceptionally heavy fall of snow about the beginning of December is said to have made the movement of large forces impracticable. In Wolhynia our Allies remain in possession of the Styr, and in Galicia they continue to hold Bothmer's Austro-German army behind the Strypa. It would seem that the enemy feel their position in these regions insecure; for it was reported early last month that they were engaged in removing their magazines from Lemberg, and in fortifying the line of the San.

Although the enemy's operations on the eastern front were in an unfinished state, and the general situation was unfavourable, there were no doubt cogent reasons which made the German General Staff decide to withdraw a number of troops from that front for employment partly in the western theatre, and partly in

performing the next item in their programme, namely, the invasion of Serbia. The troops were probably taken from the strongly-fortified line between Wilna and the Pripet, where Mackensen's army appears to have been broken up when the Field-Marshal left to assume the chief command in the Balkan operations. The numbers transferred were at first insignificant in relation to the large forces engaged in the Russian campaign, which were unofficially stated to comprise 128 divisions. There is no official information as to the numbers withdrawn; but, from statements published at Petrograd, they appear to have amounted to sixteen divisions, of which one half went to France—where the Allied offensive which began on Sept. 25 caused the Germans some anxiety—and made their presence felt in Artois and Champagne early in October; while the remainder were sent to the Danube to make up, with the troops already in observation, the armies placed under Mackensen's command, the strength of which did not, probably, exceed 200,000 men.

To what extent the Allied Governments were surprised by the new German move in the Balkans is uncertain, but there is no doubt that they were unprepared for the situation to which it gave rise. There were many circumstances which pointed to Serbia as the next objective after the conclusion of the offensive operations in Russia. Apart from the avowed intention of the Germans to force their way through Serbia to Constantinople, which might have been designed to divert attention from other quarters, it was plainly a military necessity to bring assistance to the Turks, who were in want of ammunition, and to put an end to the Allies' diplomatic attempts to entice Bulgaria to their side. Should these attempts be successful, Roumania would certainly follow suit, with the result that the position of the Austrian right flank in Galicia would become untenable. Even if the Allies' Balkan diplomacy should fail, the defeat of the Turks in Gallipoli, which might occur at any moment, would probably result in their withdrawal from the Central Alliance, and cause the Balkan Powers to espouse the Allied cause. Again, even if Bulgaria remained neutral, the participation of Roumania and Greece on

the side of the Allies would have enabled them to invade Hungary with a million men, with consequences which may be imagined. The Balkan-Hungarian frontier, in fact, has been the only vulnerable flank of the Teutonic Powers, and its security has depended on the attitude of the Balkan States. The Germans have throughout the war fully appreciated the significance of this situation, and in consequence have neglected no expedient—by stimulating the Turkish resistance in Gallipoli, and by bribes to Roumania, Bulgaria and Greece, seconded during the past summer by a display of troops on the Roumanian frontier—to secure themselves against attack on that side. The invasion of Serbia, as a first step to the military domination of the Balkans, was therefore expedient as a defensive measure, apart from ulterior aims.\*

These were military considerations which it needed no great perspicacity to see.† But it seemed to the outside observer unlikely that the invasion of Serbia would be undertaken while the operations in Russia were incomplete. Austria, in her attempt last winter, had employed over 300,000 men and failed. The attempt would hardly be renewed except with much larger numbers; and, for strategical reasons, it would have to be made from both the Save—Danube and Dwina fronts simultaneously. Both fronts were naturally very strong; and the attack on the Dwina front would present exceptional difficulties, on account of the mountainous character of the country, and the presence of the Montenegrin army on the flank. It seemed unlikely that the enemy could spare enough troops to ensure success, or, if that were possible, that the large forces required could be manœuvred in the mountainous country unless they were provided with pack transport and mountain artillery, which the Germans do not possess.

The Allied Governments, however, should have been better informed. The course of the negotiations with Bulgaria, and such knowledge as they must have possessed of the relations existing between that State and Germany, can hardly have failed to warn them of the probability that Bulgaria would join the Central Alliance, which, as

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\* For these aims, see below, pp. 229-230.

† They were, in fact, put forward in the April number of this Review.



recent operations have shown, would give the military situation quite a different aspect, by reducing the strength of the Austro-German force required, and by exposing the Serbians to attack in flank from their eastern frontier by an army at least 200,000 strong,\* accustomed to, and equipped for, mountain warfare. They appear, however, to have relied up to the last moment on the success of their diplomatic overtures to Bulgaria or, if these should fail, on the loyalty of Greece to her treaty obligations, which bound her to give military aid to Serbia in the event of an attack by Bulgaria. In both respects they were deceived.

The Allies' negotiations were directed to the revival of the Balkan League, which had been broken up when Bulgaria turned upon her allies at the end of the war of 1912-13. These negotiations, being dealt with in another article, need not be further discussed here. The Allies offered their final terms on Sept. 1. A fortnight later Bulgaria asked for certain explanations, and at the same time began to mobilise. On Sept. 24 M. Radoslavoff declared to the British and Russian ministers at Sofia, that the mobilisation was only intended to facilitate diplomatic action with a view to satisfying Bulgarian aspirations, and that no hostile intention existed with respect to Serbia. How the Allied Governments regarded this assurance does not appear, but they seem to have taken no definite notice of the Bulgarian mobilisation till the end of September, when a joint note was presented, warning Bulgaria that the Quadruple Entente would come to Serbia's assistance if she were attacked by Bulgaria. The Serbians, more clear-sighted, proposed to forestall the treacherous attack which they foresaw, by taking the offensive against Bulgaria while mobilisation was still in the initial stage; but the Allies objected on the ground that, by taking the initiative, Serbia would forfeit the assistance of Greece, whose engagement was only operative in the case of Serbia being attacked.

By this advice, which was quite in accordance with the 'wait-and-see' military policy affected by the Allies, the latter assumed a very serious responsibility. The Serbian army was already in the field, and by a rapid

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\* Allowing for a force to watch the Roumanian frontier.

advance might have occupied Sofia before the Bulgarians, who could not at that time muster more than 30,000 men, could have offered serious opposition. It is conceivable that Bulgaria might have been brought to her knees before Mackensen could force the Danube and come to her assistance. In any case the Bulgarians would have received a severe blow, and might have been prevented from taking part in invasion, with the result that the whole German scheme might have collapsed.

Having been dissuaded from taking this bold course, the Serbians called upon Greece to render aid in fulfillment of her treaty obligations. It may have been in consequence of this appeal that on Sept. 21 M. Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister, requested the Allied Governments to send 150,000 troops to Salonika to help Greece to fulfil her treaty obligations to Serbia. Two days later orders were issued for the mobilisation of the Greek army. Serbia simultaneously appealed for help; and, to quote Lord Lansdowne's statement in the House of Lords on Oct. 26,

'It was in compliance with that two-fold appeal that we sent such troops as were available to Salonika. It was a small force, because only a small force could be collected at the time. . . . At the same time a larger force was prepared. . . . The small force . . . I think 13,000 in round numbers . . . was regarded as the precursor of a larger force which was under orders at the same time.'

The fact is that the Allies were at the time committed to a combined offensive in France, which took place on Sept. 25, and had made no provision to counter the German move in the Balkans, where they were following their traditional policy of 'wait-and-see.' The Allied transports having begun to arrive in the harbour of Salonika on Oct. 5, M. Venizelos declared to the Greek Chamber that Greece was prepared to fulfil her treaty obligations to Serbia. His statement was promptly repudiated by the King, and in consequence he tendered his resignation. The Allied troops, however, began to disembark on the following day; and within a week a French force was concentrated near Ghevgeli.

Meanwhile there were no special signs to indicate to

an outside observer that the German invasion was imminent. Artillery engagements took place at points on the Save—Danube front on Sept. 10, 11 and 19; and on the night of Sept. 14 three attempts made by the enemy to cross the Save were easily repulsed. Similar incidents, however, had occurred on other occasions; and on Sept. 16 M. Pashitch, the Serbian Premier, stated, with reference to current reports of a hostile concentration on the Danube, that constant and detailed reports by French aviators proved that no hostile army had been assembled on the northern frontier. Between Sept. 19 and Oct. 4 nothing happened; but on the latter date extensive skirmishes on the Lower Drina were reported from Vienna. Two days later a general attack developed on the Save—Danube front, the chief points of attack being Jarak, Belgrade, Semendria, and Ram.

The published accounts of the operations which followed are scanty, often unreliable, and sometimes inconsistent; and it is only possible to give a rough outline of the enemy's plan, and of the course of events. The force under Marshal Mackensen was organised in three groups; on the left, a German army under General Gallwitz was allotted the Danube front from Orsova to Belgrade (exclusive); General Koevess, with an Austro-German army, attacked the line of the Save, including Belgrade; and a detached force operated in the region of Visegrad against the Drina, which was held by the Montenegrin army. Gallwitz was to move up the easy routes in the Morava valley, while Koevess, whose army comprised a number of Alpine troops equipped for mountain warfare, was to make his way through the more difficult country west of that river.

Gallwitz forced the Danube at various points between Semendria and Ram, and proceeded to clear the heights east of the Morava, in order to protect the left flank of his main body, which crossed at Semendria on Oct. 11. Koevess crossed at and about Belgrade and Zabrez. There were feints at other points; and the Serbians everywhere offered a vigorous resistance, throwing the enemy back at several places, notably at Semendria, and inflicting severe losses. Heavy engagements were fought on the ridge about Pozarevac, and on the heights south of Belgrade, the possession of which was necessary to

enable the heavy artillery and transport to move in safety by the roads in the adjoining valleys. Progress was, accordingly, very slow. Koevess did not capture Obrenovatz till Oct. 18; and at the end of a fortnight's fighting (Oct. 20) the front was defined by a line through Leskovac, Selevac, and Bojevac, showing an average advance of about fifteen miles from the frontier.

But in the meantime, on Oct. 14, Bulgaria had declared war and had simultaneously taken the offensive. The result was that the Serbian forces opposing Mackensen were exposed to attack in flank and rear; and the Salonika railway, on which they relied for supply, was liable to be cut by the Bulgarians, who moreover, threatened to interpose between the Serbian main army and the Serbian and Allied forces in Macedonia.

It will be convenient to consider in this place the reasons which may have led Bulgaria to defer so long throwing off the mask of neutrality. It is unlikely that the delay formed part of the original plan, for military considerations clearly pointed to the advisability of the Bulgarian advance synchronising with Mackensen's. The resistance to Mackensen would have been diminished by the pressure of the Bulgarians on the Serbian flank and rear; his progress would have been more rapid and less costly. The Bulgarians, possibly, were disinclined to take the decisive step until they were assured of Mackensen's ability to force the Save and the Danube; and the week's procrastination may have been part of the price agreed upon for their assistance. No doubt they were anxious to minimise the risks of intervention, and to achieve their aims as far as possible at their allies' expense. But it seems at least equally likely that the delay was due to uncertainty concerning the attitude of Greece. Had Greece been loyal to her treaty engagements, Bulgaria would have been reduced to impotence. Even the certainty that Greece would attack Bulgaria if Bulgaria should attack Serbia would have upset the whole German plan. For the Greek and Bulgarian armies almost exactly balanced each other in point of numbers; and the mere threat of a Greek offensive against their left flank would have compelled the Bulgarians to relinquish any idea of invading Serbia. The Central Powers must have abandoned the attack on Serbia, or have devoted

much larger forces to a single-handed attempt which, for the reasons already given, might easily have failed.

It is, in fact, safe to conclude that, as part of the bargain, Bulgaria had a definite promise from Germany that Greece would remain neutral; and it may be surmised that—perhaps at a late moment—Bulgaria felt some doubt as to the value of the promise. The consistent and determined attitude of M. Venizelos was, indeed, enough to cause doubt. That far-sighted statesman saw clearly that the future of Greece and the other Balkan States would be decided by the present war. He saw that the question at issue was whether or not the Balkans should be dominated by Bulgaria as the vassal of the Teutonic Powers, and that Greece would best assure her future by joining forces with the Allies. As he succinctly put it, the question was not *whether* Greece would fight, but *when* she would fight. For, if the Central Powers should win the war, she would certainly be attacked at the first opportunity by a greater Bulgaria, with the diplomatic support of her present allies, while Greece would have neither friends nor allies. It is hard to attribute the sudden downfall of that statesman, and the complete reversal of his policy, to any other cause than German pressure; and it is significant that Bulgaria's entry into the war followed immediately upon the official notification of Greece's refusal to aid Serbia, which was presented to the Serbian Government on Oct. 13.

It is probable that the Serbian Government had counted on the loyalty of Greece to her treaty obligation. Had they not done so they would hardly have been dissuaded from taking the initiative in September against Bulgaria by the argument that they would thereby forfeit the assistance of Greece. For the same reason, probably, Marshal Putnik disposed the bulk of the army in the north in order to oppose Mackensen, leaving weak forces to guard the Bulgarian frontier. The second Bulgarian army, under Todoroff, consequently made rapid progress in the south, seizing Vranje on Oct. 16, and occupying by the 22nd the whole of the railway between Vranje and Veles, including the important junction of Uskub. On Oct. 14 the French were engaged near Valandovo; and two days later the Serbians, with the aid of Allied reinforcements, repulsed heavy attacks in that region. The

Serbian at Uskub retired towards the Kachanik defile, while those at Veles fell back on the Babuna Pass on the road to Monastir. The separation of the forces in Macedonia from the main Serbian army was already accomplished.

Meanwhile Bojadjeff's first army advanced on the front Negotin—Zajecar—Knjazevac—Piot, with his left in the Vlasina Valley; but, the Serbians being stronger in this quarter, progress was less rapid than in the south. The pressure on the right flank of the Serbians opposing Gallwitz, however, facilitated that commander's advance; and a junction was effected at Parachin on Nov. 4. Nish was occupied by the Bulgarians on the following day; and on the 7th Bojadjeff was in possession of the valley of the Southern Morava from Leskovac to Alexinec, in contact with Gallwitz' left flank. The armies of Koevess and Gallwitz had, in the meantime, occupied the valley of the Western Morava, and had opened up communication at Uzice, on Nov. 3, with the Visegrad column, which had succeeded in forcing the Drina on Oct. 22 after having sustained repeated repulses at the hands of the Montenegrins. In the north-eastern corner of Serbia German troops had crossed the Danube at Orsova on Oct. 23, and in co-operation with Bojadjeff, had cleared the Serbians from the right bank between that place and Negotin, opening the river to Rustchuk for the passage of steamers and barges laden with munitions for the Turks.

The concentric advance of the Austro-German and Bulgarian armies had resulted in a considerable shortening of the fronts occupied and a consequent overlapping of their inner flanks in the region between Alexinec and Parachin. The Serbian resistance had, moreover, been in a great degree overcome by the enveloping attack, which made it impossible to make a prolonged stand in any position. Hence a considerable number of troops were set free for use elsewhere, enabling (so it is inferred) Bojadjeff to send a force to co-operate with Todoroff, and Mackensen to withdraw a couple of divisions from Gallwitz, which appear to have been sent to Rustchuk in consequence of a reported concentration of Russian troops in Bessarabia. Koevess' left flank, after occupying Kragujevac on Nov. 1, had been directed on Krusevac; and Gallwitz was allotted the front between that place



and the neighbourhood of Nish, where he linked up with Bojadjeff's right.

The country which now confronted the enemy is in every way more difficult than that in which they had hitherto operated. The mountain range which overlooks the right bank of the Western Morava attains an altitude of 5000 or 6000 feet, and roads are few and indifferent. The main roads between the Save and the Morava soon deteriorate, after crossing the latter, into mere tracks, which sometimes follow the tributary valleys, commanded by spurs and ridges on either hand, or sometimes, taking a higher level, work their toilsome way across the steep spurs. The range is intersected by the Ibar Valley, which provides a comparatively level route from Kraljevo to Novi Bazar and Mitrovica; but the best road in the whole region is probably that leading from Nish to Prishtina, which follows the Toplica Valley, and crosses an easy watershed into the valley of the Lab.

The enemy's main columns continued their movements as follows: The Visegrad column was directed by Plevelje on Glibatchi. Koevess advanced from the Western Morava by the routes Uzice—Novo Varosch—Prepolje, Pozega—Ivanitza—Sienitza, Kraljevo—Ibar valley—Novi Bazar, and Krusevac—Brus—Mitrovitza; while intermediate detachments moving from Cacak and Trstenik helped to clear the heights. Gallwitz moved in two columns on Prishtina. One attacked the Jastrebac heights from the north, while the other, proceeding by the Toplica Valley, took the Serbians in rear. Bojadjeff also moved on Prishtina from Leskovac and Vranje. Novi Bazar was occupied on Nov. 20; Prepolje on Nov. 22; Mitrovica and Prishtina on Nov. 23; and Plevelje on Dec. 1. The Serbians withdrew into the mountains of Montenegro and Albania, destroying their wheeled artillery and transport, which had to be abandoned.

Meanwhile the Serbians, who had been cut off in Macedonia by the occupation of Uskub, had put up a gallant defence in the Babuna defile, where they held their positions for a fortnight against greatly superior forces in the hope that General Sarrail, whose left wing had pushed forward to Krivolac, might come to their aid. But the French force available for this extended

movement proved inadequate; and, after crossing the Cerna on Nov. 5, and capturing a series of positions on the heights between that river and the Babuna Pass, General Sarraill found himself confronted with the bulk of Todoroff's army, and was forced to fall back on Nov. 12. The Babuna Pass was lost, the Serbians retreating on Monastir, which place they evacuated on Dec. 2. Thence they made their way by the Durazzo road into Albania. The Allied force, which in the meantime had maintained its positions at and east of Krivolac, then retired under cover of heavy rearguard fighting, and on Dec. 13 took up a position just inside the Greek frontier, across which the Bulgarians, partly no doubt for political reasons, did not attempt to advance.

The Serbian army, having suffered heavily and lost its field artillery and wheeled transport, has for the present ceased to exist as a military force; but there is reason to hope that, after having been reorganised and re-equipped at the Albanian ports, it will again be able to prove its fighting value in conjunction with the Allied force which is being assembled at Salonika. Meanwhile the support of the Italian troops which have landed on the Adriatic coast will probably ensure it from serious molestation; for the difficulty of supplying a force of any magnitude, and the impossibility of moving heavy guns, in the roadless mountains of Albania, are likely to preclude attack, and to oblige the enemy to content themselves with an attitude of observation.

Despite the promise of the Greek Government that Greece would preserve an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards the Allies, the position of the Franco-British force in Macedonia has been embarrassing, and at times precarious. Having come on the invitation of M. Venizelos, it appears to have been regarded by the new *régime* as an unwelcome guest. The Greek General Staff, especially, having been trained in Germany, and acquired pro-German sympathies, has shown a spirit which cannot be described as friendly. It was essential for the safety of the force that the reinforcements and stores disembarked at Salonika should have complete freedom of movement and ample camping-space in the neighbourhood; and that the single lines of railway

leading to the front should be left free for the transport of troops and supplies. But in and round Salonika considerable Greek forces were quartered, which, by constant marching to and fro, obstructed the roads and blocked access to the railway stations. The supply of others stationed on the frontier monopolised a large quantity of rolling-stock, and impeded the railway service. The attitude of the Greeks in the event of the Allied force being driven and pursued across the frontier, and the treatment of Serbian troops which might seek refuge in Greek territory, were also critical questions.

The Greek Government, in their anxiety to avoid becoming involved in the war, had placed themselves in a difficult and anomalous situation. Dazzled by the success of the Germanic arms in Russia, imbued with the conviction, fostered by German agents, that Germany will ultimately be victorious, they dreaded affronting the Central Alliance. On the other hand, they knew that, however the war might go on land, the Allies' sea-power could cut off their supplies and ruin their commerce. They were ultimately brought to reason by the institution, for two brief periods, of a partial blockade. The obstructing troops were withdrawn or reduced in number; and it was agreed that the Allies and their enemies should be free to fight their battles on Greek soil, and that Serbian troops which might cross the frontier should not be disarmed. Such an agreement between belligerents and a neutral power is unprecedented; and it may be remarked that the pliability shown by Germany in the negotiations, and her evident anxiety to avoid a quarrel with Greece, suggest that she does not feel her military position in the Balkans very strong. The omission to follow up the Allied force, with a view to impeding the work of entrenching at Salonika even though sufficient troops might not be available for a regular attack, points to the same conclusion. When it is considered that the interests of Greece and Roumania predispose them to espouse the cause of the Allies, a course from which they are deterred only by fear of the Central Powers and their Balkan adherents, and that these two States can jointly muster nearly a million men, this unaccustomed caution need not excite surprise. It would be imprudent to risk defeat in Greece by advancing

with insufficient forces; while the supply of large numbers and the bringing up of heavy artillery would necessitate the use of the railway, which, having been effectively damaged in many places, could not quickly be restored.

The presence of the Allied force in Macedonia put heart into the Serbians, who felt that they at least had moral support. General Sarrail's offensive beyond the Cerna probably prolonged the defence of the Babuna Pass, and delayed the occupation of Monastir by the enemy. A considerable Bulgarian force was kept occupied, which might otherwise have cut the line of retreat into Albania from the Kachanik defile, where the Serbians from Uskub fought desperately to keep the route open for the main body to retire into Macedonia. More than these things the Allies could not do. They were never strong enough; for it takes time to transport large forces by sea to a distant point, and the matter had not been taken in hand in time. The promise made by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons that 'we are prepared to give our friends in the Balkans all the support in our power in the manner that would be most welcome to them, without reserve and without qualification,' was merely an expression of sentiment and not of actual preparedness. It may be that the Serbians took the promise too literally, or it may be that they counted too confidently on the loyalty of Greece. Whatever the cause, the distribution of their army is open to criticism; and the mistake they made was much the same as that from which they had suffered in October 1914, when they dispersed their forces unduly in forward positions. This mistake they corrected in the subsequent operations, when, in the following December, they concentrated in rear of the Kolubara River, beyond the reach of the enveloping attack. It was not, therefore, a mistake they were likely to repeat. Yet they again spread their forces even more widely than before, and placed the bulk of them on the northern frontier. This suggests the surmise that they counted on the Bulgarian irruption being met by other troops, Allied or Greek, or both. Otherwise it would have been better to oppose Mackensen with weak forces, and to concentrate against the dangerous Bulgarian 'stab in the back.' Even

if the Bulgarians were not defeated they might have been kept at bay until the whole army could assemble, say, on the Vardar, outside the range of the converging attack, with the Allies on the right, and the Montenegrins and their impracticable mountains on the left.

While the Allied Governments had failed to realise the seriousness of the Balkan situation, and, hoping to solve it by diplomatic means, took no military precautions to make their diplomacy effective, the Germans were fully alive to its significance. Their negotiations, backed by a display of force in Southern Hungary, by their successes in Russia, by secret agents, lavish bribes, and the rest, brought Bulgaria to their side, and lured or frightened Roumania and Greece into neutrality. And when things were ripe they struck, as is their habit, suddenly and effectively. Military reasons which made the new move obligatory have been given above. But the Germans are looking beyond mere immediate necessities. Their aspirations in the East, which are well known, require as a preliminary step the German domination of the Balkans, and of Constantinople, the key to the whole situation, commercial and military. The policy of Germany has for years been working in this direction. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the commercial agreement with Turkey, the Baghdad railway scheme, and the attempt to reduce Serbia to submission, which was the proximate cause of the war, were all steps in this policy with which everybody is familiar, but the real meaning of which has been strangely missed. The extension of her commercial and military power to the East was, in fact, one of the main objects, if not the chief of all, for which Germany brought on the war.

But there were other objects provided for in Germany's war plans. Russia was the chief obstacle to the wished-for extension eastwards, for she also, for obvious reasons, desired Constantinople. Hence one motive for the alliance with Turkey. There was also the dread of Russia's rapid increase of population, and of her developing into a great Slav Empire by the absorption or acquisition of Slavonic territories outside her present frontiers. Russia's population had grown from 129

millions in 1897 to 171 millions in 1912, constituting, when fully organised, an overwhelming military power on the eastern frontiers of Germany and Austria, which it was necessary to break up before it should become too formidable. It has also been disclosed, with a *naïveté* which has caused the idea to be discredited, that Germany has entertained a scheme of annexing the Baltic provinces, formerly colonised by Germans, and Poland with its manufactories and agricultural resources, with the view of acquiring new areas for colonisation, of establishing a frontier belt between the Prussian provinces and Russia, and of removing the Poles from Russian influences. Whether the project was seriously entertained or not, the course of the Russian campaign fits it remarkably well.

The third principal war-project, needless to say, was the acquisition of Belgium with the great port of Antwerp and the portions of Dutch territory adjoining the estuary of the Scheldt,\* together with possibly the French Channel ports and adjacent territory. These designs were directed partly to strengthening Germany's western frontier, and partly to securing a position which would menace Great Britain's naval supremacy.

If these were the aims of the German Powers, the course of the war is clear. The Balkan campaign was not, as has been suggested, a desperate enterprise undertaken to cause the Allies to disperse their forces (though this was a probable incident), but a fundamental object of the war. It was first entrusted to Austria, seemingly as a side-issue, while Germany undertook to subjugate France. Both attempts failed; but a strong defensive front was established in France, and both Powers combined their forces against Russia, where they again failed to destroy the Russian military power. The approach of winter, the recuperative power of the Russians, and the improvement of their munition-supply, again necessitated the establishment of a defensive front; and then the Germans turned their attention to the Balkans, in accordance with an arrangement, which

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\* Von Jagow, the German Foreign Secretary, observed in a telegram sent to the German Ambassador in London on Aug. 4, 1914, 'It is obvious that we cannot profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at the expense of Holland.'



appears to have been made some months before with King Ferdinand, for the co-operation of the Bulgarian army after the harvest had been gathered in.

Although the Allied Governments failed to appreciate the full significance of the Balkan situation, attempts were made to turn it to advantage. The aspirations of Greece in Albania and Asia Minor, and of Roumania in Transylvania, were incentives to participation on the side of the Allies. But Roumania could not venture to embark on a war of uncertain duration while the possession of the Dardanelles by the Turks cut her off from outside sources of munition-supply. Greece appears to have been approached in February at the instance of M. Briand, who suggested an attack on Hungary by joint Allied, Greek, and Serbian forces. The occasion was opportune, for the Russians were threatening Hungary from the Carpathians. But the project fell through; the abortive negotiations with Bulgaria were resumed; and the attack on the Dardanelles was undertaken.

The probable objects and the expediency of the expedition were discussed at some length in the April and October issues of this Review. Information which has since been divulged throws some light on its genesis and management. Disclosures made in the House of Commons by Mr Churchill on Nov. 15 show that the idea of taking some action against Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean was originally suggested by Russia as a means of relieving the pressure in the Caucasus. Mr Churchill said:

'In consequence of these communications . . . I began to direct the attention of the First Sea Lord and other naval advisers to the possibilities of action in Turkish waters. The Dardanelles stood out as incomparably the most decisive operation that was open. Of course from the beginning we all recognised that a joint naval and military operation by surprise was the best way. . . .'

But, as no military force was available, the project of an unsupported naval attack was discussed. Lord Fisher, the responsible naval adviser of the Government, advised against 'using fighting ships for bombarding purposes except in conjunction with military operations.' Lord Fisher, it may be observed, had at his disposal the

Naval War Staff, a specially selected body of officers, analogous to the General Staff of the Army, who have made a special study of naval strategy and tactics, and whose duty it is to prepare plans for naval operations. It may, therefore, be inferred that Lord Fisher's opinion, apart from his own qualifications for forming a correct judgment, represented the best naval opinion. The advice was rejected, and other advisers were sought. Having given his opinion, and having been overruled on the advice of officers subordinate to him, Lord Fisher declined further to discuss the question at a War Council held on Jan. 28, at which plans which had been prepared at Mr Churchill's direction for carrying out the operation were considered and approved. Mr Churchill laid stress on that fact, which he regarded as implying acquiescence. The matter needs full investigation, for it is of vital importance that the position of the Government with respect to their naval and military advisers should be clearly defined. Mr Asquith, in a speech in the House on Nov. 2, disclosed the views and practice of the Government in the following words:

'You cannot determine your policy or your course of action entirely and exclusively by military considerations. . . . It is the duty of the Government to rely very largely on the advice of its military and naval counsellors, but . . . sometimes it is necessary . . . to run risks and encounter dangers which purely military or naval policy would warn you against.'

This being the ruling principle adopted by the Government, it is evident that the naval and military forces of the Crown may at any time be involved in wild or even disastrous enterprises through the advice of their naval or military counsellors being set aside by a civilian War Council.

When the troops came on the scene six weeks after the failure of the naval attack, the land operations were confined to one side of the Straits, presumably because the Allied Powers were not able at the time to provide a sufficient force to operate on both sides. The French contingent, which landed in the first instance on the Asiatic coast, was transferred, after repelling heavy attacks, to the Peninsula, where the small extent of

front, the natural strength of the position, and the security afforded by the sea on both flanks, enabled the Turks to hold large reserves in hand to meet fresh attacks, such as that at Suvla Bay on Aug. 6. Had it been possible to operate on both sides, the Allies would have had the best of the situation, because, with their ample facilities for transport, they could have reinforced either side more speedily than could the Turks. The advantage of surprise having already been lost, it might have been better to wait till a sufficient force could be provided for the double operation, than to 'run risks and encounter dangers' by attempting a doubtful enterprise. There is, indeed, some reason to suppose, from an unofficial statement, that the Greek army had been expected to co-operate, but that the arrangement fell through because the Allied Governments, in their negotiations at Sofia, had committed themselves to certain offers which precluded them from guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Greece, a condition on which the Greek Government insisted. Should this be true, it may be inferred that the original plan was based on the assumption that a Greek contingent would participate; but that, when this was not forthcoming, it was decided to proceed with the reduced forces available.

The invasion of Serbia completely changed the situation. The defeat of Turkey and the capture of Constantinople ceased to be possible objectives; and, after considerable delay, and the discussion of reports by Sir Charles Monro and Lord Kitchener, who were sent out successively to examine the local situation, the troops were withdrawn in December from the Suvla and Anzac positions. Those occupying the extremity of the Peninsula have now also retired, fortunately without loss. A very difficult operation has been carried out with great skill and remarkable success. But it remains a melancholy confession of complete and costly failure. The conquest of Serbia has for the time being given the Teutonic Powers the command of the Balkans and the Bosphorus, which it may prove as hard to wrest from them as to recover Belgium; harder, perhaps, on account of the difficulty of transporting large forces by sea, and the nature of the country and communications, which require special transport and mountain artillery.

It was disclosed by Sir Edward Carson in his letter to the Prime Minister, dated Oct. 12, resigning office in the Cabinet, that the General Staff advised against the despatch of a force to Salonika. This is not surprising, for it has been evident from the first that the defection of Greece made the force of 150,000 men asked for by M. Venizelos altogether inadequate to produce a decisive effect, and that much larger forces would be required to meet the German combination, when, as seemed inevitable, the Serbian army had been dispersed. Apart from other considerations, the conveyance of large numbers by sea is a slow operation. A great deal has been said and written about the achievements of our fleet and mercantile marine in transporting the large armies we have put in the field; and, perhaps because the achievement has been so great, it does not seem to be generally recognised that the capacity of sea-power in this respect is strictly limited. The value of sea-power in connexion with military operations—what has been called ‘amphibious power’—has been greatly modified by the conditions of present-day warfare. Its greatest asset is surprise. A force when once embarked disappears, and it can strike unexpectedly at any point suitable for landing. But the size of the force that can be conveyed in one trip is limited by the tonnage available. When several trips have to be made, the destination is disclosed; and, when the distance is great, sea-power only provides a slow and inadequate means of transport. The advanced force is liable to be defeated by superior numbers, or to be encircled by a ‘steel wall.’ On the other hand, even if ships are numerous, they can be quickly unloaded only at large ports, where ample anchorage and wharfage are available. The possible points for disembarkation are, therefore, likely to be few, and the actual destination may even be foreseen. Amphibious power, in fact, only has its full value when the enemy is comparatively weak, and liable to surprise. With the large armies of the present day such conditions can rarely exist. They did exist at the Dardanelles; and, even after the Allies’ intentions had been disclosed by the naval attack, the Turkish force was not unmanageably large during the first two months of the land operations.

The situation at Salonika is obviously very different.

Instead of seizing the initiative by surprise, the Allies have had to follow the German lead; and the transport of the large forces necessary to reverse the situation, which is a heavy tax on the already overstrained mercantile marine, can only be effected by numerous trips. It is doubtful whether enough troops will have been assembled to take the offensive before the enemy are ready to attack the position at Salonika, with the object of driving the Allied force into the sea, or building it in with a 'steel wall.' It would be undesirable to consider too closely the probable course of the future operations; but they will presumably be based on concerted action with Russian and, possibly, Italian forces, based, respectively, on the Black Sea or the Danube, and the Adriatic.

As for the Germans, a defeat in the Near East is probably the thing they are most anxious to avoid; and they may be expected to exert all their energies to avert it, and to secure their position before the spring, when new Russian armies will claim all their attention on the eastern front. The rumours of a great influx of troops into France, which became current about the middle of December, were probably initiated by them with the object of stopping the transfer of French and British troops to Salonika. A German excursion to Mesopotamia, which has also been rumoured, can hardly have been seriously thought of; and, since the set-back experienced by General Townshend after the battle of Ctesiphon on Nov. 22, that region is more likely than ever to be left in the hands of the Turks. Egypt offers a more tempting objective; and, were it not for the Balkan situation, a German contingent might have been expected to take part in the attack for which the Turks have been preparing under German direction. For Egypt—'the neck of the British Empire,' as Bismarck described it—is regarded by Germany as the most vulnerable and vital quarter in which the power of England can be assailed; and its restoration to the Ottoman Empire is supposed to be one of the terms of the alliance with Turkey. According to unofficial statements a railway designed to connect the Haifa branch of the Damascus-Medina line with the Syrian frontier was opened for traffic as far as Beersheba on Aug. 9; and a field railway and a pipeline are being pushed across the desert towards the Suez

Canal. With these new facilities, a repetition of the Turkish attack must be looked for, as a diversion to react on the Balkan situation, if for no other reason.

The unfortunate turn which affairs have taken in the Balkans has at least had some good results. It has given the Allied Powers an opportunity to combine their forces, hitherto widely separated, for concerted action on the only ground on which they could all meet. The bonds of common interest which bind them together should be strengthened by co-operation in the field. But, what is more important, it appears to have brought home to the Allied Governments the paramount need of acting in closer concert, and of expediting discussions and decisions. One of the chief advantages which the Teutonic Alliance has enjoyed has been the centralisation of the control of operations in the hands of the German General Staff. So long as the Austrian Staff were allowed a free hand things went badly. The possession of interior lines has accentuated this advantage, because it has enabled troops to be moved quickly to any desired region by direct railway routes. Unity of control results in concentration of effort; rapid transport secures the initiative. The consequent economy of force has gone some way towards compensating for disparity of numbers.

In the case of the Allies such unity of control is unattainable. It is not possible to confide the supreme control of operations on all the fronts to one Government and one General Staff. Each must necessarily conduct the operations on its own front; and, when combined action by two or more Powers is proposed, those concerned must consult and endeavour to arrive at an agreement. A project which the German General Staff could discuss and decide in a day might conceivably take the Allies a week or more; and even then there might not be complete accord. When a distant operation is decided on, there is the additional delay involved in transporting troops by circuitous sea-routes; and, as in the case of Salonika, it may be impossible to concentrate them in time. The steps recently taken to expedite decisions by arranging joint conferences between the various War Councils or their delegates should cause an improvement; but both in unity of control and quickness of decision the Central Powers must always have the advantage.



It is, however, in the matter of foresight and concerted action to meet situations or to seize opportunities which may occur in the future, that the Allied Governments have chiefly failed. Each has been so preoccupied with the situation in its immediate front that the general situation and its probable development have been obscured. To this, combined with a strange blindness to the aims of Germany, has doubtless been due the feeble military action which failed to gain the mastery of the Balkans in the five months during which the Allies had only the Turks to deal with. The magnitude of the issues involved was not appreciated. The naval attack on the Dardanelles was regarded as a sort of by-play—a 'war-gamble,' Mr Churchill called it, 'with stakes which we could afford to lose.' The gamble cost the Allies over 200,000 British casualties (including sick), besides an unknown number of French; while the result left the Germans masters of the Balkans, and in possession of their coveted road to the East—a position from which they will not easily be ousted.

In these respects, also, the Allied Governments seem to have recognised their mistakes. Recent changes in the commands and staffs in the West point to the adoption of an altered and enlarged military policy. It appears to have been realised that the end of the war is unlikely to be brought about by a great overwhelming decision on one front, and that it is more likely to result from a series of partial decisions, which should be sought for where the conditions may, for the moment, be most favourable. This broader conception of the nature of present-day warfare will need keener foresight, quicker decision, and a stricter subordination of individual interests than the Allied Governments have hitherto displayed.

W. P. BLOOD.

Art. 13.—THE PROSE WORKS OF JOSEPH ADDISON.

1. *The Works of the Right Honourable Joseph Addison, Esq.* London: Printed for Jacob Tonson, at Shakespear's-Head, over-against Katharine-street in the Strand. Four vols. MDCCXXI.
2. *Essays of Joseph Addison.* Chosen and edited with a preface and a few notes by Sir J. G. Frazer. Two vols. London: Macmillan, 1915.
3. *The Miscellaneous Works of Joseph Addison.* Edited by A. C. Guthkelch (Vol. I, Poems and Plays: Vol. II, Prose). London: G. Bell & Sons, 1914.

ADDISON and Swift ought to have changed places. Swift's heart was utterly given to the pursuit of power; as he said in a letter to Pope, all his endeavours from a boy to distinguish himself had been only for want of a great title and fortune, that he might be used like a lord by those who had an opinion of his parts—whether right or wrong was no great matter—and so the reputation of wit or great learning did the office of a blue ribbon or of a coach and six horses. But while Swift was gnawing his fingers in Laracor, or at the Deanery of St Patrick's, Addison, though he had neither birth, nor ambition, nor public eloquence, was passing from one Government post to another, as Commissioner of Appeals, Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, Commissioner for Trades and Colonies, and Secretary of State.

What Swift thought of religion we know from 'A Tale of a Tub.' Addison was the devout man who 'does not only believe, but feels there is a Deity. He has actual sensations of him; his experience concurs with his reason; he sees him more and more in all his intercourses with him, and even in this life almost loses his faith in conviction' ('Spectator,' No. 465). He found his happiness in contemplating the might and goodness of God, and in revealing to others the way to heaven. His exquisite humour, the quiet cadences of his prose, his power to observe and create character, his knowledge of men, were all used in the service of religion. As he wrote in another essay: 'I must confess, were I left to myself, I would rather aim at instructing than diverting. . . . I would not willingly laugh but in order to instruct,

or if I sometimes fail in this point, when my mirth ceases to be instructive, it shall never cease to be innocent' ('Spectator,' No. 179). Yet the virtues that he taught were all summed up in one word—prudence:

'There are many more shining qualities in the mind of man, but there is none so useful as Discretion; it is this indeed which gives a value to all the rest, which sets them at work in their proper times and places, and turns them to the advantage of the person who is possessed of them. Without it learning is pedantry, and wit impertinence; Virtue itself looks like weakness, the best parts only qualify a man to be more sprightly in errors, and active to his own prejudice' ('Spectator,' No. 225). 'The utmost we can hope for in this world is contentment; if we aim at anything higher, we shall meet with nothing but grief and disappointments. A man should direct all his studies and endeavours at making himself easy now, and happy hereafter' (Ib. No. 163).

In the Record Office there are preserved many lists of prisoners condemned at the Old Bailey Sessions, and lying in Newgate for the execution of sentence. In some cases the decisions of the Secretary of State are recorded in Addison's handwriting; and there are letters addressed to Addison by prisoners who pitifully beg his compassion. He knew what was going on, but from the first page of his works to the last there is not one word of pity for those suffering the agonies of captivity. It was left to writers like Ned Ward, the coarse and brutal author of 'The London Spy,' to protest against the bestialities of the penal system. Addison was wholly taken up with himself—a man was to direct all his endeavours to make himself 'easy now and happy hereafter.' Chaucer's Friar held a similar doctrine:

'For unto swich a worthy man as he  
Acorded nat, as by his facultee,  
To have with seke lazars aqueyntaunce.  
It is nat honest, it may nat avaunce  
For to delen with no swich poraille.'

Such was Addison's attitude to the criminal and the poor; and, though he wrote in the 'Guardian' (No. 166), 'I never saw an indigent person in my life without reaching out to him some . . . imaginary relief. I cannot

but sympathise with everyone I meet that is in affliction ; and, if my abilities were equal to my wishes, there should be neither pain nor poverty in the world,' his words are cold beside the passionate cry of Goldsmith, 'Why was I born a man, and yet see the sufferings of wretches I cannot relieve? Poor houseless creatures! The world will give you reproaches, but will not give you relief.' As Addison was untouched by the real evils of his time, so he failed to understand the rise of that scepticism which was beginning to menace revealed religion. Though his voice trembled with indignation and contempt when he spoke of atheism and atheists, he could find no arguments to meet them. These supreme tests reveal the limits of his mind and imagination. The 18th century believed that Addison wrote a perfect prose style, and that his style alone would suffice to save his name from oblivion. But to those who have heard the full orchestra of 'The French Revolution' or 'Modern Painters' or 'The Egoist' his single pipe sounds small and thin; and no one will ever speak of him again as Johnson or Macaulay or Thackeray once did.

Nevertheless his works are constantly put before the public; and now Sir James Frazer, turning from the vast labour of 'The Golden Bough,' has found 'ease and quiet breathing' in making a selection from Addison's Essays and writing for them a Preface of reverie and imagination. Addison wrote about four hundred and fifty essays, of which a hundred and seventy-four appear in this edition. The selection includes the best rather than the most characteristic of them. Consequently some aspects of Addison's mind and art appear less often than in the complete series. He is made at the same time more brilliant and more kindly. In one direction we are relieved of some papers offensive to modern taste; in the other we are spared the boredom of some of Addison's sermons. The total effect of the work is very delightful, but it shows once more how much is lost by separating Addison's work from Steele's. The essays should be printed as they were first issued. Tickell did no service to Addison when he threw out Steele's contributions to the 'Tatler' and the 'Spectator.'

In a very pleasant piece of writing the Preface tells how Sir James visited Coverley Hall, and found there a

number of papers relating to the Club—including the original letter in which the butler announced his master's death—and a new essay, not by Addison, but 'in the manner of Budgell at his best, or of Steele at his worst,' which 'sheds a glimmer of light on Mr Will Honeycomb's mysterious disappearance from that fashionable world of which he was so long a shining ornament.' He also tells us how in a dream he and Sir Roger and Will Honeycomb called upon Addison in Staple Inn, and how they surprised him at his writing-table.\*

The 'few notes' are the weakest part of this edition. Readers who require help will require very much more than is given them here. In 'Spectator' No. 592, for example, there are four phrases that need explanation (the first rehearsal of the new thunder: they have a Salmoneus behind the scenes: Mr Rymer's 'Edgar' is to fall in snow: a run of three days); and references should be given for the motto, and three quotations (from Terence, Robert South, and Pliny). Sir James Frazer annotates the phrase about Rymer's 'Edgar,' and leaves the others without a word. It would be useful to translate the Latin and Greek mottoes and quotations. The later editions of the 'Tatler' and 'Spectator' usually quote good English versions of them; and it is not to be supposed that many readers, either in the reign of Anne or to-day, could see the point of all of them without help.

Notwithstanding these defects, the editor and the publishers between them have made a very charming book; and, if Addison is to find willing readers during the next few years he is likely to owe many of them to Sir James Frazer's good offices.

Addison's reputation has always depended upon his essays, but he wrote several other prose works, enough altogether to fill a volume of five hundred pages in the new edition of his 'Miscellaneous Works' which Messrs Bell are publishing. In 1697 he contributed to Dryden's translation of Virgil a short and unimportant Essay on the Georgics; in 1705 he published a volume of

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\* Some readers may like to know that Michael Dahl painted Addison just as Sir James saw him, and that the picture is in the National Portrait Gallery.

'Remarks on Italy,' and in 1708 a pamphlet on 'The Present State of the War.' During the next six years he was writing his essays; and his only other prose work was 'The Tryal of Count Tariff.' After his death Tickell published in the collected edition of his works (1721) two other prose treatises, the 'Dialogues upon Ancient Medals' and 'Of the Christian Religion'; and eighteen years later Thomas Osborne published, 'from an Original Manuscript of Mr Addison, Prepared and Corrected by himself,' a 'Discourse on Ancient and Modern Learning' (1739).

In the formal treatises Addison has three subjects: religion, classical literature, and Whig politics. His greatest delight in literature was the study of Latin poetry; and he was himself a most skilful writer of Latin verse—he is indeed more a poet in Latin than in English. When, therefore, he was given a pension in order that he might travel on the Continent and fit himself for a place under the Whig Government, his thoughts turned to ancient Italy as the thoughts of Milton had turned sixty years earlier. The works which he wrote during these travels—the 'Remarks on Italy,' and the 'Dialogues on Medals'—are for the most part a series of illustrations of the Latin poets, drawn from Italian scenery in the 'Remarks,' and from ancient coins in the 'Dialogues.'

Italy had already been described many times when Addison travelled through it; and, having the scholar's dislike of barren repetition, he made his 'Remarks' not so much a regular account of Italy as a supplement to the works of those who had written before him. This plan caused him a good deal of embarrassment and very much disappointed his readers. He had constantly to explain that because somebody had anticipated him he would not write on this or that subject, and in the end he produced a book that might almost have been written at home. As Horace Walpole said, Addison 'travels through the poets and not through Italy.\*' When he is not illustrating one of the Latin poets by reference to the scenery before him, Addison is usually writing on

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\* There is a lively passage to the same effect in 'Tristram Shandy' about the great Addison galloping across Europe 'with his satchel of school-books . . . galling his beast's crupper at every stroke.'



government or architecture or natural science. In writing on the governments of Italy he had in mind the purpose of those who sent him; and, when he wrote of Papal tyranny, he had an eye on the Jacobites at home. There is something rather pathetic in his remarks on architecture, because he clearly admires many Gothic cathedrals, but dares not say so. Everything must be classical, though one can see sometimes that he longs to burst out into sudden praise. 'I saw between Pavia and Milan the convent of Carthusians, which is very spacious and beautiful. Their church is extremely fine, and curiously adorned, but of a Gothic structure.' That last phrase spoils everything, as Bede, in a passage highly commending the piety and learning of the Irish, after abundance of praises overthrows them all, by lamenting that, alas! they kept Easter at a wrong time of the year.\*

Addison showed a surprising interest in scientific observation not only in this work, but in his Essays too. There is an amusing example in the section on Naples:

'The grotto *del Cani* is famous for the poisonous steams which float within a foot of its surface. The sides of the grotto are marked green, as high as the malignity of the vapour reaches. The common experiments are as follows. A Dog, that has his nose held in the vapour, dies in a very short time; but if carryed into the open air, or thrown into a neighbouring lake, he immediately recovers, if he is not quite gone. . . . I observed how long a Dog was a dying the first time, and after his recovery, and found no sensible difference.'

The mischievous person who compiled 'A Table of all the accurate Remarks and new Discoveries, in the most learned and ingenious Mr Addison's Book of Travels' did not fail to notice this one.†

In the same section Addison examines the history and structure of Vesuvius in the spirit of a modern geologist; at Milan he records an 'artificial echo,' which returns a sound about fifty-six times, and compares it to the 'reverberation of images from opposite looking-glasses.' Here and there he attempts to describe natural scenery,

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\* Swift to Pope, Sept. 29, 1725.

† In Tickell's edition the wording of the passage was altered.

but, like most of his contemporaries, he has no language for the beauty of earth or water. The vast vocabulary of the Elizabethans has shrunk to a few conventional epithets. In the presence of the Alps he can only talk of 'pleasing horror,' and among the Italian lakes of 'beautiful prospects.' But a modern is most surprised at the complete suppression of his experiences of travel. The book begins abruptly at Marseilles and ends more abruptly 'in the long valley of the Tyrol.' If Addison could have guessed the mind of Prince Posterity, he would have tossed his collections from the Latin poets into the English Channel, and written the story of his adventures with landlords and travellers, in ships, and coaches and inns. The book we have is not very brilliant, and the reader who puts it down will probably forget to take it up again. Yet it has much pleasant humour, and an air of breeding and good taste.

'The Present State of the War' illustrates very strikingly the repetition of political situations. Its arguments sound strangely familiar now, for in 1708 England was engaged in just such a struggle as she is carrying on at this moment, fighting with many allied nations against one which aimed at world-dominion, and used all its resources to further that one design. Addison wrote at a moment when English resolution was beginning to fail, and his purpose is to hearten his countrymen, and provoke greater national sacrifices.\*

'The French are certainly the most implacable, and the most dangerous enemies of the British nation. Their form of government, their religion, their jealousy of the British power, as well as their prosecutions of commerce, and pursuits of universal monarchy, will fix them for ever in their animosities and aversions towards us, and make them catch at all opportunities of subverting our constitution, destroying our religion, ruining our trade, and sinking the figure which we make among the nations of *Europe*. . . . Our all is at stake, and irretrievably lost if we fail of success. . . . At

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\* 'It is a common notion among foreigners, that the English are good confederates in an enterprize which may be dispatched within a short compass of time; but that they are not to be depended upon in a work which cannot be finished without constancy and perseverance.' ('The Freeholder,' No. 25.) This passage was written seven years later than the 'Present State of the War.'

present, if we make a drawn game of it, or procure but moderate advantages, we are in a condition which every British heart must tremble at the thought of. . . . The only means . . . for bringing France to our conditions . . . is to throw in multitudes upon them and overpower them with numbers. . . . The French do their business by lying still, and have no other concern in the war than to hold fast what they have already got into their hands. . . . Will it appear credible to posterity, that, in a war carried on by the joint force of so many populous and powerful nations, France could send so great a part of its troops to one seat of the war, without suffering in any of the rest? . . . Let us exert the united strength of our whole Island. . . . We see the necessity of an augmentation if we intend to bring the enemy to reason or rescue our country from the miseries that may befall it. . . . If we neglect so fair an opportunity, we may be willing to employ all our hands, and all our treasures, when it will be too late; and shall be tormented with one of the most melancholy reflexions of an afflicted heart—that it was once in our power to have made ourselves and our children happy.'

The rest of the minor prose works are only important to students. The best of them is the 'Discourse of Ancient and Modern Learning' which makes some really valuable remarks in that barren controversy.

Addison's essays were each written to fill about a page and a half of folio printed in double columns; they were issued three times a week in the 'Tatler,' daily in the 'Spectator' and 'Guardian,' twice a week in the 'Freeholder.' These conditions of length and repetition naturally produced some of their characteristics. There was no room for preliminary flourishes or a long leave-taking; the writer must get to his point at once, and use every inch of space to the end.

'A man who publishes his works in a volume, has an infinite advantage over one who communicates his writings to the world in loose tracts and single pieces. We do not expect to meet with anything in a bulky volume, till after some heavy preamble, and several words of course, to prepare the Reader for what follows. . . . On the contrary those who publish their thoughts in distinct sheets, and as it were by piece-meal, have none of these advantages. We must immediately fall into our subject, and treat every part of it in a lively manner, or our papers are thrown by as dull and insipid; our matter must lie close together, and either be

wholly new in itself, or in the turn it receives from our expressions. . . . The ordinary writers of morality prescribe to their readers after the Galenick way; their medicines are made up in large quantities. An essay writer must practise in the chemical method, and give the virtue of a full draught in a few drops.' ('Spectator,' No. 124.)

The papers were intended to pay (and did pay handsomely); the tone and subjects of the essays were therefore decided in the long run by the public; if the public ceased to buy the papers, the papers ceased to exist. These conditions are the same for all journalism; but we are so used to seeing Addison's essays in volumes that we are apt to forget their appearance in daily sheets. Addison achieved his success in the periodical essay by using the manner of familiar correspondence; and his readers came to look for his paper as a daily letter from a wise and genial friend. Before the 'Tatler' was thought of, while he was travelling on the Continent or filling minor posts in the Government, Addison was writing to his friends letters that have all the characteristics of his essays, except their length and concentration on a single theme. For instance, he writes to Congreve from Blois, where he was staying, in December 1699:

'My greatest diversion is to run over in my Thoughts the Variety of noble scenes I was entertain'd with before I came hither. I don't believe, as good a poet as you are, that you can make finer Lanships than those about the Kings houses, or with all your descriptions build a more magnificent palace than Versailles. I am however so singular as to prefer Fontainebleau to all the rest. It is situated among rocks and woods that give you a fine variety of Savage prospects. The King has Humour'd the Genius of the place, and only made use of so much art as is necessary to Help and regulate Nature without reforming her too much. The cascades seem to break through the Clefts and cracks of Rocks that are cover'd over with Moss, and look as if they were piled upon one another by Accident. There is an Artificial Wildness in the Meadows, Walks and Canals, and the Garden instead of a Wall is Fenc'd on the Lower End by a Natural mound of Rock-work that strikes the Eye very Agreeably. For my part I think there is something more charming in these rude heaps of Stone than in so many Statues, and wou'd as soon see a River winding through Woods and Meadows as when it is toss'd up in such a Variety of figures at Versailles. But I

begin to talk like Dr Lister. To pass therefore from Works of Nature to those of Art: In my opinion the pleasantest part of Versailles is the Gallery. Every one sees on each side of it something that will be sure to please him, for one of 'em commands a View of the finest Garden in the World, and the other is wainscoted with Looking-Glass. The History of the present King, till the Year 16\*\*, is painted on the Roof by Le Brun, so that His Majesty has Actions enough by him to furnish another Gallery much Longer than the first. He is represented with all the Terror and Majesty that you can Imagine in ev'ry part of the picture, and sees his Young face as perfectly drawn in the Roof as his present one in the side. The Painter has represented his most Xtian Majesty under the figure of Jupiter throwing thunderbolts all about the cieling and striking terror into the Danube and Rhine that lie astonished and blasted with Lightning a little above the Cornice.'

Here are the colloquial ease, the sly humour (in the remark about the Looking-Glass), the unexpected turn of the sentence ('striking terror into the Danube and Rhine that lie astonished and blasted with lightning a little above the cornice') that characterise the essays.

If this point needed demonstration, it has been provided by Addison and Steele themselves. One of their commonest devices is to use a letter for an essay, or to write an essay in the form of a letter (for example, in the 'Spectator,' Nos. 127 and 251). Some of Addison's letters of travel were made to serve their turn in this way; and sometimes a whole paper is constructed of letters from correspondents. Allowing for length, and the necessity that an essay shall be directed to one theme, the two forms are interchangeable. On the other hand, Addison was inclined to develop the essay in the direction of the sermon; and in the eighth volume of the 'Spectator' (written without Steele's assistance) the 'parson in a tyewig' has forgotten that he is a private gentleman and dreams that he is in the pulpit. The very phrases of a preacher are used; and, when he pretends to write a letter, he begins:

'SIR,

'I considered in my two last letters that awful and tremendous subject, the Ubiquity or Omnipresence of the Divine Being. . . .'

Or he divides his discourse into Firstly, Secondly, Thirdly, Fourthly, Fifthly, Sixthly, and goes with damnable iteration through a series of propositions formally announced in the opening paragraph. Addison's essays, then, stand between the letter and the sermon, sometimes leaning to the one and sometimes to the other, as the subject is more or less grave and sustained. But his natural tendency is toward the sermon. He is ambitious to have it said of him that he has brought Philosophy out of closets, and libraries, schools and colleges, to dwell in clubs and assemblies, at tea-tables and in coffee-houses. But, like the little boys in the verses of Horace, we love the *elementa prima* less than the *crustula*; and Addison best recommends his doctrine to an indifferent world when he delivers it with a smiling countenance.

Addison and Swift were both teachers and counsellors of humanity—Swift as the particular servant of his Church, Addison as a layman. But it is the layman who is the better Christian. In an early poem Swift prays that men may feel him when he writes; then, he says,

‘the muse and I no more revenge desire,  
Each line shall stab, shall blast, like daggers and like fire.’

It was not the Saviour of men who taught Swift to stab and blast them. Addison never despairs of any man's salvation, or even seems to know that the shapes of lust and cruelty, fear and murder, lurk in the darkness. He has nothing to say to them. It is the Dean of St Patrick's who loves to fall upon them with a great bill-hook or a blaze of flame. Addison keeps to the small sins and the fashionable sinners; his weapons are light and shining—gentle persuasion, kindly ridicule, a still small voice, not the earthquake or the fire. But he has nothing like the audacity and universal power of Swift; and Swift soon tired of Addison's politeness. ‘I will not meddle with the “Spectator,”’ he wrote to Stella; ‘let him fair-sex it to the world's end.’\* A paragraph from ‘A Tale of a Tub’ would have torn a ‘Spectator’ to pieces.

Addison's favourite instrument for the correction of

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\* ‘Journal to Stella,’ Feb. 8, 1712.



men's faults is humour, and he loves to employ it upon all those absurdities of dress and social custom and eccentricity of speech and conduct upon which his biographers have expatiated so long and so often. But humour spent upon absurdities of dress and custom loses nearly all its point when they have passed away. What is the hooped petticoat to us? How can we enter into Addison's jests upon it? So it has come about that only the essays from the 'Spectator' are now commonly read. Sir Roger and the Club are human beings independent of place and time and circumstance. We need no commentary to see how exquisitely some types of humanity are represented in Sir Roger himself, and Will Wimble, and Sir Andrew Freeport. The other papers often depend upon custom and fashions long forgotten, and their morality is that of another age. But when the 'Spectator' visits Sir Roger in Worcestershire we are in the midst of men like ourselves, and recognise them for our old acquaintance.

In a passage already quoted Addison claims that his mirth is always innocent. Yet he loves to hover about subjects with a faint suspicion of impropriety—women's petticoats, and ankles, and tuckers—in the manner of Charles Lamb manufacturing sixpenny jokes for the 'Morning Post' on flesh-coloured stockings and the 'glowing instep.' (He is almost equally fond of subjects whose impropriety is not doubtful; and Sir James Frazer exactly catches the manner of the 'Spectator' when he suggests that Will Honeycomb had seduced the 'blowzy milkmaid' to whom we leave him unhappily married, and that 'a horsewhip brandished by a stout bucolic arm, had some share in leading Mr Honeycomb like a lamb to the altar.'

How can Addison's practice and professions be reconciled? The psychology is not very clear, but there are parallels—Jeremy Taylor, for example, and John Milton. 'Holy Living' contains a section in which the writer 'is disagreeably broad and rough'—paragraphs that 'do not make for edification'; the 'Ductor Dubitantium' is 'crowded with considerations which a wise and liberal-minded priest might discuss in private conversation with adult persons, but which must, one thinks, even in 1660, have seemed indiscreet and embarrassing when set down

in print in a popular manual.\* So Hallam says of Milton that 'voluptuousness is not wholly uncongenial to him. A few lines in "Paradise Lost" are rather too plain, and their gravity makes them worse.'

The reader who buys a set of the 'Spectator' in the belief that Addison's pages shine with unsullied purity will meet with some surprises, particularly if he has been led to believe that Addison effected a revolution in the tone of popular literature.† But such a reputation does not grow up by accident. The truth is that Addison's will is good; he loves virtue and ensues it, as Jeremy Taylor and John Milton did, too; but sometimes his sleeping passions wake, and will not be denied. Posterity has judged him by the general tendency of his works, not by the effect of some particular passages.

If one were asked to write a character-sketch of an English gentleman of the reign of Anne, one would describe a man born in the middle class, educated first at a public school, and then at Oxford, endowed by nature with an exquisite skill in Latin verse, and a taste not less exquisite for wine and conversation. Possessing that temperament which accepts the ideals of any society into which it is born, never rising much above them, but never falling far beneath them, he would enter Parliament, and hold a place under government without either success or failure, and would employ his leisure hours in the deep and placid enjoyment of literature and religion. Such qualifications and gifts as these were Addison's. But, though for more than a hundred years they made him the standard of English social life, they could not give him an immortality of fame. That is the reward of greater powers than he possessed, and greater sacrifices than he was ever willing to make.

A. C. GUTHKELCH.

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\* Edmund Gosse, 'Jeremy Taylor,' pp. 73 and 166.

† There was no change in the tone of popular literature; and the change in the drama was due, not to Addison, but to Jeremy Collier.

#### Art. 14.—BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND WAR.

THE New Year of 1916 opens the decisive phase of the war. How long the material and moral endurance of the combatants may yet prolong the conflict no man can say. But the main issue will, in all human probability, be settled in favour of one side or the other before next autumn. The struggle, if it continues after that, will be not so much to upset the verdict of next summer's battlefields as to garner in the harvest of victory, or resist the payment in full of the debt of defeat. Upon this decisive phase the Allies enter with many advantages in their favour. They have resisted unbroken the enemy's first and most formidable onset. They have inflicted very heavy losses upon him. Their reserves of man-power are still superior to his. Their deficiency in munition-power is slowly but surely being made good. Their economic resources, intrinsically far greater, have not yet been too seriously impaired by extravagance and defective organisation. The strain of the great blockade is a constant pervasive factor telling steadily upon the enemy's nerves and intensifying that craving for peace which may one day become irresistible.

If there is anxiety as to the outcome, it is not from any doubt as to the value of these assets in our favour, but from a growing conviction, based on the experience of the past year, that the supreme direction of Allied policy and Allied strategy has failed to manifest either the foresight, the concentration of effort, or the ruthless energy required for victory. It is not only the Alliance, as such, that has been characterised by the defects. The co-operation of partners so equal in status and so widely different in their outlook and in their interests must almost inevitably fall short of the degree of concentration and efficiency displayed by Germany in conducting her own affairs and those of her dependent allies, though it is satisfactory to note an increasing improvement in this respect, more particularly in the result of recent conferences between the British and French authorities. But the Allied Governments have each separately shown certain weaknesses. And, for us, the defects of our own Government—both because we are most directly concerned with it, and because we believe their persistence or

their cure to be the determining factor in the issue of the war—are matters of supreme interest at this moment. The failure to take the problem of munitions in hand at the beginning, the neglect of the recruiting situation throughout last summer and autumn, the haphazard inconsequence of the Dardanelles adventure, the futile efforts to square the diplomatic circle in the Balkans, the pitiful oscillations of our military policy in that region while our enemies were steadily and remorselessly extirpating a gallant ally—these are not things we can afford to repeat another year and still hope to defeat an adversary like Germany.

Where lies the responsibility for our failures, and what are the steps we must take to ensure that the mistakes of the past year will not be repeated in the year now before us? The answer to the first question is threefold. We have failed, firstly, owing to the defective character of our central military direction; secondly, owing to the unsuitability of Cabinet government, such as it has become in recent years, for carrying on war; and thirdly, owing to the deadening effect of our whole political system upon the very qualities most requisite for waging war. The answer to the second question is that we must reorganise the War Office, devise a new instrument of government, and—last but most important step of all—summon to the direction of affairs men who are free from the vices of our political system and who possess in themselves the qualities of constructive thought, of decision and driving power which are essential to victory. What is more, we must do all these things without delay.

Our military organisation underwent a searching test in the South African War. The experience of that war showed conclusively that the over-centralisation of all control over the various branches of military organisation in a single Commander-in-Chief was destructive of real responsibility and efficiency. Above all it showed that the most important function of all, that of planning and thinking out military policy for the future, was bound to be hopelessly neglected if it was entrusted or subordinated to any individual or department already occupied with the engrossing cares of administrative routine in any shape or form.

It was upon these conclusions that Lord Esher's Committee in 1904 based their scheme of War Office reorganisation. The office of Commander-in-Chief was abolished and an Army Council created, consisting of the heads of the great military administrative services—the Adjutant-General, the Quarter-Master-General, the Director-General of Ordnance—and, with them, the head of a new department responsible solely for policy and strategy, namely, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Over this Council presided a civilian Secretary of State, entrusted with a double function—that of representing, and in the last resort enforcing, in the Army Council the views and general policy of the Cabinet, and that of representing and defending in the Cabinet the considered military policy of the Army Council.

This system was sound in its essential principles. It established the great cardinal distinction between policy and administration, between nerve and muscle, which underlies all modern military organisation. It provided for that point of contact and medium for the interchange of ideas between the civil and military authorities which must exist somewhere or other, and which, under our present system of government, is on the whole best provided by a civilian capable of presenting the views of his military colleagues effectively in the Cabinet and before the country. The alternative of a military Secretary of State as member of a party Government, and making speeches in parliament, is not altogether attractive, apart from purely military objections, to which we shall refer later in connexion with Lord Kitchener's tenure of the office.

The new system was a decided advance on the old. Between 1904 and 1914 the organisation of the existing Regular Army was steadily improved with a view to war, and more specifically with a view to a war in Flanders, while the old casual Volunteer Force was fitted into a framework of military organisation, which greatly enhanced its potential value as a Home Defence Force and as a nucleus for expansion in an emergency. But changes in office organisation are of little effect unless they are accompanied by a change of outlook in those who control and drive the machine. And in this case the lessons of the South African War were only very imperfectly

absorbed by the politicians and soldiers who were concerned with the administration of the War Office in the decade before the present war.

Lord Haldane has a great fondness for talking of the importance of General Staff work, and of the need of the General Staff mind. His speeches, in fact, often convey the impression that the General Staff at the War Office, which was created by the late Mr Arnold-Forster, acting upon the report of the Esher Committee, was in some sort an invention of his own. But neither Lord Haldane nor, of course, the Government of which he was a member, ever admitted for a moment the first essential principle in preparation for war, namely, that it is for the General Staff to say what is the army required to carry out the national policy. On the contrary, he always frankly laid down the principle that all army organisation was strictly limited by two governing conditions—first, that our military budget should never exceed a fixed sum, equivalent to about five and a half days' expenditure in the present war; and secondly, that the strength of our Expeditionary Force should be determined by the number of men who had to be in the United Kingdom in any case in order to supply the drafts of trained soldiers for our garrisons in India, Egypt, and the naval stations. Within those limits the General Staff might think and plan to their heart's content. Whether those limits had anything to do with the requirements of Imperial security, or were compatible with the foreign policy pursued by the British Government during those years, was a question they were not supposed to ask.

But the fault was not all on the side of the politicians. It is easy to blame the politicians for overruling the 'experts.' But in an unorganised nation like ours there are very few real experts in the higher direction of war, as in many other matters. It is no reflection on the gallant and distinguished officers who in succession occupied the post before the war to say that they had not the grasp either of foreign policy, or of our own economic and industrial conditions, or of higher military organisation, requisite to lay down a military policy for the British Empire, with the knowledge and conviction which alone would have given it a chance of acceptance by a reluctant Cabinet. Nor had they the imagination



which would have made them insist that, even if they could not have the army required to cope with a great world-war, they should at least have, in the War Office itself, a staff adequate to study the various possible contingencies in detail, so that if the crisis came, and men could be improvised, there should be well-considered plans for their use. Two hundred officers would be by no means an excessive number to be employed continuously on working out possible schemes for the almost incalculable variety of operations in which our world-wide Empire might find itself involved. A large German dye-works would employ as many, and as well paid, expert chemists to conduct experiments for it. Our chiefs of the General Staff acquiesced in the work being done by about a tenth of that number. For one small corner of the field—the despatch of six divisions to take up their positions on the French left within a given number of days from the outbreak of war—the work was admirably done. The rest was barely touched.

In this condition the war found us. Half the General Staff at the War Office went to the front at once. Most of the rest followed in the course of a few months, and were replaced by 'dug-outs' and convalescents. Upon a body thus weakened descended a new portent in the shape of Lord Kitchener. It will always remain to Lord Kitchener's credit that he had the insight, from the first, to grasp something of the greatness and probable duration of this war, and the courage to resolve to create new armies to cope with it, in the teeth of the criticism of most of our professional soldiers, who believed the task impossible. But it is also true that Lord Kitchener became Secretary of State wholly unacquainted with modern General Staff methods, unaccustomed to the War Office organisation, or, indeed, to any formal system of organisation except the exercise of the power of a vigorous and forceful personality. If he had been a civilian, he might have been content to leave the organisation as it was, or been compelled to do so by the resistance of his professional colleagues on the Army Council, and confined himself to speeding up the machine. Being a soldier, he assumed from the outset the position, if not the name, of Commander-in-Chief. His colleagues

unquestioningly fell into the attitude of military subordinates, whose business was to obey and not to argue, to wait for orders and not to initiate. The Army Council was never summoned; and the War Office organisation relapsed into what it was during the South African War, with the added disadvantage that the Commander-in-Chief was also Secretary of State, and had to waste his time in the Cabinet and on various councils and committees, as well as to improvise great armies out of nothing and conduct several wars single-handed.

The inevitable results of this over-centralisation of work were not long in showing themselves. In the case of munitions a makeshift remedy was devised in the creation of a new Ministry, to which the care of the ordnance has recently been entrusted. In the case of recruiting the control was eventually handed over to Lord Derby, who promptly proceeded in October 1915 to introduce the system which had been vainly pressed upon Lord Kitchener in August 1914 by his military subordinates. As for the most important function of all, that of planning operations, it simply remained in abeyance. The operations at the Dardanelles or for the relief of Serbia were not based on any plans, good, bad or indifferent. They just grew, more or less at haphazard, out of the circumstances of the moment. It would have been a miracle if they had succeeded.

In the last two or three months, under General Sir A. J. Murray, there has been something in the nature of a revival of the General Staff. With the appointment of a soldier of the distinction and force of character of General Sir W. Robertson it is to be hoped that the Government has at last realised the importance of this much-neglected function, and intends to base its policy in future on carefully considered plans and not on impromptu makeshifts. But it is essential that the new Chief of the Staff's position should be made quite clear and unequivocal. He must be the Secretary of State's colleague and not his subordinate on the Army Council. And in the War Council he must be solely and directly responsible for the whole military policy of the war, just as the Secretary of State must be responsible for the raising and equipping of the men required to carry out that policy. He and the First Sea Lord should be the Prime Minister's right-hand

men, with direct access to him at all times, and with him form, as it were, the innermost circle of government. That is one of the first conditions of victory.

But, however sound the lines on which the central military direction may be framed, that will avail very little if the ultimate deciding authority, the Imperial Government, is so constructed as to be constitutionally unfitted for the task of conducting a great war. This in our case is a Cabinet of twenty-two members. It is enough to mention that arithmetical fact alone to realise how incompetent a body it must be for its present purpose. There can be no real consultation among so many, but only debate; and the abler its members individually as speakers or dialecticians, the more rapidly such a body tends to degenerate into a debating society, eager to protract discussion, unwilling to face irrevocable decisions. But the supreme authority in a nation at war must not only be able to decide, but to decide swiftly as each emergency arises. If it is based on consultation, it must be able to meet and consult daily. A council of twenty-two busy departmental chiefs cannot be collected even once a week without difficulty. Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, the supreme conduct of this war was directed for fifteen months by weekly meetings of the Cabinet. To speak more accurately, it was not directed at all, any more than the action in a classical tragedy is directed by the chorus of well-meaning old men who hold the stage at definite intervals and ask each other what is to be done. And, just as the chorus in these plays is often temporarily broken up into semi-choruses or groups, so the Cabinet used to divide itself into a variety of committees—War Committee, Dardanelles Committee, National Service Committee, half a hundred committees, in fact, if the Prime Minister is to be believed—without ever divesting itself of its fundamental characteristics of indecision and procrastination.

Since October a more definite attempt has been made to focus the conduct of the war in the hands of an inner Cabinet or War Council, which is to decide all current questions, only leaving broad issues of general policy to the Cabinet as a whole. This is a step in advance. But it cannot be said to furnish a real solution. The powers of the War Council are still too indefinite; the temptation

to refer to the Cabinet as a whole is still too great. And up to the present, at any rate, the outward and visible signs of greater energy and decision are wanting.

It is curious and typical that all this time there should have existed a constitutional device specially framed for the discussion of defence problems and peculiarly suited for taking over the conduct of a great war. The Committee of Imperial Defence, created by Mr Balfour ten years ago, was originally intended to be precisely just such a body as the War Council is now supposed to be, with the advantage that the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the General Staff were to be on it as full members equally with the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for War, the Foreign Secretary, and the Prime Minister. It was a body whose composition was made elastic to meet various contingencies, more particularly that of the presence of Ministers of the Dominion Governments. Unfortunately it was allowed, under the Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith *régimes*, to decline from the position of the central directorate of Imperial policy, for which it was intended, into a useful clearing-house for dealing, through sub-committees, with a variety of minor questions connected with defence, but not coming solely, or at all, under the normal purview of either Admiralty or War Office. It was never summoned during the critical week that preceded the war, nor after the decision to go to war was taken. So far as the writer is aware, it has not been summoned since. It exists, but not as an instrument of government. The right policy to pursue, if we want the war effectively conducted, is for the Prime Minister to reconstitute the Committee of Imperial Defence on the lines originally intended, and to concentrate in it the whole responsibility for the discussion and conduct of affairs. The Cabinet, as such, need not be formally eliminated. But it should not be summoned too frequently; and those members of it who are not also among the four or five permanent members of the Defence Committee should be clearly given to understand that their business is the administration of their departments and not the direction of the war. The Prime Ministers of the greater Dominions, or their representatives, should be invited to take part in the discussions of the

Defence Committee as full members, if possible for the rest of the war, and if not, then as frequently and for as long a period consecutively as possible. In this way a real organ of Imperial authority would be created, which could command the confidence of the Empire, whether in appealing for yet further efforts, or in dealing with the terms of peace. And a most important initial step would have been taken in that separation between Imperial and United Kingdom affairs which is essential if the British Empire is to survive the critical years which are bound to follow the war.

So much for the actual instrument of government. But personality is even more important than the framework in which it acts. And our greatest weakness in this war has been the want of men, and more particularly of *a man*, to arouse and direct the patriotism of the nation. In part this lack of men of force and decision may be due to mere unfortunate accident. If this war had come twenty years sooner, we should have had Mr Chamberlain, in the prime of his unequalled powers, to inspire and lead the nation, with Lord Salisbury's vast experience of foreign affairs, and the solid judgment and moral courage of the Duke of Devonshire to give it confidence. But we believe that, to a much greater extent, the weakness in individuals is but one of the outward and visible signs of the weaknesses which have crept into our whole political system. The chief feature in the development of that system during the past generation has been the ever-increasing development in the strength and cohesion of the Party machine. The improvements in communication, doing away with the originally local basis of our Parliamentary representation, the syndicating of the Press, the tightening of the control of the Government over freedom of speech in the House of Commons, the disappearance of the old distinction between non-party administration and party legislation—all these things have in their degree contributed to the increasing absorption of all public activity into the conflict between the Party machines. The Parliament Act only put the finishing touches upon a transformation which had been in progress for years.

This intensifying of the Party system as the end-all

and be-all of politics was not based on any intenser conflict between contending political principles. On the contrary, the old dividing lines between the great historic parties, which gave a meaning and reality to the party conflict over the greater part of the 19th century, were hopelessly blurred. There was thus no reality either of principle or of subject-matter in the whole business of politics. In all the wrangling over the Parliament Act, the Welsh Church, Home Rule, or Plural Voting, the historian of the future will be struck above all by the absence of any guiding principles and constructive ideas, or of any definite purpose except that of forwarding or frustrating a party interest. Even the Unionist Party, which had received from Mr Chamberlain the heritage of a great constructive policy of Imperial consolidation and economic defence, let that policy recede more and more into the background in its absorption in the narrower party strife. Such a state of affairs might develop effective demagogues, dexterous parliamentary advocates, consummate party managers. It could not be expected to breed men accustomed to deal with realities either in the world of thought or in the world of action.

If there is one man in whom the characteristic features of the system have found their fullest expression, it is the present Prime Minister. Mr Asquith's parliamentary talents are remarkable. It is true of him, as of Peel, that he can 'play on the House as on an old fiddle.' His power of evading or postponing difficulties, of contriving to find the phrases which will successfully shepherd into the same lobby men who really want entirely different things, of concealing all meaning behind a speciously transparent lucidity of expression, of saying nothing whatever in the course of half an hour, and yet leaving an impression of business-like conciseness, commands the unbounded admiration of all connoisseurs of the game of keeping the Party top spinning. But behind the imposing parliamentary *façade* there is—nothing. Mr Asquith is, to put it bluntly, devoid of ideas. One might search all his speeches through from beginning to end without coming across a real thought, as distinguished from the intellectual small change of debate. He knows no realities except those of the law courts or the division lobby; and his speeches, in consequence, for all their



skill of phrasing and elocution, are singularly flat and lifeless. They illuminate no fact, they quicken no emotion, they convey no message. Above all, and most emphatically, he is a man of inaction and indecision. The natural instinct of the parliamentarian for putting off difficulties, for waiting upon his opponent's false moves, for trusting to the improvisation of the moment, has in his case reached an almost morbid degree of development. With him 'Wait and see' has become the final maxim with which to meet every difficulty and resolve every problem. Such is the leadership to which, under the dispensation of our party system, the fortunes of the British Empire have been entrusted in the most critical struggle in its whole history. The consequences are writ large upon the course of the war, and may be writ larger unless that leadership can be changed.

The Cabinet with which Mr Asquith began the war was, in the main, composed of average politicians of the Liberal-Radical type. Only two or three call for any special comment. Sir Edward Grey is another version of Mr Asquith drawn in a somewhat different style. The business-like forensic manner is replaced by the aloofness of the statesman-scholar. Simple sincerity rather than brisk dexterity is with him the dominant note. But the fundamental characteristics are the same. There is the same lack of imagination and ideas; the same failure to grasp realities or to think clearly in advance, veiled by the same superficial lucidity of statement; the same lack of prevision and purpose, though with it, as with Mr Asquith, a strong vein of negative tenacity. A high sense of honour and the instincts of a gentleman are hardly a sufficient equipment for the conduct of foreign affairs in these troublous days. It requires something more—unerring insight and a sense of strategy, of which he has shown no sign. Possessing no acquaintance with foreign nations, and prevented by his lack of intellectual sympathy from reading their minds or divining their intentions, he is always being taken by surprise. He wastes invaluable time in striving to reconcile irreconcilables. He does not lead, he waits on, events; and events in war-time, as recently has been the case in the Balkan peninsula, are apt, when unforeseen, to be disconcerting in the extreme.

Very different in their characteristics were the other two dominating personalities in the Liberal Cabinet, Mr Churchill and Mr Lloyd-George. Mr Churchill is a man both of ideas and of action. In courage, in ability, in resource, in driving power, he possesses many of the qualities required for a leader in a great crisis. Unlike most of his colleagues, he had devoted serious thought to the problem of war. He had worked hard and successfully to prepare the Navy for the war whose probability he believed in; and, when the crisis came at the end of July 1914, he threw himself heart and soul into the task of persuading his reluctant colleagues to face the situation. But with his great qualities are coupled a certain lack of judgment, a want of correspondence between his plans and the means for their execution, an excessive eagerness to achieve striking and dramatic results. Under the control of a strong Prime Minister these defects might have been kept in check. In a Cabinet too weak either to reject his plans or to carry them out whole-heartedly, they were bound to prove disastrous.

Mr Lloyd-George is, in the best as well as in the less happy sense of the word, a demagogue. If he lacks balance, restraint, accuracy or administrative capacity, he possesses on the other hand insight and imagination, courage and enthusiasm, in a remarkable degree. His legislation before the war, whatever its weaknesses, was at least inspired by ideas, and, in essence, sound ideas. Whatever he may have said in ignorance before the war about the folly of military preparation, he has since voiced in no uncertain tone the national determination to fight this struggle to a decisive finish. Whatever he may have done before to play upon class animosities, he has stood up courageously against his old associates and supporters where he has conceived their conduct to be opposed to the national interest. His quick insight and enthusiasm have been invaluable in securing the tardy mobilisation of our industries for the purposes of war. He may yet do inestimable service in sustaining the courage and determination of the nation, its readiness to endorse bold decisions and face heavy sacrifices, in the difficult time that lies before us.

The Unionist Opposition at the outbreak of the war

was to a large extent the counterpart of the Government. The spirit of partisanship was somewhat less keen among its members, the sense of national responsibility higher, the interest in problems of Imperial strength and security greater. But, on the whole, their horizon had been almost equally limited, and their constructive faculties almost equally paralysed, by years of party strife. Their chief idea at the outset was to lend a loyal support to the Government, to abstain from criticism, and to rejoice that they were not such an Opposition as the Radicals might have been if they themselves had been in power. When the Government showed signs of tottering last spring, and Mr Asquith appealed to their patriotism to help him out of his difficulties by forming the Coalition, they accepted his proposal without further ado. They apparently made no stipulations either as to the control of the really vital offices of State or as to the policy to be pursued. To have done so might have appeared lacking in that good form, about which the Unionist Front Bench has always been as sensitive as a maiden lady about her reputation. Besides, it would have implied that they had thought out a definite policy, which there is no reason to assume.

In effect they deprived the House of Commons and the country of a responsible Opposition and of a potential alternative Government, without securing any equivalent guarantees as to a change in the methods to be adopted. They were inserted in the Cabinet, without affecting its general character, much as bits of meat may be inserted in a jelly without giving the whole a muscular texture. They have attended to their departments zealously and conscientiously. They have loyally stood by the Government in public. Mr Bonar Law has recently enhanced an already great reputation. His temporary leadership of the House, in the absence of the Prime Minister, gave evidence of remarkable parliamentary skill in a difficult position. More than that, his recent speeches have been marked by a directness and sincerity, and by a capacity of appeal to lofty motives, which have given him a real authority over his former opponents as well as over his old supporters. Behind the scenes the Unionist Ministers have, it is believed, generally been in favour of more vigorous measures, and

one, at least, of them, Lord Curzon, has been indefatigable in pressing the necessity for universal military service upon his colleagues. His great administrative experience, his wide range of knowledge of conditions abroad, within and without the British Empire, his immense industry, his lucid eloquence, may well mark him out for work more important and more prominent than that which has so far been assigned to him. The whole deportment, in fact, public and private, of Unionist Ministers has been unimpeachably correct and patriotic. They have neither intrigued nor wire-pulled, nor attempted to 'noble' the Press. On the other hand, it cannot be affirmed that they have achieved great results; to a large extent they have participated, no doubt unwillingly, in the continuance of procrastination and drift.

To this rule there was, however, one exception. Sir Edward Carson joined the Coalition Cabinet with reluctance. If general rumour is to be believed, he found himself at issue, almost from the very start, with the whole method and temper of the Cabinet, and continually upset the equanimity of that friendly debating society by declaring that it should be reduced to half a dozen members and sit daily, by urging immediate decisions on recruiting, or by warning them of the dangers of the Dardanelles enterprise. The lamentable delays and oscillation of our Balkan policy, culminating at the beginning of October in our acquiescence in the defection of Greece and in the destruction of Serbia, brought matters to a climax. More than one member of the Cabinet, it is believed, had for weeks past talked of resigning. Only Sir Edward Carson had the decision requisite to achieve resignation in the face of all Mr Asquith's blandishments and delays. He now stands outside, the strongest personality in the House of Commons and an arresting figure in the public eye. Like Mr Asquith, Sir Edward Carson is a lawyer. But in his whole political life before this war he had defended only one single political cause—the maintenance of the integrity of the United Kingdom—and he is conspicuously lacking in the characteristics generally associated with the lawyer politician. Like Mr Lloyd George, he suffers under the disability of never having seriously studied the problems of war in peace, but like him he has made up

by concentration of purpose upon victory, by natural quickness of mind, and by a sure instinct. Above all he possesses that gift of leadership, as distinct from political advocacy, which can only be acquired by courage, sincerity and concentration of will, and which can only be proved in times of crisis and anxiety.

There is only one other man in England to-day who has had the opportunity of displaying that same gift of what Carlyle called 'Kingship' over a people engaged in a great struggle. During the critical years of the long-drawn South African crisis the Loyalists of South Africa, British and Dutch, hung upon Lord Milner with that same unquestioning faith and devotion that the Ulstermen have shown to Sir Edward Carson, and with that same implicit confidence in the loyalty of their leader to them. That he has not since then become a popular figure in our party politics is only natural. No man so terribly sincere, so intolerant of shams and unrealities, could possibly have taken a share in the party game, unless compelled by an intensity of personal ambition which Lord Milner does not possess. Even now the honest party man on both sides hesitates at the mere mention of his name. He admits Lord Milner's knowledge and grasp of precisely the kind of problems with which we are confronted, his strength of will, his lofty patriotism. But he is frightened of the effect that his unqualified definiteness of purpose, his habit of calling things by their real names, his hatred of pretence, might have on a public habituated to the soothing syrup of the popular platform. The honest party man is mistaken. What the nation wants to-day is not soothing syrup but the tonic of truth. What it is longing for is not tentative enquiries as to what it would or would not like to do, but marching orders. The man who is not afraid to give those orders will find behind him a strength and unity, a power of effort and a readiness to bear sacrifices that are undreamt of to-day.

It is just that directness and definiteness of appeal which have enabled Lord Derby to make of his recruiting campaign the remarkable success it undoubtedly has been; and these same qualities have helped no less, when even this remarkable manifestation of public spirit was found to have fallen short of our military

needs, to prepare the public for the acceptance of that moderate measure of compulsion which has necessarily followed. Whom the crisis will produce as our leader among the men who have been mentioned, or others, no one can say. Nor is it possible to forecast when or how the necessary change of government will come about. The Parliament and Registration Bill, by prolonging the life of this Parliament for eight months, has done away with an opportunity, which might otherwise have automatically presented itself to the nation this January, for considering the fitness of its rulers and the possibility of an alternative. As it is, we must now wait for the collapse of the Government either from its inherent internal weakness or in face of a growing unanimity of public disapproval. But that can only be when hard experience has completed the process of weaning the public from the fond delusions in which it has acquiesced so long, and nerved it to face the bracing shock of looking steadfastly at the true aspect of things.

It is truth and leading that England needs most at this moment. We have lived far too long, like Plato's cave-dwellers, in a world of shadows and shams, so long, indeed, that even now we shrink from hard facts, and peevishly resent the counsel of those who would bid us face those facts and act upon them. But the light will not hurt us, and in our hearts we know it. The surface of our national life may be cankered and corroded with make-believe and sloth. But the core of the nation is sound, and its soundness has been proved on many a field of suffering and glory. Our so-called leaders are mere puppets, dry husks rattling on the stalk. But England only needs to feel the hand of a man at the helm, and to hear the voice of a man in her ear, in order to spring to action mightier, more enduring, more unconquerable than ever before.



# Art. 15.—THE DANISH AGREEMENT AND THE FEEDING OF GERMANY.

THE British Foreign Office has quite recently entered into an agreement of which the substance is that all imports into Denmark shall be consigned under the direction of two Danish trading associations, and that all re-exports into Germany of imported goods shall be prohibited save as to specified articles. Among these are certain foodstuffs which are unlimited in amount except by operation of the general modifying principle that there shall only be permitted such total imports into Denmark as constituted her customary supply prior to the war.\*

The importance of these provisions in themselves may readily be magnified, even when it is remembered that foodstuffs have been declared to be conditional contraband. But when one recalls the Prime Minister's words to Parliament on March 1, 1915, and reads in the Order in Council of March 11: 'His Majesty has therefore decided to adopt further measures in order to prevent *commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany*,' the phenomenon of the Foreign Office, by its signature to a formal document, assenting to the conveyance into Germany of sea-borne goods, such as coffee and tea and cocoa (albeit of Danish manufacture), creates in the mind a sense of bewildered unreality. A hundred questions arise. Has the Order in Council proved an impracticable undertaking? Has the policy of the Foreign Office changed while we knew it not? How far has the change operated; how much further will it go? Must we give up our hope of a Germany blockaded into submission? And, if this be only a necessary and partial surrender, can we in International Law so limit our concession? The significance of the Danish Agreement is therefore immense. It is a revelation of the workings of the mind of the Foreign Office; it is a landmark which, suddenly seen after long days upon a dark sea, tells of the great distances that have been traversed toward an unforeseen port.

The explanation of the course that has been laid by

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\* The writer has had access to a complete copy of the Agreement.

the Foreign Office will not, however, be found in the Order in Council of March 11, 1915. The secret resides in another pronouncement made just six years earlier by those who now guide the ship of State as then. The same Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presided over the genesis of the Declaration of London and of the Danish Agreement; among the representatives of the Foreign Office who attended the London Conference was the delegate who signed the Danish Agreement on behalf of Great Britain. Sir Edward Grey wrote to the British Plenipotentiary at the Conference:

'For the purposes of blockade . . . the destination justifying capture is that of the ship and not of the cargo; and a vessel whose final destination is a neutral port cannot, unless she endeavours, before reaching that destination, to enter a blockaded port, be condemned for breach of blockade, *although her cargo may be ear-marked to proceed in some other way to the blockaded coast*. . . His Majesty's Government see no reason for departing from that practice, and you should endeavour to obtain general recognition of its correctness.'

The delegates from the Foreign Office attending the Conference wrote as follows:

'It seems doubtful whether, under the conditions of modern commerce, the strictly legitimate exercise of the right to seize goods destined for the armed forces of the enemy, regardless of the enemy or neutral character of the port where the goods are to be landed, confers any far-reaching advantage on a State at war with a continental country which can freely draw its supplies from neighbouring neutral territories. It would always be easy, in the case of conditional contraband, which, unlike absolute contraband, does not, by its very nature, suggest the use to which it will be put, to evade all liability to capture by consigning such goods to neutral ports under conditions which would make it practically impossible for capture to prove their final destination. It may therefore be said that the benefit derived by a State, when belligerent, from the right to apply the doctrine of continuous voyage to a shipment of conditional contraband is narrowly limited in cases where the enemy territory is easily accessible through neutral ports, and is largely balanced, if not outweighed, by the interest which such State, as a neutral, would have in a definite prohibition of any belligerent molestation of the trade between two

neutral ports, except trade in absolute contraband. . . . It is only as regards countries having no maritime frontier that the doctrine of continuous voyage has been unanimously acknowledged to remain applicable in respect to both absolute and conditional contraband.'

It is, of course, apparent that the delegates who thus thought and wrote never contemplated a situation in which they would be called upon 'to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany.' It is equally apparent that no reconciliation is possible between the views and declarations of March 1909 and those of March 1915.

The Declaration of London provides as follows :

*'Preliminary Provision.* The Signatory Powers are agreed that the rules contained in the following chapters correspond in substance with the generally recognised principles of International Law.

'Art. 1. A blockade must not extend beyond the ports and coasts belonging to or occupied by the enemy.

'Art. 35. Conditional contraband is not liable to capture, except when found on board a vessel bound for territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or for the armed forces of the enemy, and when it is not to be discharged in an intervening neutral port.'

Foodstuffs could not, therefore, under the provisions above stated, either by the declaration of the blockade, or by their designation as conditional contraband, have been prevented from reaching Germany. It is, therefore, of the gravest significance that Lord Crewe should have stated in the House of Lords on Dec. 20 that the Prime Minister's memorable speech of March last must be construed as 'subject to the accepted principles of International Law, and that what he intended was that within those principles every conceivable effort should be made to prevent goods that mattered either entering or leaving Germany.' Why then did the Prime Minister speak in March of cutting through 'juridical niceties'? What possible significance in the light of this explanation had this phrase? And why say 'commodities of every kind' if one meant only 'goods that mattered'? There is, therefore, presented the following series of logical dilemmas :

(1) The Prime Minister in March 1915 had no such intention of limiting his words, and the official apologist spoke without consultation and authority ;

(2) The Prime Minister in March 1915 accepted the controlling force of the Preliminary Provision of the Declaration of London, and intended by a suppressed, modifying clause to nullify the force of his expressed undertaking ;

(3) The Prime Minister in March 1915 proposed to repudiate the Preliminary Provision of that Declaration, and to disagree with the British Delegates who had written : ' We obtained recognition of the fact . . . that as a body these rules have amounted practically to a statement of what is the essence of the law of nations properly applicable to the questions at issue under present-day conditions of maritime commerce and warfare.'

(4) The Prime Minister meant precisely what he said in March 1915, but the Government has departed from the terms of his declaration, and now with his acquiescence seeks to put a different intention upon his words.

Such conditions and such alternatives indicate the significance of the Danish Agreement. To understand it, is to comprehend Foreign Office policy and the recent course of international trade developments. But behind these lies the whole history of maritime international law ; and one must endeavour to envisage the problem presented to the nations, both neutral and belligerent, when the decision embodied in the Order in Council of March 1915 was made.

It is proposed to consider, without any attempt at technical definition, the general principles accepted during the 18th century, the modifications and proposals of modifications caused by the Napoleonic wars and the American Civil War, the changed commercial conditions of to-day, and the attempts at solution of the vital problems so created.

Prior to the Napoleonic wars, several principles were generally accepted, among which were :

1. *The right of a neutral (in the absence of a blockade) to trade with a belligerent in goods (a) non-contraband, (b) not destined for the armed forces of the enemy.* In

17th- and 18th-century days, warfare was a professional matter carried out by professional soldiers. The scale of conflict and the proportion of those affected were small. It doubtless never occurred to the Governments of those days that the issue of a war would be seriously affected by what sailing ships brought or did not bring to the civil population of their enemies, except to the inhabitants of beleaguered sea-ports.

2. *The right of a belligerent to seize goods of the enemy when found in neutral vessels.* This doctrine had nothing to do with considerations of contraband nor indeed with any national policy; it was, so far as one can gather, the crystallisation of individual and selfish impulse. The doctrine was in 1856 abandoned by Great Britain in the Declaration of Paris in favour of such nations as should subscribe thereto.

3. *The right on the part of any belligerent to blockade the ports of its enemy and prohibit all commerce to and from such enemy.* The purpose, of course, was the destruction of commerce. Inasmuch as it involved the right to stop neutral ships, and, in the event of infraction of the rules of blockade, to confiscate them, those rules were most precise and came to be strictly construed. The most careful and certain notification of a blockade was peremptory; but into the details of this it is immaterial for our purpose to enquire. Such blockade might be of one port, of any number of ports, of all ports; but it was imperative that it should be *effective*, as it was called, and that it should apply with exact impartiality to the ships of every neutral. Effectiveness required that sailing ships should be sufficient in number to prevent access to the blockaded port, and should be stationed in such close proximity as to accomplish that object. It was distinctly not good practice to declare a blockade and then make such declaration the basis of seizure when and where opportunity occurred. Impartiality again was essential, else the favouring of the ships of one nation would do grievous wrong to the commerce of another friendly and neutral country.

4. *The right of a neutral to trade in complete freedom with every other neutral.* Sailing ships were small, railroads were non-existent, land transportation was too impracticable to be a determining factor in international

war-time policy. Goods landed at the port of one country did not in important volume find their way into another and warring country; there was therefore no operating reason to hinder their delivery.

At the beginning of the 19th century Napoleon introduced what he termed the 'Continental policy.' England was an island; and, as one European country after another came under his domination, Napoleon thought that here was an opportunity to exclude her from all profitable commerce and so work her economic downfall. Then, as now, she was mistress of the seas; but, if all markets were closed to her, ruin must result. Hence, by the terms of the Berlin Decree, all Continental ports (save those of Sweden) were prohibited to ships that carried English commerce or had touched at an English port. Such a declaration had obviously no relation to accepted principles of international law; it was simply a fiat of military policy designed to negative the advantages flowing from British control of the seas. A blockade of English ports was impossible, and the right to seize enemy goods availed nothing when Napoleon's ships were swept from the seas; so a remedy absolutely arbitrary and unprecedented was sought. Great Britain responded by what she termed reprisals, which were as unwarranted by existing law as had been the French decree. Among other declarations, it was by Order in Council decreed that the possession of a 'certificate of ownership' of goods required by the 'Continental policy' subjected the ship and cargo to seizure and confiscation.

Between the upper and nether millstones of such decrees, American commerce was ground to powder. Called upon to observe a course of conduct reconcileable with no canons of International Law, forced to choose between alternative courses of action which led alike to ruin, the United States in 1812 declared war upon Great Britain. It was an unpleasant surprise to many Americans to find that the Order in Council of March 1815 adopted the same ground of justification—that of reprisals for illegal enemy acts—as had been taken by those earlier Orders which led to the war of 1812.

One will observe that neither the French nor the British decree promulgated any doctrine or principle capable of becoming International Law in the future



A declaration of blockade is an intelligible and universally applicable policy of law; a decree that 'certificates of ownership' shall constitute cause for confiscation is and must always remain an example of arbitrary action incapable of general application. The introduction of the plea of 'reprisal' is in itself a confession of lack of real justification, so far at least as neutrals are concerned. For it is to appeal to the wrongdoing of another as warrant for one's own infraction of law; and, if a neutral's rights in dealing with one belligerent are to be affected by what the other belligerent may do, there is an end of neutral rights. The Napoleonic wars and the War of 1812 closed without any definitive acceptance or rejection of the policies sought to be enforced. Down to the opening of the present war they remained the subject of criticism but not of imitation.

The events of the American Civil War gave rise to developments in maritime policy which were potential principles of future International Law. The sailing vessel had given way to the steamship; the railroad had begun its transformation of commerce. These fundamental changes in the conditions of trade intercourse immediately manifested themselves in the desire to attain the old objects of warfare by new methods adjusted to the new underlying facts. It may be interesting briefly to trace the influence of these facts in modifying the accepted principles of International Law.

1. The idea of contraband was at once accepted, and the list of articles declared to constitute contraband was greatly enlarged. Among the most significant additions were every kind of provisions and all articles capable of being converted to military use. The distinction with which Great Britain in the present war began to treat foodstuffs as only conditionally contraband had no place in the policy of Abraham Lincoln. He struck directly and boldly at the food supply of the South. Nor did the criterion applied by the Federal Government suffer the importation of any ingredient of munitions. Hence it was that the enlightened opinion of present-day America acquiesced at once in the declaration of cotton as contraband, while marvelling at Great Britain's delay.

2. The right of a belligerent to seize enemy goods when found in neutral ships has been accepted as good

International Law by the States. They had declined to subscribe to the new doctrine of the Declaration of Paris. Their Supreme Court continued to apply and enforce the old rule, and would in a similar case so hold to-day. In this respect there was nothing in the circumstances of the Civil War that tended to modify existing law.

3. The principles of blockade, however, received an expanded interpretation. It might take three sailing vessels to cut off access to a harbour, while one steamship might with conceivably reasonable activity guard two adjacent ports. Moreover, close proximity of ships to ports was no longer an essential. Even granting this, the historian will at once acknowledge that the blockade by the North of the whole Southern coast-line was fitful and incomplete. None the less it was acquiesced in by Europe and Great Britain, and was in the main effective.

4. The most significant outcome of changing conditions in the transport of goods was the doctrine of 'continuous voyage.' The Federal Government indeed acquiesced in the idea that neutrals might freely trade with other neutrals. But if, owing to geographical or other conditions, the shipment of goods to a neutral meant transshipment to the enemy, then it insisted that its sea-power might properly be used to prohibit such commerce. The policy of the North was economically to crush the South by the absolute destruction of incoming and outgoing commerce through its own mastery of the seas. It was apparent that, if neutral goods might be sent freely into Mexico and thence over a land boundary into the Confederacy, blockade and contraband would become meaningless terms, and sea-power would lose its decisive advantage. Those who to-day urge what they call the 'freedom of the seas,' are re-arguing the position of the Confederacy, and repudiating the policy of Abraham Lincoln and the North.

The Federal Government carried their innovating doctrine to great lengths. They applied it to the idea of blockade as well as to that of contraband. They prohibited ships from carrying goods to certain Mexican ports; they in effect blockaded the British possession of Bermuda against goods which they conceived to be destined for transshipment; and they won the war

against the exhausted South. Great Britain made no formal protest against this policy. She saw that the actions taken were no more than were naturally developed out of changed material conditions. With her ancient instinct for what pertains to matters of a sea-faring nature, she felt rather than realised that the preservation of the influence of sea-power inhered in the new policy of the United States.

This was the attitude of Great Britain fifty years ago. During the last decade another temper has come over her policy, which reached its culmination in the Declaration of London. The spirit of that document is seen revealed in Articles 1 and 35 quoted above (p. 269); it may also be studied in Article 28:

'The following may not be declared contraband of war:

'(1) Raw cotton, wool, silk, jute, flax, hemp, and other raw materials of the textile industries, and yarns of the same.

'(2) Oil seeds and nuts; copra.

'(3) Rubber, resins, gums, and lacs; hops.

'(4) Raw hides and horns, bones, and ivory.

'(5) Natural and artificial manures, including nitrates and phosphates for agricultural purposes.

'(6) Metallic ores.'

Etc., etc., down to section 17.

This war is a life-and-death struggle between a great military nation and a great maritime power. Whatever tends to reduce the importance of sea mastery is Germany's gain, just as every enhancement thereof is England's. The most effective measure possessed by Great Britain is the starvation of Germany by using the mastery of the sea. It is beyond the purview of this article to bring forward statistics on this subject, but no informed man doubts that this winter will be one of considerable shortage of food, particularly meats, in Germany; and that the winter of 1916-1917 must weaken to a marked degree, through lack of sufficient food, her armed resistance, *always assuming that she be not supplied through neutral countries*. Therefore it is that the syllogism may well be a true one:

The existence of England depends on her victory over Germany;

Her victory over Germany depends on the cutting-off of neutral supplies ;

Therefore the existence of England depends on the cutting-off of neutral supplies.

However, when in August 1914 the Cabinet, and above all the Foreign Office, were confronted with this great possibility of strategy, every psychological force was set in motion against its adoption. The Declaration of Paris had had sixty years of revered life and had steadily been upheld against all dissent. The doctrine of continuous voyage, which had shown such vitality in the American Civil War, had just been combated and shorn of its power, so far as the Foreign Office could, by the Declaration of London, accomplish that object. It was true that Germany needed wool for her soldiers, and cotton for her great guns, but it was only six years ago these same officials of the Foreign Office had declared that neither wool nor cotton must be made contraband. It was obvious that Germany was being fed through neutral ports, but the ink was hardly dry on the opinion of these same men that foodstuffs might 'evade all liability to capture by consigning such goods to neutral ports under conditions which would make it practically impossible for a captor to prove their final destination.'

The delegates who wrote in this sense are doubtless true patriots, sincere believers that theirs is the only sound policy ; and, when the destiny of this nation was given into their hands, they had to follow their innermost convictions. Therefore it was that at the outset of the war the Declaration of London was by executive act 'adopted and put in force' (with certain exceptions) 'as if the same had been ratified.' Therefore it was that only after months had passed did Great Britain promulgate the Order in Council of March 11, 1915 ; and that only after the lapse of a whole year did she, in explicit violation of the Declaration of London, declare cotton to be contraband. Therefore, again, it is that we have to-day the Danish Agreement signed by one of those very delegates, to whose

'diplomatic qualifications and judgment' (as the British Plenipotentiary wrote to the Secretary of State) '... is in my judgment largely due the favourable reception of British

propositions by the foreign delegations, and the conciliatory spirit that, generally speaking, characterised the proceedings of the Conference and enabled us to arrive at a result which I hope will meet with your approval and that of His Majesty's Government.'

The 'result' referred to was the Declaration of London.

The strain put upon the Foreign Office was, therefore, inevitably great when an indignant nation demanded that the power of the navy should be used against sea-borne commerce with Germany. True it was that in the American Civil War cotton had been confiscated by the Federal Government wherever found; true it was that foodstuffs had been declared to be absolute contraband; true it was that the doctrine of continuous voyage had been applied to questions of blockade. But to adopt these precedents, to declare cotton and foodstuffs absolute contraband, to recognise generally and to extend the doctrine of continuous voyage, was to discredit and abjure all that every authority at the Foreign Office had said and written and done during his whole official life. The Order in Council of March 11, 1915, was accordingly the product of public demands acting upon the preconceptions of the Foreign Office.

Theoretically that Office might have said: 'We have been wrong in attempting to nullify the force of sea-power, and in criticising the position adopted by the United States; we now freely admit that Abraham Lincoln was right, and we shall so maintain as long as the future of Great Britain is committed to our hands. We begin by denouncing, in their entirety, the Declarations of Paris and of London.'

The Foreign Office did not take this course; they sought a middle ground, and they evolved the Order in Council of March 11. On its face and in its substance, that Order has no precedent warrant in International Law; it simply proclaims its arbitrary intention to do as it likes—'deem to be just,' is the language preferred—with respect to all shipments destined for Germany and to all exports of German goods. Indeed, the only warrant relied on was the Napoleonic precedent and the declaration of 'an unquestionable right of retaliation.' It is no exaggeration to say that Great Britain, because of the submarine

violations by Germany of International Law, proposed in the Order in Council to lift the whole problem of neutral rights out of the domain of law into that of anarchy—whither, one must admit, Germany had shown the way. Mr Asquith's resolution to cut the network of 'juridical niceties' revealed a point of view dangerously approaching that of the German Chancellor when he tore up his 'scrap of paper.'

The extension of the list of absolute contraband to include foodstuffs, wool and cotton was not, despite the American precedent, made in the Order. Reliance was rather placed on a novel form of blockade. The word was avoided in the Order itself, but was repeatedly used by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. On March 15 he spoke of the Order as 'initiating a policy of *blockade*'; on July 23 he wrote to the American Ambassador: 'The measures we have announced constitute no more than an adaptation of the old principles of *blockade* to the peculiar circumstances with which we are confronted.' The memorandum on naval policy published on Jan. 4 says: 'The state of things produced is *in effect a blockade*, adapted to the conditions of modern war and commerce, the only difference in operation being that the goods seized are not necessarily confiscated.' This is to seek firmer ground than allegations of reprisal could afford. It would be a sure defence of a British blockade to-day that, so long as it is effective, the manner and means are wholly indifferent. The submarine has made close watch impossible; but the radius of the activity of the modern warship renders the guard at the entrance of the English Channel or in the stretches of the North Sea far more effective than was the blockade of the Confederate ports in the American Civil War. Similarly, while it is accepted law that a neutral ship must be searched on the high seas and not taken for examination of her cargo to a belligerent port, Great Britain has persistently disregarded this rule. It is apparent that the rule grew out of conditions when ships were small and cargoes were of a few hundred, not of many thousands of tons. With the changing of the reason for the rule, the rule itself may well be correspondingly modified.

Perhaps the most substantial legal objection to a



blockade by Great Britain resides in the fact that, as a result of the geographical configuration of Northern Europe, Sweden may ship goods to German ports actually unblockaded, while ships of the United States are stopped in the North Sea. This, of course, results in a partial and preferential conduct of the blockade, however involuntary such partiality may be. The difficulty is a real one, but it should be faced. It raises the fundamental question whether sea-power, under modern conditions of transportation and of commerce, is or is not to be suffered to work out its wonted ends. If it is, then, just as the proximity of Mexico to the Confederacy was not regarded as a bar to the operation of Federal sea-power, so to-day the fact that Sweden can ship part of her produce to Germany need not, if the doctrine of continuous voyage be properly applied, open German ports to the world. International Law is still capable of growth; if it were not, it would indeed be a dead thing.

Such, in its essence, was the appeal made by the Foreign Secretary when he used the words quoted above. Even then the method of putting into operation a blockade by a declaration which did not mention the word was gravely unfortunate. In truth, the Order in Council of March 11 is not a development of the principles of International Law. It does not assume to be so; it calls itself 'an act of reprisal'; it belongs to the order of thought that supports with argumentation Germany's attitude towards Belgian neutrality and her submarine policy. One would never by a word seek to lessen the supremacy of English sea-power, but it is permissible to wish that it might be declared and made effective by methods other than the Order in Council of March 11. Above all one might wish that it could have been supplemented by an extension of the absolute contraband list, and by an explicit adoption of the widest applicability of the doctrine of continuous voyage.

Such a course, however, would have implied no less than a rebirth of those men who have lived to evolve the Danish Agreement. It would, in truth, have resembled a conversion with all the accompanying phenomena of conviction of wrongdoing, repentance, and confession

of sin. The strange gods of the Declaration of London must have been forsworn. To state the case is to realise its psychological impossibility. The Order in Council is, therefore, a hastily devised method of escape for those to whom all direct and straightforward doors had been closed by their own eager hands. That Order had, indeed, two ingratiating qualities; it avoided any avowed repudiation of the past policy of the Foreign Office, and at the same time it promised the nation that no commodities should reach Germany. Of course, it was wholly inconsistent with the Declarations of Paris and of London, but it preserved echoes of the humanitarian impulse which had produced these Declarations, in its avoidance of confiscation of the goods seized. Above all, the Order declared itself to be warranted as a reprisal, and thereby enabled its authors to treat it as a temporary retaliatory measure, which in time might again be superseded by a reaffirmation of the doctrine to the promulgation and adoption of which those who composed the Foreign Office had devoted their official lives.

It has been said of the Foreign Office that it 'set itself with vast ingenuity to the invention of a system which should at once give to the seamen the appearance, and at the same time prevent them from getting the substance, of what they asked.' Such is not the opinion of the present writer. Those who compose the Foreign Office are honest men, sincere believers in international ideals of justice, genuinely endeavouring to bring it about that such ideals shall prevail on earth. To them, the Declarations of Paris and of London have been beacon lights that show the world the pathway from savagery to civilisation. They were true and not false to their ideals when they refrained from declaring foodstuffs absolute contraband, when they refused to accept and develop to the full the American doctrine of continuous voyage, and when they evolved the Order in Council of March 11, 1915.

Into the hands of these men was committed the task of 'preventing commodities of every kind from reaching and leaving Germany.' Their instrument was the Order in Council. They have laboured at their task for eight months. Trade statistics now reveal the actual condition

of things, as the Danish Agreement reveals their state of mind.

The items of most significance to us are those concerning foodstuffs. Let us take Denmark. Comparing the normal monthly imports and exports prior to the war with the imports during November last, we get the following results, calculated in pounds :

	Normal Imports.	Normal Exports.	Apparent Neutral Consumption of Imports.	Imports, Nov. 1915.
Cocoa . . .	450,240	20,160	430,080	2,304,960
Coffee . . .	3,496,640	743,680	2,752,960	5,136,320
Fruit . . .	3,053,120	163,520	2,889,600	6,885,760

It is interesting to observe that the above-mentioned articles may by the Danish Agreement be re-exported into Germany, and that obviously the argument concerning normal exchange between the two countries and the theory of 'common stock' have little reality when the amount of normal re-exports is studied. But to continue :

	Normal Imports.	Normal Exports.	Imports, Nov. 1915.
Lard . . .	454,720	777,280	598,080
Meat . . .	965,440	29,711,360	3,402,560

Here the interesting point is that normally exports from Denmark greatly exceed imports. Why, then, should any imports be needed except for transshipment into Germany? Obviously, this is the destination of the imported meat and lard. We continue :

	Normal Imports.	Normal Exports.	Apparent Neutral Consumption of Imports.	Imports, Nov. 1915.
Fish (canned) . .	145,600	11,200	134,400	703,360
Animal oils and fats .	1,218,560	862,400	356,160	743,680
Vegetable „ „ .	2,852,240	1,482,880	1,319,360	1,951,040
Oleaginous nuts .	18,110,400	658,560	17,451,840	62,608,000

When it is realised that 'oleaginous nuts' include linseed, the significance of these enormous imports becomes apparent.

Similar comparative figures respecting imports into Sweden and Holland are as follows :

	Normal Monthly Imports.	Normal Monthly. Exports.	Apparent Neutral Con- sumption of Imports.	Imports, Nov. 1915.
<i>Sweden.</i>				
Cocoa . . .	324,800	8,960	315,840	2,502,080
Coffee . . .	5,969,600	2,240	5,967,360	18,605,440
Fruit . . .	3,368,960	557,760	2,811,200	4,795,840
Lard . . .	165,760	6,720	159,040	257,600
Meat . . .	734,720	2,961,280	—	8,016,960
Fish (canned) . .	78,400	58,240	20,160	152,320
Animal oils and fats	1,034,880	246,400	788,480	4,480
Vegetable „ „	5,129,600	120,960	5,008,640	2,885,120
Oleaginous nuts .	4,549,440	33,600	4,515,840	3,355,520
<i>Holland.</i>				
Cocoa . . .	8,008,000	5,546,240	2,761,760	6,301,120
Coffee . . .	25,233,600	17,498,880	7,734,720	38,617,600
Fruit . . .	15,964,480	13,153,280	2,811,200	38,592,960
Lard . . .	7,230,720	5,376,000	1,854,720	11,175,360
Meat . . .	1,843,520	11,874,240	—*	17,973,760
Fish (canned) . .	none	none	—	116,480
Animal oils and fats	19,398,400	13,484,800	5,913,600	8,160,320
Vegetable „ „	22,120,000	17,467,520	4,652,480	21,313,600
Oleaginous nuts .	124,378,240	71,588,160	52,790,080	75,960,640

\* Here the exports are normally greater than the imports, showing that the article is one of home production, and that necessity for imports, except for re-export, does not exist.

To realise at a glance what this means in approximately a year, it will be well to take the single item of *cocoa* imported into Denmark and Sweden during the eleven months up to Nov. 30, 1915, compared with the average of eleven months during the years 1911-1913, calculated in pounds :

	Average for 11 months during 1911-1913.	11 months ending Nov. 30, 1915.
Denmark . . .	4,952,640	40,479,040
Sweden . . .	3,472,800	24,908,800

For this same period of eleven months in 1915, the total excess of *coffee* imports over the normal into Holland, Sweden and Denmark amounts to the stupendous figure of 270,419,520 pounds.

It is thus plain that commodities of every kind have *not* been prevented from reaching Germany. The cause is not far to seek. In the most eager and confident hands the Order in Council was only a poor weapon with which to wage the struggle; and in the hands of those whose whole training and beliefs were against the drastic use of the applicable principles of International Law, the wonder is that there should have been maintained even the semblance of observance of the Order. The point of view of the Government stands revealed in the words of Lord Lansdowne, spoken in the House of Lords (Dec. 16):

'I go so far as to say that, in the case of a country situated as Denmark is, in close propinquity to the country of our enemies, unless you have some arrangement of that kind [the Danish Agreement], you will find that you are helpless to prevent great quantities of supplies from passing through neutral channels into the hands of your enemy. The temptation to carry on business of this kind is enormous. There are vast profits to be made. There is corruption on every side. . . . Look what happens. You hold up ships carrying cargo which you suppose is going to the enemy. You may find that you have let through an amount of a particular cargo representing the full limit to which the neutral country is entitled for its own consumption. But if, as time goes on, you find more cargoes coming in, and the papers of the ships which carry them are in order, and there is no proof of enemy destination, you are absolutely helpless, and you have really to acquiesce and see all these supplies passing through, in spite of your precautions.'

Can a student of psychology doubt the utter sincerity of the speaker? Can a student of International Law fail to recognise the echoing verbiage of the Declaration of London? It will be at once admitted that cotton and rubber and copper have, since the Order in Council, been successfully cut off from Germany. But the question will obtrude itself, why 'you are absolutely helpless' to exclude foodstuffs, when the exclusion of the above-named articles has been completely accomplished. It was not so in the American Civil War. Foodstuffs were then declared absolute contraband. If they are not to-day, it is because the minds that created the Declaration of London have not shaken themselves free from preconceptions. The answer to the Government apologists on this head

is profoundly simple. 'You cannot make every commodity contraband by calling it so,' explained Lord Crewe. Certainly not, but you *can* make foodstuffs contraband; and that is the issue. Again, all the emphasis laid on the difficulty of cutting off supplies to Germany will not answer the plain proposition that, if it is actually done with copper and rubber and cotton, it can likewise be done with foodstuffs.

Few men ascribe their own difficulties to subjective causes; so we find the Lord President of the Council speaking objectively of 'the trammeling conditions of the international laws under which we have to work.' He tells us:

'To imagine for a moment that you can get the cargoes dealt with condemned simply because you happen to think it inconvenient that they should reach Germany is one more of the idle dreams of which I have already spoken. It is quite true that absolute contraband, which it is most important to keep out of the country, would always be condemned. But as regards conditional contraband, it is quite well known that unless an enemy destination can be proved it will be allowed to go through.' (House of Lords, Dec. 20.)

The suggestion would seem to be obvious that there was much to be gained by the declaration of an article to be absolute contraband. But a few moments later we find this same Minister saying:

'I confess that my noble friends and I are a little surprised to see the ancient legend resuscitated that the declaration of cotton as contraband had any real bearing on its going into Germany or staying out of it. What did affect the entrance of cotton into Germany was the Order in Council of March. . . . The real stoppage of cotton dated from the March Order in Council.'

Now, since cotton was not even conditional contraband in March 1915, how comes it that it was so readily stopped, while other commodities—even those that were conditional contraband—could not be excluded under 'the trammeling conditions of International Law'? For Lord Crewe is right in saying that cotton was stopped, not as contraband, but by the operation of the Order in Council. The truth is that, until cotton was declared to



be absolute contraband, there was no possible distinction known to International Law between cotton and foodstuffs which would not have favoured the passage of the former. About cotton, however, the British Government had made up its mind; and the exporting world knew it. About foodstuffs it has not as yet made up its mind, except, if we accept the evidence of the Danish Agreement, to suffer them in diminished volume to go forward into Germany.

The Order in Council announced that 'commodities of every kind' should be prevented from reaching Germany. The Danish Agreement provides that such and such foodstuffs, *inter alia*, may be imported into Denmark and thence exported into Germany. Every Government apologist hastens to assure the nation that this agreement is a means of carrying out the general pledge. It is precisely as though, following a solemn announcement of unconditional warfare against sexual immorality, a bill should be introduced providing for licensing prostitution. Vehement arguments in favour of this device are common enough; they have precisely the same validity and cogency—neither more nor less—as the arguments that the best way to keep foodstuffs from Germany is to treat with Denmark as to the amount Germany shall be allowed.

It is only too obvious that, prior to the execution of the Danish Agreement, the supplying of Germany through neutral countries had become the potent fact, and the undertaking of the Order in Council the empty promise. Recourse has thus finally been had not to extension of contraband, not to an enforced blockade, but to the Danish Agreement. The idea has been that this would be an improvement on the existing unsatisfactory state of things. The matter was put quite clearly from the business point of view in the House of Lords by Lord Emmott (Dec. 20):

'I understand, in the present state of International Law, an abnormal supply to a country is not a sufficient reason to stop a cargo unless you can prove enemy destination; and, when cargoes of abnormal amount reach Denmark, our control over them ceases. I take it that this Agreement will lead to an agreement with Denmark in regard to the quantities to be imported into that country—an agreement founded upon

her normal needs for internal purposes. I take it that it will also include guarantees against any considerable sales to the enemy; and I say that with the quantities arranged and with the guarantees which I have described, trade will go on much more smoothly with Denmark, and a great deal less will reach the enemy than is reaching the enemy at the present time.'

Let us, however, examine the Danish Agreement from the point of view of International Law. We have traced how it has come to be made, having regard to the psychological forces at work in the Foreign Office. It may be well to present the technical arguments by which it is supported.

The American doctrine of 'continuous voyage' has for many years opposed itself to the English conception of 'common stock' which found embodiment in the Declaration of London. America said: Goods which are destined to the enemy country may be stopped even if they pass through an intervening neutral country. The Declaration of London said: When goods are consigned to a neutral country and become part of the common stock of that country, the question of a possible further destination cannot be cause for seizure. Therefore, when Denmark presented a claim to be allowed to import goods *for her own consumption*, there was nothing either in the American or in the British doctrine which could warrant a challenge of such right. But there necessarily inhered the question whether goods ostensibly destined for Danish consumption might not in reality find their way into Germany. The policy known as 'rationing' obtained thereupon a certain popularity in the Foreign Office. If, said its sponsors, Denmark is only allowed to receive what she needs for her own consumption, as shown by statistics, Great Britain will gain an additional and potent safeguard. But, said Denmark, we need goods not only for our own consumption, but for *exchange with Germany*, either as we import them or as changed by process of Danish manufacture; any fair rationing should be based upon our total imports prior to the war. According to your present interpretation of International Law (they argued), we are entitled to import whatever you cannot prove is destined for Germany; and it is a fact well

known to those behind the scenes that a great quantity of imports is daily passing through our country and through Sweden into Germany, as to which you have not, under your interpretation of 'continuous voyage,' the evidence you deem necessary to seize and confiscate them. We will ourselves, if you deal with us moderately, hold back large quantities of the goods going into Germany if you will only agree with us in a 'rationing' policy which takes into account what we propose to call home requirements; and home requirements shall consist, not only of articles for home consumption, but such additional volume of articles as have in past years formed the normal basis of exchange with Germany. We agree that you shall measure such volume by the amount of our imports in years previous to the war. By thus legitimising a certain measure of trade with Germany, you will gain our aid in reducing the volume of that trade below what now is illegitimately, from your point of view, taking place.

We know the men to whom this argument was addressed. It won approval and resulted in the agreement under discussion. The objection will at once suggest itself that here is a voluntary preference afforded, a concession to Denmark executed by the Foreign Office, which evades the blockade aspects of the Order in Council, and voluntarily permits conditional contraband to reach Germany. By its very terms it would seem to be an abrogation of the blockade and a stultification of the contraband decree. But an answer has been carefully prepared by the Foreign Office to this objection.

In the first place the parallel between the relation of Mexico to the Confederacy in the Civil War and that of Denmark to Germany is challenged. The importations admitted to have been made into the Confederacy through Mexico were not, argue the Foreign Office, goods destined (according to the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States) to become part of the common stock, but were clearly intended to go through by a continuous voyage into the Confederacy. There was not such a course of legitimate exchange existing between Mexico and the Confederacy prior to the war as was admittedly the case with Denmark and Germany. Therefore the goods which under

the executed Agreement are to be sent into Germany by way of Denmark first become, properly speaking, part of the common stock. Once they are part of the common stock, it is a matter of normal trade that they should pass on into Germany. The situation with respect to such goods is quite different from that of goods which leave the United States—from which they never came prior to the war—stamped with the intention of being destined for Germany. The doctrine of continuous voyage applies to the latter goods; the doctrine of common stock to the former. Between a shipload of coffee coming from the States and one coming from England, both of which, as a matter of fact, will reach Germany, the distinction may be difficult, and would doubtless be insuperable but for the Agreement. The whole question now is whether the two Danish consignees choose to purchase the coffee. If they certify it as coming under the Agreement, well and good; if not, the coffee must be seized. The opportunity for invidious discriminations is regrettable, but unavoidable. What the Danish Associations accept, becomes *ipso facto* part of the common stock; and its subsequent export to Germany is immaterial. What these associations refuse to accept, must be seized under the doctrine of continuous voyage. It is a highly subtle distinction, and is subject to the objection that the man in the street, or more significantly, the man in the exporting country who does not get the orders, is apt to see little reason for the seizure of his ship loaded with coffee, while his rival's ship, also loaded with coffee, which he knows is being handsomely paid for by his old German customer now importing through the Danish Associations, is allowed to pass free. His Government, moreover, is likely to find the British explanations of 'common stock' and 'continuous voyage' woefully inadequate.

The answer made by the Government to the charges of preference advanced in the House of Lords was that similar concessions would be made to neutral countries similarly situated, such as Sweden and Norway. But what about non-contiguous countries like the United States? If Great Britain is to export to Germany through the medium of Sweden and Denmark over the high seas, why may not the United States export precisely

the same article to Germany over those same high seas? Denmark has urged that her normal trade with Germany, even in articles which she herself imported from over seas, must be maintained. The United States may well put forward a similar claim, that, if Denmark, Sweden and Norway are entitled to have their normal *ante-bellum* trade with Germany in sea-borne products maintained, so also is the United States. Roughly, that trade happens to have been worth something like 90,000,000*l.* in the year preceding the war.

The truth is that, when it comes to this question of conceding violations of a blockade, it is not only the *importing* nations which are concerned, but the *exporting* nations. A preference is, on the face of it, given to Denmark, which is not given to the United States. If it be promised also to Sweden and Holland, that does not at all help the situation. It makes it so much the worse from the point of view of the United States; and Sweden herself may not care to accept a similar limited concession, but may stand on her international right to treat the blockade as abrogated.

It might, perhaps, have smoothed out the practical working of the plan, although it would not have relieved the legal aspects, had Great Britain wholly refrained from any exporting to Denmark under the Agreement. If a limit is to be put on goods which should be allowed to go into Germany, it might seem possible that England would not care to be the nation to supply these goods. When a trustee begins to find profit in his trust, whatever be the real honesty of his purpose, he has placed himself in an indefensible position. It should, however, be clearly stated that an examination of the statistics proves conclusively that, with inconsiderable exceptions, the imports which are reaching Germany through Denmark and Sweden have hitherto come not from Great Britain but from overseas. The argument in favour of maintaining British exports is evidently one which has not been put to the test of statistical information. The percentage of exports of the articles of food above set forth from the United Kingdom to Sweden during the month of November last was only 3·6 per cent. of the total, while the percentage of Denmark was 4·3 per cent.

The suggestion of 'rationing' is, at first blush, a

plausible and attractive one. Granted that the neutral nations should be allowed imports to the extent of their own consumption, it would seem a simple solution to limit their imports accordingly. There inheres, however, a grave difficulty. It is the destination of each particular shipment with which International Law is concerned. The fact that an amount of meat sufficient to feed a neutral country for a year has passed into it within six months, is no reason why cargoes destined *bona fide* for neutral consumption should be excluded for the balance of the year. With whatever high hopes a policy of rationing may be begun, they are bound to prove illusory when put to a practical test. The imports of meat into Holland during the month of November, 1915, when surely the scheme of the Netherlands Overseas Trust and of 'rationing' had had time to operate, will illustrate the contrast between the specious argument and the lamentable fact. Holland normally imports 1,843,520 lbs. of meat and exports 11,874,240 lbs. per month; yet during the month of November, 1915, she has been allowed to receive 17,973,760 lbs. of meat, almost ten times the total of average monthly imports prior to the war.\* *In what possible way does the principle of 'rationing' permit the import of goods which the importing country already possesses in excess of its own needs?*

Above all, in considering the whole question of the rights of belligerents and neutrals with respect to sea-borne commerce, one must remember that a way out *must* be found. It cannot be that sea-power is henceforward to be deprived of its rewards. Courageous and straightforward action in evolving new customs and rules to meet new conditions is inevitable. It is a popular comment to-day that International Law is a dead thing. The observer looks upon a struggling world, sees the shattering of convention after convention, and jumps to the apparent conclusion. The truth, however, is directly contrary. If International Law is to be a live thing, then development, which is a law of life, must modify its decrees. Altered conditions of commerce must work out answering modifications of law.

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\* Belgian needs may possibly be included in these figures, but they cannot account for so enormous an increase. No less than 904,960 lbs. came from Great Britain, to the disadvantage of her own population.



